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Medical and ethical decisions concerning whether or not to treat defective neonates 
have confronted parents and health care professionals for decades. 1 In the past these 
decisions were less complicated and controversial since hospitals and physicians lacked the 
medical technology and expertise to sustain the lives of these defective neonates. Years ago, 
medical decisions about treatment were made in the privacy of the delivery room or the 
nursery. Such medical decisions were typically viewed as private matters between 
physicians and parents and were not matters for public policy debate. This scenario, 
however, has changed dramatically with advances in neonatal medicine and technology 
during the past twenty-five years. 
New medical technologies, surgical procedures and pharmaceutical advancements 
have made neonatology a technologically complex medical subspecialty. Techniques and 
procedures considered a medical impossibility just a few years ago have become a medical 
reality today. "The development of technologies as complex as extracorporeal membrane 
1 A neonate is a child from birth to one month of age. The Merck Manual, ed. 
Robert Berkow, M.D. (Rahway, N.J.: Merck Research Laboratories, 1992), 1918. 
"Defective" refers to a deviation from standard functioning that is determined by medical 
standards. These defects would include congenital malformations, low-birth-weight, 
genetic anomalies, asphyxia, etc. 
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oxygenation and as simple as the administration of exogenous surfactant have resulted in the 
survival of many infants who would have succumbed to their illnesses only a few years 
ago."2 Unfortunately, this technological progress often takes place without the benefit of 
reflective analysis. Consequently, both medically and ethically, neonatology has entered into 
uncharted waters with no clearly defined moral goals in sight. 
Even with dramatic technological advances, diagnostic and prognostic certainty for 
many neonatal conditions remains illusive. Dr. John Arras writes: 
Diagnoses are rarely 100 per cent certain and in spite of the traditional jargon, 
very few diagnoses are ever "ruled out." Prognosis is rarely certain at the 
time that a diagnosis is entertained because all treatments vary in their 
efficacy from patient to patient and from time to time. Furthermore, the risks 
of treatment are not always predictable. 3 
As a result, neonates with serious congenital anomalies, such as spina bifida, anencephaly, 
intraventricular hemorrhage, etc., are often treated aggressively. This treatment prolongs the 
lives of many neonates when in the past they would have been allowed to die. Such life-
prolonging treatment decisions have far-reaching ramifications. Not only do medical 
decisions to treat defective neonates create ethical problems for the neonate but they also 
create emotional, social, and financial problems well beyond the resources of families and 
society. At present, many in society believe that all defective neonates must be treated. 
2Richard L. Bucciarelli, "Neonatology In The United States: Scope And 
Organization," Neonatology: Pathophysiology And Management Of The Newborn, eds. 
Gordon B. Avery, Mary Ann Fletcher, Mhairi G. MacDonald (Philadelphia, PA.: J.B. 
Lippincott Company, 1994), 12. 
3John D. Arras et al., "The Effect OfNew Pediatric Capabilities And The Problem 
Of Uncertainty," Hastings Center Report 17 (December 1987): 10. 
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Such a view raises a serious question. Does society have an ethical obligation to meet the 
financial needs of these neonates and their families now and in the future? Many ethicists 
believe that treatment decisions for defective neonates should no longer be considered 
private matters made in the privacy of the delivery room. These decisions are complex and 
have far-reaching medical, ethical, and financial ramifications for the neonate, the family, 
and society at large. 
It is relatively easy to observe a direct correlation between technological advances 
in neonatology and corresponding ethical dilemmas. As neonatal technology continues to 
advance, crucial ethical issues likewise have multiplied and diverse moral and policy 
arguments have proliferated. 4 There is little question that technology has provided new 
means to save life. However, in recent years, questions are being raised about the ethical 
nature of the means adopted and the quality of life being saved. 
To address these questions, bioethicists have proposed a variety of ethical criteria, 
that is, rules, standards, and guidelines concerning treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
These criteria have developed from their ethical methodologies. A major problem for 
decision-makers is that there is little or no consensus on which criterion or set of criteria is 
ethically and medically more beneficial and appropriate. As a result of this continuing 
debate, many defective neonates are suffering the consequences. Some neonates are alive, 
but their lives are so completely submerged in pain and suffering that their entire life will be 
essentially a mere struggle for survival. In contrast, others are being allowed to die when 
4Kathleen Nolan, "Imperiled Newborns," Hastin~s Center Report 17 (December 
1987): 5. 
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their deaths could be prevented. Parents and health care professionals search for a normative 
ethical criterion that will address the numerous treatment categories of defective neonates 
from an objective stand point. At the same time, this criterion ought to incorporate 
individual differences and personal value judgments. However, at the present time there is 
no consensus and defective neonates are suffering as a result. 
Dissertation Overview 
Richard A. McCormick, S.J., described by some of his colleagues as the Dean of 
Roman Catholic moral theologians in the United States today,5 proposes a patient-centered, 
quality-of-life approach to treatment decisions for defective neonates that appears to meet 
the needs of decision-makers. The primary focus of this dissertation will be to articulate, 
analyze, and evaluate the three constitutive elements of McCormick's ethical methodology 
as they each relate to treatment decisions for defective neonates. McCormick's ethical 
methodology consists of three sets of claims: anthropological, epistemological, and 
criteriological. The analysis and critical evaluation of McCormick's ethical methodology 
will also consider alternative ethical positions that critique the positions he advances. The 
scope of this dissertation will include an analyses of the writings of Richard A. McCormick 
and his ethical methodology as applied to treatment decisions for defective neonates through 
5See Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Teleology, Utilitarianism, And Christian Ethics," 
Theological Studies 42 (1981): 601; Timothy J. Toohey, review of Health And Medicine 
In The Catholic Tradition: Tradition In Transition, by Richard A. McCormick, S.J., in 
Journal Of Pastoral Care 39 (Spring 1985): 278; and Edward Collins Vacek, S.J., review 
of The Critical Calling: Reflections On Moral Dilemmas Since Vatican II, by Richard A. 
McCormick, S.J ., in Journal Of Religious Ethics 20 (Spring 1992): 209. 
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December 1994. 
Chapter two will consider McCormick's theological anthropology, which is rooted 
in the Christian story of Creation-Fall-Redemption. This forms the foundation upon which 
he grounds his notions of personhood, relationality, and human life as a relative good. 
Chapter three will treat McCormick's moral epistemology. He appears to have a dual 
moral epistemology, that is, it appears he has made a significant shift in his moral 
epistemology, at least at the level of synderesis. The first moral epistemology, which is prior 
to 1983, follows the school of John Finnis, J. Finance, G. de Broglie, and G. Grisez. Human 
persons seek the goods or values that define human flourishing by reflection on the natural 
inclinations. The second epistemology, which begins after 1983, emphasizes prediscursive 
and discursive reasoning informed by the Christian story. Prediscursive reasoning discovers 
the basic human values, and discursive reason analyzes them, while the Christian story 
serves as a "corrective vision" to the cultural biases that may affect human reasoning. 
Chapter four will consider McCormick's moral criteriology. His moral criterion for 
treatment decisions for defective neonates is based on a patient-centered, quality-of-life 
approach. This approach is rooted in a normative understanding of what ought to be in the 
"best interests" of the defective neonate. This chapter will focus on McCormick's moral 
criterion for bioethical decision-making as it relates to never competent patients, since 
defective neonates may be grouped into this particular category. There appears to be a dual 
criteria for McCormick's quality-of-life standard. The first criterion centers on the potential 
for human relationships associated with the defective neonate's medical condition. The 
second criterion is based on the traditional understanding of the benefit/burden calculus. 
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Chapter five will apply McCormick's ethical methodology to four diagnostic 
treatment categories of defective neonates, established by this author, to determine if 
McCormick's normative method offers a practical and beneficial approach that can be used 
by the appropriate Christian decision-makers. The four treatment categories of defective 
neonates include: ( 1) The defective neonate whose potential for human relationships is 
completely nonexistent. An example is the anencephalic infant. (2) The defective neonate 
who has a potential for human relationships but whose potential is utterly submerged in the 
mere struggle for survival. An example is a neonate with a Grade III massive 
intraventricular hemorrhage. (3) The defective neonate who has a potential for human 
relationships but the underlying medical condition will result in imminent death. Another 
variation of this category would be when the defective neonate has the potential for human 
relationships but after medical treatment has been initiated, it becomes apparent that the 
treatment is medically futile. An example of the first type is a neonate with hypoplastic left 
heart syndrome; an example of the second type is a neonate suffering from full-thickness 
necrotizing enterocolitis with perforation. (4) The defective neonate who has a potential for 
human relationships and has a correctable or treatable medical condition. An example is a 
neonate with Down syndrome and esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula. In this 
chapter, justification will be offered to explain why McCormick believes parents, in 
consultation with health care professionals, are the proper decision-makers. Throughout this 
chapter, criticisms of each methodological element will be addressed and applied, where 
applicable, to each treatment category. 
Chapter six offers an overall assessment and summary conclusion of McCormick's 
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ethical methodology as applied to treatment decisions for defective neonates. Two areas 
will be examined and critically analyzed from McCormick's perspective and from my own 
perspective. First, is McCormick's ethical methodology practical, beneficial, and appropriate 
for Christian parents and health care professionals in making treatment decisions for 
defective neonates? Second, can McCormick's ethical methodology be recommended to all 
decision-makers, both Christian and non-Christian, as a public policy option for the 
treatment of defective neonates? This chapter will also consider McCormick's contributions 
and shortcomings and will discuss future considerations where further explanation and 
clarification are necessary. Finally, I will conclude with a personal assessment of what has 
been learned from McCormick's ethical methodology and from this dissertation. 
There are two primary reasons for focusing this dissertation on McCormick's ethical 
methodology. First, as one who has had enormous influence in the field of moral theology 
in the United States, McCormick has written extensively in bioethics, and has formulated 
many useful guidelines, standards, and moral conclusions. In recent years, McCormick has 
applied these guidelines and standards to the issue of treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. Given the vast complexity involved, it is not surprising that his ethical 
methodology has met with considerable criticism. This criticism has been directed at 
McCormick's need to articulate his theoretical foundations clearly and develop them 
systematically and coherently. While there may be inconsistencies and ambiguities with 
McCormick's ethical method, there are also many positive elements in it that may serve as 
an appropriate and beneficial criteria that can be applied to treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. To date, there has been only one dissertation written on McCormick, but this has 
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not focused on his general ethical methodology. This dissertation will attempt to construct 
a systematic analysis of McCormick's ethical methodology to determine if he advances 
Roman Catholic moral theology, especially in the area of bioethics. 
Second, with rapid advances in neonatal medicine and technology, there is a serious 
need to examine whether McCormick's ethical methodology can assist parents, health care 
professionals, and other decision-makers in discerning these difficult neonatal treatment 
decisions. Decision-makers are searching for a public policy option that is both practical and 
beneficial in making treatment decisions for defective neonates. This dissertation will seek 
to determine whether McCormick's ethical methodology can be applied in a consistent and 
helpful way to each of the four diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates. The 
challenge for decision-makers is to determine how to apply this ethical methodology 
consistently to the wide diversity of neonatal defects. McCormick argues that he can address 
quality-of-life issues in a consistent way and can assist parents and health care professionals 
in practical moral decision-making. This critical analysis of McCormick's ethical 
methodology, as applied to treatment decisions for defective neonates, will determine if his 
ethical methodology is appropriate and whether it can be recommended as a public policy 
option for all decision-makers. The importance of this critical examination can serve not 
only an academic, theoretical purpose--the advancement of moral theology-- but it can also 
serve a clinical, practical purpose--giving assistance to parents and health care professionals 
in making well-discerned or sensitive moral decisions that affect the lives of defective 
neonates. 
The remainder of this chapter will examine Richard A. McCormick, S.J. as a moral 
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theologian, the ethical methodologies used in bioethics today, neonatology from a United 
States perspective, and general ethical approaches to treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. 
Richard A. McCormick. S.J.--Moral Theologian 
The development of McCormick's ethical methodology can be situated by examining 
the background of this distinguished moral theologian. Richard A. McCormick was born on 
October 3, 1922 in Toledo, Ohio. He entered the Society of Jesus at the age of eighteen. 
His father, an eminent physician and past president of the American Medical Association, 
gave McCormick a distinct perspective on the medical profession. McCormick received his 
B.A. in 1945 from Loyola University Chicago, and an M.A. in 1950 from the same 
institution. He completed theological studies at the Jesuit theologate at West Baden, Indiana, 
and was ordained a priest in 1953. In 1957, McCormick received his S.T.D. (Doctorate in 
Sacred Theology) from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, with a thesis on the 
removal of a probably dead fetus to save a mother's life. McCormick began his career as a 
moral theologian that same year, returning as a professor to the Jesuit theologate in West 
Baden, Indiana. After seventeen years in seminary education, McCormick was named the 
Rose F. Kennedy Professor at the Kennedy Institute, Georgetown University in Washington, 
D.C. In 1986, McCormick accepted a teaching and research position as the John A. O'Brien 
Professor of Christian Ethics at the University of Notre Daine. For many years, he has 
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served on numerous local, state, national and international ethical boards6 and has written 
extensively in the field of bioethics. 7 
McCormick has often emphasized the idea that "one's teaching and writing reflect 
inescapably the historical context in which one lived."8 Trained in a theology that was 
deeply rooted in the classicist mentality, had a major influence on McCormick as a moral 
theologian and has informed his bioethical positions.9 Wedded to neoscholasticism, 10 the 
6McCormick has served on the ethics committees of the American Hospital 
Association, Catholic Health Association, American Fertility Society, and the National 
Hospice Association. In addition, he has served on the Ethics Advisory Board of the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and on the President's Commission on 
Bioethics. 
7Charles E. Curran, "Introduction: Why This Book?" in Moral Theology: 
Challenges For The Future, ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 1990), 6. 
8Richard A. McCormick, SJ., Corrective Vision: Exploration In Moral Theology 
(Kansas City, MO.: Sheed & Ward, 1994), 40. 
9For McCormick, the classicist mentality "conceives culture normatively and 
abstractly and represents a certain disengagement from the forces shaping the 
contemporary world. It seeks and easily finds certainties and views departure from them 
as unfaithfulness, pluralism as bordering on anarchy." Ibid. 
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"Neo-scholasticism is a term used for the revival, from 1860 to 1960, of the 
philosophical tradition of the medieval and baroque universities. After the rise of the 
Enlightenment, Catholic theology found difficulty in using the empiricist and idealist 
philosophies to express orthodox theological concepts. By 1850 some were suggesting 
that a return to the 'Scholastic' tradition of the older Catholic universities might be the 
best solution. This received papal approbation in Leo XIIl's encyclical Aeterni Patris 
(1879), which held up the 'Christian philosophy' of Thomas Aquinas as the best model 
for philosophia perennis for all Catholic education but urged that it be freed of 
obsolescent elements and that it assimilate the best of modem thought. .. By the time of 
the Council the weaknesses of neo-scholasticism were recognized by Catholic 
theologians: its lack of historical perspective and the eclectic confusion of Thomism with 
the alien doctrines of Francisco de Suarez, Duns Scotus, Rene Descartes, G. W. Leibniz, 
Immanuel Kant, and idealism; its failure to deal adequately with the findings of modem 
science and to recognize human historicity and subjectivity; and its teaching methods that 
11 
moral manuals were the textbooks that shaped the scope, method, and content of moral 
theology up through 1965. 11 Following Vatican II, the Catholic Church acknowledged a 
shift in worldviews from a classicist, legalistic mentality to a modem, more historically 
conscious wordview. Actually the "plausibility structures" of the classicist view were in the 
process of breaking down since the 1800's. 12 After the Council, Catholic moral theology 
tended to conceptualism, while neglecting to ground principles and definitions in 
experience." The Harper-Collins Encyclopedia Of Catholicism, ed. Richard P. McBrien 
(San Francisco, Calif.: Harper-Collins Publishers, 1995), 911. 
11 ln the manual tradition the objective norm of morality was viewed almost 
exclusively in terms oflaw, both in the Church and in civil society. Law included the 
eternal law, divine positive law, natural law, and human law. Conscience was the 
subjective norm of morality and conscience had to conform itself to the various laws 
comprising the objective norm of morality. An extrinsic and voluntaristic mindset 
supported such a legal model. For the voluntarist the source of obligation comes not from 
the moral reality itself, but from the will of the legislator: something is good because it is 
commanded. This approach claims to be Thomistic. However, critics claim that it 
deviates dramatically from positions of Thomas Aquinas who had insisted on an intrinsic 
and rational approach to morality. For Aquinas, something is commanded because it is 
good. For a more detailed analysis of the manual tradition, see Charles E. Curran, 
"Introduction: Why This Book?" in Moral Theology: Challenges For The Future, 2. 
12F or McCormick, "It has become commonplace to say that the Council reinserted 
the Church into history, the wider context of Christianity and the world. It is also 
commonplace to interpret this as meaning the abandonment of a classicist consciousness 
for a renewed historical consciousness. To McCormick "historical consciousness' means 
taking our culture seriously as soil for the 'signs of the times,' as framer of our self-
awareness. That means a fresh look at how Christian perspectives ought to be read in the 
modem world so that our practices are the best possible mediation of gospel values in the 
contemporary world ... " Some emphases which cluster about the new historical 
consciousness in moral theology are the following: "a more dynamic, less aprioristic 
notion of natural law; collegiality by the teaching office of the Church in the discovery of 
moral truth; respect for the religious liberty of others in implementing our convictions in 
the public forum; a fresh look at our pastoral policies and practices where certain 
irregularities are involved (e.g., the divorced and remarried); a new awareness of the 
conflict model of decision-making, and of the sinfulness of the world in which we must 
pattern our lives and grow in Christlikeness; a more positive and pastoral pedagogy in the 
12 
began to detach itself from neoscholasticsm and opened up dialogue with a variety of 
philosophical partners. These theological, philosophical and cultural shifts allowed 
McCormick to reexamine many traditional formulations in a new light. 13 As a moral 
theologian, McCormick views himself fitting in somewhere between the classicist and the 
historical consciousness mentality. McCormick writes: "Trained in the classicist mentality, 
I have become conscious of both its strengths and its weaknesses--and the need to correct or 
modify the latter."14 
In an article entitled "Self-Assessment And Self-Indictment," McCormick sets forth 
three distinct stages in his methodological development: prior to Vatican II, Vatican II, and 
the debates about the encyclical Humanae Vitae. 15 This dissertation will add a fourth, that 
is, the debates about the "Curran Affair," which has had a profound impact on McCormick's 
communication of moral values." Richard A. McCormick, S.J., The Critical Calling: 
Reflections On Moral Dilemmas Since Vatican II (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 1989), 9, 22. 
13It should be noted that Vatican II ratified an allowance for Catholics to engage 
modem historical emphasis. Many theologians such as Bernard Haring, Pierre Teilhard 
De Chardin, S.J., and other Catholic modernists, were doing this already. The question 
is: was Vatican II the leader or was it following the lead that others had established? 
Paulinus Odozor believes that McCormick began to subscribe to a form of personalist 
morals well before the Council. This author would agree with Odozor that McCormick 
was one of the many Catholic theologians engaging in modern historical emphasis prior 
to the Council. For a more detailed analysis on McCormick and historical emphasis, see 
Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral 
Theology (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 89. To understand 
how McCormick subscribed to a form of personalist morals, see Richard A. McCormick, 
S.J., "The Primacy Of Charity," Perspectives (August-September 1959): 18-27. 
14McCormick, Corrective Vision, 41. 
15 Humanae Vitae is the 1968 encyclical of Pope Paul VI that reaffirmed the 
condemnation of artificial contraception for Roman Catholics. 
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recent writings. 16 Prior to Vatican II, the Church viewed itself as the guardian of God's law. 
The Church both determined and interpreted God's law and claimed the right and the duty 
to safeguard it without question. The magisterium was viewed by many as being highly or 
overly authoritarian and paternalistic; public dissent was almost unknown. Many held a very 
legalistic and juridical understanding of the Christian life. The methodology of manualist 
moral theology tended to be casuistic, unecumenical, unbiblical, "domestic" in its concerns, 
centrally controlled, natural law-oriented, and sin-centered. McCormick believes that he 
"escaped such pervasive influences first not at all, then only gradually and more or less." 17 
Vatican II reversed many of the forces predominant prior to the Council. Broader 
themes of Christian aspiration and living that were biblically inspired began to replace the 
earlier emphasis on natural law, casuistry, and a one-sided sin-centeredness. The 
authoritative teaching of the magisterium, the self-understanding of the Church, the 
understanding of moral norms, the relation of reason and morality, the place of the lay voice 
in the formation of moral conviction in the Church, and the significance of non-Catholic 
witness and conviction all began to be questioned and debated. During this period, the 
Roman moral theologian Josef Fuchs, S.J. became a role model for McCormick. 18 
16McCormick's article "Self-Assessment And Self-Indictment" was published in 
1987 prior to Rome's final judgment on Charles Curran. It is my assessment that 
McCormick has entered a distinctive fourth stage since 1987 even though he has never 
stated it explicitly in any of his writings. 
17McCormick, Corrective Vision, 42. 
18Fuchs continues to serve not only as a role model for McCormick, but 
McCormick refers to Fuchs as "my mentor in Rome." Richard A. McCormick, S.J., 
"Reproductive Technologies," Lecture-Ob/Gyn Grand Rounds, May 17, 1995, Loyola 
McCormick writes: 
I needed someone of Fuchs' stature and undoubted loyalty to show me the 
possibility of change without unacceptable abandonment of essentials of "the 
Catholic idea." Without my explicitly averting to it, what was really 
changing were basic notions of ecclesiology and eventually moral 
methodology. 19 
14 
During this period within moral theology there was a movement away from an act-centered, 
physicalist approach in judging the rightness and wrongness of human conduct to a person-
centered approach. For McCormick, 
Vatican II proposed as the criterion not "the intention of nature inscribed in 
the organs and their functions" but "the person integrally and adequately 
considered." Furthermore, to discover what is promotive or destructive of the 
person is not a deductive procedure. 20 
This basic change in worldview would restructure moral theology and would have a 
significant impact on how ethical decisions were discerned. 
Following Vatican II, the papal encyclical Humanae Vitae was one of the most 
significant events of the twentieth century for the Roman Catholic Church. Humanae Vitae 
allowed theologians to wrestle with the meaning of "religious submission of mind and 
will."21 This pivotal encyclical moved McCormick to reexamine two essential aspects of 
University Medical Center, Maywood, Illinois. 
19McCormick, Corrective Vision, 43. 
20McCormick, The Critical Calling, 339-340. 
21 
"In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the 
faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious assent of the soul. 
This religious submission of will and of mind must be shown in a special way to the 
authentic teaching authority of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking ex 
cathedra." "Dogmatic Constitution On The Church," The Documents Of Vatican II, ed. 
Walter M. Abbott, S.J., (Piscataway, N.J.: New Century Publishers, 1966), no. 25, 48. 
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moral theology: the notion of the moral magisteriwn and the understanding of moral norms. 
McCormick came to understand that the proper response to authoritative teaching is not 
precisely obedience, but rather a docile personal attempt to assimilate the teaching. 
Humanae Vitae also initiated a much broader discussion among theologians that focused on 
the method of founding moral norms. As a result, McCormick entered the proportionalism 
debate, a major turning point in the development of his ethical methodology. Despite the 
importance of the notion of the moral magisteriwn and the understanding of moral norms, 
McCormick believes that one problem overshadows them all: the relation of religious 
(Christian) belief to concrete areas of hwnan behavior. McCormick believes his greatest 
failing as a moral theologian has been his inability to explore and make more clear and 
persuasive Vatican Il's famous statement: "Faith throws a new light on everything, manifests 
God's design for man's total vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions that are fully 
human. "22 But, he has not given up hope of rectifying this failing. 
The fourth stage of development in McCormick's ethical methodology results from 
his involvement with the "Curran Affair." McCormick viewed the dismissal of Charles E. 
McCormick writes: "The problem prior to Humanae Vitae was whether the positive 
doubts surrounding traditional teaching had encountered a true teaching statement ... 
The problem after Humanae Vitae is the extent to which this document, obviously a 
teaching statement, has truly resolved the doubts." McCormick objected to the 
encyclical's main thesis that it is intrinsically evil to engage in artificial contraception. 
For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's position on Humanae Vitae, see 
McCormick Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Throu~h 1980, (Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1981 ), 215-231. 
22 
"Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modem World," The Docwnents 
Of Vatican II, no. 11, 209. 
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Curran from the theology faculty of the Catholic University of America as a great injustice. 
For McCormick, it violated the fundamental principles of academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy. The central issue in the "Curran Affair" concerns the right to public dissent from 
authoritative, noninfallible proposed teachings of the Church. McCormick writes: "Dissent 
is not an end product; it is a way of getting at things, a part of the human process of growth 
and understanding. "23 For McCormick, dialogue, debate, and dissent are necessary in the 
Church to ensure that moral teachings are free from error. Theologians must be willing to 
reexamine past formulations. 24 When the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
demanded that Curran be removed from his teaching position as a moral theologian in the 
Department of Theology at the Catholic University of America there were serious 
implications that followed from this approach for all theologians and Catholic universities. 25 
The "Curran Affair" moved McCormick to become noticeably more vocal and pronounced 
in his criticism of the magisterium and bolder in his reexamination of tradition. McCormick 
saw the "restorationists" in the magisterium trying to claim the center as their own, making 
23McCormick, The Critical Callin~, 120. 
24F or McCormick, "We know that at any given time our formulations--being the 
product of limited persons, with limited insight, and with imperfect philosophical and 
linguistic tools--are only more or less adequate to the substance of our convictions. It is 
the task of theology constantly to question and challenge these formulations in an effort 
to reduce their inadequacy." Ibid., 17. 
25 As McCormick puts it, "The first is that, to be regarded as a Catholic theologian, 
one may not dissent from any authoritatively proposed teaching. The second is that 
'authentic theological instruction' means presenting Church teaching, and never 
disagreeing with it, even with respect and reverence. Third, and correlatively, sound 
theological education means accepting, uncritically if necessary, official Catholic 
teaching." Ibid., 119. Emphasis in the original. 
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the true centrists in moral theology appear to be on the extreme left. 26 He also saw the goal 
of the "restorationists" to be the preservation of the pyramidal structure of the Church. For 
McCormick, the "Curran Affair" has been an important reminder that "when criticism is 
squelched and power enlists theology for its purposes, the entire Church suffers because 
theology has been politicized, i.e., corrupted. "27 
Prior to the "Curran Affair" McCormick had been more reactive than proactive in his 
approach to moral theology.28 As a result of the "Curran Affair," McCormick realized that 
the very foundation of academic freedom and institutional autonomy were at stake, not to 
mention the role of moral theologians in the Church today. McCormick observed that "it 
takes little imagination to see how the climate of fear may lead theologians to 'stop exploring 
and challenging questions of the day,' or to hedge his or her bets. "29 The result would be 
devastating for the Church and for society. Fearing retrenchment by the magisterium, 
McCormick has become less cautious in his criticism and has adopted a more proactive 
26The term "restorationist" means the radical Catholic right. The goal of these 
"restorationists" is to restore the pyramidal structure of the Church and, as a result, the 
heavily obediential character given to the teaching-learning process of the Church. 
27McCormick, The Critical Callin~, 126. 
28Curran also believes this to be true. Curran writes: "In his attempt, as a moral 
theologian in the Catholic Church, to make this tradition a living reality, our author has 
been more reactive than proactive. He has responded to the work of others in the "Notes" 
and thereby has pushed forward his own understanding and agenda. This is one very 
important way of dealing with a tradition and keeping it alive. Others will adopt more 
innovative and even more radical approaches in their dealing with the tradition and trying 
to move it forward. The genre of the "Notes" makes its most expert practitioner an 
incrementalist and reformer by definition." Curran, "Introduction: Why This Book?" in 
Moral Theolo~y: Challen~es For The Future, 9. 
29McCormick, Corrective Vision, 15. 
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approach to tradition while trying to move it forward. 30 
One result of these four stages in McCormick's development is the possibility of 
categorizing McCormick's writings into three distinct periods. First, from 1957-1967 he was 
still operating within the classicist mentality. His ethical methodology was dependent on the 
deductive method of the manuals and he used a revised form of casuistry. Second, from 
1968-1983 he was writing "Notes On Moral Theology" for Theological Studies and was 
preoccupied with the distinctiveness of Christian ethics debate and the proportionalism 
debate. At this stage, a major paradigm shift occurred in McCormick's ethical methodology. 
His personalist orientation rooted in a "revised notion" of natural law compelled McCormick 
to move toward a teleological methodology. Finally, 1983-to present, McCormick decided 
to turn his attention to bioethics and to approach bioethics from a theological viewpoint. His 
ethical methodology entailed the use of prediscursive and discursive reasoning in 
conjunction with the Christian story. The importance of this categorization of McCormick's 
writings into these three distinct categories will become more apparent when McCormick's 
ethical methodology is analyzed in the following chapters. 
These four stages of McCormick's methodological development show a clear 
maturation or evolution in McCormick as a theologian and bioethicist. He began his career 
as a moral theologian trained in the juridical, physicalist approach of the classicist worldview 
rooted in neoscholasticism. Later he was drawn by Vatican II into a less juridical, more 
30This can be seen in McCormick's response to Veritatis Splendor. See 
McCormick, "Veritatis Splendor And Moral Theology," America 169 (October 30, 
1993): 8-11; and Idem, "Some Early Reactions To Veritatis Splendor," Theological 
Studies 55 (September 1994): 481-506. 
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personalist approach of the historical-conscious worldview rooted in a '"revised notion" of 
natural law. McCormick has developed, along with other moral theologians, the idea of 
proportionalism, which along with the influence of the "Curran Affair," has led to his more 
proactive revision of the moral tradition. 31 This dissertation will argue that McCormick 
remains firmly within the moral tradition of the Roman Catholic Church. However, in many 
of his writings McCormick interprets this tradition to be in the process of transition. 
As a bioethicist, McCormick's respect for, and openness to, science and technology 
and his emphasis on human experience allow him to explore how medical technology has 
challenged Catholic moral theology to rethink some of its positions on issues regarding 
human life. Despite the complexity and diversity of advances in medical technology, 
McCormick sees a common denominator: more control means more responsibility, or at least 
a different kind of responsibility. This new sense of responsibility poses new ethical 
questions. How are we to exercise this responsibility? In what direction? With what criteria 
and controls? In light of what hopes and aspirations? And with what definition of the 
human? For McCormick, these are the questions at the heart of bioethics. In other words, 
31 McCormick refers to some of the best known names in moral theology as 
proportionalists: Josef Fuchs, SJ., Bruno Schuller, SJ., Franz Bockle, Louis Janssens, 
Bernard Haring, Franz Scholz, Franz Furger, Walter Kerber, SJ., Charles Curran, Lisa 
Cahill, Philip Keane, Joseph Selling, Edward Vacek, S.J., David Hollenbach, S.J., 
Maurice de Wachter, Margaret Farley, James Walter, Rudolf Ginters, Helmut Weber, 
Klaus Demmer, Garth Hallett, S.J. The leading published opponents of this 
methodological move are Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, William May, and 
the late John R. Connery, S.J. Common to all so-called proportionalists is the insistence 
that causing certain disvalues (on tic, nonmoral, physical, premoral evils) in our conduct 
does not ipso facto make the action morally wrong as certain traditional formulations 
supposed. The action becomes morally wrong when, all things considered, there is no 
proportionate reason. McCormick, Corrective Vision, 8-9. 
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the task of bioethics is not to apply mechanically old and presumably invariable injunctions 
to new facts, but rather to discover in changing times the very meaning of our value-
commitments.32 McCormick has urged the Catholic Church to move beyond the positions 
of the past without forgetting the best of the tradition. This transition has not been an easy 
task, nor has it been without its pitfalls. McCormick argues: 
A transition involves both a "coming from" and a "going toward." The 
former dimension refers to the past that is historical but neither dead nor to 
be sloughed off like a decaying shell. This past was alive, with its own 
enduring visions, motives, and values that must continue to animate the 
"going toward" in ever changing circumstances. 33 
Advancements in medicine and technology continue to challenge the Church tradition on 
various levels. Bioethical problems have two key characteristics: they are ever-changing and 
extremely complex. It is impossible for one individual to master and draw firm ethical 
conclusions valid for all times and cultures. Bioethical problems demand a convergence of 
competencies to discover what is truly humanly promotive or destructive.34 
McCormick is well aware of the bioethical problems that face moral theology today. 
He is especially concerned about how science and technology can lull ethicists into a false 
sense of trust. Concerning this problem, McCormick writes: 
32Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "The New Medicine And Morality," Theology 
Digest 21 (1973): 308. 
33Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Health And Medicine In the Catholic Tradition: 
Tradition In Transition (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 160. 
34Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "'Gaudium et Spes' And The Bioethical Signs Of 
The Times," in "Questions Of Special Urgency": The Church In The Modem World 
Two Decades After Vatican II, ed. Judith A. Dwyer (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 1986), 94. 
Our culture is one where: technology, especially medical, is highly esteemed; 
moral judgments tend to collapse into pragmatic cost-benefit calculations; 
youth, health, pleasure, and comfort are highly valued and tend to be sought 
and preserved at disproportionate cost; and maladaptations, such as senility, 
retardation, age, or defectiveness, are treated destructively rather than by 
adapting the environment to their needs. These factors suggest that the 
general cultural mentality is one that identifies the quickest, most effective 
way as the good way. Morality often translates into efficiency.35 
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McCormick understands that moral theology must be open to the challenges of medicine and 
technology and must always be ready to assist in confronting these ethical dilemmas in a 
realistic and ethical manner. For him, this does not mean that bioethicists must abandon the 
tradition of Catholic Church nor does it mean that such ethical dilemmas be resolved solely 
by tradition, power, fiat, prestige, political trade off or by economics. The value of human 
life continues to be challenged by new circumstances. Changing circumstances demand that 
imagination and creativity be employed to devise new formulations and understandings of 
this value in light of these new circumstances.36 To accomplish this task, the bioethicist must 
remain in dialogue with health care professionals so that together a consensus may be 
reached to handle these difficult and complex ethical dilemmas. Even with enormous strides 
in the development of medical technology, no moral consensus exists on how to handle these 
ethical problems. In particular, there is little agreed-on consensus on the required ethical 
methodology to address such ethical problems. 
In recent years, a major area of ethical concern for bioethicists has focused on the 
35McCormick, How Brave A New World?: Dilemmas In Bioethics (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1981), 84. 
36Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' Criteria For 
Sustaining Life," Hospital Progress 56 (September 1975): 76. 
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subspeciality of neonatology. The impetus for McCormick's entry into the ethical problems 
facing neonatology, and in particular treatment decisions for defective neonates, was the 
result of the now famous "Johns Hopkins Case."37 McCormick was also influenced by an 
article written by Drs. Raymond S. Duff and A. G. M. Campbell in the New England Journal 
Of Medicine that reported on 299 deaths in the special-care nursery of the Yale-New Haven 
Hospital between 1970 and 1972.38 For McCormick, both situations were endemic to a 
culture and society that places higher value on some children over others to the point that 
some defective neonates may not even warrant treatment. McCormick began to question 
the criteria these physicians used to justify these decisions. He also inquired about the role 
parents played in the decision-making process. After involvement in a few neonatal ethical 
cases, McCormick soon came to the awareness that consensus on criteria regarding treatment 
decisions was lacking. He expressed concern that parents were often regarded and treated 
37For a more detailed analysis of the Johns Hopkins Case, see James M. 
Gustafson, "Mongolism, Parental Desires And The Right To Life," Perspectives In 
Biology And Medicine XVI (1973): 529-559. 
380fthese, forty-three (14%) were associated with discontinuance of treatment 
for children with multiple serious anomalies, trisomy, cardiopulmonary crippling, 
meningomyelocele and other central nervous system defects. After careful consideration 
of each of these forty-three infants, parents, and physicians in a group decision concluded 
that the prognosis for "meaningful life" was extremely poor or hopeless, and therefore 
rejected further treatment. Duff and Campbell state: "The awful finality of these 
decisions, combined with a potential for error in prognosis, made the choice agonizing for 
families and health professionals. Nevertheless, the issue has to be faced, for not to 
decide is an arbitrary and potentially devastating decision of default." Richard A. 
McCormick, S.J., "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 340. See also 
Raymond S. Duff, M. D. & A.G. M. Campbell, M. D., "Moral And Ethical Dilemmas In 
The Special-Care Nursery," The New England Journal Of Medicine 289 (October 25, 
1973): 889-894. 
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as third-party onlookers and not as co-patients in these tragic cases. In response to this 
situation, McCormick observed that "high technology came at parents in a rush. There is no 
indication that parents' wishes were consulted, their counsel sought, their consent obtained, 
their suffering assuaged. Things just happened to them, one after another."39 From all of 
this it became evident that a serious need exists for an ethical methodology to address both 
the substantive and the procedural questions that are part of treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. In response, McCormick has proposed a patient-centered, quality-of-life approach 
to treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
McCormick's quality-of-life approach has been developed directly from his ethical 
methodology. However, this is but one specific ethical methodology among many. '"Since 
its emergence some thirty years ago, bioethics in the United States has employed several 
methodologies. Principlism--the reliance on moral principles to address issues and resolve 
case quandaries--has come to dominate. "40 Over the past three decades, while recognizing 
the intellectual power and cogency of principlism, other ethical methodologies have emerged 
that suggest alternative treatments that either replace principlism entirely (though retain a 
role for principles as well as insights from principlism) or complement it, filling it out and 
39Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Best Interests Of The Baby," Second Opinion 2 
(1986): 18. 
40Edwin R. DuBose, Ronald P. Hamel and Laurence J. 0' Connell, "Introduction" 
in A Matter Of Principles?: Ferment In U.S. Bioethics, eds. Edwin R. DuBose, Ronald P. 
Hamel and Laurence J. O'Connell (Valley Forge, PA.: Trinity Press International, 1994), 
1. 
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providing correctives for its ills.41 This next section will examine the various bioethical 
methodologies operative in the United States today. 
Bioethical Methodolo~ies42 
Before examining the ethical methodology of Richard A. McCormick, it is necessary 
to place his ethical methodology within its proper context. To accomplish this, one must first 
define ethical methodology. Second, one must examine the general types of ethical 
methodologies used in contemporary bioethics. Finally, McCormick's own ethical 
methodology must be located within the diverse field of bioethical methodologies. 
Many ethicists begin their search for moral meaning and truth with the lived 
41Ibid., 9. 
42There are a number of terms to describe this specific field of study--bioethics, 
medical ethics, biomedical ethics, health care ethics, etc. This dissertation will use the 
term "bioethics" because in light of its origin, this term incorporates the global sense of 
bioethics as an ethics of the life sciences and health care. Warren T. Reich argues that this 
means "bioethics goes beyond ethical issues in medicine to include ethical issues in 
public health, population concerns, genetics, environmental health, reproductive practices 
and technologies, animal health and welfare, and the like. This broader scope, with which 
both Van Rensselaer Potter and Andre Hellegers (originators of the term) agreed, was the 
original intent of the Hastings Center, which from the start was interested in 'ethics and 
the life sciences.' Since 1972 the Encyclopedia of Bioethics advocated an approach to 
bioethics that is global in both scope and range of ethical sources. Noting that the word 
'bioethics' is a composite derived from two Greek words - bios (life~ hence life sciences) 
and ethike (ethics), it established a broad scope for the field in the following definition, 
which became standard in many parts of the world: 'the systematic study of human 
conduct in the area of the life sciences and health care, insofar as this conduct is 
examined in the light of moral values and principles.'" Warren Thomas Reich, "'The 
Word 'Bioethics': The Struggle Over Its Earliest Meaning;' Kennedy Institute Of Ethics 
Journal 5 (March 1995): 29. See also Warren Thomas Reich, "The Word 'Bioethics': Its 
Birth And The Legacies Of Those Who Shaped Its Meaning," Kennedy Institute Of Ethics 
Journal 4 (December 1994): 319-3 3 5. 
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experiences that determine the value and worth of human persons. Once these foundational 
experiences are established, these ethicists then move to a process of reflection upon them 
to determine if these values are judged to be true and worthy of human well-being. In order 
to understand and judge human experience in the world, it is necessary to discover a method 
that will assist in determining the kinds of people we ought to be and the types of actions we 
ought to perform. For example, ethicist Trutz Rendtorffwrites: 
If we define ethics as a theory of how we are to live, we are led to analyze the 
ethical question, and to describe and emphasize its basic elements. Now that 
these basic elements involved in living an ethical life have been described, 
we must look at the various elements of the ethical question in a methodical 
fashion so that they can be carefully considered. This will strengthen the role 
of ethics in orienting the discussion of how human life is to be lived. An 
ethical methodology of this sort is highly desirable, because the complexity 
of ethical experience demands a high degree of clarity, and clarity must 
extend to all the varied aspects that constitute ethical problems.43 
A theory of ethics grows out of the human experience of reality. Through an ethical 
methodology, one can understand with precision the process in which the basic structure of 
an operative theory of ethics is explored and analyzed in its details. 44 An ethical 
methodology provides a strategy which will be of assistance in living a good life in the midst 
of conflicting values. 
Bioethical methodologies are a relatively new phenomenon. According to most 
assessments, bioethics began in the late l 960's or early l 970's. Many scholars believe that 
bioethics first began with the establishment of the Seattle Artificial Kidney Selection 
43Trutz Rendtorff, Ethics: Basic Elements And Methodology In An Ethical 
Theology (Philadelphia, PA.: Fortress Press, 1986), 86. 
44Ibid. 
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Committee in 1962.45 The growth of bioethics into a scholarly discipline did not begin until 
a decade later when the Hastings Center and the Kennedy Institute were established. Soon 
after, a few individuals were appointed to medical faculties, a literature in scholarly and 
professional journals emerged, and conferences were convened.46 Ethicists with both 
philosophical and theological backgrounds were called to consult with health care 
professionals and families on various ethical dilemmas in the medical profession. 
For the first decade of bioethics existence, bioethicists tended to stress principles; but 
as medicine advanced and technology became more complex, many bioethicists began to see 
principlism as too fragile, too constraining a structure to sustain the large issues that 
bioethics must consider.47 As a result, "new currents" began to emerge that either replaced 
principlism or complemented it. In addition to principlism, it is possible to identify six 
major methodologies operative in the field of bioethics today. These include: 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, narrative, virtue-based, medical casuistry, and natural law. 
However, no single methodology can adequately encompass the full dimensions of human 
experience.48 Each methodology offers a different path toward a common ground as each 
45F or a more detailed analysis of the Seattle Artificial Kidney Selection 
Committee, see Gregory E. Pence, Classic Cases In Medical Ethics, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1995), 297-299. 
46Albert R. Jonsen, forward to A Matter Of Principles?: Ferment In U.S. 
Bioethics, ix. 
47lbid. 
48lt should be noted that Hauerwas, Macintyre and others would remind us that 
what goes by the name "human experience" is always reported via the lens of a particular 
culture. Thus, human experience is never raw, but theory-laden and assumption-laden. 
See Stanley Hauerwas, Vision And Virtue (Notre Dame, IN.: Fides Publishers, 1974); 
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aims to unpack the dense layers of human experience in an effort to achieve shared insight 
and to promote informed action. 49 A brief analysis of each of these seven ethical 
methodologies will be helpful in understanding how they impact on contemporary bioethics. 
Principlism: 
As bioethicists began to consult with physicians and families about ethical dilemmas, 
a central question became: how were these ethical dilemmas to be analyzed so that all those 
involved could understand the terminology used? Albert Jonsen, a first-generation 
bioethicist, has suggested that it was necessary to create a common language; this language 
has become known as principlism. Jonsen writes: 
The philosophical ethics of that era had very little to say about the substantial 
content of moral decision and action. Theological ethics used terms that were 
incomprehensible to many who were not believers or were believers of 
another sort. We had to find an idiom that, at one and the same time, 
expressed substantive content and was comprehensible to many listeners. 
Although there were no consultations among us, no convocations to debate 
the issue, and no conspiracy to create an ism, almost all of us drifted away 
from the philosophical and theological languages of our intellectual tutelage. 
Like strangers in a strange land, we had to devise new forms of 
communication among ourselves, with our scientific and medical colleagues, 
and with the public. 50 
In 1974 the U.S. Congress passed the National Research Act which established the 
Idem, Character And The Christian Life: A Study In Theoloi:ical Ethics (San Antonio, 
TX.: Trinity University Press, 1975); and Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, 
IN.: University ofNotre J?ame Press, 1984). 
49DuBose, Hamel, and O'Connell, "Introduction" to A Matter Of Principles?: 
Ferment In U.S. Bioethics, 16. 
50Ibid., xii. 
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National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research. The law mandated the following: 
The Commission shall (1) conduct a comprehensive investigation and study 
to identify the basic ethical principles which should underlie the conduct of 
biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects, (2) develop 
guidelines which should be followed in such research to assure that it is 
conducted in accord with such principles ... 51 
The result of this commission was the issuance of the Belmont Report. Promulgated in 
1978, this report settled on three basic principles which include: autonomy, beneficence, and 
justice. The Belmont Report "became the classic principlist statement, not only for the ethics 
of human experimentation, but for bioethical reflection in general."52 Ethicists James 
Childress and Thomas Beauchamp reevaluated these three principles and added a fourth 
principle called nonmaleficence, which was to be separated from beneficence. These basic 
ethical principles provided 
scholars in this new field something that their own disciplinary traditions had 
not given them: a clear framework for a normative ethics that had to be 
practical and productive. They provided a focus for the broader, vaguer, and 
less applicable general reflections of philosophers and theologians of the 
era.53 
As a result, a common language was established that most could comprehend. Following 
the Belmont Report, bioethics became principlist. 54 
51 Ibid., xiv. 
52Ibid., xv. 
53lbid., xvi. 
54According to Jonsen bioethics became principalist, then, for several reasons. He 
writes: "First, the first bioethicists found in the style of normative ethics current at that 
time, the style of theory and principle, a via media between the arid land of metaethics 
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As applied normative ethics, principlism is the application of general principles and 
rules to particular biomedical situations to determine the appropriate moral action by the 
agent. The four core principles (autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice) are 
intended to provide a framework of moral theory for the identification, analysis, and 
resolution of moral problems in biomedicine. Deliberation and justification occur in 
applying the framework to cases. 55 
As bioethicsts became more involved in the complex dimensions of the medical 
profession, many realized that, despite the value of principlism, the approach had serious 
limitations. There existed a serious need to understand the full dimensions of the complexity 
and depth of human experiences that surrounded many ethical dilemmas in medicine. 
Principlism provided only one part of the puzzle. A major criticism leveled against 
principlism is that it is viewed as a "top-down" methodology that tries to impose abstract 
ethical principles on many diverse situations. 56 The result can be a tendency for principlism 
and the lush but generally inaccessible visions of theological ethics. Second, the Belmont 
Report was a foundational document that met the need of public-policy makers for a clear 
and simple statement of the ethical basis for regulation of research. Third, the new 
audience of doctors and medical students had to be led through dilemmas and paradoxes 
by ideas and language that clarified rather than complexified the issues." Ibid. 
55Thomas L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles Of Biomedical 
Ethics, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 16. 
56 At best, these critics charge, principles serve as a checklist of considerations 
worth taking into account when addressing an issue. At worst, they "obscure and confuse 
moral reasoning by their failure to be guidelines and by their eclectic and unsystematic 
use of moral theory ... "Other critics are troubled by the paramount status principlism 
accords to the "value complex of individualism," with its emphasis on autonomy, self-
determination, and individual rights. See DuBose, Hamel and O'Connell, "Introduction," 
in A Matter Of Principles?, 2. 
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to obscure the full facts of a situation and to ignore the levels of complexity involved in each 
particular situation. 
Phenomenological Methodology: 
The phenomenological method exammes situations from both objective and 
subjective dimensions. This approach places more emphasis on the subjective dimension 
since each situation is understood to be composed of a complex set of relationships. The 
focus is on the participants in the situation and how they experience and understand the 
situation. According to bioethicist Richard Zaner, the phenomenological method considers 
each situation as "context-specific" and works with and on behalf of persons. Therefore, the 
phenomenological method requires a strict focus on situational definitions. In clinical 
situations, moral issues are presented for deliberation, decision, and resolution solely within 
the "contexts" of their actual occurance. There is a need to penetrate and interpret each 
situation and relationship carefully, attentively, and completely. Every situational 
constituent, including any associated moral issue, is viewed solely within an ongoing 
relationship between the patient and the physician. In the phenomenological method, clinical 
ethics addresses the patient-physician relationship, always aware that all experience is in 
need of interpretation. 57 
57F or a more complete analysis of the phenomenological method, see Richard M. 
Zaner, "Experience And Moral Life: A Phenomenological Approach To Bioethics," in A 
Matter Of Principles?: Ferment In U.S. Bioethics, 211-239. See also Idem, The Context 
Of Self: A Phenomenological Inquiry Using Medicine As A Clue (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 1981 ); Idem, Ethics And The Clinical Encounter (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988); and Mary Rawlinson, "Medicine's Discourse And The 
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Hermeneutical Methodology: 
The hermeneutical method, according to philosopher Drew Leder, is an open-ended 
approach to a variety of interpr-etative perspectives. It rejects a "top down" methodology 
that would impose uniform abstract principles on diverse situations. Within each medical 
situation there are a number of voices, each with its own narrative text that is open to 
multiple interpretations. The hermeneutical method approaches a case with a sense of 
respect for its "otherness" and allows a case to speak its own truth(s). The basic dynamic of 
bioethics is understood as an ongoing circle of experience-reflection-experience. 58 The 
hermeneutical approach is more open to the many influences that shape a text and thus to the 
many interpretative strategies that can be brought to bear upon it. Bioethicists operating 
within the hermeneutical approach believe that every text is susceptible to an infinite variety 
of readings. This is not to say that each text is equally significant or useful. It is important 
not to foreclose the possibility of multiple interpretations which overlap, supplement, clash, 
and converse with one another in ways that lead one to a deeper understanding of 
phenomena. 
In the past, the bioethicist was viewed as the "answer person," showing what course 
of action was required by moral reasoning. A hermeneutically reframed notion of rationality 
requires new and productive roles for the bioethicist. The bioethicist becomes the articulator 
of the perspectives of the case participants and listens to the voice of each participant 
Practice Of Medicine," in The Humanity Of The Ill: Phenomenolo~ical Perspectives, ed. 
V. Kestenbaum (Knoxville, TN.: University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 69-85. 
58DuBose, Hamel, and O'Connell, "Introduction," in A Matter Of Principles?, 10. 
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allowing these voices to emerge more fully. The bioethicist is then better able to act as a 
facilitator of dialogue between the various parties, fostering mutual understanding and 
respect. The bioethicist recalls contexts and perspectives which often are systematically 
obscured and assists participants within the drama to tell and retell and to interpret and 
reinterpret their stories in order to achieve a consensus and mutual understanding in the face 
of the present ethical dilemma. 59 
Narrative Methodology: 
The narrative method is similar to the phenomenological and hermeneutical methods. 
While this approach focuses on human experience, it also considers the richness of an 
individual's human story to reveal a fuller account of a particular situation. The narrative 
form can be described as "knowing-in-telling."60 As cultures define their values through 
myth, individuals achieve identity and intimacy by telling and following stories. The 
narratival dimension moves beyond the realm of facts and searches for deeper and fuller 
meaning in human experience. This is accomplished by the awareness that each individual's 
story falls within a variety of contexts: the personal, religious, psychological, and historical. 
59 For a more complete analysis of the hermeneutical method, see Drew Leder, 
"Toward A Hermeneutical Bioethics," in A Matter Of Principles?: Ferment In U.S. 
Bioethics, 240-259. See also David C. Thomasma, "Clinical Ethics As Medical 
Hermeneutics," Theoretical Medicine 15 (June 1994): 93-112; Stephen L. Daniel, 
"Hermeneutical Clinical Ethics: A Commentary," Theoretical Medicine 15 (June 1994): 
133-140; and M. Wayne Cooper, "Is Medicine Hermeneutics All The Way Down?," 
Theoretical Medicine 15 (June 1994): 149-180. 
60DuBose, Hamel, and O'Connell, "Introduction" in A Matter Of Principles?, 11. 
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The bioethicist encounters this narratival dimension in every medical situation. 
Rita Charon, a second generation bioethicist, argues there are four fundamental 
stages to a narrative. These include: recognition, formulation, interpretation, and validation. 
These various stages assist the bioethicist in examining and interpreting the wider 
dimensions that surround an ethical dilemma. Autonomy, justice, beneficence, and 
nonmaleficence continue to guide ethical action and decisions within health care. 
Importantly, narrative competencies have the power to particularize health care decisions. 
The narrative method can increase involvement of both patients and providers in clarifying 
ethical choices as well as adopting timely longitudinal steps toward ethical recognition that 
will obviate quandary ethics.61 The recognition of the narrative components in the actions 
of all bioethicists potentially can remove sources of bias, can assure a conceptual 
understanding of the personal contributions to ethical decision-making, and can favor a 
practice that respects the singular aspects of each clinical situation without raising relativistic 
or unduly situational fears. 62 
61 Quandary ethics focuses on moral dilemmas and problems, which then have to 
be resolved. One common criticism of principlism is that it fosters a conception of 
bioethics as quandary ethics. For a more detailed analysis of quandary ethics, see Ibid., 
92-93. 
62F or a more complete analysis of the narrative method, see Rita Charon, 
"Narrative Contributions To Medical Ethics," in A Matter Of Principles?: Ferment In 
U.S. Bioethics, 260-283. See also Kathryn M. Hunter, "Narrative," in Encyclopedia of 
Bioethics, rev. ed., vol 4, ed. Warren T. Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster & 
Macmillan, 1995), 1789-1793; Barbara Smith, "Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories," 
in On Narrative, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 
99-117; and Patricia Benner, "The Role Of Experience, Narrative, And Community In 
Skilled Ethical Comportment," Advances In Nursing Science 14 (1991): 1-21. 
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Virtue-Based Methodology: 
The virtue-based method not only shifts the field of ethical analysis away from rules, 
principles, and rights; it moves beyond contextual questions that are the central focus of the 
phenomenological, hermeneutical, and narrative approaches. The virtue-based approach 
focuses on the character of the participants and is a personalist ethic, centering on the doctor-
patient relationship. 63 Robert Veatch contends that this is not a relationship among 
"strangers"; rather, it is a relationship that depends on trust and confidence, if not 
friendship. 64 Ethicist James Drane views the character of the doctor as part of the therapeutic 
relationship and sees a structure to the doctor-patient relationship based on the patient's trust 
that the physician will do what is necessary to help the patient heal. The physician's primary 
task is not to cure illness but to care for patients, and such care depends on the character of 
the physician. The focus of attention in a virtue-based approach is on the inner realities of 
the persons involved with particular attention to motives, dispositions, intentions, and 
attitudes. The character of a person is formed by the actions chosen and the values 
63 A personalist ethic in response to another person is an ethic of responsibility, or 
a relational ethic that seems obviously appropriate to medicine, where everything starts 
and finishes with a doctor-patient relationship and where most of the doctor-patient 
contacts have nothing to do with quandaries or dilemmas or conflict of rights. For a more 
detailed analysis, see James F. Drane, "Character And The Moral Life: A Virtue 
Approach To Biomedical Ethics," in A Matter Of Principles?: Ferment In U.S. Bioethics, 
286. 
64See Robert Veatch, '"Against Virtue: A Deontological Critique Of Virtue Theory 
And Medical Ethics," in Virtue And Medicine: Explorations In The Character Of 
Medicine, ed. Earl E. Shelp (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1985), 175-200. 
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committed to over time. Character describes the person created by an individual's acts and 
omissions. A virtue-based approach focuses on the inner being of a person and the moral 
qualities brought to a situation rather than upon extrinsic principles. The refocusing of 
attention in mainstream biomedical ethics on "character" and "virtue" affords new 
dimensions to biomedical ethics not generally present within principlism. Ethicists working 
from a virtue-based methodology do not come to medicine with general principles justified 
in other contexts, that are to be applied now to "medical quandaries" or problem-points. 
Rather, medicine itself is seen as an exemplification of virtuous practices. The integration 
of the inner being of the doctor into a biomedical ethic of acts and rules will enhance medical 
ethics as a form of applied philosophy without diminishing any of the power of a mainstream 
principle's approach.65 
Medical Casuistry Methodology: 
Medical casuistry is the direct analysis of particular cases in clinical medicine. It 
deals directly with practical issues within clinical medicine and focuses on particular cases. 
The casuistic approach has its origins in the classical discipline of rhetoric. Two rhetorical 
techniques used by casuists include topics and the comparison of paradigm and analogy.66 
65For a more complete analysis of the virtue-based method, see James F. Drane, 
Becoming A Good Doctor: The Place Of Virtue And Character In Medical Ethics 
(Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed & Ward, 1988); Idem, Religion And Ethics (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1976); Stanley Hauerwas, "Virtue And Character," in Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, 
rev. ed., vol. 5, 2525-2531; and Idem, Vision And Virtue (Notre Dame, IN.: Fides Press, 
1974). 
66Albert R. Jonsen, "Casuistry," in Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 1, 
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Particular cases are described by their circumstances and topics. Casuistical analysis then 
seeks to place each particular case into a context of similar cases. The technique of lining 
up cases, rather than viewing them in isolation, is the essence of casuistical analysis. The 
task of the medical casuist is to refer difficult cases arising in marginal and ambiguous 
situations to simpler, more nearly paradigmatic examples. Further, the casuist considers 
how far the simpler examples offer guidance in resolving the conflicts and ambiguities that 
awaken our moral perplexity. Paradigmatic cases provide the casuist a common basis for 
comparison and contrast. It is evident that the roots of medical casuistry are practical rather 
than theoretical and are based on the particular insights accumulated in the course of concrete 
practical experience. The medical information obtained in this approach is quite beneficial, 
but many ethicists question its intuitionist tendencies. 67 
Natural Law Methodology: 
The final methodology to be considered is natural law, the cornerstone of the Roman 
Catholic tradition of ethics. Natural law in the Catholic tradition is based on the premise of 
"reason informed by faith." Natural law ethical theory is founded upon "an Aristotelian-
344-350. 
67For a more complete analysis of the medical casuistry method, see Stephen 
Toulmin, "Casuistry And Clinical Ethics," in A Matter Of Principles?: Ferment In U.S. 
Bioethics, 310-318; See also Albert R. Jonsen, "Casuistry," in Encyclopedia Of 
Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 1, 344-350; and Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The 
Abuse Of Casuistry (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988). 
37 
Thomistic teleological model of moral agency and moral law."68 Aquinas situates the natural 
law in his treatise on law in the Summa Theologica Ia-Hae, qq. 90-97.69 The natural law is 
set within the theological context of the exitus et reditus (coming from God and returning to 
God) schema The root of morality for Aquinas is in ratio naturalis (natural reason) which 
all human beings share. St. Thomas believed that the will in every human person is drawn 
to the good. Thomas viewed the natural law as a deliberative ethic which arrives at the good 
not through obedience to specific laws but by the deliberation of "right reason" (recta ratio). 
Every human person by nature possesses natural inclinations which guide toward self-
realization and self-actualization. Reflecting on the Thomistic understanding of natural law, 
Frederick Copleston has written that: 
Possessing the light of human reason, every human person can reflect on 
these fundamental inclinations of his nature and promulgate to himself the 
natural moral law, which is the totality of the universal precepts or dictates 
of right reason concerning the good which is to be pursued and the evil which 
is to be shunned. By the light of his own reason, therefore, man can arrive 
at some knowledge of the natural law. And since this law is a participation 
in or reflection of the eternal law in so far as the former concerns human 
beings and their free acts, man is not left in ignorance of the eternal law 
68Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Teleology, Utilitarianism, And Christian Ethics," 601. 
69 Aquinas maintains that for something to be called law, it must be (1) reasonable, 
in the sense of directing action; (2) ordained to the common good; (3) legislated by the 
proper authority; and (4) duly promulgated (Summa Theologica Ia-Hae, 90). The eternal 
law, whereby the world is ruled by divine providence, satisfies these criteria in an 
exemplary way (Summa Theologica Ia-Hae, 91, 1). Natural law, however, is principally 
that part of divine reason accessible to the human intelligence. It is not to be confused 
with the order of the physical or biological world. Law is predicated only by a kind of 
similitude with the order found in nonrational entities (Summa Theologica Ia-Hae, 91, 2, 
3). Russell Rittinger, "Natural Law," in Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 4, 
1806; see also Richard Gula, Reason Informed By Faith: Foundations Of Catholic 
Morality (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 220-249. 
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which is the ultimate rule of conduct. 70 
The fundamental principle of the natural law, which is regulative of all other precepts, 
is that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided."71 Human nature is 
inclined toward certain intelligible goods. Aquinas refers to the precepts that govern our 
pursuit of these goods as the first precepts of the natural law. 72 The primary precepts are 
grounded in human nature and are self-evident, that is per se nota--known in themselves. 
However, the primary precepts themselves do not comprise a complete moral code. 
Practical reason reflecting on human nature as manifested in experience can discover less 
general and more particular precepts that Thomas refers to as the secondary precepts. The 
secondary precepts are more detailed and are prudential conclusions following closely from 
the first principles. Aquinas maintained that the primary precepts of the natural law are 
unalterable. The primary precepts are the same for all persons and hold always and 
everywhere. However, with respect to the proper conclusions of practical reason, there is 
not the same truth and rectitude for all, nor are they equally known by all. 73 The secondary 
precepts can change for special reasons in some particular cases or in the event of some 
7
°F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (New York: Penguin Books, 1955), 221. 
71 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-Ilae, 94, 2 (Westminster, MD.: 
Christian Classics, 1948), 1,009. 
72The first precepts of the natural law are: self-preservation (common to all 
substances), procreation and care of offspring (common with other animals), knowing the 
truth about God, and living in society (common to rational creatures alone). For a more 
detailed analysis of the first precepts, see Ibid., 1009-1010. 
73For a more detailed analysis, see Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-Ilae, 94, 4, 
1,010-1,011. 
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special causes preventing the observance of such precepts. 
Of all the methodologies examined, natural law is perhaps the most ancient and 
historically persistent in W estem ethics. However, natural law remains a very ambiguous 
term. Charles E. Curran points out that the word "nature" had over twenty different 
meanings in Christian thinking before Thomas Aquinas. Curran contends that the word 
"law" is also ambiguous, since it tends to have a very legalistic meaning for people today; 
whereas for Aquinas "law" was an ordering of reason. Curran writes: 
Natural law ethics has often been described as a legalistic ethic, that is, an 
ethic based on norms and laws; but in reality for Thomas natural law is a 
deliberative ethic which arrives at decision not primarily by the application 
of laws, but by the deliberation of reason. Many thinkers in the course of 
history have employed the term natural law, but frequently have defined 
natural law in different ways. Thinkers employing different natural law 
approaches have arrived at different conclusions on particular moral topics. 
Natural law in the history of thought does not refer to a monolithic theory, 
but tends to be a more generic term which includes a number of different 
approaches to moral problems. There is no such thing as the natural law as 
a monolithic philosophical system with an agreed upon body of ethical 
content from the beginning of time. 74 
While Roman Catholic moral theology is not committed to one particular natural law 
approach to moral problems, there are basic Catholic principles concerning moral objectivity 
that are held in official Catholic teaching and by Catholic scholars committed to the natural 
law tradition. Philip S. Keane, S.S. believes there are four such principles: 
First, there exists an objective moral order in which some actions are right 
and other actions are wrong; the moral order is not fleeting or capricious; it 
is not something we can make up at will, granted, of course, that throughout 
74Charles E. Curran, "Natural Law In Moral Theology," in Readings In Moral 
Theology No. 7: Natural Law And Theology, eds. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. 
McCormick, SJ. (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 253-254. Emphasis in the original. 
history we continually gain insights into the exact nature of the moral order. 
Second, not only does the objective moral order exist but the human person 
(by reason even without the aid of faith) is able to know this order and 
understand that he or she ought to do what is objectively morally good and 
avoid doing what is objectively morally evil. Third, once the human person 
and community come to objective moral knowledge, that knowledge is 
universalizable. Fourth, human persons do not always actualize their 
fundamental ability to know the objective moral order. Sometimes, either 
with or without fault or culpability, the human person will fail to be free 
enough to act on his or her knowledge. This failure, while it cannot be 
ignored, and while it may render the person less guilty or not guilty of sin, 
does not change the objective moral order. 75 
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There does not appear to be any basic disagreement among Catholic natural law theologians 
regarding these basic principles. The questions among contemporary natural law theologians 
centers on how does one determine moral objectivity. Keane writes: 
The basic question of moral objectivity is not whether external structure 
always yield the same moral object. The question is how much about the 
person and his or her action must be taken into account in order to grasp 
adequately the moral object of the act.76 
The contemporary natural law ethicist believes a more complete analysis of the human 
person and his or her actions is necessary before one can give an adequate account of moral 
objectivity. 
Catholic natural law theory has traditionally upheld two values of great importance 
for moral theology: (1) the existence of a source of ethical wisdom and knowledge that the 
Christian shares with all humankind, and (2) the fact that morality cannot be merely the 
75F or a more complete analysis of these four basic Catholic principles, see Philip 
S. Keane, S.S., "The Objective Moral Order: Reflections On Recent Research," 
Theological Studies 43 (1982): 260-262. 
76lbid., 265. 
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subjective whim of an individual or a group of individuals. 77 Since bioethics encompasses 
matters of physiological well-being, moral choice, and justice, Roman Catholic moral 
theology claims that it is clear that natural law is indispensable to the framing and resolution 
of bioethical issues. Despite theoretical problems and disagreements, "nature" remains a 
useful standard for health. Modem technology urgently requires the investigation of the 
moral relevance of the contrast between nature and art.78 Contemporary Catholic natural law, 
as it impacts on bioethics, is more person-centered in its approach in contrast to act-centered. 
This personalistic criterion is based on the essential dimensions of the human person. 
According to Louis Janssens, an action is moral if it is beneficial to the person integrally and 
adequately considered (i.e., as a unique, embodied spirit) and in the person's relations (i.e., 
to others, to social structures, to the material world, and to God). 79 The values upheld by the 
Catholic natural law theory and its personalistic criterion have helped create insights and 
perspectives that inform one's reasoning in the area of biomedicine. 
77Curran argues that in the last few years Catholic thinkers have been developing 
and employing different philosophical approaches to understanding morality. One could 
suggest that such approaches are modifications of natural law theory because they retain 
the two important values mentioned above. Others prefer to abandon the term natural law 
entirely since the concept is very ambiguous. There is no monolithic philosophical 
system called natural law, and the term has been somewhat discredited because of the 
tendency among some to understand "natural" in terms of the physical structure of human 
acts. Curran sees three alternative approaches which have been advanced in recent years--
personalism, a relational and communitarian approach, and a transcendental 
methodology. See Charles E. Curran, Contemporary Problems In Moral Theology (Notre 
Dame, IN.: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1970), 138-139. 
78Hittinger, "Natural Law," 1811. 
79Louis Janssens, "Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations," Louvain 
Studies 8 (Spring 1980): 13. 
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All seven ethical methodologies reflect attempts by bioethicists to surface and better 
understand the complexity and density of human moral experience. Some of these 
methodological approaches focus more upon human relationships and human experiences. 
Others afford greater attention to the interpretation of human experience as well as the inner 
realities of individuals involved in these situations. Further, many of these approaches 
consider the direct analysis of particular cases in clinical medicine. McCormick is quite 
critical of many of these ethical methodologies. He contends that there is a "pervasive 
dissatisfaction with the status quo of bioethical reflection in the United States. A sense of 
malaise is unmistakably present and hovers over the subject like a dark cloud."80 
McCormick proposes that his ethical methodology, which is reasonable, objective, and 
rooted in the Catholic tradition, can counteract this malaise. 
McCormick is firmly positioned in the natural law methodology of the Roman 
Catholic tradition. His understanding of natural law methodology has developed over the 
years from the more classicist view of natural law to the more revisionist view of natural law 
that is based in a historically conscious worldview. 81 Despite this revisionist view of the 
8
°For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's criticism of these ethical 
methodologies, especially principlism, see McCormick, "Beyond Principlism Is Not 
Enough: A Theologian Reflects On The Real Challenge For U.S. Biomedical Ethics," in 
A Matter Of Principles?: Ferment In U. S. Bioethics, 344-361. 
81For McCormick, the classicist mentality "conceives culture normatively and 
represents a certain disengagement from the forces shaping the contemporary world. It 
seeks and easily finds certainties and views departure from them as unfaithfulness, 
pluralism as bordering on anarchy." McCormick, Corrective Vision, 40. McCormick 
understands historical consciousness as "taking our culture seriously as soil for the 'signs 
of the times,' as framer of our self-awareness. This means taking a fresh look at how 
Christian perspectives ought to be read in the modem world so that our practices are the 
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natural law it is clear that McCormick remains true to a very basic commitment that 
underlies the Roman Catholic tradition of moral teaching: moral values and obligations are 
grounded in a moral order known by human reason reflecting on experience. McCormick's 
commitment to an objective and reasonable morality is grounded in the thought of Aquinas, 
who in turn drew on Aristotle as well as on Christian sources. McCormick understands that 
humans and their abilities are limited, but it is at least in principle possible for them not only 
to become aware of those goods or values which enhance human life but also to consider 
these goods or values from viewpoints of persons and groups different in culture, religion, 
or historical era. 82 
McCormick's revisionist notion of Catholic natural law has been greatly influenced 
by the events of Vatican II. Lisa Sowle Cahill believes there have been four important shifts 
in the Catholic understanding of natural law that have shaken what appeared to be a prior 
unanimity of this tradition. Cahill writes: 
First, a shift from a "classicist" to a historically conscious worldview. 
Second, the theological ferment after Vatican II has brought a greater 
awareness that the teaching office of the Catholic Church interprets natural 
law; it does not simply transmit revelation. Third, the Second Vatican 
Council represents an ecumenical movement toward dialogue with Protestant 
theology and ethics, and hence the enhanced Catholic appreciation for 
best possible mediation of gospel values in the contemporary world. Fresh look often 
leads to new emphases and modifications of more ancient formulations--formulations and 
emphases appropriate to one point in history but not necessarily to all." McCormick, The 
Critical Calling, 9. 
82Lisa Sowle Cahill, "On Richard McCormick: Reason And Faith In Post-Vatican 
II Catholic Ethics," in Theological Voices In Medical Ethics, eds. Allen Verhey and 
Stephen E. Lammers (Grand Rapids, Ml.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1993), 81-82. 
scripture. Fourth, a more integral appreciation of the importance of the 
sociality and interdependence of human persons characterizes recent Catholic 
thought. 83 
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McCormick believes these shifts have enhanced the traditional natural law premise of 
"reason informed by faith." Reason is shaped by faith, and this shaping takes the form of 
perspectives, themes, insights associated with the Christian story. Reasoning about the 
Christian story reveals the deeper dimensions of the universally human. 84 As a result of this 
"compenetration" of faith and reason, McCormick has shifted attention away from the 
principles and prescriptive norms that have occupied the focus of the Thomistic moral 
tradition, to a more experiential, commonsense basis of natural law thinking. This shift, not 
surprisingly, has caused McCormick to be openly criticized by the "traditionalist" segment 
of the Catholic Church. 85 According to Lisa Sowle Cahill, it is possible to locate three main 
initiatives of McCormick's work in regarding to the revision of natural law: 
First, to develop the traditional natural law method into a more experience-
based and flexible form. Second, to unite Christian commitment with the 
natural law method, which in the past tended not to stress any special duties 
of discipleship. Third, to field issues of "dissent" in the Church, making 
dissent a partner in the constructive development of Catholic ethics. 86 
831bid., 84. Emphasis in the original. 
84McCormick, The Critical Calling, 204. 
85The traditionalist segment of the Catholic Church believe that the reasonableness 
of extant specific norms is not to be challenged nor the norms substantially revised. 
Loyalty in faith to Jesus and his Church is measured by fidelity to the Catholic Church's 
authoritative moral interpretations. McCormick insists that the magisterium is not exempt 




Cahill believes "it is fair to say that virtually all of McCormick's moral principles and 
conclusions come down to a matter of 'reasonableness'; but he increasingly uses Christian 
themes to flesh out and motivate. "87 Reason can discover and know the basic human goods. 
However, the Christian story nourishes the overall perspectives of the person and serves as 
a "corrective vision" to the secularism of the culture. For McCormick, 
The Christian story tells us the ultimate meaning of ourselves and the world. 
In doing so, it tells us the kind of person we ought to be, the goods we ought 
to pursue, the dangers we ought to avoid, the kind of world we ought to seek. 
It provides a backdrop or framework that ought to shape our individual 
decisions. 88 
Yet, for McCormick, the Christian perspective does not yield specific moral rules for 
individual decision-making. Epistemologically these insights are not specific to Christians 
since they can be and are shared by all people of good will. 89 
McCormick argues that because his ethical methodology is reasonable and objective, 
it can be applied to any situation. However, he is also aware that because natural law is 
based on human experience, moral reasoning reflecting on experience always does so within 
a historical context. Applying an ethical methodology to a culture as diverse as that of the 
United States and to the technologically complex field of neonatology presents serious 
challenges. There exists a plurality of views in our culture even on matters as fundamental 
as saving the life of a neonate. Confronted by this pluralism and the medical complexity of 
87Ibid., 87. 
88McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 50. 
89Ibid., 59. 
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present day neonatology, McCormick began to address these challenges by becoming more 
knowledgeable in the specialization of neonatology. In this process he learned quickly the 
importance of consultation with medical authorities and the need to be in dialogue with 
parents. McCormick once observed that: 
It remains true that if I, as a moral theologian, am going to reflect on the 
moral problem of terribly disabled neonates, I ought to learn all I can from 
neonatal intensive-care units, from nurses, from experienced physicians, from 
parents.90 
McCormick has done this in various ways, and as a result he has gained invaluable 
knowledge and experience. Following McCormick's example, this next section will examine 
the specialization of neonatology from a United States perspective. 
Neonatology: A United States Perspective 
Neonatology means knowledge of the human newborn. As a specialization, it has 
its roots in obstetrics, pediatrics, and physiology .91 Prior to the mid-1950's, medical care for 
defective neonates was primitive and generally fell under the jurisdiction of pediatricians. 
Medical decisions about the treatment of defective neonates were practically "non-decisions'' 
due to the lack of technology and medical information in this area. During this time period, 
infant mortality was high. Ethical questions concerning treatment decisions were practically 
nonexistent since most defective infants were expected to die and were allowed to die. 
90McCormick, "Public Policy On Abortion," How Brave A New World?, 201. 
91For a more extensive historical review of neonatology as a specialization, see 
Gordon B. Avery, "Neonatology: Perspectives In The Mid-1990's," in Neonatology: 
Pathophysiology And Management Of the Newborn, 4th ed., 3-7. 
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Before 1950, survival of the fittest along with a medical policy of gentleness with minimal 
intervention described the general approach to treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
The speciali:zation of neonatology became prominent during the late 1950's and the 
early 1960's. In 1960, the term "neonatology" was coined by Dr. Alex Schaeffer as interest 
continued to expand in the "neonate."92 Neonatal intensive care grew rapidly, bringing the 
technology of respirators, careful monitoring, computed tomography, ultrasonography, and 
aggressive intervention to the defective neonate. Unfortunately, little contemplative analysis 
accompanied this growth of medical technology. New ground was being broken~ the lives 
of neonates were being saved, and new financial constraints on health care dollars led to the 
creation oflarge regional centers for neonatal intensive care.93 Since the early l 960's, the 
United States has been at the forefront of neonatal medical advancements and in the creation 
of Neonatal Intensive Care Units (NICU). Describing neonatal medicine in the United 
States, various authors have collected the following data: 
In the United States approximately 4.1 million live births occur each year in 
about 5000 hospitals. Approximately 6-8% or 300,000 newborns will require 
special care of some variety, ranging from a few hours for observation to 
many weeks or months in the Neonatal Intensive Care Units. In an affluent 
middle-class community hospital approximately 3-4% of babies will require 
some special care or attention; in an inner-city, urban, lower socioeconomic 
setting as many as 15-20% of the babies will require special care. The overall 
infant mortality rate in the United States is 9 per 1000, yet African-American 
infants die at nearly twice that rate. Portions of several U.S. urban areas have 
92Clement A. Smith, "Neonatal Medicine And Quality Of Life: An Historical 
Perspective," in Ethics Of Newborn Intensive Care. eds. Albert R. Jonsen & Michael 
Garland (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1976), 32. 
93Alan R. Fleischman, "Ethical Issues In Neonatology: A U.S. Perspective," 
Annals New York Academy Of Sciences 530 (June 1988): 83. 
infant mortality rates similar to those of underdeveloped countries. Infant 
mortality can be further divided into neonatal mortality (i.e., death before 29 
days of age) and post-neonatal mortality (i.e., death between 29 days and one 
year of age). One-half of all neonatal deaths can be attributed to four leading 
causes: low birthweight, acute perinatal asphyxia, congenital anomalies, and 
perinatal infections. There are approximately 792 hospitals providing 7,500 
neonatal intensive care beds in the United States and close to 3,764 
pediatricians subspecialty trained specifically in neonatology. The number of 
neonatologists has doubled since 1985. The Office of Technology 
Assessment estimates that neonatal care cost about $4 billion per year in the 
United States.94 
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As neonatal medical technology advanced, and as the lives of many defective neonates were 
saved, the ethical dilemmas multiplied and became more complex. Advances in neonatal 
technology raise numerous problems: the meaning and definition of death, the duty to 
prolong life, medical priorities, euthanasia, etc. However, the common denominator in all 
these advancements is that more control means greater responsibility, or at least a different 
94lt should be noted that between 1985 and 1988, neonatal mortality declined 
more than five times as fast as post-neonatal mortality. In 1989 and 1990 provisional 
rates of 6.25 deaths per 1000 live births and 5.74 deaths per 1000 live births are thought 
to be a reflection on the marked improvement in death related to perinatal conditions that 
declined by 8.5% in 1989 and an additional 6.3% in 1990. Again minority neonatal 
mortality rates are considerably higher than Caucasian. For a more detailed analysis of 
neonatal medicine in the United States, see Fleischman, 84; Emergency Cardiac Care 
Committee and Subcommittees, American Heart Association, "Neonatal Resuscitation," 
Journal Of The American Medical Association 268 (October 28, 1992): 2276-2281; John 
D. Lantos & Kathryn L. Moseley, "Medical Aspects And Issues In The Care Of Infants," 
in Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 3, ed. Warren T. Reich (New York: Simon & 
Schuster Macmillan, 1995), 1195; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
"Neonatal Intensive Care For Low Birthweight Infants: Costs And Effectiveness," Office 
Of Technology Assessment, Washington, D.C., December, 1987; Richard L. Bucciarelli, 
"Neonatology In The United States: Scope And Organization," in Neonatology: 
Pathophysiology And Management Of The Newborn, 4th ed., 12-31; and Robert Wood 
Foundation, "Challenges In Health Care: Perspective 1991" (Princeton, N.J.: RWJ 
Foundation, 1991 ). 
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kind of responsibility.95 A central ethical question confronting neonatologists and 
bioethicists today is how to set limits on the use of this new technology. 
In the United States virtually all infants with any chance of survival are treated 
aggressively in the delivery room. Later, these neonates are stabilized in the intensive care 
nursery until further information is made available to provide a more definite prognosis. 
This is the "wait until certainty approach." As more data is generated about diagnosis and 
prognosis, recommendations are then made to withdraw current treatment or withhold future 
treatment when death or a terribly impaired life seems inevitable. This approach to the 
uncertainty of neonatal care can be contrasted with the "vitalist approach" of aggressive 
intervention for all infants at all times, or the "statistical approach" which seeks to minimize 
the number of infants who die slow deaths or who live with profound disabilities, thus 
sacrificing some potentially healthy survivors by not treating infants based on minimum 
weight or gestational age criteria.96 Undoubtedly, there is a wide spectrum of treatment 
95Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "The New Medicine And Morality," Theology 
Digest 21 (1973): 308. 
96Fleischman, 85. The international perspective among pediatricians is both 
similar and different. In Sweden they use the "statistical prognostic strategy." This 
approach seeks to minimize the number of infants whose deaths would come slowly as 
well as those whose lives would be characterized by profound disabilities. This approach 
uses statistical data, like birth weight, gestational age, and early diagnostic tests, to make 
selective nontreatment decisions. Pediatricians in Britain and Australia use the 
"individualized prognostic strategy." They are willing to engage in time-limited trials to 
give various treatments a chance to work, even when the child being treated is likely to 
have ongoing disabilities. This strategy reflects an ethical perspective that realizes the 
inherent uncertainty in medicine, permits some role for parental discretion, and affirms 
the appropriateness of selective nontreatment decisions once the child's progress appears 
poor. In much of the world the differences in medical management that have just been 
described have no significance. The shortages of medicine, the obsolescence of medical 
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decisions for defective neonates. A major concern of many ethicists is that with an enormous 
bias to save life during the medical crisis in the nursery there is limited provision of aftercare 
and support for families with defective or disabled children.97 
The majority of these ethical dilemmas regarding treatment decisions for defective 
neonates are made daily in the privacy of the NICU by parents, health care providers, or a 
combination of the two. It is only when a conflict exists between the "best interests" of the 
neonate and the parental authority that treatment decisions become matters of public concern. 
Since 1980, decision-making powers of parents and health care providers have been 
challenged and placed under legal scrutiny. The threats of medical malpractice, civil or 
criminal liability, and failure on the part of physicians to be aware of judicial trends have 
caused additional problems.98 However, not all the blame should be placed at the door of 
equipment, the inadequacies of prenatal care, the limited number of pediatricians, and the 
ongoing problems of malnutrition and infectious disease contribute to the social context 
in which the lives of infants are frequently short and often characterized by disease and 
disability. For a more detailed analysis, see Robert F. Weir, "Ethical Issues," in 
Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 3, 1209-1210. 
97Gordon B. Avery, "The Morality Of Drastic Intervention," in Neonatolo~y: 
Pathophysiolo~y And Mana~ement Of The Newborn, 4th ed., 8. 
98Many physicians are often uncertain regarding the legality of abating life-
sustaining treatment for nonautonomous patients. Because most physicians do not usually 
read the literature in bioethical ethics and health law, they are frequently unaware of the 
consensus that has developed in recent years regarding the ethics and legality of making 
decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment on the behalf of nonautonomous patients. In 
addition, physicians are often given very conservative legal advice by the attomey(s) 
working for their hospitals. Because the professional responsibility of hospital attorneys 
is to protect the hospital's legal and financial interests, they are frequently inclined to 
give advice on cases that is unduly conservative in terms of the patients' or physicians' 
interests. Especially in cases that involve decisions to abate life-sustaining treatment with 
nonautonomous patients, the legal advice to physicians is often to continue the medical 
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physicians. The federal government has played a major role and has caused and contributed 
to the confusion, uncertainty, and indecision in many treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. 
Advancements in neonatal medical technology and the resulting ethical dilemmas 
have increased public awareness that some defective neonates have had medical treatments 
inappropriately withheld or withdrawn, leading to death in many cases. An early incident 
that raised public awareness to inappropriate use of treatment with defective neonates was 
the 1963 "Johns Hopkins case." This neonate was diagnosed with Down syndrome with an 
added complication of an intestinal blockage called duodenal atresia. After consultation with 
physicians on the case, the parents decided not to treat the duodenal atresia and eleven days 
later the infant died. 99 A second incident that raised public awareness was the publication 
status quo for an indefinite period of time to minimize even the possibility of the patients' 
surrogates becoming upset and initiating legal action against the physician and hospital. 
The combination of these factors results in considerable uncertainty on the part of many 
physicians regarding the ethical standards for decisions to abate life-sustaining treatment 
for nonautonomous patients and the legal liability involved in such decisions. In 
particular, physicians are often troubled by the prospect of civil or even criminal liability 
for failure to provide the full panoply of life-sustaining treatments. The 1983 California 
case of Barber v. Superior Court (an appellate court decision to drop murder charges 
against two physicians) still rings an alarm for physicians, at least in part because it was 
incorrectly portrayed in the media. Yet all states to have considered the question of 
liability have adopted the view of the Barber court that a physician who acts "in good 
faith" and within established professional standards of care cannot incur civil or criminal 
liability. See Robert F. Weir & Larry Gostin, M.D., "Decisions To Abate Life-Sustaining 
Treatment From Nonautonomous Patients," Journal Of The American Medical 
Association 264 (October 10, 1990): 1846. 
99There is some confusion about the date of this case. Some state it occurred in 
1963 but others set the date in 1971. The confusion may be caused by the fact that a film 
about this case was widely circulated in 1972. Richard Sparks states: "In late 1963, at the 
Johns Hopkins Medical Center in Baltimore, an infant boy was born who lived for only 
52 
of several articles in medical journals in the early 1970's about the practice of withholding 
and withdrawing medical treatment from defective neonates in neonatal intensive care 
units. 100 While there was no significant public response to these events, other than a sense 
of agreement that parents in consultation with physicians ought to make these treatment 
decisions and ought to have the right to determine the outcome for defective neonates, there 
was a sense of guarded concern. Bioethicists, however, raised serious questions about the 
criteria used to make these clinical decisions. Thus, the ethical debate about the proper 
criteria for treatment decisions began. It was not until April of 1982 and the "Baby Doe" 
case in Bloomington, Indiana, that there began public outcry in the United States about 
withholding treatment from defective neonates. 101 The result of this case was the publication 
fifteen days. The circumstances surrounding his brief life and the fact that he was the 
subject of a widely circulated 1972 film Who Shall Survive? have made the 'Johns 
Hopkins Baby' one of a handful of well-known, ethically troubling cases regarding 
decisions not to treat handicapped or so called 'defective' newborns." See Richard 
Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?: Bioethics And The Handicapped Newborn (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1988), 2. For a detailed description of the Johns Hopkins case, see 
Robert Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), 50-51. 
100R. S. Duff & A.G. M. Campbell, "Moral And Ethical Dilemmas In The Special 
Care Nursery," 889-894; J. Lorber, "Results Of Treatment Of Myelomeningocele," 
Developmental Medical Child Neurology 13 (1971): 279-303; and A. Shaw, G. 
Randolph, & B. Manard, "Ethical Issues In Pediatric Surgery: A Nationwide Survey Of 
Pediatricians And Pediatric Surgeons," Pediatric 59 (1977): 588-599. 
101 
"Baby Doe was afflicted with Down syndrome, a chromosomal abnormality 
resulting in mental retardation and a propensity for cardiac and other congenital 
malformations. The infant had such a congenital defect, a tracheo-esophageal fistula (an 
abnormal passage connecting the trachea and esophagus), which if not surgically 
corrected results in death. The parents, after consultation and with the concurrence of 
their attending physician, refused to consent to surgery, primarily on the ground a child 
with Down syndrome could not attain a 'minimally acceptable quality of life.' That 
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of two sets of federal regulations during the Reagan administration: the "Baby Doe" 
regulations of 1983 and the subsequent child abuse regulations established in 1985. 
The "Baby Doe" regulations were written with the assumption that physicians and 
parents could not be trusted to give needed care to handicapped infants. These regulations 
mandated that every infant, unless permanently unconscious, irretrievably dying, or 
salvageable only with treatment that would be "virtually futile and inhumane," should be 
given life-sustaining treatment, no matter how small, young, or disabled the infant might 
be. 102 These regulations claimed to draw their authority from Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 103 Hospitals were required to post notices that required health 
care professionals who observed that treatment was being withheld or withdrawn from a 
defective or handicapped infant to call a twenty-four-hour toll free "handicapped infant 
hotline" in Washington, D.C. The government responded to these reports by dispatching a 
conclusion was, and continues to be, strongly disputed. A trial court, (Indiana Supreme 
Court) however, ruled that the parents had the right to refuse surgery for their child (In re 
Infant Doe, 1982)." Anne M. Dellinger and Patricia C. Kuszler, "Public-Policy And legal 
Issues," in Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 3, 1215. 
102Weir, "Ethical Issues," 1208. For a more complete analysis, see Department of 
Health and Human Services, "Nondiscrimination On The Basis Of Handicap," Federal 
Register 48 (1983), 9630-9632; Department of Health and Human Services, 
"Nondiscrimination On The Basis Of Handicap Relating To Health Care Of Infants: 
Proposed Rules," Federal Register 48 (1983), 30846-30852; and Fleischman, "Ethical 
Issues In Neonatology," 86. 
103Section 504 is the basic civil rights statute for handicapped individuals. Section 
504 states: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of 
his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance ... "Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 127. 
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"Baby Doe squad" to investigate immediately the alleged discrimination against the 
neonate. 104 These regulations, mandating signs and creating "Baby Doe squads," were 
declared invalid by a federal judge on procedural grounds in April of 1983. 105 The 
regulations, now revised, were reintroduced on July 5, 1983, by the Department of Health 
and Human Services. In addition to signs and hotlines, the regulations advocated a process 
of decisional review called Infant Care Review Committees in order to encourage "informal, 
enlightened and fair decision making."106 After considerable opposition, these regulations 
were again struck down. The basis of the regulations, the discrimination statute known as 
Section 504, was subsequently declared by the United States Supreme Court as inappropriate 
as the foundation of regulations concerning nontreatment of handicapped newborns. 107 
Additional efforts toward regulation were made by the U.S. President's Commission 
For The Study Of Ethical Problems In Medicine And Biomedical And Behavioral Research 
104Fleischman, "Ethical Issues In Neonatology," 86. 
1050n March 18, 1983 the American Academy of Pediatrics announced its lawsuit 
against the Department of Health and Human Services, and on April 14, 1983, Judge 
Gerhard A. Gesell in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler invalidated the rule on 
procedural grounds. See Kenneth Kipnis & Gailynn M. Williamson, "Nontreatment 
Decisions For Severely Compromised Newborns," Ethics 95 (October 1984): 93. 
106Fleischman, "Ethical Issues In Neonatology," 86. 
107Ibid. 
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(1983 ), 108 the American Academy of Pediatrics ( 1984 ), 109 and numerous writers on ethics in 
pediatric medicine. Concerned parties proposed the formation of an ethics review 
committee. 110 In 1984, the Federal Child Abuse Law was amended, 111 which added to each 
108In the volume entitled Deciding To Forego Life Sustaining Treatment. the U.S. 
President's Commission recommended: "When the benefits of therapy are unclear an 
ethics committee or similar body might be designated to review the decision making 
process ... cases included in this category should certainly encompass those in which a 
decision to forego life-sustaining therapy has been proposed because of a physical or 
mental handicap." President's Commission For The Study Of Ethical Problems In 
Medicine And Biomedical And Behavioral Research, Deciding To Forego Life 
Sustaining Treatment, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. (1983), 227. 
109The bioethics Committee of the American Academy of Pediatrics developed a 
set of guidelines for the establishment and operation of Infant Bioethics Review 
Committees. These committees would facilitate review of any cases where there was the 
consideration of foregoing life-sustaining treatment. The hope was that conflict situations 
could be resolved within these committees. See American Academy of Pediatrics, "Joint 
Policy Statement: Principles Of Treatment Of Disabled Infants," Pediatrics 73 (1984): 
559-560; and American Academy of Pediatrics "Guidelines For Infant Bioethics Review 
Committees," Pediatrics 74 (1984): 306-310. 
110Given the complexity of some pediatric cases and the life-and-death nature of 
selective nontreatment decisions, the common recommendation was to have an ethics 
committee consult on the case and give advice to the physicians in the case. The ethical 
perspective at the heart of this recommendation was straightforward: in truly difficult 
cases, the most prudent procedure for decision-making is the achievement of consensus 
by a multidisciplinary committee that is knowledgeable, emotionally stable, and 
consistent from case to case. For a more detailed analysis, see Weir, "Ethical Issues," in 
Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 3, 1208. 
111 A new definition of withholding of medically indicated treatment is added to 
Section 3 of the Act to mean the failure to respond to an infant's life-threatening 
conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration and 
medication) which in the treating physician's reasonable medical judgment will be most 
likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions. Exceptions to the 
requirement to provide treatment may be made only in cases which: ( 1) the infant is 
irreversibly comatose; or (2) the provision of such treatment would merely prolong dying 
or not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening 
56 
state's child protection agency the concern for withholding of medically indicated treatments 
from neonates. Currently in effect, these regulations do not mandate unnecessary or 
inappropriate treatments but allow physicians to use reasonable judgment in decision-
making. Further, parents are allowed a role in the process even though the term "parent" is 
not part of the law or regulations. These federal regulations urge but do not mandate the 
formation of Infant Care Review Committees to facilitate decisional review and to assist in 
conflict resolution. 112 In 1992, the Americans with Disabilities Act (A.D.A.) went into 
effect; this act protects Americans with a wide range of disabilities from discrimination. 
Whether the A.D.A. applies to defective neonates is not clear. However, in February 1994 
a federal court specifically cited this act in mandating treatment for a 16-month-old 
anencephalic infant named Baby K. Time will tell what impact the A.D.A. will have 
regarding the protection of defective neonates. 113 Interest in the regulation of treatment 
conditions or otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or (3) the provision 
of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the 
treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane. For a more detailed 
analysis of the Federal Child Abuse Law, see Fleischman, "Ethical Issues In 
Neonatology," 87; Department of Health and Human Services, "Child Abuse and 
Neglect: Prevention and Treatment," reprinted from The Federal Register 50 (April 15, 
1985), No. 72: Rules and Regulations, part 1340, 14887-14892. 
112Concerns were raised about the Infant Care Review Committees. First, many 
fear that parental authority for decision-making for infants will be circumvented and 
supplanted by such committee structure. Second, there is a fear that the ethics 
committees will be too narrowly focused on the law and that ethical analysis will be less 
part of the committee's deliberations than concern for the law and institutional liability. 
See Fleischman, "Ethical Issues In Neonatology," 87. 
113F or a more detailed analysis of the Baby K case, see Pence, Classic Cases In 
Medical Ethics, 198. Baby K was brought to a hospital emergency room in Virginia in 
respiratory distress. It should be noted that federal regulations require hospitals to treat all 
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decisions for defective neonates appears to be an American phenomenon. Other 
technologically advanced nations have not initiated such regulations. 114 
Despite these proposed federal regulations and medical guidelines that have gone a 
long way toward clarifying treatment issues, there is still no consensus on a specific criterion 
concerning treatment decisions for defective neonates. There is general agreement within 
the medical, legal, and ethical professions that there are some defective neonates whose lives 
need not be sustained. Consensus ends, however, when an attempt is made to determine 
which specific neonates should receive or should not receive treatment. Some argue that life 
should be preserved at all cost. For others, life may be ended, even by active means, when 
it has become too burdensome. Others hold opinions that are ambiguous and fall somewhere 
in between. The ethical perspectives concerning treatment decisions for defective neonates 
are equally diverse. Often this results in unnecessary suffering for some neonates and death 
for others. The diversity of ethical perspectives, not to mention legal and medical 
perspectives, has brought to the forefront the urgent need of parents and health care 
professionals for an ethical criterion to assist them in making these difficult and complex 
patients needing care who arrive at an emergency room. The particular interest with this 
case is that the AD.A. was cited in this case. Baby K had been on a respirator since birth. 
When the case was heard, her physicians wanted to disconnect it and let her die; but her 
mother insisted on continued care, for religious reasons. At its heart, Baby K's case was 
about whether or not physicians may, without incurring charges of discrimination against 
the handicapped, overrule parents' decisions about continuing treatment which seems to 
be medically futile and pointlessly expensive. Ibid. See also Mark Bonano, "The Case Of 
Baby K," Annals Of Health Care 4 (1995): 151-13. 
114See Weir, "Ethical Issues," in Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 3, 1208. 
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treatment decisions. 115 One caution must be stated clearly from the beginning. There do not 
exist ethical criteria that will bring about moral certitude in treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. Diagnosis and prognosis are almost always very speculative so value judgments 
are an important part of the entire decision-making process. However, despite this caution, 
various bioethicists have proposed ethical approaches to treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. This next section will survey these various ethical approaches. 
General Ethical Ap_proaches To Treatment Decisions For Defective Neonates 
This section will present a summary of the various ethical approaches used by 
bioethicists in making treatment decisions for defective neonates. This survey is not 
intended to be exhaustive, but rather to present in a thoughtful and thought-provoking way 
the views that are representative of certain ways of thinking about treatment decisions for 
defective neonates. 
Ethical criteria for treatment decisions concerning defective neonates must address 
both substantive and procedural issues. Substantive issues include consideration of 
appropriate standards for making treatment decisions and present various options. These 
options can be placed into four categories. First, treat every newborn as aggressively as 
possible. Second, base selective treatment in the balance between direct benefits and burden 
of care. Third, consider the personal and financial costs to the family and to society. Fourth, 
115For an extensive survey of the legal and medical perspectives regarding 
treatment decisions for defective neonates, see Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of 
Handicapped Newborns, 59-142. 
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focus selective treatment on the "best interests" of the neonate, so that treatments should be 
limited only if suffering or a radically diminished quality of life would make existence a net 
burden to the infant. Procedural issues focus on: (1) how decisions ought be made and (2) 
who are the appropriate decision-makers in the case. Potential decision-makers include 
parents, health care professionals, ethics or infant care review committees, and the courts. 116 
The substantive and procedural issues are inseparable, and together they form the basis of 
ethical criteria concerning treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
Much of the debate about various approaches centers on the notion of "objectivity." 
Objective data on which to base the decision must be considered to determine how and 
whether value judgments play an integral part in determining ethical criteria. Paul Ramsey, 
a leading Protestant ethicist, who recently passed away, proposed a "medical indications 
policy." Medically indicated criteria suppose that the judgment is not only objective (not 
determined by personal value judgments) but is determined by scientific evidence alone. 117 
Ramsey's categorical imperative is "never abandon care." For him, all nondying neonates 
must be treated, if they can be so benefitted by the treatment. The patient's best interests, 
medically speaking, are to be the focus of any treatment decision for these patients. Every 
neonate's life, whether defective or not, is viewed to be of equal and independent value. The 
physician has the primary responsibility for determining if the neonate is dying and whether 
116Aaron L. Mackler, "Neonatal Intensive Care," Scope Notes 11 (Washington, 
D.C.: Kennedy Institute of Ethics, 1993): 1-2. 
117Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Notes On Moral Theology 1981Through1984 
(Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1984), 35. 
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or not treatment offers the potential for medical benefit. Regrettably, Ramsey is less clear 
about the role of parents in decision-making even though he does speak of parental 
consent. 118 
Warren T. Reich, John R. Connery, S.J., and Leonard J. Weber each adopt "the 
ordinary/extraordinary means" approach. These ethicists reject the quality-of-life 
formulation. The ordinary/extraordinary means approach is a patient-centered, burden-to-
benefit calculus and insists that each human life is inherently good regardless of condition. 
In this sanctity-of-life ethic, 
each individual life is inherently good regardless of condition and that all 
lives are of equal value. There is no justification for discrimination based on 
quality or condition oflife and no justification for killing, unless a person has 
forfeited his right to life by certain actions which are themselves a destruction 
of or a threat to life itself. 119 
Reich, Connery and Weber argue that, since parents have the primary responsibility in 
raising their children, they must be recognized as having primary responsibility for making 
treatment decision for their defective neonates. 120 
118Paul Ramsey, Ethics At The Edges Of Life: Medical And Legal Intersections 
(New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1978); Idem, The Patient As Person: 
Explorations In Medical Ethics (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1970). 
119Leonard J. Weber, Who Shall Live?: The Dilemma Of Severely Handicapped 
Children And Its Meaning For Other Moral Questions (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), 
82-83. 
120Reich and Weber affirm that there is a binding obligation to accept all 
"ordinary" means to sustain or prolong life, while there is no strict obligation to use 
"extraordinary" means. Extraordinary is any means that ( 1) does not hold out a 
reasonable hope of medical benefit or which (2) also has the effect of causing or 
perpetuating an excessive hardship for the patient (and for one's principal caretakers). 
Connery rejects the movement by Gerald Kelly, S.J. to incorporate medical benefit into 
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Michael Tooley and Peter Singer present an approach called "termination of selected 
nonpersons." This view is based on the functional definition of personhood. Tooley and 
Singer equate personhood with the mental capacity to become a moral agent. Ultimately, 
their position results in a benefit/burden calculus weighed on the side of the parents and other 
moral agents affected by the infant non-person's life prolongation or death. 121 Mary Anne 
Warren's approach is similar to that of Tooley and Singer's. Infants are considered to be 
human beings in the genetic sense, but Warren questions if they are humans or persons in the 
moral sense. 122 Warren holds that neonates are nonpersons and should be allowed to 
the very definition of what constitutes a means as "ordinary" or "extraordinary." 
According to Connery, benefit and burden "deal with different issues" and ought to 
remain distinct. Connery has merely reinstated the older language of obligatory/optional 
for that of ordinary/extraordinary, relegating the latter to one half of the equation, namely 
"burden" viewed from the patient's perspective. Richard Sparks argues that Connery's 
preference for the older language is ultimately more a matter of semantics than of actual 
differences in content. See Richard Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?, 102-103. See also 
Leonard J. Weber, Who Shall Live?, 82-87; Warren T. Reich, "On The Birth Of A 
Severely Handicapped Infant," The Hastings Center Report 3 (September 1973): 10-11; 
Warren T. Reich & David E. Ost, "Infants: Ethical Perspectives On The Care Oflnfants," 
Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, vol. 2, ed. Warren T. Reich (New York: The Free Press, 
1978), 727-729; and John R. Connery, SJ., "Prolongation Of Life: The Duty And Its 
Limits," Linacre Quarterly 47 (May 1980): 151-165. 
121Michael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," Philosophy And Public Affairs 2 
(Fall 1972): 3, Idem, "A Defense of Abortion And Infanticide," in The Problem Of 
Abortion, ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1973 ), 51-
91; Idem, "Decisions To Terminate Life And The Concept Of Person," in Ethical Issues 
Relating To Life And Death, ed. John Ladd (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 
62-93; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); 
Idem, "Unsanctifying Human Life," in Ethical Issues Relating To Life And Death, ed. 
John Ladd (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 41-61; Idem, "Life: The Value 
Of Life," Encyclopedia Of Bioethics ed. Warren T. Reich, 822-829; and Sparks, To Treat 
Or Not To Treat?, 236-242. 
122F or Warren, there are five traits necessary for personhood: consciousness, 
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continue living because they are wanted by their parents or since others are willing to pay 
for their care. For Warren, when an unwanted or defective neonate is born into a society that 
cannot afford and/or is not willing to take care of it, then its destruction is permissible. This 
action is not murder because only persons have a full right to life. 123 
H. Tristram Englehardt's position is based on the "child's best interests." Selective 
nontreatment is justifiable only when death appears to be in the best interests of a nondying 
infant. Such a decision is guided by the expected lifestyle and the cost in parental and 
societal pain and money for its attainment. Englehardt writes: 
When this perspective is adopted, there is a moral framework for withholding 
treatment or intentionally killing in cases where, in the parent's judgment, 
the child's existence after treatment will primarily be characterized by severe 
pain and deprivation. Even though the cost of the proposed treatment is not 
high--thus not making the treatment "extraordinary" -- the treatment may still 
be withheld when it is judged to be in the child's best interests. 124 
David Smith's position is similar to Englehardt's as he argues selective nontreatment by 
reasoning ability, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate, and the presence 
of self-awareness. See Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 156. 
123Mary Anne Warren, "On The Moral And Legal Status Of Abortion," The 
Monist 57 (January 1973): 43-61; and Idem, "Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?" 
Canadian Journal Of Philosophy 7 (June 1977): 275. 
124H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "Ethical Issues In Aiding The Death Of Young 
Children," Beneficent Euthanasia. ed. Marvin Kohl (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 
1975); Idem, "Bioethics And The Process Of Embodiment," Perspectives In Biology And 
Medicine 18 (Summer 1975): 486-500; Idem, "Euthanasia And Children: The Inquiry Of 
Continued Existence," Journal Of Pediatrics 83 (July 1973): 170-171; Idem, "Medicine 
And The Concept Of Person," Ethical Issues In Death And Dying, eds. Tom Beauchamp 
& Seymour Perlin (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978); Sparks, To Treat Or 
Not To Treat?, 242-250; and Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 
174. 
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parents is sometimes necessary for the sake of the child's best interests. However, Smith 
believes this argument is more problematic and less inclusive than Engelhardt seems to 
suggest. Smith understands the best interests test as a test that errs in favor of prolonging 
life. He acknowledges that there can be rare instances in which nontreatment would be in 
the best interests of the child, but in general, the best interests test amounts to a prohibition 
of active or passive infanticide on most newborns. 125 
Robert Veatch uses the "reasonable person standard," which is drawn from legal 
parlance. He maintains that a guardian has the right to refuse even lifesaving treatments for 
a defective neonate if the treatment is "unreasonable because of its uselessness or the burden 
it generates."126 This is a patient-centered perspective that is based on the reasonableness of 
the treatment. A parent may morally refuse treatment for a defective neonate if it would 
seem "within the realm of reason to reasonable people."127 
125David H. Smith, "On Letting Some Babies Die," Hastings Center Studies 2 
(May 1974): 37-46; Idem, "Death, Ethics And Social Control," in Medical Wisdom And 
Ethics In The Treatment Of Severely Defective Newborn And Young Children, ed. David 
J. Roy (Montreal: Eden Press, 1978), 74; Idem, "Our Religious Traditions And The 
Treatment Of Infants," in Which Babies Shall Live? Humanistic Dimensions Of The 
Care Oflmperiled Newborns, eds. Thomas H. Murray & Arthur L. Caplan (Clifton, N.J.: 
Humana Press, 1985), 59-70; Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 
175-176; and Weber, Who Shall Live?, 61-63. 
126Robert M. Veatch, "Shall We Let Handicapped Children Die?" Newsday, 8 
August 1982, 1, 8-9. 
127A reasonable person would find a refusal unreasonable (and thus treatment 
morally required) if the treatment is useful in treating a patient's condition (though not 
necessarily life-saving) and at the same time does not give rise to any significant patient-
centered objections based on physical or mental burden; familial, social or economic 
concern; or religious belief. See Robert Veatch, Death. Dying And The Biological 
Revolution (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1976), 112; and Paul Ramsey, 
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Next there is the quality-of-life approach. There are a number of approaches that 
fonn a spectrum moving from a more conservative quality-of-life position to a more radical 
quality-of-life position. Albert Jonsen and Michael Garland present a minimalist quality-of-
life approach. The responsibilities of parents, the duty of physicians, and the interests of the 
state are conditioned by the medico-moral principle, "do no harm, without expecting 
compensating benefit for the patient." Life-preserving intervention is understood as doing 
hann to an infant who cannot survive infancy, or will live in intractable pain, or who cannot 
participate even minimally in human experience. 128 Joseph Fletcher can be generally situated 
within the quality-of-life approach, though his position is further down on the spectrum than 
that of Jonsen and Garland's. Fletcher argues that ethical analysis of nontreatment decisions 
begins with an inquiry into the "nature" of the life of the infant to be prolonged or 
tenninated. Parents and physicians must determine if the proposed treatment will promote 
human well-being and reduce suffering for all individuals involved. It must be asked if such 
treatment will simply prolong the life of the infant who will end up in an institutional 
"warehouse" for the mentally and/or physically handicapped. The continued existence of a 
defective neonate is evaluated not only by the quality of its projected future but also by the 
quality of its projected impact on the lives of those affected by it. A number of practical 
Ethics At The Ed~es Of Life, 163-171. 
128A. R. Jonsen et al., "Critical Issues In Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference 
Report And Policy Proposal," Pediatrics 55 (1975): 756-768; and A. R. Jonsen & 
Michael J. Garland, Ethics Of Newborn Intensive Care. 
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elements are included in this evaluation. 129 Once a decision is made that the neonate's 
projected quality of life is insufficient to prolong life through medical treatment, Fletcher 
suggests that the means chosen to terminate the neonate do not really matter. 130 
Earl Shelp also advocates a quality-of-life approach founded on a property-based 
theory ofpersonhood. For Shelp, to be a person in the full sense as a member of the moral 
community one must possess the qualities of "minimal independence."131 Since neonates 
129Fletcher writes: "First, the extent to which the parents are counseled; second, 
the parents' attitude toward defects; third, the size or proportion of the risk in terms of a 
projected distribution of chances; fourth, the severity of the risk; fifth, the economic 
resources of the family; sixth, the welfare of other children involved, as well as the 
parents' physical and emotional capacity to cope." Joseph Fletcher, "Moral Aspects Of 
Decision-Making," in Report Of The Sixty-Fifth Ross Conference On Pediatric Research: 
Ethical Dilemmas In Current Obstetric And Newborn Care, ed. Thomas D. Moore 
(Columbus, OH.: Ross Laboratories, 1976), 70. See also Weir, Selective Nontreatment 
Of Handicapped Newborns, 169. 
130Joseph Fletcher, "Four Indicators OfHumanhood--The Enquiry Matures," 
Hastings Center Report 4 (December 1974): 6-7; Idem, "Medicine And The Nature Of 
Man," in The Teaching Of Medical Ethics, eds. Robert M. Veatch, Willard Gaylin & 
Councilman Morgan (New York: Institute Of Society, Ethics And The Life Sciences, 
1973), 52-57; Idem, "Ethics And Euthanasia," American Journal OfNursing 73 (April 
1973): 670-675; Idem, "Infanticide And The Ethics Of Loving Care," in Infanticide And 
The Value Of Life, ed. Marvin Kohl (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1978), 15-20; 
and Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 168-169. 
131The qualities of "minimal independence" would include a capability to relate, 
communicate, ambulate, and perform tasks of basic hygiene, feeding, and dressing. 
Clearly there are technologies available today that can supplement or compensate for 
one's deficiencies in any of these areas. If competent medical opinion is that a particular 
newborn is physically and/or mentally impaired to the degree that these capabilities are 
not attainable even with technological assistance, then parents and society are not obliged 
to attempt the impossible. Either or both may elect to sustain this class of newborns, but 
there can be no moral obligation to do the impossible. This conclusion obviously rests on 
the belief that independence and these criteria for minimal independence are morally 
defensible ends upon which duties to attain them are grounded. For a more detailed 
analysis, see Earl E. Shelp, Born To Die?: Deciding The Fate Of Critically Ill Newborns 
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do not posses these qualities, for Shelp they are considered persons only in the social sense. 
In his view, persons in the strict moral sense, that is, parents, siblings, or anyone the neonate 
might affect, have priority over neonates. Therefore, if the burdens imposed on others are 
disproportionate or unreasonable, then parents may make a moral decision to forego or 
withdraw medical treatments. Shelp even allows for infanticide in certain cases. 132 Parents 
are the primary treatment decision-maker, because they stand in a "quasi-fiduciary role" to 
their children. 133 Shelp's quality-of-life approach is a form of socially-weighed calculus. 134 
Finally, Richard A. McCormick also advocates a patient-centered, quality-of-life 
approach based on the potential for human relationships associated with the infant's medical 
condition. His approach also considers the traditional understanding of the burden/benefit 
(New York: The Free Press, 1986), 48. 
132Shelp writes: "In those instances today when the baby is born with a disease or 
defect such that it can be judged reasonably to foreclose (1) the attainment of capacities 
for minimal independence, (2) the attainment of capacities sufficient for personhood, (3) 
whose survival would impose a burden on the infant such as to render life a net disvalue, 
or (4) whose severely impaired survival would impose upon others an unreasonable, 
grave, disproportionate, or incommensurable burden, a decision that intends death for the 
newborn could be morally justified. When death for a newborn is a morally justifiable 
intention and outcome, it is as morally licit to bring about this end by merciful means as it 
would be to stand aside while death occurs by so-called natural means." Ibid., 175. 
133Parents are guided in their decision making role about the reasonableness of 
treatments by the principles of autonomy, beneficence, and justice. Ibid., 70-76. 
134Earl E. Shelp, Born To Die?; Idem, "Courage And Tragedy In Clinical 
Medicine," Journal Of Medicine And Philosophy 8 (November 1983): 417-429; Idem, 
"To Benefit And Respect Persons: A Challenge For Beneficence In Health Care," in 
Beneficence And Health Care, ed. Earl E. Shelp (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1982), 200-217; and James J. Walter, "Termination Of Medical 
Treatment: The Setting Of Moral Limits From Infancy To Old Age," Reli~ious Studies 
Review 16 (October 1990): 305-307. 
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calculus. McCormick's way of proceeding may be viewed as a reformulation of the 
distinction between extraordinary/ordinary means of life support. In this case, treatment 
decisions are morally optional when they are too burdensome for the patient even though 
treatment may extend the length of life. For McCormick, quality-of-life judgments are an 
extension of a sanctity-of-life ethic. 135 He argues that quality-of-life treatment decisions 
ought to be made by parents in consultation with the appropriate health care professionals. 
This brief survey of the ethical approaches reveals both the broad diversity of ethical 
approaches to treatment decisions for defective neonates and the significant lack of 
consensus within the general categories of these approaches. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that many parents and health care professionals are often left in a state of ambiguity and 
confusion when attempting to make treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
Today, parents and health care professionals are drawing lines between neonates who 
will be treated and those who will not be. If these lines are being drawn, then there must be 
an ethical methodology that these appropriate decision-makers can use. McCormick believes 
his ethical methodology is both practical and beneficial for all decision-makers in making 
treatment decisions for defective neonates. To determine if this is true, the three distinct 
elements of McCormick's ethical methodology (theological anthropology, moral 
135McCormick writes: "Quality-of-life assessments ought to be made within an 
overall reverence for life, as an extension of one's respect for the sanctity of life. 
However, there are times when preserving the life of one with no capacity for those 
aspects of life that we regard as human is a violation of the sanctity of life itself. Thus to 
separate the two approaches and call one sanctity of life, the other quality of life, is a false 
conceptual split ... " Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of 
Life," How Brave A New World?, 407. Emphasis in the original. 
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epistemology and moral criteriology) will be analyzed and examined in the following 
chapters. Once his ethical methodology has been examined, it will be applied to the four 
diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates to determine if it is appropriate and can 
be recommended to all decisions-makers, both Christian and non-Christian, as a public 




In the most generic sense, anthropology may be considered as the human person's 
description and explanation of himself or herself. As an empirical science, anthropology is 
usually divided into cultural and physical: the study of human beings' social behavior, 
languages, world views, family life, and communal organizations as distinguished from the 
investigation into the evolution of human beings, the functional capacities of the human 
body, the development of races, etc. 1 Likewise, anthropological claims may also be 
considered as a subset of a full theological system. 
Theological anthropology is "the critical reflection on the origin, purpose, and 
destiny of human life in the light of Christian belief."2 It considers human persons precisely 
in terms of their relationship to God. As J. J. Mueller notes: 
Karl Rahner correctly reflected that whatever we say about God says 
something about us; and whatever we say about ourselves says something 
about God. God and humanity are correlative terms. If either God or 
humanity did not exist, theology would be meaningless. It is no wonder that 
1T. M. McFadden, "Anthropology," The New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. XVI 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1967), 12. 
2Robert A. Krieg, "Theological Anthropology," in The Encyclopedia Of 
Catholicism, ed. Richard P. McBrien (San Francisco: CA.: Harper-Collins, 1995), 64. 
69 
70 
theology begins in the human experience of God. 3 
Being-in relation to God forms the basis for viewing the human person as centrally related 
to, totally dependent on, and responsible to God. The human person is dependent upon God 
for his or her origin, nature, condition, dignity, and destiny. To understand this relationship 
between God and the human person, theological anthropology draws upon a variety of 
disciplines. Robert Krieg writes: 
Theological anthropology employs a variety of methods (e.g., transcendental 
reflection, historical investigation, phenomenological inquiry) in its study of 
Scripture, the Jewish-Christian tradition, the findings of social sciences, 
contemporary life and thought (e.g., philosophy), and the Church's current 
experience (e.g., worship, communal life, and service).4 
Theology's openness to, and dialogue with, the social sciences, history, and various forms 
of philosophy has had a significant bearing on theological anthropology.5 
Influenced by these data, theology proceeds to reflect on the human person within the 
31. J. Mueller, S.J., What Is Theolo~y? (Collegeville, MN.: The Liturgical Press, 
1988), 17. 
4Krieg, "Theological Anthropology," in The Encyclopedia Of Catholicism, 64. 
5Without being exhaustive, the following are contributions of these disciplines as 
they have had a bearing on a contemporary theological anthropology: "First, man is a 
being-in-time in the sense that he experiences his own radical finitude; bounded by death, 
he perceives that he does not have a hold upon existence. He faces this realization with 
anxiety, and seeks to make sense of it in light of his orientation toward the fullness of 
being or eternity. Second, man is historical or social. His awareness of reality is not 
achieved in isolation from the cultural forces that variously shape his perspectives. 
Language, even though culturally conditioned and limited, is the necessary embodiment 
of truth. Third, freedom is an essential prerequisite for human fulfillment, without which 
cultural advance is an illusory veneer. Fourth, man is future oriented. As Marxists stress, 
the future is the dominant mode of time and a vision of an authentic although yet-to-be 
achieved model supplies the hope out of which a nonalienated society can be achieved." 
T. M. McFadden, "Anthropology," New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. XVI, 12. 
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scope of revelation. The human person has been created by God, has been redeemed by God, 
and is destined for God. God is perceived as the metaphysical ground of the human person's 
receptivity through his or her finite resources oriented to the infinite. The acknowledgment 
of this tension and its implications for the person as both limited and transcendent is the 
foundation for the open-ended anthropology without which religion and revelation become 
totally extrinsic to the human. The final fulfillment of this tendency becomes explicit for the 
Christian in the mystery of the incarnate Word, the ultimate union of God and the human 
person who is the paradigm for all humankind. Christology becomes, therefore, the 
culmination of Christian theological anthropology.6 For many contemporary theologians, 
theological anthropology, with its emphasis on the human person as a knowing subject, has 
become the core of theology's foundation. 
For McCormick, theological anthropology concerns the human person in all his or 
her fullness as viewed within the context of the Christian mysteries. McCormick writes: 
The Christian tradition is, or better ought to be, an outlook on the human, a 
community of privileged access to the human. The Christian tradition is 
anchored in faith in the meaning and decisive significance of God's covenant 
with persons, especially as manifested in the saving incarnation of Jesus 
Christ and the revelation of His final coming, His eschatological kingdom, 
which is here aborning but will finally only be given. Faith in these events, 
love and loyalty to their central figure, yields a decisive way of viewing and 
intending the world, of interpreting its meaning, of hierarchizing its values 
of reacting to its apparent surds and conflicts. 7 
The Christian mysteries provide a framework for understanding the full dimensions of the 
6Ibid. 
7Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Christianity And Morality," Catholic Mind, 75 
(October 1977): 28. 
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human person. The person understands what is human because the Christian mysteries 
underline the truly human against cultural biases and distortions. Within these mysteries the 
very meaning, purpose, and value of the human person is grounded. 
McCormick believes the basic structure of human life has been revealed in God's 
self-disclosure in Jesus. The acceptance of this disclosure by the human person transforms 
the person's values, attitudes, perspectives, and dispositions, which impact on how he or she 
understands God, self, others, and the world. 8 These attitudes and values sharpen and 
intensify the human focus on what is good and definitive of human flourishing. McCormick 
writes: 
One who has accepted in faith God's stupendous deed in Christ, one who sees 
(and accepts) in the Christ God's self-disclosure and therefore who sees (and 
accepts) in the Christ-event the central fact of human history, will come to be 
(by God's healing grace) stamped by the dispositions associated with that 
event. Some are putting others' needs ahead of our own; seeking God's will 
in hard times; carrying one's cross in imitation of Christ; giving one's life for 
one's friends; turning the other cheek; seeing Christ in the neighbor; 
subordinating everything to the God-relationship; trusting in God's 
providential care. Such dispositions do not, of course, solve problems. They 
do, however, powerfully incline us to seek out and do morally right things.9 
From within the context of the Christian mysteries, the human person can discover and 
communicate what it means to be fully human and how this impacts on human existence. 
8 An example of some of the insights, perspectives, and value judgments that 
McCormick infers from the Christian mysteries as they relate to bioethics would be: life 
as a basic but not absolute value; the extension of this evaluation to nascent life; the 
potential for human relationships as an aspect of physical life to be valued; the radical 
sociality of the human person; the inseparability of the unitive and procreative goods; and 
the permanent, heterosexual marriage as normative. For a more detailed analysis, see 
McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 51-59. 
9McCormick, "The Best Interest Of The Baby," 19-20. Emphasis in original. 
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Thus for the Christian there is an inner dynamic of the faith experience. McCormick argues 
that, "the person of Jesus is testimony to the fact that no effort of man to know himself, find 
himself, be himself, is a viable possibility outside the God-relationship."10 The person of 
Jesus constantly reminds the human person that what God did for humanity is an affirmation 
of the human and therefore must remain the measure of what the persons may reasonably 
decide to do to and for themselves. 11 
In essence, McCormick's theological anthropology is important because it is the 
foundation for his ethical methodology. The context in which McCormick views the human 
person has a direct influence on both his moral epistemology and his moral criteriology. The 
person viewed in terms of the Christian mysteries is not only modified as a decision-maker, 
but has been given a standard by which to judge particular situations. McCormick believes 
that informed moral judgments are always made within a context. For the Christian, that 
context consists in a complex interrelationship of anthropological and theological 
presuppositions. These presuppositions, which inform the person's moral thinking and 
judgment, are derived from and rooted in God's actions and purposes as they impact on the 
inner dynamics of the person. 
To understand the full dimensions of McCormick's doctrine of the human person one 
must examine and analyze his notion of God and God's providential wisdom, as well as the 
10McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theology And Bioethics: Exploring 
The Foundations And Frontiers, ed. Earl E. Shelp (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, 
1985), 101. 
11 McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 17. 
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relations between divine and human agency. This will be the central focus of this chapter, 
because these positions profoundly affect the shape and direction of his understanding of the 
human person, and ultimately, how McCormick discerns moral decisions. After analyzing 
the human person in terms of the Christian mysteries, McCormick will infer various value 
judgments. From these value judgments McCormick will derive moral norms and human 
rights that form the basis for his positions on treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
The remainder of this chapter will examine McCormick's theological anthropology 
from the perspective of salvation history described in terms of creation-fall-redemption. An 
effort will be made to specify the practical implications of McCormick's theological 
anthropology as it pertains to treatment decisions for defective neonates. Finally, this 
chapter will consider various criticisms of this part of McCormick's ethical methodology. 
McCormick's Theolo~ical Anthropolo~y 
The center of McCormick's theological anthropology is the human person "integrally 
and adequately considered," which he views within the context of the Christian mysteries. 
By "theological anthropology" McCormick means 
a doctrine of the human person that views the human person in terms of the 
great Christian mysteries: creation-fall-redemption. It is a doctrine that 
would yield an appropriate emphasis on vision, perspectives, and character 
and the stories, metaphors and images that generate and nourish these 
elements. 12 
McCormick argues that Vatican II summarizes theological anthropology very cryptically. 
12McCormick, Corrective Vision, 21. 
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For the Council, "faith throws a new light on everything, manifests God's design for man's 
total vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions which are fully human." 13 For 
McCormick the terms "God's design" and "total vocation" are shorthand for what he means 
by theological anthropology. 
McCormick's view of the doctrine of the human person has developed through his 
writings. He began his career as a moral theologian trained in the manualist tradition that 
emphasized the juridical and physicalist approach of the classicist mentality. "This mentality 
conceives culture normatively and abstractly and represents a certain disengagement from 
the forces shaping the contemporary world. " 14 The classicist image of the human person 
was one of the "agent as solitary decision-maker."15 In this view, moral norms were 
understood as generalizations about the significance or meaning of human conduct. 16 The 
criterion for rightness and wrongness was not the whole person, but isolated dimensions of 
the human person. This criterion McCormick refers to as "faculty finality" or "physicalism," 
which offers an analysis of faculties and finalities. 17 Vatican II reversed many of the 
13 
"Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modem World," The Documents 
Of Vatican II, no. 11, 209. 
14McCormick, Corrective Vision, 40. 
15Ibid., 21. 
16For example, McCormick has written that "if concrete actions promote a value, 
they are prescribable. If they generally attack a value, they are generally proscribed. If 
they always attack a value, they are always proscribed." McCormick, The Critical 
Calling, 14. 
17 
"Physicalism" refers to the tendency in moral analysis to emphasize or even 
absolutize the physical and biological aspects of the human person and human actions 
independently of the function of reason and freedom. An example of what McCormick 
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predominant forces prior to the Council and thus McCormick began to favor a less juridical 
and more personalist approach. This approach gives priority to a historically-conscious 
worldview with a "revised" conception of the human person. 18 Vatican II broadened 
previous conceptions of the "human person" when it explicitly introduced the notion of the 
person "integrally and adequately considered." For example, The Pastoral Constitution On 
The Church In The Modern World asserts that "the moral aspect of any procedure ... must 
be determined by objective standards which are based on the nature of the person and the 
person's acts."19 The official Vatican Commentary on this wording notes two important 
points for consideration: 
( 1) The expression formulates a general principle that applies to all human 
actions, not just to marriage and sexuality where the phrase occurs. (2) The 
choice of this expression means that "human activity must be judged insofar 
as it refers to the human person integrally and adequately considered. "20 
Vatican II proposed as the criterion for rightness and wrongness of human conduct not "the 
intention of nature inscribed in the organs and their functions" but "the human person 
integrally and adequately considered" (personam humanam integre et adequate 
means by "faculty finality" would be that "the faculty of speech was given to us for the 
purpose of communicating true information. To use it in a way contradictory of this 
purpose (locutio contra mentem) was morally wrong." Ibid. 
18F or a detailed discussion of historical consciousness, refer to Chapter One, 
Richard A. McCormick, S. J.--Moral Theologian section above. 
19 
"Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modem World," The Documents 
Of Vatican II, no. 51, 256. 
20McCormick, The Critical Callin~, 14. See also Schema constitutionis pastoralis 
de ecclesia in mundo huius temporis: Expensio modorum partis secundae (Vatican Press, 
1965), 37-38. 
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considerandam).21 This not only represents a significant shift in the criterion of moral 
conduct from a deductive to an inductive procedure; it also leads McCormick into the realm 
of theological anthropology.22 Lisa Sowle Cahill observes that, "to base moral evaluation 
on the 'nature of the person' means increasingly to look beyond the individual, and certainly 
beyond physical functions and capacities, placing the person in relationship to others. "23 
Vatican H's emphasis on the centrality of the human person has made moral theologians 
more aware of the need for a sound theological anthropology. 
McCormick's understanding of the person "integrally and adequately considered" 
builds on the anthropology of Vatican II. It can also be inferred from McCormick's writings 
that he has adopted Louis Janssens' concept of a human person, which seeks to understand 
the human person in all his or her essential aspects.24 Janssens suggests that to consider the 
21Ibid., 339-340. See also Schema constitutionis pastoralis de ecclesia in mundo 
huius temporis: Expensio modorum partis secundae, resp. 104. McCormick believes the 
person "integrally and adequately considered" has its origin in St. Thomas. McCormick 
writes: "It is interesting to note that St. Thomas wrote that 'we do not wrong God unless 
we wrong our own good."' For McCormick, his "our own good" is identical with the 
person "integrally and adequately considered." Ibid., 16. 
22 For example, the classicist analysis viewed the faculty of speech for the purpose 
of communicating true information. Thus, to use it contradictory to this purpose was 
morally wrong. However, if "we view speech in broader perspective (historical 
consciousness) and see it not simply as an informative power, but as an endowment 
meant to promote the overall good of persons in community, we have altered our basis for 
our definition of a lie." Ibid., 14. 
23Lisa Sowle Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," Theological Voices In Medical 
Ethics, 84. 
24 McCormick cites Janssens' concept of person and his eight essential aspects of 
person in several of his writings: The Critical Calling, 14-15; Corrective Vision, 15; 
Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 16-18; and "Past, Present and Future of 
Christian Ethics," in Called To Love: Toward A Contemporary Christian Ethic, ed. 
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person adequately all the essential aspects of the person must be considered. It is necessary 
to consider the person in himself or her~elf and in his or her relations to the world, to others, 
to social groups, and to God. Janssens considers eight aspects of the human person. 25 All 
human actions that promote the person adequately considered in this way are morally right; 
those that attack or undermine the person are morally wrong. 26 Since McCormick cites 
Janssens' eight essential aspects of the human person several times in his writings and in 
very favorable terms, it is fair to conclude that these essential aspects of the human person 
reflect McCormick's own anthropological views. 27 
Francis Eigo (Villanova, PA.: Villanova University Press, 1985): 1-19 at 4. 
25The following is McCormick's summary of Janssens' definition of the human 
person that he incorporates into his understanding of the human person: "The human 
person is (1) a subject (normally called to consciousness, to act according to conscience, 
in freedom and in a responsible way); (2) a subject embodied; (3) an embodied subject 
that is part of the material world. ( 4) Persons are essentially directed to one another (only 
in relation to a Thou do we become I). (5) Persons need to live in social groups, with 
structures and institutions worthy of persons. ( 6) The human person is called to know and 
worship God. (7) The human person is a historical being, with successive life stages and 
continuing new possibilities. (8) All persons are utterly original but fundamentally 
equal." McCormick, The Critical Calling, 14. See also Louis Janssens, "Artificial 
Insemination: Ethical Reflections," 3-29. 
26McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 17. McCormick 
believes that the Church has not integrated successfully the notion of the person 
"integrally and adequately considered" into our moral decision-making. McCormick 
writes: "Our failure to take Vatican II seriously and flesh out the significance of persona 
integre et adequate considerata has left a vacuum and made it possible for certain 
authority figures to reduce scientific data to 'mere polls' and dismiss them, or to collapse 
scientific studies into 'scientism.' Janssens' study has helped to fill the vacuum and 
overcome the false alternatives." McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology 1981 Through 
1984, 52. 
27McCormick notes that "Janssens' insistence on the 'person adequately 
considered' as a normative criterion is absolutely correct, and his elaboration of what that 
means is very helpful." Ibid., 51. Paulinus Odozor believes that McCormick relies on 
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McCormick believes that the Christian tradition provides the human person with two 
heuristic devices for understanding the full dimensions of the human person and the dynamic 
nature of life. The first device looks at the human person from the inside. McCormick 
writes: 
Salvation history is described in terms of creation-fall-redemption. This is 
not only temporal history but it is the shape of our own personal history. We 
bear the marks of this temporal history in ourselves, in our attitudes, habits 
and values. As Thomas Clarke has noted, our everyday lives in Christian 
perspective are simultaneously an act of continuing creation, a struggle with 
evil and a personal campaign for the victory and prospering of good. 28 
McCormick's notion of the great Christian mysteries throws light on the fact that the human 
person has been created by God, is redeemed by God, and is destined for God. 29 "God's 
Janssens' eight aspects of personhood but questions whether McCormick is dependent on 
Janssens. Odozor writes: "McCormick exhibits a tendency to downplay his own original 
contribution and to give credit to some other person whose work on the issue he believes 
to be more encompassing. Sometimes this obscures the fact that he may in fact have been 
the originator of the idea under discussion or at least that he himself had previously held 
the same or similar views. Therefore, on the issue of the definition of personhood, it is 
difficult to distinguish what McCormick appropriates from Louis Janssens from his own 
original insights." Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral 
Theology, 204. Throughout this chapter I will show how McCormick has incorporated 
Janssens' eight aspects of the human person. 
28McCormick, Corrective Vision, 64. See also Thomas Clarke, S.J., "Public 
Policy And Christian Discernment" in Personal Values And Public Policy, ed. John C. 
Haughey, S.J. (Mahwah, NJ.: Paulist Press, 1979). 
29The following are some of the key elements of the Christian mysteries that 
McCormick isolates: God is the creator and preserver of human life; human persons are 
on a pilgrimage and thus have no lasting home in this world; in Jesus' life, death, and 
resurrection humans have been totally transformed both personally and communally; 
human persons remain subject to sin, although both sin and death have met their victor; 
the ultimate significance of human lives consists in developing a new life; the ultimate 
destiny of the combined journeys of human persons is the coming of the Kingdom; all 
humans are offered eternal life in and through Jesus Christ and the chief and central 
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Christ tells us what God thinks of us, and therefore we are--in spite of darkness, 
estrangement, sickness, and brokenness--basically loveable. "3° Created in the image and 
likeness of God, the human person is the central focus and crown of God's creation. 31 
The triad of creation-fall-redemption will be the vehicle for discovering and 
communicating how Christ gives new meaning to the world. It will be the vehicle for how 
the human person continues the process of redemption until the time when all humankind 
in the eschaton will be totally redeemed. There are various models and metaphors for 
viewing the human experience of creation-fall-redemption. There also exist secular variants 
of these models.32 However, the advantage of the Christian models is that "they have an 
ultimacy of reference--what God does for us in creation, what we do to ourselves in 
manifestation of this new life in Christ is the love for each other that manifests in 
concrete forms of justice, gratitude, forbearance, and chastity. For a more detailed 
analysis, see McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 49. 
30Ibid., 106-107. 
31 To clarify the position that the human person is the crown of creation, 
McCormick writes: "The fact that the universe antedated human life by millions of years 
and will be around after life as we know it has disappeared can be read as God's lavish 
way of presenting human life precisely as the crown of the universe. The actor remains 
central even though and when the stage is empty and when the show is, so to speak, over. 
We have seen such lavishness throughout the natural kingdom. Lavishness may be 
viewed as highlighting rather than decentralizing human life." Richard A. McCormick, 
S.J., "Gustafson's God: Who? What? Where? (ETC.)," Journal Of Religious Ethics 13 
(1985): 57. 
32The models and metaphors for viewing our experience and interpreting it that 
correspond to the triad of creation-fall-redemption have their roots in scripture, especially 
in St. Paul and St. John. Some of these models and metaphors are the following: light-
darkness-enlightenment; freedom-bondage-liberation; integrity-brokenness-reintegration; 
health-sickness-healing; and peace-estrangement-reconciliation. The secular variants of 
these models are: "ship-shape," "down-and-out," "on-the-mend." McCormick, Corrective 
Vision, 64-65. 
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sinfulness, what God does for us in redemption. "33 This device assists the human person in 
understanding the internal dimension of being, but human persons are more than internal 
beings. Human persons exist and act in the concrete world. 
The second heuristic device is a view from the outside. McCormick uses Thomas 
Clarke's notion of"climates" to explain that the human situation is made up not only of the 
characteristics of personhood (interiority, subjectivity) but also of climates (symbols, 
institutions, structures, manner of living, lifestyles, etc.). McCormick argues: 
These "climates" refer not only to laws and structures of a formal kind, but 
to informal climates like accepted habits of speech, physical settings, the 
influence of tradition and customs, mind-sets, popular and public values, etc. 
Such climates have a profound influence on how we think, feel, behave. 
They seep through our pores and become the shapers of our decisions and 
even our lives. The danger we daily face: that the values and priorities of a 
secular, material and unbelieving world will seep through and strengthen our 
lack of freedom and truth and run our lives in a kind of silent slavery. The 
opposite is also true. Personal attitudes and freely chosen relationships affect 
the climates in which we live and decide. 34 
In order to counteract these exterior climates that may bias the human person, Christianity 
has given much attention to "climates of grace." Grace shapes our priorities, values, habits, 
attitudes, and eventually our decisions. McCormick observes that "when this climate gets 
into decisions and relationships, it will get into our world and have a transforming effect. 






Emerging out of the triad of creation-fall-redemption comes the ultimate fact that 
Jesus Christ is God's total gift of self. For the Christian, this fact transforms the inner-
person and gives the person a new context and basis for understanding God, self, others, and 
the world. Although humanity has not yet realized its full redemption, the love of Christ 
challenges humanity to move forward in the process of redemption to the time when all 
humanity will be totally redeemed, that is, when Christ comes to claim the redeemed world. 
For McCormick, the response of faith by the human person is a response of the whole person 
to God's stunning and aggressive love in Jesus.36 
In order to analyze the full dimensions of how salvation history affects the human 
person, I will examine and evaluate separately each element of the creation-fall-redemption 
triad, because each of these elements play a foundational role in understanding McCormick's 
moral epistemology and moral criteriology. I will also examine and evaluate McCormick's 
positions on Christology, the incarnation, and eschatology. McCormick's views on these 
three doctrines play a major role in his theological anthropology even though they are not 
included explicitly in the creation-fall-redemption triad. In order to maintain the integrity 
of the triad, McCormick's views on these three doctrines will be treated separately at the end 
of this section. 
Doctrine Of Creation 
The foundation of McCormick's theological anthropology is rooted in the doctrine 
36McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theolo~y And Bioethics, 100. 
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of creation. The doctrine of creation is about the lasting relationship between God and all 
creation. God is the author and preserver of all life. God willed not only to create the world 
out of nothing and continually sustain it, but also to enter into a relationship with it. This 
relationship can never be overestimated. It is the basis for the fundamental Christian truth 
that human persons have their origin from God and are destined for God. 
The Christian tradition is anchored in the belief that God relates to and covenants 
with God's people. This covenant is the basis for the human person's social and relational 
nature. God would love all creation and all creation would love God in return. The special 
sense of intimacy God has with humanity, and not with the rest of the created world is the 
basis for understanding the human person as the crown and glory of God's creation. Each 
individual human person is graced with the gifts of reason and freedom making each unique 
and existing in a special relationship with God. This relationship finds its fulfillment in the 
love one has for God and is manifest in the love human persons have for one another. It is 
primarily in others that human persons are able to recognize and love God. This love, which 
has as a standard the love of Jesus Christ, is the crowning achievement of human 
relationality. It is through social, relational, and interdependent persons that the work of 
creation is advanced and humankind moves toward its ultimate destiny. Each person is an 
integral part of God's action and plan. Through the responsible use of the goods of creation, 
human persons assist God in bringing creation to its fulfillment. 
In order to understand the significance of the doctrine of creation for McCormick's 
theological anthropology I will consider the various aspects of the doctrine--the imago Dei, 
the uniqueness and diversity of the human person, covenant as a metaphor for human 
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sociality and relationality, and McCormick's view concerning humans as co-creators--and 
analyze each in depth. I will do this because each one plays an integral role in the doctrine 
of creation, but also because each aspect has a profound influence on his moral epistemology 
and moral criteriology. 
Imago Dei. As the author and preserver of life, God created human life out of 
nothing and thus gave life its ultimate meaning.37 McCormick writes: 
Just as God called the world out of chaos (nothing), just as He created a 
people (Israel) out of next to nothing and the new Israel out of insignificant 
beginnings, so He calls into being each one of us. Thus, Psalm 139: "Truly 
you have formed my innermost being; you knit me in my mother's womb." 
This is the thought-form that governs the biblical account of human life.38 
The ultimate meaning God gave human life is that all human life is sacred, because all 
human persons are unique and equal in the eyes of God. Created in the image of God, the 
37McCormick agrees with James Gustafson that God is not only the creator and 
preserver of order; God is the enabler of our possibilities. Earlier theologians put more 
emphasis on the creator-preserver perspective of God, which leads to a notion that God is 
directly and immediately involved in human causality, a kind of creationism. McCormick 
follows the analysis originally proposed by Karl Rabner which conceived of God as the 
transcendental ground of all created reality causally active only through created 
secondary causes. This will have a profound influence on how McCormick shapes moral 
arguments. For a more detailed analysis of this perspective, see McCormick, "Moral 
Arguments In Christian Ethics," Journal Of Contemporary Health. Law and Policy, I 
(1985): 7-8. See also James Gustafson, The Contributions Of Theolo~y To Medical 
Ethics (Milwaukee, WI.: Marquette University Press, 1975). 
38Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "'Biomedical Advances And The Catholic 
Perspective," in Contemporary Ethical Issues In The Jewish And Christian Traditions, ed. 
Frederick E. Greenspahn (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 1986), 41. 
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human person "is a member of God's family and the temple of the spirit."39 Therefore, God 
confers on humanity a sense of dignity, which makes everyone equally valuable. Sustained 
and preserved by God, the human person is totally dependent on God for human existence. 
The human person is dependent on God because being a creature implies finitude. That is 
to say, it imposes limitations on our being and on our doing. Human persons can make 
choices, but their choices are limited by time, space, and matter.40 As the preserver of life, 
and the ultimate destiny of the human person, God sustains humanity by God's self-gift of 
love. God created each human person out of love, which is the basis for the relationship of 
each person with God. Persons also fulfill their destiny by responding to God through others 
in a loving manner. Christians understand this God-relationship, that is, total self-gift, in and 
through Jesus Christ. God is self-gift and human persons are created in God's image and 
39Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Who Or What Is The Preembryo?," Kennedy 
Institute Of Ethics Journal 1(March1991): 12. 
400dozor writes that for McCormick, "In these circumstances therefore, good and 
evil are closely intertwined, and the good we achieve often comes at the price of 
deprivation and imperfection. Thus, we must kill to preserve life and freedom; we protect 
one through the pain of another; our education must at times be punitive; our health is 
preserved at times by pain and disfiguring mutilation; we protect our secrets by 
misstatements and our marriages and population by contraception and sterilization. 
Every choice is therefore a sacrifice that could bring about mixed and ambiguous results. 
Furthermore, finitude implies a practical limitation on human capacity to love. Although 
McCormick believes that the ideal to love one another as Christ loves us must be pursued 
constantly, he also understands that there are limits to what each finite creature can do. 
To refuse to accept this limitation is to fail to recognize that to impose perfect love on 
imperfect creatures is a disproportionate demand capable of turning creatures from God 
and in fact turns them into God." Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of 
Moral Theology, 78; see also McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic 
Tradition, 46; Idem, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 49. 
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likeness.41 
The imago Dei is an important aspect in understanding McCormick's doctrine of 
creation. The problem is that he never defines precisely what he means by it. McCormick 
writes that, "we are images of God in our humanity."42 However, he never explains what that 
image entails. One could infer from McCormick's writings that what he means by the imago 
Dei is the capacity of humans to be filled with the Spirit of God, which allows the person to 
reflect the qualities of God. If Jesus Christ, the exemplary human person, is God's total self-
gift of love, and this gift is offered to all human persons, then human persons image God in 
their ability to love. When the human person responds to others in love, he or she is 
reflecting the qualities of kindness, generosity, and fidelity that characterize God. 
In summary, the imago Dei is the foundation for McCormick's doctrine of creation. 
Created in the image of God, each human person has been created by God out of love. Each 
human person has an intrinsic dignity that is not subject to whims or calculations.43 Finally, 
each human person has a destiny that can be fulfilled by responding to God through relating 
to others lovingly. For McCormick, the imago Dei is not a static concept given once-for-all. 
Rather, it is as dynamic as the human person is dynamic. The human person deepens in the 
imago Dei by responding to God, others, and the world lovingly.44 
41McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theology And Bioethics, I 02. 
42McCormick, The Critical Callin~, 268. 
430dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 77. 
44McCormick's notion of the human person being created in the image and 
likeness of God corresponds to Janssens' view of the human person as a bodily subject in 
relationship with God. Janssens argues that human persons are to know and worship God 
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Uniqueness and diversity of the human person. McCormick argues that "uniqueness 
and diversity (sexual, racial, ethnic, cultural) are treasured aspects of the human condition. 
Theologically viewed, we are images of God in our humanity, in its enchanting, irreplaceable 
uniqueness and differences. "45 Created in the image and likeness of God, with the same 
origin, nature, and destiny, human persons share not only a basic uniqueness and equality but 
also a basic individual dignity. The Judaeo-Christian tradition has always viewed human 
persons as "in relationship to God." McCormick writes: 
This means that persons are the bearers of an "alien dignity," a dignity 
rooting in the value God puts in them . . . The greatest affirmation of this 
alien dignity is, of course, God's Word--become flesh. As Christ is of God, 
and Christ is the man, so all persons are God's, his darlings, deriving their 
dignity from the value He is putting on them. This perspective stands as a 
profound critique of our tendency to assess persons functionally, to weaken 
our hold on the basic value that is human life. It leads to a particular care for 
the weakest, most voiceless, voteless, defenseless members of society: 
orphans, the poor, the aged, the mentally and physically sick, the unbom.46 
There are certain common features of humanity that every human person shares. However, 
because each person is an individual, each person embodies these common features 
differently and to different degrees. No two people can be expected to respond to the same 
situation in the same way. Each person is the same but different because of the gifts of 
reason and free will bestowed upon them by God. What the human person thinks and how 
in all they do. The God-relationship is the most profound and ultimate aspect of the 
person. 
45McCormick, The Critical Calling, 268. 
46McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 10-11. Emphasis in the original. 
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the human person responds forms the basis of human individuality. 
As rational beings, human persons have the ability to discover and analyze the basic 
values of life. Our dispositions, perspectives, and beliefs are the mark of our unique 
character. These dispositions and perspectives have their roots in the affections, feelings, 
and sensitivities of each person as well as our discursive reasoning. Human persons have 
also been given the gift of free will that allows them to make choices. McCormick places 
great emphasis on human freedom in regards to the uniqueness and individuality of the 
person. McCormick believes: 
Freedom is often presented as a quantity, something I possess at the age of 
reason and unpackage as I mature. Contrarily, freedom is much more 
accurately described as a task, something to be built and acquired. We do not 
have it; we must first earn it. It is the increasing ability to dispose of 
myself.47 
McCormick argues that freedom is not just the freedom of choice to do a certain thing or not. 
Rather, the freedom to which McCormick refers is what Karl Rahner calls "basic or 
fundamental freedom." Concerning basic human freedom, McCormick writes: 
It is the more basic choice with respect to the whole meaning and direction 
of my life. It is "yes" or "no" to the whole moral order. It is the free 
determination of one's self with regard to the totality of existence, a 
fundamental choice between love and selfishness, between ourselves and God 
our Savior. It is the fundamental acceptance or rejection of the grace that is 
the person of Jesus into my life as invitation of the Father. It is our 
acceptance or rejection deep in our persons of God's enabling love.48 
47Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "The Moral Theology Of Vatican II," in The 
Future Of Ethics And Moral Theology (Chicago, IL.: Argus Communications Co., 1968), 
17. 
48McCormick, Corrective Vision, 59. See also Karl Rahner, Foundations Of 
Christian Faith (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 93-97; and Ronald Modras, "The 
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Basic freedom presupposes that the moral order "is properly and primarily constituted by the 
order of personal response," which involves the exercise of a basic choice between self and 
God and between love and selfishness.49 Therefore, it refers to the relationship between the 
agent as a free person and his or her actions. Like freedom of choice, it is expressed through 
one's choice of particular goods. However, whereas freedom of choice concerns the 
psychological motivations or principles behind our choice of particular objects, fundamental 
freedom involves a basic orientation or a fundamental option on the part of the self-conscious 
subject to realize himself or herself either in openness to God and thus to other conscious 
subjects or through withdrawal from them.50 
For McCormick, it is human intention, or the basic direction of human actions 
governed by one's knowledge and freedom that is the core of human individuality and 
Implications OfRahner's Anthropology For Fundamental Moral Theology," Horizons 12 
(1985): 70-90. Odozor argues that McCormick's notion of"basic freedom" has six 
characteristics: "(l) It is free. It is within the power, and it is the responsibility of the 
moral agent to realize 'the fundamental posture or orientation toward the ultimate good of 
human life' through object choices and a fundamental option or self-disposition. (2) It is 
supernatural because the radical disposition of the self characteristic of fundamental 
option is inconceivable without divine empowerment under the grace of the Spirit. (3) It 
is obscure. Fundamental freedom is located at the deepest level of human consciousness 
and thus excludes adequate conceptual and propositional formulation. ( 4) Although it 
defies total conceptualization, basic freedom is still conscious without objective 
formulation. ( 5) We cannot say with certainty when a moral agent opts for openness 
toward God and the world or makes a negative commitment against them. (6) 
Fundamental freedom is a definite and total commitment, which 'excludes the possibility 
of a series of quickly repeated transitions between life and death.'" Odozor, Richard A. 
McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 84-85; see also McCormick, The 
Critical Calling, 174-175. 
49McCormick, "The New Morality," 770. 
500dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 83. 
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uniqueness. Every human person shares the common features of humanity, but who we are 
as historical beings, will determine the different uses of these common features. By 
historical beings McCormick is referring to our being rooted in time and space and to our 
characteristic as changing beings whose self-definition and experience of self emerge from 
a consciousness in contact with a rapidly changing world. 51 As historical beings, each person 
matures through stages, each with specific challenges and possibilities. Furthermore, persons 
live in social groups that have their own cultural history and development. 52 This means that 
a person's racial, religious, ethnic, and sexual characteristics will play a role in determining 
one's distinctiveness or uniqueness.53 The cultural, religious, and familial values a person 
holds will determine who that person is and the types of decisions that person will make. 
Created by God in our uniqueness and "diversity," all human persons should respect and 
value one another for who and what they are. Jesus Christ, the perfect human person, stands 
as a model for the uniqueness and "diversity" of the human person. 54 The self-giving of 
Christ is not only the basis for this individuality and "diversity," it is also the core of who 
51lbid., 78-79; see also McCormick, "The New Morality," 771. 
52McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 17. 
53McCormick's view of the uniqueness and diversity of the human person 
corresponds to Janssens' concept of the person as a subject, a historical being, and 
Janssens' notion of human persons as fundamentally equal. 
541t should be noted that what McCormick is trying to emphasize here is that we 
must respect all people. He fears that "diagnostic and eugenic interventions that would 
bypass, downplay, or flatten these diversities and uniqueness should be viewed as 
temptations. We have a mixed history in the United States regarding sterilization of the 
retarded and other 'undesirables.'" Created in God's image requires us to treat all people 
with dignity and respect. For a more detailed analysis, see McCormick, The Critical 
Callin~, 268-269. 
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we are as human persons--social and relational beings. 
Covenant: human sociality and relationality. The Christian tradition is anchored in 
faith, based on the belief that God relates to and covenants with a people. McCormick 
observes that "God covenanted with the Jewish people, with a group. It was within a group 
and through a group that the individual was responsible and responsive to God. "55 This 
loving, graced relationship or covenant between God and God's people is a metaphor to 
explain the human person's social and relational nature.56 McCormick argues that "if a 
person's dignity is radically in his relationship to God, and if this is a relationship pursued 
and matured only through relationships to other persons, then this relationship to God is 
unavoidably social."57 The Hebrew scriptures offer a number of stories about God's 
covenant with the Jewish people that attest to this fact. But this is even clearer in the New 
Testament with Paul's notion of "being in Christ" as a shared existence. Paul refers 
frequently to the human person's new being which is being in a community. 58 To be a 
55McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 12. Emphasis in the original. 
56The social and relational aspect of McCormick's view of the human person is 
similar to Janssens' view of the human person as living in social groups and the human 
person as essentially interpersonal. 
57McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 12. 
58 Further McCormick writes: "Assumption into Christ means assumption into His 
Body, His People. We cannot exist as Christians except in a community, and we cannot 
define ourselves except as 'of a Body.' Hence it is Christianly axiomatic that the 
community of believers (the Church) is the extension of the Incarnation. It is similarly 
axiomatic that those actions wherein we initiate into, fortify, restore, and intensify the 
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Christian is to be a part of a believing community, an ecclesia. McCormick states: "Our 
being in Christ is a shared being. We are vines of one branch and sheep of the same 
shepherd. "59 
McCormick argues that this sense of community, which is at the core of Christian 
consciousness, has two implications. He writes: 
First, it has meant that my freedom to realize my potentialities as a person is 
conditioned by the authenticity of the members of the community, and vice 
versa--that is, the community exists for the individual. Second, it means that 
we cannot exist in isolation, neither can we know as Christians in isolation, 
and it would be un-Christian to think we do or hope that we could. Our 
shared knowledge is concerned with God's wonderful saving events and their 
moral implications.60 
Each individual has been given gifts and talents by God, but to reach self-fulfillment as 
individuals and as a people it is necessary that these gifts and talents be shared with and 
complemented by those of others. This sense of radical sociality suggests that the well-being 
of persons is interdependent. Further, the well-being of one person cannot be conceived of 
or realistically pursued independently of the good of others since being a social creature is 
part of human being and becoming.61 McCormick argues: 
We exist in relationships, and are dead without them. This is not surprising 
for those who believe that man is created in the image and likeness of God. 
For the more we know of God, the more we know that He is relation, that His 
Christlife (the Christian sacraments) are at once Christ's actions and the actions of the 
community." Ibid. 
59McCormick, "Biomedical Advances And The Catholic Perspective," 44. 
60McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 12-13. 
61McCormick, "Bioethical Advances And The Catholic Perspective," 44-45. 
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very being is "being-in-and-for-another."62 
McCormick argues that to be a human person "means to have the capacity, actually or 
potentially, for significant human relationships. It is, I believe, not a Christian discovery. 
but a typically Christian insistence that the crowning achievement of human relationships 
is love. "63 
The ultimate meaning of the relational constitution of the human person is love. 
Human relationships are the very possibility of growth in the love of God and neighbor. 
McCormick writes: 
As my ability to love God is His gift to me, so our ability to love each other 
is our gift to each other. The greatest human need is to be loved. For 
unloved, I remain unloving, withdrawn, self-encased. But when I am loved 
in a full human way, selfbood, personal dignity, a feeling of security, a sense 
of worth and dignity is conferred upon me--the very things which enable me 
to respond to others as persons, to love them. Thus it is clear that because my 
greatest fulfillment is the other-centeredness of love (and charity), my 
greatest human need is for that which created the possibility; that is love from 
others, their acceptance of me as a person. Similarly my greatest gift to them 
is my self-donation to them because this is also their greatest need. 64 
It is the ability to relate to others that allows the human person to love God. This ability 
occurs within a group and through a group. McCormick understands that to love our 
neighbor is in some real sense to love God. He quotes 1 John 4: 20-21 to clarify this point. 
"If any man says I love God and hates his brother, he is a liar. For he who loves not his 
62lbid. Emphasis in the original. 
63McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 14. 
64McCormick, "Man's Moral Responsibility For Health," 17. 
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brother, whom he sees, how can he love God, whom he does not see?" The good our love 
wants to do for God and to which God enables the human person, can be done only for the 
neighbor. This is a point Karl Rahner has argued, and McCormick accepts his position. For 
Rahner and McCormick, the love of God and the love of neighbor are inseparable. It is the 
love of neighbor that unites the human person with God. 65 McCormick writes: 
It is in others that God demands to be recognized and loved. If this is true, 
it means that in Christian perspective, the meaning, substance, and 
consummation of life are found in human relationships. 66 
In swnmary, in the covenantal relationship God has with us, God gives God's love 
freely and waits for a response. McCormick argues that "our radical acceptance of God is 
tied to love of the neighbor--a love that secures rights, relieves suffering, promotes growth. 
God is speaking to us in history and we are not free to be uninvolved."67 Response to God 
must be both individual and corporate and can occur only by relating to others lovingly. As 
65 Rahner writes: "Christian love of neighbor is both in potency and in act a 
moment of the infused supernatural theological virtue of caritas by which we love God in 
his Spirit for his own sake and in direct community with him. This means, therefore, that 
the love of neighbor is not merely the preparation, effect, fruit and touchstone of the love 
of God but is itself an act of this love of God itself; in other words, it is at least an act 
within that total believing and hoping surrender of man to God which we call love and 
which alone justifies man, i.e., hands him over to God, because, being supported by the 
loving self-communication of God in the uncreated grace of the Holy Spirit, it really 
unites man with God, not as He is recognized by us but as He is in Himself in His 
absolute divinity." Karl Rahner, "Reflections On The Unity Of The Love Of Neighbor 
And The Love Of God," Theological Investigations vol. 6 (Baltimore, MD.: Helicon, 
1969), 236. 
66McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 54. Emphasis in 
the original. 
67McCormick, The Critical Calling, 12. 
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social beings, in loving relationship with God through others, human persons are 
interdependent, and should never seek self-fulfillment independently of the goods of others. 
This quality ofrelationality will define McCormick's understanding of the human person and 
forms the basis of his theological anthropology. 
Human persons as co-creators. As part of the loving covenant God has with us, God 
calls human persons to bring creation to its fulfillment, its ultimate destiny, when "all will 
be all."68 One can infer from McCormick's writings that his view of co-creatorship is based 
both in the anthropology of Vatican II and Janssens' first aspect of the human person's 
essential dimension where the person is a subject, normally called to consciousness, to act 
according to conscience, in freedom and in a responsible way.69 Human persons are beings-
in-the-world whose challenge is to transform not only humanity but the natural order.70 
According to the Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modern World, the Council 
teaches: 
Man, created in God's image, received a mandate to subject to himself the 
earth and all that it contains, and to govern the world with holiness and 
68This refers to 1 Corinthians 15: 28--"And when everything is subject to him, 
then the Son himself will be subject in his tum to the One who subjected all things to 
him, so that God may be all in all." 
691 have stated earlier that because McCormick cites Janssens' eight essential 
aspects of the human person, it is fair to conclude that they reflect his own anthropology. 
70The transformation of the natural order is referring to the positive and negative 
uses of science and technology. Vatican II notes that "technology is now transforming the 
face of the earth and is already trying to master outer space." "Pastoral Constitution On 
The Church In The Modem World," no. 5, 203. 
justice; a mandate to relate himself and the totality of things to Him who was 
to be acknowledged as the Lord and Creator of all . . . They can justly 
consider that by their labor they are unfolding the Creator's work, consulting 
the advantages of their brother men, and contributing by their personal 
industry to the realization in history of the divine plan. 71 
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Since the human person has been gifted with a creative intellect and free will, then God is 
to be viewed as an enabler of human abilities and potentialities. McCormick argues that this 
perspective is adopted by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theo/ogica Ia-Ilae, 91, 2: 
Rationalis creatura . .. fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens [a creature 
endowed with reason participates in providence by providing for self and others]. God 
committed the natural order to us as intelligent and creative persons. In this sense he is not 
only the creator of the natural order, but the enabler of our potentialities through our 
innovative interventions. 72 McCormick interprets Aquinas to mean that God has graced the 
human person with the means to bring creation to its fulfillment. When these means are used 
to help others and to serve God, then creation is advanced toward its ultimate destiny. 
Further, the human person also has the ability to misuse the goods of creation for self-serving 
motives. McCormick writes: "Thus our attitude toward the world must live in paradoxical 
71 Ibid., no. 34, 232. 
72McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 16. McCormick 
also quotes John Macquarrie to reinforce his position. Macquarrie writes: "The doctrines 
of creation and providence make possible an ultimate trust but at the cost of imposing an 
ultimate responsibility. We are not only creatures, but co-creators with God who 'have a 
share in shaping an as yet fluid and plastic world--a world in which the most fluid entity 
is human nature itself."' McCormick, "Bioethics And Method," 310. See also John 
Macquarrie, in Christian Theology: A Case Study Awroach, eds. Robert A. Evans and 
Thomas D. Parker (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 94. 
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tension, combining both appreciation and manipulation."73 On the one hand, human persons 
are creatures and completely dependent on God for their existence. On the other hand, they 
are also responsible for playing a role in bringing creation to its fulfillment. An example of 
how the human person combines both an appreciation and a manipulation of creation would 
be gene therapy associated with adenosine deaminase (ADA) deficiency syndrome.74 Gene 
therapy in this situation involves "the removal of bone marrow cells, then treatment of them 
with modified viruses in order to insert a new and normal gene, and finally replacement of 
the bone marrow cells back into the patient's body where the new gene would code properly 
for the deficient enzyme or protein."75 Saving a person's life by this type of gene therapy 
is an example of how creation can be manipulated responsibly. The human person is to love 
and respect what God has created and at times manipulate it in order to bring creation to its 
ultimate destiny. Such a realization in history of God's divine plan is only to be 
accomplished by the responsible manipulation of creation for the good of God and humanity. 
However, the human person can also misuse the goods of creation for selfish motives. This 
is a direct effect of the Fall. 
73McCormick, "Bioethics And Method," 310. 
74 
"ADA deficiency syndrome is a purine salvage pathway enzyme that converts 
adenosine and deoxyadenosine to inosine and deoxyinosine, respectively. ADA 
deficiency results in elevated quantities of deoxyadenosine triphosphate, which inhibits 
DNA synthesis. These children may be normal at birth but develop progressive 
immunologic impairment as deoxyATP accumulates." For a detailed analysis, see The 
Merck Manual, 315. 
75McCormick, The Critical Calling, 262. 
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Doctrine Of The Fall 
The Christian tradition teaches that the first man and woman disobeyed God. As a 
result, the covenant with God was broken. Enfranchised with the gifts of reason and free 
will, the Fall took place and sin entered the world (Genesis 3: 1-24 ). In the wake of the Fall, 
many Catholic theologians teach that the imago Dei was not entirely lost; rather, it was only 
badly damaged or weakened. This translates into the Catholic position that humanity, which 
is fallen, remains essentially good and with the grace of God can distinguish between what 
is morally right and should be done and what is morally wrong and should be avoided. 
Catholic theologians have historically based their theological anthropology predominantly 
in the doctrines of Creation and Incarnation. 
McCormick's interpretation of the Fall follows a traditional Catholic understanding. 
Human beings have been gifted with reason and free will, and while the Fall and its effects 
have weakened both, reason and free will are not utterly destroyed. The life, death, and 
resurrection of Christ have transformed the human situation, but not totally. Sin exists in the 
world and the human person, being imperfect, is still susceptible to its effects. McCormick 
writes: 
The tradition has viewed man as redeemed but still affected by the reliquiae 
peccati (remnants of sin). In the words of the scholastics, man is tofus 
conversus sed non totaliter (a total convert but not totally). This means that 
notwithstanding the transforming gift of God's enabling grace, we remain 
vulnerable to self-love and self-deception (sin) and that these noxious 
influences affect our evaluative and judgmental processes ('primi hominis 
culpa obtenebrate '--'obscured by the fault of the first human being').76 
76McCormick, The Critical Calling, 50. See also Denzinger-Schonmetzer, 
Enchiridion Svmbolorum (Barcelona: Herder, 1963), no. 2853. 
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In McCormick's writings he distinguishes original sin, individual, personal sin, and 
social sin. Original sin is the direct result of the Fall. The consequence of original sin is that 
the human person has been diminished, and his or her path to fulfillment has been blocked. 
Sin entered the world and along with human creaturehood and finitude, ambiguity became 
part of the human condition.77 As a result of the Fall, both human reason and freedom have 
become even more vulnerable. McCormick writes: 
Human beings are not disincarnated spirits with instantaneous understanding 
and freedom. Their knowledge comes slowly, painfully, processively. Their 
freedom is a gradual achievement. Their choices are limited by space, time, 
and matter. The good they achieve is often at the expense of the good left 
undone or the evil caused. In Bergson's words, "every choice is a sacrifice." 
Every commission involves an omission. Thus our choices are mixed, 
ambiguous. This intertwining of good and evil in our choices brings 
ambiguity into the world. The limitations of human beings become 
eventually the limitations of the world, and the limitations of the world return 
to us in the form of tragic conflict situations. 78 
Humanity has been redeemed, but because of the Fall, there is a need for daily redemption. 
Temptation is now part of life. McCormick argues: 
We know that the just are those who have turned to God and embraced His 
holy will in faith. Yet we also know that they are exposed to temptation. 
The pilgrim just have not achieved the ultimate depths of free adherence to 
770dozor argues that for McCormick, sin is not the only cause of ambiguity in 
human choice. Odozor states: ''Ambiguity is primarily a result of the human condition, a 
result of human creaturehood and finitude. To argue otherwise would be to imply that sin 
is the cause of human finitude and creaturehood and to suggest that but for sin, all 
constraints to human knowing and doing would be nonexistent. McCormick does not 
subscribe to such a view. Because he acknowledges ambiguity he also acknowledges 
conflicts in moral decision-making." Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal 
Of Moral Theology, 1 71. 
78McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 46. 
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God. Their charity is, in this sense, incomplete. 79 
McCormick argues that there are two facts of human experience that make this obvious. He 
writes: 
First, is our lack of freedom. St. Paul stated: "For I do not do the good I 
want, but the evil I do not want is what I do" (Romans 7: 10). As a result of 
the Fall there is a certain lack of freedom in our condition as human beings, 
an inconsistency in acting according to our basic option. Second, our human 
condition is accurately described as lack of truth. We lie to ourselves and to 
one another. We turn away from the evil (and the good) in ourselves and in 
our actions. We prefer not to face it. It is uncomfortable, unflattering, 
unsettling. We are generous to a fault, especially our own.80 
The human person lives this daily tension. On the one hand, the human person is confronted 
by the acceptance of God's enabling love into one's being. On the other hand, there exists 
the ratification of sin in the unfolding of one's life. Life is a struggle between charity, which 
is the center of all virtues, and self-love, which is the root of all sin. 
McCormick understands individual, personal sin to be a change in one's basic 
orientation toward God. He believes: "Sin involves a conversion to the creature, but its 
principal element is aversion from God. That is, sins concerned with this or that object are 
signs of a deeper rebellion, even though this deeper rebellion is not real except in particular 
acts."81 For McCormick, conversion is a reestablishing of the fundamental posture which 
is the acceptance and deepening of God's enabling love into the very being of the person. 
Individual, personal sin for McCormick is an internal act, which contravenes the 
79McCormick, "The Moral Theology Of Vatican II," 16. 
80McCormick, Corrective Vision, 57-58. 
81McCormick, "The Moral Theology Of Vatican II," 14. 
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moral order in different ways. It is the heart that is sinful. McCormick uses scripture to 
clarify his position. He writes: 
In the parable of the prodigal Son (Luke 15: 11-31) sin is not only an action 
against God, but above all a withdrawal of a son from the supremacy and 
charity of the father. Similarly, St. John treats individual sins as manifesting 
the internal situation (anomia) of the sinner (1 John 3:4). Individual sins are 
consequences of this internal situation. In St. Paul, hamartia is sin 
personified, a kind of power in man. This power originates with the sin of 
Adam but is freely accepted by the sinner and becomes the font of various 
sins. 82 
For McCormick, individual, personal sins are the manifestation of the fundamental sin that 
occurred as a result of the Fall. McCormick further clarifies his position on individual, 
personal sin by making a distinction between mortal sin and venial sin. For McCormick, 
mortal sin is an act of fundamantal liberty by which a person disposes of self before God 
who is calling him or her through grace. It is therefore a fundamantal option, in which an 
individual turns in rejection from the charity of Christ whether Christ is thematically known 
or not. 83 Venial sin is not an act of fundamental or core liberty. It is rather a relatively 
821bid. 
83 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Personal Conscience," Chicago Studies 13 (Fall 
1974): 248-250. McCormick continues: "It is the rupture of a covenant relationship with 
the God of salvation and therefore also with His people, the Church. Since mortal sin is a 
denial of charity, it bespeaks the death of the life of friendship with God. If such a mortal 
illness becomes one's final option, it effects eternal death. But as long as it is not final 
and definitive conversion is possible, but only with the grace of Christ." This type of 
personal upheaval does not usually occur except in matters that are sufficiently grave. 
For McCormick, "serious matter is that concrete human disorder likely to provoke an 
individual to the use of basic freedom in the rejection of God. It is that peak moment in 
which a person can embody and seal a disintegrating relationship with the God of 
salvation. Whether an individual does sever his relationship with God (commit mortal 
sin), we generally cannot say with certainty." Ibid. 
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superficial act involving only peripheral or slight freedom. 84 
Sin has more than an individual, personal manifestation. It also has a social 
manifestation. Social sin is the result of the power of sin in the world. 85 The human person 
must focus on both the interior and exterior components of sin in order to understand the 
reality of sin in the world. As social and relational beings, sin cannot be conceived of as 
only an isolated act of an individual since it also has societal, structural dimensions. For 
example, McCormick writes: "We began to see that the sins and selfishness of one 
generation became the inhibiting conditions of the next. The structures and institutions that 
oppress people, deprive them of their rights and alienate them are embodiments of our sinful 
condition. "86 
There is an inevitable relationship between individual, personal sin and social sin. 
Because for McCormick, the love of God and neighbor are inseparable. Therefore, it follows 
that the love of neighbor must also be inseparable from justice to the neighbor. As social 
beings, individuals participate in society by helping to create social structures. Some of 
84lbid., 249. McCormick writes: "Venial sin, committed as it is at a less central 
level of person, is compatible with love of God (charity) alive in the depths of the soul. 
But it undermines the fervor of charity and, over a period of time, can dispose one for the 
commission of mortal sin. Ibid. 
85 McCormick writes: "The power of sin in the world, even the redeemed world, 
remains virulent and manifests itself in oppressive and enslaving structures, both 
individual and social, that touch us all. Individually we are anxious, neurotic, physically 
ill, selfish, emotionally crippled, instinctively limited. Socially our structures prevent 
equality of opportunity, reinforce poverty and greed, discriminate. All these things isolate 
and divide us and inhibit our growth as loving persons." McCormick, The Critical 
Calling, 307. 
86McCormick, Corrective Vision, 18. 
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these social structures are the direct cause of various forms of oppression, injustice, and 
exploitation. Because human persons share in the creation of these structures and the 
maintaining of them, individuals also share in the responsibility for the sinfulness they cause. 
Examples of social sin would include: racial discrimination, economic systems that exploit 
the worker such as migrant farm workers, exclusion of women from certain positions, etc. 
There are many biblical images that attest to this: "the prince of this world," "the power of 
darkness," "the elements of this world," "principalities and powers." These phrases convey 
the idea that sinfulness can be embodied in our very institutions and ways of doing things, 
in the air we breathe. 87 
As a result of the Fall, the presence and influence of sin pervades all creation. 
However, sin does not destroy the basic goodness of all that God has created. For 
McCormick, there is always hope. That hope is Jesus Christ, the supreme liberator. In Jesus 
Christ the human person has been transformed. For McCormick, this transformation has far-
reaching ramifications for all of creation. 
Doctrine Of Redemption 
McCormick understands redemption to be God's saving activity through Jesus Christ 
in delivering humanity from sin and evil. As a pilgrim people who have been adversely 
affected by the Fall, humankind has been redeemed by the life, suffering, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. The human condition that is imbued by sin, suffering, and 
87lbid., 65. 
ambiguity is now opened to mercy, forgiveness, and redemption. McCormick writes: 
Jesus came to liberate us all by his graceful presence (life-death-resurrection) 
from the grips of sin and from its structural manifestations. This he did by 
offering to us the capacity to love after his example, and thus fulfill our 
potential as human beings. A lifetime work. 88 
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For McCormick, the effect of being redeemed by Christ is that human persons have been 
totally transformed into "new creatures" into a community of the transformed.89 In Jesus' 
life, death, and resurrection, sin and death have been overcome and have met their victor.90 
McCormick argues that "we are offered in and through Jesus Christ eternal life. Just as Jesus 
has overcome death (and now lives), so will we who cling to him, placing our faith and hope 
in him and taking him as our law and model. "91 
As redeemed, something profound has happened to the human person. The love of 
Christ, which is God's gift of charity, has been poured into the very being of the human 
person. McCormick argues that "it is our task--and one with eternal stakes--to protect, 
nourish, support, extend, and deepen that great gift. "92 For McCormick, it is the love of 
Christ that guides the "new creature" to the ultimate end. This end, however, is not always 
88McCormick, The Critical Calling, 307. 
89McCormick's phrase "new creatures" appears to come from 2 Corinthians 5: 17--
"And for anyone who is in Christ, there is a new creation, the old creation has gone, and 
now the new one is here." In referring to the love commandment McCormick writes: 
'This is the new law (John 13:34) since it is internal, 'natural' to the new creature (2 Cor. 
5:17), ... " McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theology And Bioethics, 103. 
90McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 49. 
91Ibid. 
92McCormick, Corrective Vision, 57. 
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realized. Redeemed in Christ, the "new creature" is still threatened by the reliquiae peccati 
[remnants of sin]. Humans have a tendency to make idols and to pursue the basic goods of 
life as ends in themselves. McCormick writes: 
This is the radical theological meaning of secularization: the loss of the 
context which subordinates and relativizes these basic human goods and 
which prevents our divinizing them. The goods are so attractive that our 
constant temptation is to center our being on them as ultimate ends, to cling 
to them with our whole being. 93 
It is only with Jesus as the standard of human love that human persons are able to avoid this 
type of idolatry, because as "new creatures" we are free and powerful in Christ's grace.94 
Human persons have been redeemed, but they must also grow into the fullness of their 
redemption. 95 
What McCormick means specifically by becoming a "new creature" as the effect of 
redemption is not clear. It is only in McCormick's later writings that one finds this notion 
of "new creature." The reason for this is that from 1983 to the present McCormick has 
written primarily in the area of bioethics from a theological perspective. As a result, he has 
introduced certain theological notions that have not had the advantage of being fully 
developed over the years.96 
93McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theolo~y And Bioethics, 106-107. 
94When McCormick speaks of Jesus as the standard of our love he means "that 
Jesus' love was that of absolute righteousness or purity of heart. That is, it was a love 
shaped by the absoluteness and ultimacy of the God-relationship." Ibid., 106. 
95McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 46. 
96For a more detailed analysis of the categorizing of McCormick's writings into 
three distinct periods, refer to Chapter One, Richard A. McCormick, S.J.--Moral 
Theologian section above. It is interesting to note that in the first period of his writing, 
106 
One can infer from McCormick's writings since 1983 that it is Jesus' love that 
empowers the human person and makes the human person a "new creature." It empowers 
the human person to love God in and through one's neighbor. McCormick writes: 
... in Jesus, God confronts us to tell us who we are and what we may 
become, to enlarge our humanity, to create and deepen our capacity for the 
Godlife. He confronts us to mirror to us our true potential, and by mirroring 
to confer it. This conferring liberates us from those cultural, hereditary, and 
personal hang-ups and deformities that drain self-respect and stifle our 
growth.91 
As "new creatures" McCormick believes the human person is liberated and empowered. 
Liberated from self-distrust to self-esteem, from anxiety to peace, from emptiness and 
alienation to joyful hope, and from the slavery of compromised secular value judgments to 
fearless Christian value judgments. Empowered, the hwnan person can recognize and fulfill 
one's true potential and help others realize the fullness of their potential. 98 
Jesus Christ, as the standard of love, shapes the basic priorities of the "new creature" 
and suggests the shape of Christian love for one another. The effects of redemption for 
McCormick include both individual redemption and social redemption. He argues that, if 
human beings allow the grace of Christ to transform them totally, then 
1957-1967, McCormick was still operating within the classicist mentality. During this 
time he wrote his dissertation (510 pages) entitled, "The Removal Of A Fetus Probably 
Dead To Save The Life Of The Mother." The word "God" is used only five times and 
there are no references to "Jesus" or "Christ." It is in the third period, from 1983 to the 
present, when McCormick decides to write primarily in the area of bioethics from a 
theological perspective that he introduces theological notions such as: "new creature," 
Christology, incarnation, and eschatology. However, he fails to fully develop them. 
97McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 27. 
98lbid., 28. 
it will inevitably get into our habits, values, and attitudes and thus into our 
decisions small and large. It will shape our priorities. And when this climate 
gets into our decisions and relationships, it will get into the world and have 
a transforming affect [sic]. 99 
107 
Christ's love relativizes all human goods in a world that has a tendency to absolutize them. 
As McCormick writes: 
Christ's suffering and cross were both a symbolic contextualizing of human 
goods and the profoundest act of love. Therefore, those who strive to follow 
Him ("as I have loved you") are performing the profoundest act of love for 
the world by pursuing in interpersonal life the basic goods within their 
context, as subordinate. In this sense, both Christ's love for us as standard, 
and therefore our love for each other, constitutes a profound relativizing of 
basic human values. 100 
As "new creatures" in Christ, Christians are called to challenge any tendency to absolutize 
not only individual goods, but institutions, structures, and ideas. Human beings are called 
to an ongoing conversion until they reach the ultimate destiny of their combined journeys--
the coming of the kingdom. The present can never be absolutized because it is always 
incomplete. It is only in the future, with the return of the glorified Christ to claim the 
redeemed world, that human beings as a pilgrim people redeemed in Christ will reach 
fulfillment. 
99McCormick, Corrective Vision, 66. It should be noted here that while 
McCormick utilizes much of Karl Rahner' s anthropology Rahner would not agree with 
McCormick's notion of "being transformed totally." Freedom, for Rahner, entails the 
"whole self' making a decision. But because the human person can never fully integrate 
all aspects of his or her self, one can never give one's self totally over to either good or 
evil. See Rahner, Foundations Of Christian Faith, 97-106; and Idem, "The Fundamental 
Option," Theological Investigations vol. VI, 181-188. 
100McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theology And Bioethics, 107. 
Emphasis in the original. 
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Conversion is central in understanding what McCormick means by the effects of 
redemption. McCormick argues: 
Too often we have viewed forgiveness in its narrowest sense as a definitive 
act or declaration of non-imputation. In a larger and richer sense, it is the 
whole process of withdrawal from sin, of deepening antipathy to sin, of 
refashioning of the sinner. It is a many-sided process ofliberation capable 
of infinite increase and perfection. One's deepening inner revulsion for and 
psychological opposition to sin is part of the process. Conversion is, we 
might say, a deepening of the fundamental option. 101 
The radical acceptance of God is tied to the love of neighbor--a love that secures rights, 
relieves suffering, and promotes growth. 102 This entails not only a personal conversion but 
the conversion and transformation of creation. McCormick writes further that conversion 
means 
not simply individual one-on-one action for those we generally avoid (the 
mentally ill, the starving, the sick, criminals, poor minorities, etc.); it means 
organizing the corporate power of the community in such a way that so-called 
"sinful structures" are changed. The structures which oppress people, 
alienate them, deprive them of rights, are embodiments of our sinful 
structure. 103 
As social and relational beings, human persons live in community and are responsible for 
one another. For example, as persons, Christians are called to bind every wound, shelter the 
sick, share possessions with the poor, educate the young, offer compassion to the bereaved, 
protect the innocent, bring therapy to the mentally ill--but above all to work to change the 
structures that allow human deprivations to exist--and always with the intent to expand a 
101McCormick, "Moral Theology Of Vatican II," 17. 
102McCormick, The Critical Calling, 12. 
103lbid., 12-13. 
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person's capacity to love by loving that person in every concrete way possible. Human 
persons learn to love by being loved. 104 Conversion is an ongoing process, which challenges 
individual Christians to expand the capacities of love in their own lives and to expand the 
capacities of others to love by liberating them from all that prevents love from growing and 
flowering. 
In conclusion, for McCormick, it appears that love is the basis of being a '"new 
creature" in Christ. As a standard, Christ not only sensitizes humanity to the meaning of 
persons, but also on how to view and intend the world. Human beings are called to an 
ongoing conversion and to transform not only self but also others and the world. This is a 
lifelong process that will find its completion only when the glorified Christ comes to claim 
the redeemed world. 
Christo logy, Incarnation, And Eschatology 
McCormick states that his own theological anthropology consists in viewing the 
human person in terms of the great Christian mysteries of creation-fall-redemption. We are 
created by God, redeemed by God, and called back into loving union with God. However, 
it is evident from his writings that the doctrines of Christo logy, the incarnation, and 
eschatology, also play significant roles in his theological anthropology. McCormick's 
positions on Christo logy, the incarnation, and eschatology are presented as inchoate theories. 
He refers to them throughout his writings; however, he fails to present them systematically. 
104Ibid., 308. 
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It appears that McCormick implicitly includes them within the triad without explicitly 
classing them as part of the great Christian mysteries. 
Christology serves as a major element in McCormick's theological anthropology. 
By "Christology" McCormick means the critical theological reflection upon the Christian 
confession that Jesus is the Christ. Jesus Christ is God's self-disclosure as self-giving love. 
McCormick argues: 
If Jesus is God-become-man, God's self-gift and self-revelation, the second 
person of the Triune God, then knowing Him is knowing God. His actuality 
is at once insight-injunction for us, insight into who God is and who we are, 
injunction as to what we should become. "Lord," Philip said to him, "show 
us the Father and that will be enough for us." "Philip," Jesus replied, "after 
I have been with you all this time, you still do not know me? Whoever has 
seen me has seen the Father" (John 14: 8-9). Knowing Jesus' qualities, 
ideals, and injunctions is a direct insight into God's gracious governance of 
the world. More importantly, knowing who He is is knowing both the 
Godhead and ourselves in relationship with the Godhead, and therefore 
knowing some things about God's plan for us. 105 
McCormick's Christology, while not systematically detailed in his earlier writings, is the 
bond that unites the great mysteries. McCormick writes: 
For the believer, Jesus Christ, the concrete enfleshment of God's love, 
becomes the meaning and te/os of the world and of the self. God's self-
disclosure in Jesus is at once the self-disclosure of ourselves and our world. 
"All things are made through him, and without him was not anything made 
that was made" (John 1 :3). Nothing is intelligible without God's deed in 
Christ.106 
He argues that the human person is illumined by the person, teaching, and 
105McCormick, "Gustafson's God: Who? What? Where? (ETC.)," 59. Emphasis in 
the original. 
106McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics" Theology And Bioethics, I 00. 
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achievement of Jesus Christ. 107 The experience of Jesus is regarded as normative for 
McCormick because Jesus is believed to have experienced what it is to be human in the 
fullest way and at the deepest level. 108 Jesus Christ provides the context by which the human 
person can view the relationships of God, self, others, and the world. Jesus' love is the 
paradigm and model of what our love must be for God and others. McCormick writes: 
To be molded in Christ's image means a deepening or radicalizing of our 
love. We grow to love the Heavenly Father as Christ did. But love after the 
fashion of and in the manner of Christ's love is essentially different from 
other good works, from any other act we perform. In other works, one might 
say, we give something; in love we give ourselves. It is this growth in 
surrender to ourselves, this giving in Christ's image that the Spirit is 
attempting to operate in us. In this sense, all our actions are mediations or 
expressions of Christlike love. 109 
For the Christian, all things lack full meaning and intelligibility without reference to God's 
deed in Jesus Christ. The believer's response to this specific, momentous, and supreme 
event of God's love is a total and radical commitment of faith. 
McCormick's position on Christology becomes more specific in his later writings. 
In an article entitled, "Moral Theology In The Year 2000," McCormick offers six assertions 
to serve as the foundation of theological ethics. These are rooted in the Christian fact that 
in Jesus something has been done to and for the human person. Jesus Christ is a prior action 
of God at once revelatory and response-engendering. 110 These six assertions form the core 
107McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 51. 
108McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 9. 
109McCormick, "The Moral Theology Of Vatican II," 11. 
110McCormick, Corrective Vision, 25. 
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of McCormick's Christology which serves as the unifying bond of his theological 
anthropology. McCormick writes: 
First, God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ as self-giving love allows of no 
further justification. It is the absolutely ultimate fact. The acceptance of this 
fact into one's life is an absolutely originating and grounding experience. 
Second, this belief in the God of Jesus Christ means that "Christ, perfect 
image of the Father, is already law and not only law-giver. He is already the 
categorical imperative and not just the font of ulterior and detailed 
imperatives." Third, this ultimate fact reveals a new basis or context for 
understanding the world. It gives it a new (Christocentric) meaning. Fourth, 
this "new fact and center of thinking" that is Jesus Christ finds its deepest 
meaning in the absoluteness and ultimacy of the God-relationship. Fifth, the 
God-relationship is already shaped by God's prior act in Jesus (self-giving). 
"To believe in Jesus Christ, Son of God, is identical with believing that God--
the absolute, the meaning--is total gift of self." Therefore, the "active 
moment of faith takes place in the recognition that meaning is to give oneself, 
spend oneself. and live for others." Sixth, the empowered acceptance of this 
engendering deed (faith) totally transforms the human person. It creates new 
operative vitalities that constitute the very possibility and the heart of the 
Christian moral life. 111 
These assertions give credence to the fact that McCormick's Christology is the dominant 
force that brings together the various aspects of his theological anthropology. In and through 
Jesus the human person comes to know that the God-relationship is total self-gift. Charles 
E. Curran has written that a more functional Christology, one concerned with the saving 
work of Christ, has greater implications for moral theology than a one-sided ontological or 
metaphysical Christology. In a Christology from above, salvation is abstract, individual, and 
extrinsic, whereas in a Christology from below, salvation is concrete, communal, and 
intrinsic. 112 McCormick's Christology by this analysis would seem to fall into Curran's 
111Ibid., 25-26. 
112According to Robert Krieg: "A Christology 'from above,' or a 'descending 
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functional category, because as McCormick's theological anthropology will show, salvation 
is concrete, communal and intrinsic. 113 
Fundamental to McCormick's theological anthropology is his view on the 
decisiveness of God's covenant with humanity manifested in the saving incarnation of Jesus 
Christ. 114 For McCormick, the incarnation "no matter what the depth of its mystery, was, 
as Vatican II repeatedly noted, an affirmation of the human and its goodness."115 God so 
loved humankind that God was willing to enter the human situation completely. McCormick 
writes: 
The incarnation is necessarily affirmation about humanhood and is the 
Christian theological basis for asserting that "the glory of God is humanhood 
alive." After Jesus and because of what we know in Jesus, humans are 
indeed the measure of all things. To say less is to undermine the implicit 
affirmations of the incarnation. 116 
Christology,' starts with an understanding of the triune God and the mystery of God's 
self-disclosure within creation and history and then moves to reflection upon God's 
entering into history in Jesus Christ (the Incarnation), his ministry, and his suffering, 
death, and resurrection. A Christology 'from below,' or an 'ascending Christology,' 
begins with the humanity of Jesus and/or a historical recollection of Jesus' message, 
ministry, and destiny and then proceeds to consider Jesus' Resurrection and relationship 
with God." For a more detailed analysis, see Robert E. Krieg, "Christology," 
Encyclopedia Of Catholicism, 311. 
113See Charles E. Curran, "The Person As Moral Agent And Subject In Light Of 
Contemporary Christology," in Called to Love: Toward A Contemporary Christian Ethic, 
24-25. 
114McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 315. 
115McCormick, "Moral Arguments In Christian Ethics," Journal Of Contemporary 
Health Law And Policy, 1 (1985): 23. 
116McCormick, "Gustafson's God: Who? What? Where (ETC.)," 60. To clarify 
this view McCormick quotes Joseph Sittler and writes: "As a result of God's concrete act 
in the Incarnation, 'human life has available a new relation to God, a new light for seeing, 
114 
By the incarnation--the supreme epiphany of God's self and our potential selves--God's 
immanent presence, his love in the flesh, became visible in the person of Jesus Christ. 117 The 
"good" became identified with the divine person of Jesus Christ. Charity, which flows from 
our experience of God's own love in Christ, became the heart of the Christian moral life. 118 
One cannot understand the full dimensions of the mystery of the incarnation without 
an appreciation for the complexity of sin and an understanding of the ultimate destiny of 
humanity's combined journeys in the coming of the kingdom. The incarnation confirms the 
basic goodness inherent in human nature, fallen but redeemed. In reaffirming the goodness 
of creation, the incarnation reestablishes the covenant with God's people, and gives human 
life new significance. Humanity is open to God and longs to enter into relationship with 
God. The social and communitarian nature of the human person is further developed and 
brought to fruition by the incarnation. Jesus enters completely into the fullness of human 
fellowship. The love of God has been made visible in the world by the mystery of the 
Incarnation. As a result, the Word made flesh is the standard, the center of mind and heart, 
and charity is at the root of human behavior. 119 
McCormick's notion of eschatology has its origin in the Christian mysteries. God 
a new fact and center for thinking, a new ground for giving and loving, a new context for 
acting in this world."' McCormick, Corrective Vision, 26. See also Joseph Sittler, The 
Structure Of Christian Ethics (New Orleans, LA.: Louisiana State University Press, 
1958), 18. 
117McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 49. 
118McCormick, "The Primacy Of Charity," 21. 
119lbid., 25. 
is the creator, redeemer, and destiny of all creation. McCormick states clearly that 
we are pilgrim people, having here no lasting home .... The ultimate destiny 
of our combined journeys is the "coming of the kingdom," the return of the 
glorified Christ to claim the redeemed world. 120 
115 
McCormick's notion of eschatology, along with his understanding of the doctrine of creation, 
serves as the basis for his view of humanity's co-creatorship. As relational creatures in a 
covenant with God, human persons are called to work together as co-creators to help bring 
about the kingdom of God. God acts through humanity by God's free gift of God's self in 
grace, and human persons cooperate with that grace to bring about the kingdom of God. 
McCormick follows the Catholic theological tradition that teaches that the reign of 
God through Jesus Christ and the Spirit is already present in the mystery of the world. 
However, the fullness of this reign will come only at the end of time. There exists both a 
continuity and discontinuity between this world and the next. Human persons must strive 
to cooperate in bringing about the kingdom of God, but their efforts will always be 
imperfect, insufficient, inadequate, because the kingdom of God is a gracious gift to us. 121 
Despite all human efforts, McCormick argues that "we are led to admit that the final 
validation and transformation of human effort is given by God with the ultimate coming of 
120McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 49. For an 
excellent account of eschatology--the study of last things, individual eschatology--the 
study of the final condition of individual human beings, and universal eschatology--the 
study of the final state of the universe, the total goal toward which God is moving all 
creation, see John H. Wright, "Eschatology," Encyclopedia Of Catholicism, 476-477. 
121Charles E. Curran, Politics. Medicine. And Christian Ethics: A Dialogue With 
Paul Ramsey (Philadelphia, PA.: Fortress Press, 1973), 201. 
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His kingdom."122 The "already but not yet" is the central focus of McCormick's eschatology 
and is the basis for his prophetic view of eschatology. 123 
McCormick's prophetic perspective concerning eschatology is developed out of his 
views on the Church and on the doctrine of creation. His eschatology is in contrast to both 
the apocalyptic and the teleological views of eschatology as Harvard theologian Harvey Cox 
has dubbed them. 124 Prophetic eschatology offers a more balanced view of the continuity 
and discontinuity between this world and the next. Harvey Cox distinguishes prophetic 
eschatology from both the apocalyptic and the teleological by stating: 
Prophetic eschatology visualizes the future of this world not as an inferno 
that ushers in some other world but as the only world we have and the one 
which man is unavoidably summoned to shape in accord with the human 
person's hopes and memories. Against the teleological view, it sees the 
122McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 16. 
123 Theologian Peter C. Phan of the Catholic University of America elaborates on 
this notion by stating: "Eschatology is an aetiological account from the present situation 
of sin and grace forward into its final stage of final fulfillment and not an anticipatory 
description of what will happen at the end of time and beyond. Eschatology is 
anthropology conjugated in the future tense on the basis of Christology." I believe that 
McCormick would agree with this evaluation. Peter C. Phan, "Contemporary Contexts 
And Issues In Eschatology," Theological Studies 55 (September 1994): 515-516. 
124Harvey Cox articulates three distinct views of eschatology--apocalyptic, 
teleological, and prophetic. Cox writes: "Classical apocalyptic imagery included both a 
vision of catastrophe and holocaust (the dies irae) and a celebration of the restored and 
glorious new world it would usher in ... It also breeds a fantasy of an elect who will be 
saved from the catastrophe and who will be called to rule the new world." The 
teleological view "sees the world and the human person evolving, but the evolutionary 
process proceeds toward a state which will be identical with that from which it began. 
The telos is the recapitulation of the arche." Harvey Cox, "Evolutionary Progress And 
Christian Promise," Concilium, vol. 26, ed. Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press, 
1967), 35-47. 
eschata transforming the arche, rather than vice versa. It sees the future with 
its manifold possibilities undoing the determinative grip of the past, of the 
beginning. In contrast to most forms of teleology, prophecy defines the 
human person as principally historical rather than as natural. Without 
denying his kinship to the beasts it insists that his freedom to hope and 
remember, his capacity to take responsibility for the future, is not an accident 
but defines his very nature. But, most importantly, prophecy sees everything 
in the light of its possibilities for future use and celebration .. Without 
rejecting the influence of historical continuities, it insists that our interest in 
history, if it is not merely antiquarian, arises from our orientation toward the 
future. We write and rewrite the past, we bring it to remembrance, because 
we have a mission in the future. The Israelite prophets called the past to 
memory not to divinize it but to remind people that the God of the covenant 
still expected things from them in the future. 125 
117 
Cox's view of prophetic eschatology could serve as a framework for interpreting 
McCormick's eschatology. While McCormick has not addressed the eschatological issue 
in depth, it is possible to deduce his understanding of prophetic eschatology from his 
ecclesiology and his understanding of the human person "integrally and adequately 
considered." 
McCormick states clearly that the Church is eschatological. As a pilgrim Church it 
is "a tentative and unfinished reality. It is in via. A fortiori its moral and ethical judgments 
are always in via and share the messy, unfinished and perfectible character of the Church 
itself."126 This eschatological experience of the Church is evident in its understanding of the 
gospel message as never complete. God's revelation is perceived in the dynamic unfolding 
of history. 127 The Church moves forward into the future, but never forgets the past. Thus, 
125Ibid., 45-47. 
126McCormick, Corrective Vision, 6. 
127 I believe this also serves as the basis for McCormick's notion of development 
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there is a basic dynamism that involves both continuity and change. Second, McCormick's 
understanding of the doctrine of creation views the human person as a historical being who 
uses the past to advance the future. The human person has been graced by God with creative 
intellect and freedom in order to help transform creation. As co-creators with God, human 
persons have been enabled by God to use their abilities and potentials in a responsible 
manner that will help bring about the realization in history of the divine plan. McCormick's 
view of the Church and his understanding of the human person serves as the framework for 
his prophetic eschatology. His view of eschatology will play a distinctive role in his moral 
epistemology, in his reinterpretation of tradition, and has a profound influence on his criteria 
for moral decision-making. 
In summary, the mystery of creation-fall-redemption is not only our history as a 
people; it is also our own personal history. Each human person is created in the image and 
likeness of God. As a result of the Fall, each human person is prone to sin, failure, and 
corruption. But with the eyes of faith, humankind has been redeemed by the love of Jesus 
Christ which challenges each person to move forward in the process of redemption to the 
time when all humankind in the eschaton will be totally redeemed. For McCormick, "our 
lives are processes of enlightenment, liberation, reintegration, healing, reconciliation. These 
words are active and transitional. They suggest the past, acknowledge the ambiguous 
of doctrine in the Church. The development of doctrine involves both continuity and 
change. That means that the formulations of its moral convictions are also in via, never 
finished and always in need of improvement, updating and adjustment to changing 
circumstances. For a more detailed analysis, see McCormick, The Critical Calling, 339-
340; and Idem, Corrective Vision, 76-81. 
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present, but point to the glorious future." 128 The bond that holds McCormick's theological 
anthropology together is the love of Christ--charity. While McCormick's position on 
Christology is not systematically spelled out, it plays a distinctive role in his theological 
anthropology. Jesus Christ, the perfect human being and concrete enfleshment of God's 
love, is the standard by which human persons must live and his love is the ground of human 
behavior. With Jesus as the standard, it is now possible to draw some practical implications 
from McCormick's theological anthropology as it relates to treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. 
Practical Implications OfMcCormick's Theological Anthropology As Applied To Treatment 
Decisions For Defective Neonates 
McCormick's positions on bioethical dilemmas develop their plausibility and force 
from his theological anthropology. Throughout his writings in bioethics, the very meaning, 
purpose, and value of a person is grounded in, and ultimately explained by, the Christian 
mysteries. Thus, his theological anthropology provides the framework that ought to shape 
a person's decisions on various bioethical dilemmas. McCormick writes: 
When decision-making is separated from this framework, it loses its 
perspective. It can easily become a merely rationalistic and sterile ethic 
subject to the distortions of self-interested perspectives and cultural drifts, a 
kind of contracted etiquette with no relation to the ultimate meaning of 
persons. 129 
Personal value judgments about bioethical dilemmas must have a standard by which they can 
128McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 107. 
129McCormick, "Biomedical Advances And The Catholic Perspective," 38. 
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be judged. For McCormick, that standard is Jesus Christ who is the standard of love. If 
personal value judgments are separated from the Christian mysteries of creation-fall-
redemption, they lose their meaning for the Christian and become controlled by the forces 
of science and technology. 130 
McCormick argues that in Western secularized society value judgments have become 
technological as they have become separated from theological anthropology. Science and 
technology have become the standard because the Christian story that reveals the meaning 
of life is no longer functional. McCormick argues: 
Thus in our secularized society we have (1) the assertion of autonomy as the 
controlling value of the person; (2) the canonization of pluralism as 
instrumental to it. . . It [autonomy] is surely a precious value. But it is the 
condition of moral behavior, not its exhaustive definition. 131 
For McCormick, technology cannot determine what it means to be truly human. To 
understand the human person comprehensively it is necessary to place the human person 
within the very matrix that is the only complete indicator of the truly human. The Christian 
mysteries will not give concrete answers or ready-made rules. But the Christian mysteries 
will '"tell us who we are, where we come from, where we are going, who we ought to be 
becoming. It is only against such undertakings that our concrete deliberations can remain 
truly humane and promote our best interests."132 
130McCormick levels this criticism against Paul Ramsey. McCormick writes: 
"This is the crux of my problem with Paul Ramsey's 'medical indications policy' with 




As human beings created by God, redeemed by God, and destined for God, the 
human person has been transformed. Although incomplete, this transformation must 
influence how the human person views bioethical issues. McCormick argues that for 
Christians faith can shed light on bioethics in three distinct but overlapping ways. He 
explains: 
1. Protective: the human person perceives basic human values, but the 
perception is shaped by our whole way of looking at the world. Faith should 
and does sensitize us to the meaning of persons, to their inherent dignity 
regardless of functionality. In this sense it aids us in staying human by 
underlining the truly human against cultural pressures to distort it. 
2. Dispositive: the Christian of profound faith will reflect in his or her 
dispositions the very shape of faith. That shape is the self-gift we call 
charity, love of God in others, charitable action. Although the non-Christian 
may choose the same action, which is shaped by charity, the act will be 
chosen and viewed by the Christian as a more intense personal assimilation 
of the shape of the Christ-event. 
3. Directive: the biblical materials that occasion and ground faith yield 
themes or perspectives that shape consciousness. 133 
Having examined these three distinctive ways that faith sheds light on bioethics, I will argue 
in this dissertation that McCormick applies the following value judgments, which are 
inferred from his theological anthropology, to treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
Human Life Is A Basic But Not Absolute Good 
One of the basic notions of McCormick's theological anthropology is that human life 
is a precious gift with a purpose and destiny. Human beings are called to live life to its 
133For a more detailed analysis, see McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," 
Corrective Vision, 141-148; and Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," 88. 
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completion, knowing that self-fulfillment can only occur in the eschaton. McCormick 
argues: "The fact that we are pilgrims, that Christ has overcome death and lives, that we will 
also live with him, yields a general value judgment on the meaning and value of life as we 
now live it. It can be formulated as follows: life is a basic good but not an absolute one."134 
Therefore, human life is a relative good, because there are higher goods for which life can 
be sacrificed. 135 In this argument, McCormick draws upon Church teaching and Scripture 
as he writes: 
Life is basic because, as the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
worded it, it is the "necessary source and condition of every human activity 
and of all society." It is not absolute because there are higher goods for 
which life can be sacrificed (glory of God, salvation of souls, service of one's 
brethren, etc.). Thus, in John 15:13: "There is no greater love than this: to lay 
down one's life for one's friends." Therefore, laying down one's life for 
another cannot be contrary to the faith or story of meaning of humankind. 
It is, after Jesus' example, life's greatest fulfillment, even though it is the end 
of life as we now know it. Negatively, we could word this value judgment 
as follows: death is an evil, but not an absolute or unconditional one. 136 
Dying is a rhythm of nature, a natural part of life. However, for the Christian, it is not the 
absolute end. It is a transition, that is, the end of one stage--physical life--and the beginning 
134McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theology And Bioethics, 97. 
135Lisa Sowle Cahill states: "McCormick identifies the good 'higher' than human 
life as the capacity for relationships of love. This good is related to religious commitment 
because love of God is accomplished through love of neighbor, a claim made with 
particular force by contemporary Catholic neo-Thomists such as Karl Rahner and Josef 
Fuchs." Lisa Sowle Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," 92. See also Josef Fuchs, S.J., 
"Christian Existence And Love Of Neighbor," Personal Responsibility And Christian 
Morality (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983), 28-31; and Karl 
Rahner, "Reflections On The Unity Of The Love Of Neighbor And The Love Of God," 
231-249. 
136McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theology And Bioethics, 97. 
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of another--eternal life. 137 Christians have regularly refused to absolutize either life or death, 
because there is a higher spiritual good. For the Christian, the idolatry of physical life is 
unacceptable. 
This value judgment has immediate implications for the care of defective neonates. 
McCormick argues: "It issues into a basic attitude or policy: not all means must be used to 
preserve life. " 138 McCormick bases this argument on the words of Pope Pius XII in the 
Pontiff's 1957 address to the International Congress of Anesthesiologists. After noting that 
there exists an obligation to use only ordinary means to preserve life, Pius XII stated: "A 
more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most men and would render the 
attainment of the higher, more important good too difficult. Life, health, all temporal 
activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends. " 139 McCormick interprets Pius XII as 
arguing that 
137McCormick writes: "Thus the death of the Christian is viewed as the fulfillment 
of the life of grace, the completion of the sacraments, as a step toward the coming of 
God's kingdom, as a sharing of one side of Christ's paschal mystery. As such, it is 
clearly a decisive moment in each person's life. For it is viewed as fixing for all eternity 
a person's intention. At this moment the soul ceases to act in fundamentally changeable 
ways. The 'period of probation' is over." McCormick, Health And Medicine In The 
Catholic Tradition, 121. 
138McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theology And Bioethics, 97. 
McCormick writes: "Life is indeed a basic and precious good, but a good to be preserved 
precisely as a condition of other values. It is these other values and possibilities that 
found the duty to preserve physical life and that also dictate the limits of this duty. In 
other words, life is a relative good, and the duty to preserve it is a limited one. These 
limits have always been stated in terms of means required to sustain life." McCormick, 
"To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 345. Emphasis in the original. 
139Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation Of Life," Acta Apostolicae Sedis 49 (1957): 
1,031-1,032. 
forcing (morally) one to take all means is tantamount to forcing attention and 
energies on a subordinate good in a way that prejudices a higher good, even 
eventually making it unrecognizable as a good. Excessive concern for the 
temporal is at some point neglect of the eternal. An obligation to use all 
means to preserve life would be a devaluation of human life, since it would 
remove life from the context or story that is the source of ultimate value. 140 
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Life is a basic good, but there may co~e a time when that life is no longer considered a 
precious gift. When a person no longer has the potential for human relationships--which are 
the very possibility for growth in love of God and neighbor--or these relationships would be 
so threatened, strained, or submerged that they would no longer function as the heart and 
meaning of the individual's life as they should, then one is no longer required to preserve 
that life by all human means. 141 To preserve a life in this situation would be to replace the 
"higher, more important good." "Physical life" would become the ultimate value. When 
that happens, the value of human life has been distorted. 
The moral implication of this value judgment that life is a basic but not absolute good 
can be applied to the defective neonate. When one attempts to treat but in the context where 
there will likely come a time when such treatment will be medically futile or may even visit 
needless iatrogenic insults on the defective neonate, then one is not morally obliged to 
initiate or continue treatment. For McCormick, an example of a neonate in this situation 
would be one with necrotizing enterocolitis. 142 The Catholic tradition has sought a middle 
140McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theolo~y And Bioethics, 97-98. 
141McCormick, 'To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 347. 
142McCormick, "In The Best Interests Of The Baby," 24. Necrotizing 
enterocolitis is a condition predominantly seen in premature neonates, which is 
characterized by partial- or full-thickness intestinal ischemia, usually involving the 
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path between medico-moral optimism or vitalism (which preserves life with all means, at any 
cost, no matter what its condition) and medico-moral pessimism (which actively kills when 
life becomes onerous, dysfunctional, or boring). 143 McCormick seeks this same middle path 
since he understands treatment decisions to be more than mere technological judgments. For 
him, treatment decisions are also value judgments, and as such, they are rooted in the 
Christian mysteries of creation-fall-redemption. 
Life Is A Value To Be Preserved Only Insofar As It Contains Some Potentiality For 
Human Relationships 
For McCormick, to be human means to have a capacity, actually or potentially, for 
significant human relationships. 144 Human persons exist in relationship with God and others. 
For McCormick, "the crowning achievement of human relationships is love."145 Therefore, 
significant human relationships are the very possibility of growth in love of God and 
neighbor. This emphasis on relationality, particularly that human relationship called "love," 
sums up briefly the meaning, substance, and consummation of life in the Judaeo-Christian 
perspective. For McCormick, the love of God is the "higher, more important good." In the 
Christian tradition it follows that 
terminal ileum. This neonatal anomaly will be examined in depth in Chapter Five. 
143McCormick, "Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition," Acta Hospitalia 
26 (1986): 57. 
144McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 14. 
145Ibid. 
life is a value to be preserved precisely as a condition for other values, and 
therefore insofar as these values remain at least minimally attainable or, as 
James Gustafson puts it, "as the sine qua non for other values." Since these 
other values cluster around and are rooted in human relationships, it seems 
to follow that life is a value to be preserved only insofar as it contains some 
potentiality for human relationships. 146 
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McCormick reasons that, before any human experiences, responses, or achievements are 
possible, there must be human life. In this sense, human life is a condition for all other 
values and experiences. However, when a human life is devoid of the possibility of 
experiencing human love, that is, no experience or interrelation is possible, then that life has 
achieved its potential. 147 This is not to devalue the worth of the person. 148 
McCormick will define human personhood as a social state that requires a potential 
for human relationships. 149 He argues that "we exist in relationships and are dead without 
them." 150 If a human person is no longer able to love God, then that person has lost the 
146McCormick, "Biomedical Advances And The Catholic Perspective," 43. See 
also James Gustafson, The Contribution Of Theology To Medical Ethics, 85-86. 
147McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New 
World?, 405. 
148McCormick writes: "One can say and, I believe, should say that the person is 
always an incalculable value, but that at some point continuance in physical life offers the 
person no benefit. Indeed, to keep 'life' going can easily be an assault on the person and 
his or her dignity." Ibid., 406. Emphasis in the original. 
149McCormick argues that the well-being of human persons is interdependent. 
McCormick writes: "It cannot be conceived of or realistically pursued independently of 
the good of others. Social insertion is part of our being and becoming. As Joseph Sittler 
words it, 'personhood is a social state."' McCormick, "Biomedical Advances And The 
Catholic Perspective," 44-45. See also Joseph Sittler, Grace Notes And Other Fragments 
(Philadelphia, PA.: Fortune Press, 1981), 98. 
150McCormick, "Some Neglected Aspects Of Moral Responsibility For Health," 
How Brave A New World?, 42. 
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potential for relationality and has achieved one's potential. For McCormick, it is the ability 
to relate that grounds the human person's ability to love, and becomes the basis for 
determining human personhood. 151 
In the case of defective neonates, when the potential for human relationships is 
simply nonexistent or would be so utterly submerged in the mere struggle to survive, then 
for McCormick life has achieved its potential. 152 In this situation McCormick argues that it 
would be morally permissible to forgo or discontinue treatment. McCormick opines: "It is 
neither inhuman nor un-Christian to say that there comes a point where an individual's 
condition itself represents the negation of any truly human--that is, relational--potential. 
151McCormick's notion of personhood will also have implications for the 
preembryo. He will draw a distinction between genetic individuality and developmental 
individuality. Genetic individuality occurs at the union of sperm and ovum at fertilization 
that yields a new hereditary constitution called a zygote. It is a unique genetic individual 
with the potential to become an adult, but it is a theoretical and statistical potential 
because only a small minority actually achieve this in the natural process. Developmental 
individuality occurs when there is a source of only one individual. This does not occur 
until a single body axis has begun to form, near the end of the second week post 
fertilization when implantation is underway. McCormick's point is that developmental 
individuality (singleness) is essential to personhood. The pre-embryo is viewed as a 
"potential person" because it has the potential for relationality and therefore should be 
treated with dignity and respect. For a more detailed analysis, see Richard A. 
McCormick, S. J., "The First 14 Days," The Tablet 10 March 1990, p. 301-304; Idem, 
"Who Or What Is A Preembryo?," 1-15; and Idem, "The Embryo As Potential: A Reply 
To John A. Robertson," The Kennedy Institute Of Ethics Journal 1 (December 1991) 
303-305. 
152 An example of a defective neonate whose potential for human relationships is 
simply nonexistent would be one with anencephaly (the neonate lacks a cerebrum and 
skull). An example of a defective neonate whose life is utterly submerged and 
undeveloped in the mere struggle to survive would be one with a Grade III massive 
intraventricular hemorrhage (an untreatable neurological condition that leads to death). A 
more detailed analysis of both anomalies will be given in Chapter Five. 
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When that point is reached, is not the best treatment no treatment?"153 On this subject he 
writes: 
Every human being, regardless of age or condition, is of incalculable worth. 
The point is not, therefore, whether this or that individual has value. Of 
course he has, or rather is a value. The only point is whether this undoubted 
value has any potential at all, in continuing human survival, for attaining a 
share, even if reduced, in the "higher more important good." This is not a 
question about the inherent value of the individual. It is a question about 
whether this worldly existence will offer such a valued individual any hope 
of sharing those values for which physical life is the fundamental 
condition. 154 
For McCormick, the potential for human relationships is based on his theological 
anthropology which emphasizes God's covenant with human persons. If the essential 
relationship of love (for others, God, and self) is the benchmark of a Christian life, then 
McCormick would conclude that a life lacking the basic capacity for such responsive love 
is a human life with no earthly potential, no personal future for the neonate, except death and 
whatever awaits thereafter. 155 
Human Life As Sacred 
As the author and preserver of life, God created human life out of nothing and thus 
gave life its ultimate meaning. That ultimate meaning is that human life is sacred, because 
all persons are unique and equal in the eyes of God. McCormick writes: "Human life is 
153McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die?" How Brave A New World?, 348-349. 
154lbid., 350. Emphasis in the original. 
155Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?, 168. 
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sacred because of its origin and destiny, because of the value God places on it. Our grasp 
of this sacredness is marvelously deepened in Christ's costing love. " 156 For McCormick, 
human life is sacred because it is created by God, redeemed by God, and destined for God. 
From this value judgment he draws out the moral obligation that human life must be treated 
with dignity and respect. 
Human persons being unique and equal in the eyes of God are bearers of an "alien 
dignity," a dignity rooting in the value God puts in them. The greatest affirmation of this 
dignity is God's Word become flesh. This perspective stands as a profound critique of the 
human tendency to assess persons functionally, to weaken our hold on the basic value that 
is human life. The sacredness of human life and the dignity that is derived from it leads to 
a particular care for the most defenseless members of society. 157 McCormick argues that 
"sacredness oflife demands reverential attitudes and practices."158 
McCormick's view on the sacredness of life directly influences his positions on 
treatment decisions for defective neonates. There is a debate within bioethics concerning the 
"sanctity oflife" v. "quality oflife." Proponents of the sanctity oflife position argue that 
focusing attention on the obligation to preserve life avoids degrees of discrimination in 
quality-of-life criteria. McCormick believes that these two approaches should not be set 
156McCormick, The Critical Calling, 268. 
157McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 10-11. 
158McCormick, The Critical Calling, 268. 
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against each other. 159 As a result of this belief, McCormick draws a distinction between 
"every person is of equal value" and "every life is of equal value." He believes that every 
person is sacred, is of incalculable worth, and deserves to be treated with dignity and respect. 
However, he does not believe that every life is of equal value. According to McCormick: 
What the "equal value" language is attempting to say is legitimate: We must 
avoid unjust discrimination in the provision of health care and life supports. 
But not all discrimination (inequality of treatment) is unjust. Unjust 
discrimination is avoided if decision-making centers on the benefit to the 
patient, even if that benefit is described largely in terms of quality-of-life 
criteria. 160 
McCormick argues that "we must be concerned not just with keeping a patient alive by 
surgery or medication, but with a certain level of being alive, a certain acceptable mix of 
freedom, painlessness and ability to function." 161 Every human life is sacred in the eyes of 
God. However, when that human life is devoid of the potential for significant human 
relationships, it is a violation of the sacredness of human life to preserve it. An example 
McCormick gives would be the decision medically to treat an anencephalic infant as if it 
were to recover from its condition. 
159McCormick writes: Quality-of-life assessments ought to be made within an 
over-all reverence for life, as an extension of one's respect for the sanctity of life. 
However, there are times when preserving the life of one with no capacity for those 
aspects of life that we regard as human is a violation of the sanctity of life itself Thus to 
separate the two approaches and call one sanctity of life, and the other quality of life, is a 
false conceptual split that very easily suggests that the term 'sanctity of life' is being used 
in an exhortatory way." McCormick, "The Sanctity Of Life, The Quality Of Life," How 
Brave A New World?, 407. Emphasis in the original. It should be noted that this 
assessment will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Four. 
160Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
161 McCormick, "Man's Moral Responsibility For Health," 9. 
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Once a decision has been made to forgo or discontinue treatment, because the neonate 
has no potential for significant human relationships, there is still a moral obligation to give 
comfort to that defective neonate. For McCormick, that comfort would consist in palliative 
care.162 Since every human life is of incalculable worth, one can never abandon a neonate 
because a decision has been made not to treat. Every human life has value and should be 
treated with dignity and respect. 
Medical Treatment Decisions Ought To Incorporate Individual And Social Factors 
God made a covenant with the Jewish people, that is, with a group. For McCormick, 
the implication of this is that it is only within a community and through a community that 
an individual is responsible and responsive to God. McCormick argues that this sense of 
community, which is sunk deep into the human consciousness, means two things. First, the 
community exists for the individual. Second, to be a Christian means one cannot exist in 
isolation, neither can one know as a Christian in isolation. 163 Therefore, for McCormick, to 
be a person is to be a social being. Since human beings are related, it is apparent that human 
persons need each other in order to reach self-fulfillment. Decisions made by one will affect 
others. There exists a clear relation between the individual and the community. There have 
been times when the individual and the community were viewed as two separable and 
162Palliative care is aimed at controlling pain, relieving discomfort, and aiding 
dysfunction of various sorts. 
163McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 12-13. 
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competing values. The Judaeo-Christian tradition has resisted this view and recognizes that 
the individual and community are inseparable complementarities. McCormick argues: 
The individual and the community are related like only partially overlapping 
circles. At points there is identification of concerns and goods, at other 
points there is distinction. Thus, while the individual is an integral part of the 
community and must take it into account in defining his or her own 
prerogatives and rights, still the individual does not exist for the community 
in a way that totally subordinates him or her to it. 164 
This radical equality before God and the sense of being part of a community requires that the 
human person search for a delicate balance between the two. 
Understanding human persons as radically equal and essentially social has far-
reaching moral implications in regard to treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
Decisions about medical treatment will not only affect the individual neonate but will also 
have serious ramifications for the family and society as a whole. As radically equal, all 
neonates are entitled to medical treatment if such treatment will be beneficial for their 
condition. As essentially social, all neonates are members of the community and their 
particular family. Therefore, social factors such as cost, allocation of resources, better 
utilization of medical personnel; and familial factors, such as excessive psychological, 
emotional, and financial burdens, must be considered when determining treatment decisions 
for defective neonates. A delicate balance must be found between the right of every 
individual to medical treatment and social and familial factors. 
McCormick includes not only the rights of the individual neonate in regards to 
1641bid., 13. 
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treatment decisions but also includes familial and societal considerations. 165 He bases his 
inclusion of social factors on the Catholic theological tradition. As Pius XII taught: 
"normally, one is held to use only ordinary means--according to circumstances of persons. 
places, times, and culture--that is to say, means that do not involve any grave burden for 
oneself or another."166 McCormick includes financial costs within this category of social 
factors. McCormick writes: "If the financial cost of life-preserving care was crushing, that 
is, if it would create grave hardships for oneself or one's family, it was considered 
extraordinary and nonobligatory."167 
There exists a delicate balance between individual and community needs, and 
McCormick admits that these are in constant flux and tension. As a member of society, 
McCormick maintains that there are certain obligations which are part of the requirements 
for membership in society. Thus, individual membership in human communities goes hand 
in hand with obligations. 168 He argues: "Individuals ought to--indeed can--be rightly forced 
to make certain sacrifices for the common good (for example, conscription, proportionate 
165See Richard A. McCormick, S.J. and John Paris, S.J., "Saving Defective 
Infants: Options For Life Or Death," How Brave A New World?, 352-361. 
166Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation Of Life," The Pope Speaks 4 (1958): 394. 
Emphasis added. 
167McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 347. 
McCormick also quotes Gerald Kelly, S.J. to help substantiate his position. McCormick 
writes: "One need not spend money or incur a debt which would impose a very great 
hardship on himself or his family, because this kind of hardship would be more than 
'reasonable' or 'moderate' care of health and therefore more than God would ordinarily 
demand." Gerald Kelly, S.J. Medico-Moral Problems (St. Louis, MO.: The Catholic 
Health Association Of The United States And Canada, 1957), 132. 
1680dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 80. 
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taxation)."169 Yet, for McCormick, the individual can never exist for the community in a way 
that totally subordinates the individual to the community. McCormick believes: "The 
common good of all persons cannot be unrelated to what is judged to be promotive or 
destructive to the individual--in other words, judged to be moral or immoral."17° For 
McCormick, the balance between individual and social considerations entails making a value 
169McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 13. According to social ethicist David Hollenbach: "Recent 
official Catholic teaching has presented two complementary interpretations of the 
meaning of the classical concept of the common good. First, Gaudium et Spes stated that 
humans were created by God not for life in isolation but for the formation of social unity 
(Gaudium et Spes, no. 32). The communitarian character of human existence means that 
the good of each person is bound up with the good of the community. . . Second, the 
common good is defined as 'the sum total of conditions of social living, whereby persons 
are enabled more fully and readily to achieve their own perfection"' (Mater et Magistra, 
no. 65; and Gaudium et Spes, no. 26). David Hollenbach, S.J., "Common Good," in The 
New Dictionary Of Catholic Social Thought, ed. Judith A. Dwyer (Wilmington, DE.: 
Glazier, 1994), 192-197. Odozor believes that McCormick's position on "the common 
good" is highly nuanced. There are things that we all, children included, have to do in 
virtue of social justice. Involvement in non-therapeutic experimentation (even in the case 
of children and other incompetent subjects) is an issue of social justice if it does not 
involve undue burden. Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral 
Theology, 81. Lisa Sowle Cahill points out, the concept of the common good from which 
McCormick argues "is distinctive in its comprehension of all persons equally and by its 
ordering to a transcendent communion, that of persons in God. McCormick defines 
justifiable experimentation on the premise that communal interaction is an essential 
component of the realization of values, and proposes it with the conviction that those 
values persons 'tend towards' or seek are common ones." Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Within 
Shouting Distance: Paul Ramsey And Richard McCormick On Method," Journal Of 
Medicine And Philosophy 4 (December 1979): 402. 
170This category would include choices involving notable risk, discomfort, 
inconvenience. McCormick argues that such works are done based on "individual 
generosity and charity." This shows that McCormick is aware of the possibility of abuse 
by sacrificing the rights of the individual to the welfare of the entire community. See 
McCormick, "Proxy Consent In The Experimentation Situation," How Brave A New 
World?, 67; see also Idem, "Public Policy And Fetal Research," How Brave A New 
World?, 72. 
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judgment, and the means for achieving this balance are to be found in the great Christian 
mysteries of creation-fall-redemption. 
Pain And Suffering Can Have Redemptive Meaning 
McCormick follows the Catholic theological tradition and argues that pain and 
suffering have a special place in God's saving plan. Without glorifying suffering, the 
Catholic tradition has viewed suffering and even death within a larger perspective, that of 
the redemptive process. By suffering, Christians can participate in the Paschal mystery. 
McCormick writes: 
Suffering is not mere pain and confusion, dying is not merely an end. These 
must be viewed, even if mysteriously, in terms of a larger process: as 
occasions for a growing self-opening after Christ's example, as various 
participations in the paschal mystery. 171 
For the Christian, pain and suffering must be seen as something more than that which is to 
be avoided. McCormick does not propose that suffering is to be caused, but rather believes 
that there are times when persons must at least endure it. 172 
Christians view life within the context of the Christian mysteries. McCormick writes: 
"Just as Christ suffered and died for us to enter his glory, so we who are 'in the Lord,' who 
are inserted into the redemptive mystery, must expect that our growth 'to deeper life' will 
171McCormick, Corrective Vision, 145. 
172Leonard Weber elaborates on the difference between causing suffering and 
enduring suffering. Weber writes: "To cause suffering is something that we should 
always try to avoid when possible. But to endure suffering is not always evil. Suffering is 
a little like death: it is terrible to bring it about unnecessarily, but one can often act nobly 
in accepting it." Leonard Weber, Who Shall Live?, 100. 
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share the characteristics of God's engendering deed in Christ."173 For McCormick, grave 
illness is to be seen as an intensifying conformity to Christ. As the human body weakens and 
is devastated by disease and illness, the strength of Jesus Christ is shared by those who have 
been baptized into his death and resurrection. For McCormick, the Catholic conviction is 
that grave illness should be a time of grace, of the gradual shedding of the sinful self. 174 This 
conviction reinforces the view that human persons are completely dependent upon God's 
love. Christ manifested his supreme dignity by doing God's will-- "Not my will but thine 
be done" (Luke 22:43). Christians are called to the same complete dependence on God's 
love as Christ showed on the Cross. This dependence on God manifests itself in human 
dependence on others. Therefore, suffering should lead not only to dependence on God but 
to dependence on others. When a human person is experiencing pain and suffering, that 
person needs the help and presence of others. Only through dependence on others and God 
can one truly become independent. 175 
173McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 116-117. 
1741bid., 118. 
175McCormick' s view on suffering as a form of dependence on God is influenced 
by Drew Christiansen's theology of dependence. Suffering is a form of dependence on 
God where Christians enter more deeply into the Paschal mystery. McCormick writes: 
"Dependence is an opportunity, a call to let ourselves go, to open up to God, to cling in 
trust to a power beyond our control, to see more clearly than ever the source and end of 
life, much as Christ did in his dying dependence on the Father. Suffering leads to 
dependence on others. Dependence on others should be a sign of a more radical 
dependence on God. Since our freedom is intended to lead us to a deeper union with God, 
it is an interesting paradox that our deep dependence on God establishes our own radical 
independence: independence in dependence." McCormick, Corrective Vision, 145. See 
also Drew Christiansen, S.J., "The Elderly And Their Families: The Problems Of 
Dependence," New Catholic World 223 (1980): 100-104. 
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McCormick's views on pain and suffering have a direct influence on his positions 
concerning treatment decisions for defective neonates. Some ethicists believe that it is 
morally right to dispatch or terminate infants' lives when they are in intractable pain, 176 or 
once a decision has been made that their quality of life is insufficient to prolong life through 
medical treatment. 177 McCormick has never defended infanticide. His position is quite clear: 
"there is no proportionate reason for directly dispatching a terminal or dying patient."178 In 
situations of critical illness, death may only be brought about indirectly by acts of omission. 
Life is sacred and the direct killing of an innocent life is a "virtually exceptionless norm."179 
McCormick's moral position on infanticide is grounded in his doctrine of creation and in the 
176See Paul Ramsey, Ethics On The Ed~es Of Life, 212-227; and Weir, Selective 
Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 168-169. 
177See Joseph Fletcher, "Infanticide And The Ethics Of Loving Care," in 
Infanticide And The Value Of Life, 15-20; and Idem, "Ethics And Euthanasia," American 
Journal OfNursing 73 (April 1973): 670-675. 
178McCormick, "New Medicine And Morality, 316. 
179The phrase, "virtually exceptionless norm," McCormick borrowed from Donald 
Evans. It means that the theoretical possible exceptions are virtually zero in the practical 
probability. For a more detailed analysis, see Donald Evans, "Paul Ramsey On 
Exceptionless Moral Rules," The American Journal Of Jurisprudence 16 (1971): 184-214. 
Lisa Sowle Cahill states: "In an earlier article on death and dying McCormick (referring 
to the work of Germain Grisez and John Finnis) locates life--at least that of the innocent--
among the 'basic values' that may never be sacrificed directly. He agrees that although 
occasionally good reasons may exist for omitting life-sustaining measures, the 
proposition that there is no proportionate reason for directly dispatching a terminal or 
dying patient has yet to be refuted. Weighing against direct euthanasia are the possible 
short- and long-term effects of accepting acts of commission. The 'presumption of a 
common and universal danger' establishes at least a 'virtually exceptionless' norm 
against it. This is a social consideration that obviously moves beyond--though not 
necessarily making obsolete--the older Catholic approach that upholds the 'individual's 
right to life' in any consideration of direct killing." Lisa Sowle Cahill, "On Richard 
McCormick," 96-97. 
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lordship of God over all creation. For example, McCormick writes: "If all persons are 
equally the creatures of the one God, then none of these creatures is authorized to play God 
toward any other. And if all persons are cherished by God, regardless of merit, we ought to 
cherish each other in the same spirit."180 Thus, for McCormick, all human life is valued 
because of God's unconditional love. Therefore, no person has the right to take an innocent 
life simply because that person is experiencing pain and suffering. If every person is created 
by God, redeemed by God, and destined for God, then only God can decide when a person 
will attain his or her ultimate destiny. 
Science And Technology As Goods Of Creation 
Science and technology are goods of creation that make possible the otherwise 
impossible. Created in the image and likeness of God and graced with the gifts of free will 
and reason, the human person has been enabled by God to use these gifts in a creative way 
that will help transform self, others, and the world. Advances in science and technology are 
the result of God's gifts to humankind. 181 Consequently, these advancements must be used 
180McCormick, "Public Policy On Abortion," How Brave A New World?, 197. 
181lt should be noted that God's gifts to humankind also refer to animals. Medical 
advances, including transplantation techniques have been developed thanks to the 
sacrifice of a variety of animals. Due to animal research and the use of animal organs, a 
young infant born with a hypoplastic left ventricle heart (an infant missing the major 
pumping chamber of the heart), an affliction that caused death for most infants only a few 
years ago, now has the possibility of being saved. The use of animals for research has 
caused a great controversy with animal rights groups. McCormick would argue that 
animals can be used in research as long as the experiments are well designed and are for 
the good of humanity. For a more detailed analysis, see John D. Aquilino, "Life Or 
Death?: A Parent's Plea For Civility And Reason," Chica~o Tribune, 26 July 1995, 15. 
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in a responsible manner that will advance the good of creation. As co-creators with God, the 
human person's "attitude toward the world must live in paradoxical tension, combining both 
appreciation and manipulation."182 
In this technological age, human persons are confronted daily with the dilemmas that 
because something can be done, does that mean it ought to be done? McCormick believes 
that the "power-plasticity model" of the human person, identified by Daniel Callahan, has 
shaped contemporary moral imagination and feelings. According to this model, human 
persons today view themselves corporately as homo technologicus, which means that if 
something can be done, it will be done. In society today, "the best solution to the dilemmas 
created by technology is more technology. We tend to eliminate the maladapted condition 
(defectives, retardates, and so on) rather than adjust the environment to it."183 For 
McCormick, advancements in science and technology must be examined holistically. The 
responsible use of science and technology must consider the good of the whole person and 
182McCormick, "Bioethics And Method," 310. 
183McCormick writes: "In relating to the basic human values, several images of 
man are possible, as Callahan has observed. First, there is the power-plasticity model. In 
this model, nature is alien, independent of man, possessing no inherent value. It is 
capable of being used, dominated, and shaped by man. Man sees himself as possessing an 
unrestricted right to manipulate in the service of his goals. Death is something to be 
overcome, outwitted. Second, there is the sacral-symbiotic model. In its religious forms, 
nature is seen as God's creation, to be respected and heeded. Man is not the master; he is 
the steward and nature is a trust. In secular forms, man is seen as part of nature. If man is 
to be respected, so is nature. We should live in harmony and balance with nature. Nature 
is a teacher, showing us how to live with it. Death is one of the rhythms of nature, to be 
gracefully accepted." McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical 
Codes," How Brave A New World?, 7. See also Daniel Callahan, "Living With The New 
Biology," Center Ma~azine 5 (1972): 4-12. 
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the common good of society, not just a particular problem. McCormick argues that, 
"moralism and excessive preoccupation with 'problems' and the rights and wrongs of 
omissions and commissions, too readily leads us to overlook the human quality of care and 
cure--that which we need no matter what our condition."184 Responsibility in science and 
technology requires human persons to look not only at individual problems but at the future 
implications of such a technology in the light of what it means to be a human person 
"integrally and adequately considered." McCormick expresses concern with the danger that 
both the human and the morally good will be identified with what is technologically possible, 
with the result that technology creates its own morality. 
Scientific and technological advancements play an integral role in deciding treatment 
decisions for defective neonates. Neonatal medical information and technology increase 
every day, and these advancements are often implemented almost immediately. Neonatal 
technology can now prolong the lives of many neonates, when in the past these neonates 
would have died. There is little doubt that technology has provided the means to save the 
lives of many neonates. However, McCormick frequently questions the ethical nature of the 
means adopted and the quality of the life being saved. He observes that technology 
"challenges us to grow beyond our past without forgetting it, to be informed by tradition 
without being enslaved by it, to move into the future while still clinging to the imperishable 
riches of the past."185 While demonstrating great respect for medicine and technology, 
184McCormick, "Some Neglected Aspects Of Moral Responsibility For Health," 
How Brave A New World?, 43. 
185Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Technology And Morality: The Example Of 
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McCormick remains firmly grounded in the Catholic theological tradition and calls for the 
responsible use of the goods of creation. For him, just because something can be done does 
not necessarily mean it ought to be done. His thinking here is particularly applicable to 
treatment decisions for defective neonates. A need exists for an ethical criterion to assist 
decision-makers as they determine whether certain neonates should be aggressively treated. 
Such an ethical criterion must examine whether or not certain technologies are in the "best 
interests" of the person "integrally and adequately considered." According to McCormick, 
the great Christian mysteries provide the framework by which the Christian can judge what 
is truly human and in the "best interests" of the person against cultural attempts to distort it. 
In conclusion, McCormick's view of the human person in terms of the creation-fall-
redemption triad is the ground for the meaning, purpose, and value of the human person. 
The basic structure of human life has been revealed in God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. 
The acceptance of this self-disclosure by the human person in the form of values and 
attitudes has a profound impact on how the human person views, God, self, others, and the 
world. These values and attitudes keep the focus of the human person on what is good and 
definitive of human flourishing. McCormick's theological anthropology provides the 
framework for the various value judgments that influence his positions on treatment 
decisions for defective neonates. These value judgments form the basis for both the 
theological and anthropological presuppositions that will inform and shape the human 
person's moral thinking and judgment. 
Medicine," New Theology Review 2 (November 1989): 32. 
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McCormick argues that the value judgments inferred from his theological 
anthropology are reasonable and firmly rooted in the Catholic theological tradition, an 
argument not shared by all his Catholic ethicist colleagues. Some critics argue that 
McCormick's interpretation and analysis of the Christian mysteries is lacking in clarity. 
Others criticize the vagueness and selective use of concepts within his anthropology. Still 
others argue that the practical implications of his theological anthropology have not been 
consistently applied to treatment decisions for defective neonates. To complete the analysis 
of McCormick's theological anthropology it will be necessary to articulate, analyze, and 
evaluate some of these criticisms. 
Criticism 
A variety of criticisms have been directed at McCormick's theological anthropology 
from a diverse group of critics. McCormick believes that such criticism by peers is a 
valuable tool that can lead to further clarification, reevaluation, and even the revision of 
one's positions. For example, McCormick has written that "I take seriously the suggestion 
that theologians should be ready, willing and able to admit mistakes--especially to each 
other. In that spirit it goes without saying that I would welcome criticism and correction."186 
Taking McCormick at his word, this section will evaluate four specific critiques directed at 
McCormick's theological anthropology. 
First, McCormick's theological anthropology is shaped not only by the Christian 
186McCormick, The Critical Callin~, xi. 
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mysteries of creation-fall-redemption, but also by the doctrines of Christology, the 
incarnation, and eschatology. These latter three doctrines are presented in McCormick's 
writings as inchoate theories. In his earlier writings, that is, prior to 1983, McCormick 
incorporated these three doctrines implicitly within the triad of creation-fall-redemption. It 
is not until after 1983 that these three doctrines appear more explicitly in an undeveloped 
form. One can speculate that the reason for this is that from 1983 onward McCormick writes 
primarily in the area of bioethics from a theological perspective. From this perspective it 
became necessary for him to articulate his positions on Christology, the incarnation, and 
eschatology. However, his positions on these three doctrines have never been articulated in 
a systematic manner. 187 This has resulted in a sense of ambiguity regarding McCormick's 
theological anthropology and its practical implications. 
Presenting these three doctrines in a more developed fashion would clarify a number 
of important issues regarding McCormick's theological anthropology. For example, 
McCormick agrees with James Gustafson that Christology is the most critical doctrinal issue 
for any Catholic theology. 188 If McCormick is correct that it is in and through Jesus that 
human persons know the full dimensions of the God-relationship as total self-gift, and if 
God's self-disclosure in Jesus is at once a self-disclosure of humanity and the world, then it 
187This is in contrast to a theologian like Charles E. Curran who is quite explicit 
about the content of his theological stance. It includes the five mysteries of faith: creation, 
sin, incarnation, redemption, and resurrection/destiny. See Richard Grecco, Theology Of 
Compromise: A Study In The Ethics Of Charles E. Curran (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishers, 1991 ), 1-53. 
188See McCormick, "Gustafson's God: Who? What? Where? (ETC)," 58. 
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seems imperative that McCormick should present his position on the doctrine of Christology 
in a systematic manner. With this understood the human person can gain a deeper 
understanding of humanity and the God-relationship. In regard to the incarnation, 
McCormick states: "An ethics that takes the incarnation seriously, will be the very last to 
abandon moral reasoning and argument; for the incarnation, no matter what the depth of its 
mystery, was, as Vatican II repeatedly noted, an affirmation of the human and its 
goodness."189 If the incarnation is an affirmation of the human and its goodness, and the 
"glory of God is humanhood alive," then to understand the human person "integrally and 
adequately considered," it would be beneficial for McCormick to clarify his position on the 
incarnation by developing his view on the doctrine in more depth. Finally, McCormick's 
notion of co-creatorship has its origin in both his doctrine of creation and his doctrine on 
eschatology. His notion of co-creatorship has a significant influence on the formation of 
certain value judgments that influence treatment decisions for defective neonates. To 
understand the full significance of co-creatorship and how it influences these moral 
decisions, it would do well for McCormick to clarify his position on eschatology and to state 
explicitly how it impacts on co-creatorship. 
Second, McCormick's theological anthropology affords great emphasis to the social 
and relational nature of the human person. For McCormick, the human person is essentially 
social, radically equal, and inherently relational. The origins of these positions are found 
in his understanding of the doctrine of creation. The human person, created in the image and 
189McCormick, The Critical Calling, 67. 
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likeness of God, is in a loving covenant with God. This relationship with God finds 
fulfillment through the love of one's neighbor. Unless a person can relate to and with others, 
that person can neither love nor develop his or her potential. The central theme of 
McCormick's doctrine of creation is the relational nature of God with humanity. Despite a 
significant amount of focus on relationality in his theological anthropology, McCormick 
never once mentions the theological concept of the Trinity. Rather, he emphasizes the 
significance of God as the Father, the centrality of Jesus Christ as the Son, and the guidance 
given to humanity by the Spirit. Yet he never mentions the notion of interrelations within 
the Trinity. McCormick does articulate the interdependence of human persons, the 
communitarian nature of human persons, and how the potential for human relationships is 
the basis for personhood. However, he fails to relate these concepts and communitarian 
themes directly to the Trinity. This is an important issue because in McCormick's view on 
Christology he refers to the fact that, "knowing Jesus, the second person of the Triune God, 
is knowing God. Knowing who Jesus is is knowing both the Godhead and ourselves in 
relationship to the Godhead, and therefore knowing some rather basic things about God's 
plan for us."190 Understanding the notion of "relation" in the Trinity can only deepen our 
knowledge of who God is and how human persons understand their relationship to and with 
God. That is important in any theological anthropology. 
One explanation for McCormick's avoidance of the relational nature of the Trinity 
may be the complex and archaic language that has been used in the past to explain the 
190McCormick, "Gustafson's God: Who? What? Where? (ETC)," 59. 
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theological nature of the Trinity. McCormick may believe that such language may cause 
only confusion rather than clarity if he tried to relate it to the nature of the human person in 
regards to contemporary bioethical dilemmas. Theologian Kenneth R. Himes argues: 
Few Catholics today understand what the Greek-speaking theologians of 
Cappodocia meant by hypostases or even what Tertullian meant by personae 
when the formula three-in-one was used to describe the Trinity. The hallowed 
formulation simply does not communicate the substance of the tradition 
accurately to most believers. 191 
McCormick may believe that the archaic language surrounding the Trinity would be 
misunderstood and thus his communitarian notion of the human person become meaningless. 
If true, then he might benefit from a more contemporary interpretation of the Trinity 
advanced by some present-day theologians. A number of contemporary theologians have 
expressed the notion "relation" in the Trinity in a more contemporarily relevant manner. 
Such clarity might strengthen significantly McCormick's position on the social and relational 
nature of the human person and give it an even stronger theological grounding as related to 
bioethical issues. 192 
191Kenneth R. Himes, 0. F. M., "The Contribution Of Theology To Catholic 
Moral Theology," in Moral Theolotly: Challenlles For The Future, 64. 
192 One contemporary theologian who has expressed the notion of "relation" in the 
Trinity in a coherent and relevant manner is Leonardo Boff. Boff writes: "The fact that 
the Son proceeds from the Father and the Spirit from the Father and the Son as from one 
beginning, means that there are mutual relationships between the three Persons. 
'Relationship' means an ordering of one Person to another, a connection between each of 
the divine Three ... As already inferred, the relationships constitute the Persons; in other 
words, it is through relationship that one Person is situated in relation to the others and 
differentiated from them, each essentially supposing and requiring the others. So the 
Father supposes the Son; the Son necessitates the Father; the Holy Spirit can be 
understood only in the breathing-out by the Father and the Son. The Persons are mutually 
distinguished (one from another) and required (one situating the others)." Leonardo Boff, 
147 
Third, McCormick states explicitly that the human person is "essentially social," 
which he bases in the doctrine of creation. 193 For him, when deciding on treatment decisions 
for defective neonates, it is necessary to take into consideration the effects of these decisions 
on the family and society at large. He quotes Pope Pius XIl194 and Gerald Kelly, S.J.,195 to 
show that the Catholic theological tradition has always included social factors in determining 
medical decisions. However, a number of ethicists suggest that McCormick offers a very 
narrow view of social factors as they influence treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
Richard Sparks and James McCartney, both Roman Catholic ethicists, criticize McCormick's 
view of these social factors. 
The issue of including social and familial factors in determining treatment decisions 
for defective neonates will be examined and analyzed in a more complete manner in chapter 
four, which will deal with McCormick's moral criteriology. However, the social nature of 
the human person is the basis for including these factors, so it is pertinent to include this 
criticism under theological anthropology. Sparks believes that "the ultimate decision as to 
whether treatment is in a given patient's total best interest ought to incorporate not only 
Trinity And Society (New York: Orbis Books, 1988), 91-92. See also Jurgen Moltmann, 
History Of The Triune God: Contributions To Trinitarian Theology (London: SCM, 
1991); and Idem, The Trinity And The Kingdom: The Doctrine Of God (San Francisco, 
CA.: Harper and Row, 1981). 
193McCormick's interpretation of the social nature of the human person also 
comes from the Documents of Vatican II. The fathers at Vatican II argue that being 
created in the image and likeness of God means creation for community, not isolation. 
See "Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modem World," nos. 12, 32. 
194See Pius XII, "The Prolongation Of Life," The Pope Speaks, 394. 
195See Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems, 132. 
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medical or individualistic (i.e., experiential) burden factors, but also broader social factors, 
viewed from the patient's existentially-contexted vantage point."196 Sparks argues that 
McCormick's interpretation of social factors is too narrow. He suggests that McCormick 
allows the patient's social nature to impact only to the extent that the person has 
physiologically-based potential to relate with others (determining one's minimal capacity to 
derive benefit from treatment). However, he rejects communality when it comes to the 
impact the patient's condition has on one's family or society (burden in the fullest sense). 
Sparks further argues that it would be truer to the extraordinary/ordinary means tradition and 
fairer to the patient viewed as a social as well as personal being to allow familial and even 
societal burdens into the calculus concerning the defective neonates' best interests. Sparks 
states that "those who are broader interpreters of the quality of the patient's life echo the best 
of the extraordinary/ordinary means tradition in their insistence that the cost, psychic strain, 
and the degree of inconvenience born by others, a non-competent's social net-worth, ought 
rightly to be factored in as part of the patient's burden, holistically considered."197 
In similar fashion, James McCartney criticizes the first guideline offered by 
McCormick and Paris in their joint America article198 that specifies their criteria of the 
capacity for human relationships as a summary of the burden-benefit evaluation. That 
196Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?, 198. 
197Ibid. 
198McCartney is referring to Richard A. McCormick, S.J. and John J. Paris, S.J., 
"Saving Defective Infants: Options For Life Or Death," America 148 (April 23, 1983): 
313-317. 
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guideline states, "life-saving interventions ought not be omitted for institutional or 
managerial reasons."199 McCartney writes: 
... since we are talking about the promotion of a positive good (the saving 
of the life of the child), there may be limitations and restrictions based not on 
the infant's questionable ability to benefit from this treatment, but on the 
sheer fact that it may cost too much, may involve personnel who are more 
needed elsewhere, may utilize resources that could more readily save many 
more lives, may involve the family in genuinely excessive psychological, 
emotional, or financial burdens they are unable to handle, or may involve the 
child's becoming a ward of the state with the psychological trauma that 
entails. While I agree that we ought to do all that we can to mitigate these 
factors, when they are irrevocably present I hold that they would provide 
adequate justification for the foregoing or discontinuance of treatment when 
they are coupled with a fairly serious pathological anomaly.200 
The major point of Sparks' and McCartney's criticism appears to be that McCormick 
is not consistent in the application of some elements of his theological anthropology. In a 
number of articles,201 McCormick argues that social and familial factors ought to be 
considered in the burden-benefit calculus. He argues that under specific guidelines, infants 
should be allowed to participate in experimentation because as members of the Christian 
community there is a sense of solidarity and Christian concern for others. Sharing in 
sociality, infants are in some sense volunteer-able to help the common good of society, 
199McCormick and Paris, ""Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New 
World?, 358-359. 
200James McCartney, "Issues In Death And Dying," in Moral Theology: 
Challenges For The Future, 279. 
201The articles referred to are: McCormick, "Proxy Consent In The 
Experimentation Situation," How Brave A New World?, 51-71; and Idem, "Sharing In 
Sociality: Children And Experimentation," How Brave A New World?, 87-98. 
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provided that their individual well-being is not thereby appreciably burdened.202 McCormick 
further supports inclusion of social and familial factors in the burden-benefit calculus by 
appealing to the Catholic theological tradition's "extraordinary-ordinary means" distinction. 
McCormick understands the tradition as stating: 
If the financial costs of life-preserving care was crushing--that is, if it would 
create grave hardships for oneself or one's family--it was considered 
extraordinary and nonobligatory. Or again, the grave inconvenience of living 
with a badly mutilated body was viewed, along with other factors (such as 
pain in preanesthetic days, uncertainty of success), as constituting the means 
extraordinary. Even now, contemporary moralist M. Zalba, S.J., states that 
no one is obliged to preserve his life when the cost is "a most oppressive 
convalescence" (molestissima convalescentia). 203 
Sparks believes that, despite McCormick's statements on this topic, he has not applied social 
and familial factors in a consistent manner when dealing with defective neonates. Sparks 
argues that this may be due to the fact that McCormick is trying to address his critics who 
believe his quality-of-life criteria may lead to the slippery slope of selfish social 
utilitarianism. 204 
202Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?, 199. 
203McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 347. See also 
M. Zalba, Theologiae Moralis Summa 3 (Madrid: La Editorial Catolica, 1957), II, 71. 
204Sparks cites two other reasons for why McCormick fails to apply social and 
familial factors in a broader manner. First, if social and familial factors are allowed to 
overrule a relationally able infant's presumed interest in therapy, the subsequent 
nontreatment would indeed harm the patient left untreated. Death or a more burdened 
quality of life seem inevitable. Therefore, contrary to the pain-free experimentation 
premise, incorporation of social factors in these cases cannot help but harm the patient, at 
least if nontreatment and foreseen death are considered not in the infant's best interest. 
Second, it is not clear that McCormick and Paris absolutely exclude all social burden 
factors. In their joint America article they assert that familial factors ought not dictate an 
infant's access to treatment, since behind one's nuclear family there is a second line of 
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From the vantage point of McCormick's theological anthropology, it appears that 
Sparks' and McCartney's criticism of McCormick in this area may be accurate. McCormick 
affords significant attention to articulating the significance of the human person as essentially 
social and inherently relational. However, it also appears that McCormick does not apply 
the full dimensions of these concepts to treatment decisions for defective neonates. This 
issue of social and familial factors applied to treatment decisions is a complex issue that 
entails more than just the social and relational nature of the human person. There may be 
more to McCormick's position on these issues than just a failure to be consistent in the 
application of social and familial factors in a broad sense to treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. A final evaluation of this criticism will be deferred until chapter four when 
McCormick's moral criteriology is articulated, analyzed, and evaluated. 
The final criticism directed at McCormick's theological anthropology concerns his 
view of redemption and the Pauline images he uses of being "in Christ" or "in the Lord." 
What does this mean at the level of concrete existence? Ethicist Kenneth Himes writes: 
McCormick's answer is quite sweeping: the experience of being in Christ 
"totally transforms the human person" creating "new operative vitalities." 
From here he proceeds to lay out an understanding of how charity, rooted in 
the experience of acceptance of Christ as Lord, forms the entirety of the 
moral life. 205 
Unfortunately, McCormick fails to articulate what he means precisely and concretely by 
social support or defense, the society. They decline to speculate whether the cost of 
handicapped care exceeds a society's (finite) resources or the demands injustice for its 
equitable distribution. See Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?, 199-200. 
205Himes, "The Contribution Of Theology To Catholic Moral Theology," in Moral 
Theology: Challenges For The Future, 67. 
152 
"totally transformed," or by "new operative vitalities." Himes argues that, "the statements 
read more like assertions that are not easily reconcilable with human experience. It appears 
that McCormick claims too much in his account of the experience of redemption. "206 
Himes believes that McCormick's abstractness in regards to redemption is because 
his account of redemption is insufficiently eschatological. "What is lacking is the element 
of the 'not yet' and the consequent role for processes of conversion and growth."207 To 
address this deficiency, Himes argues that more attention must be given to the experience 
of grace given in Jesus as experienced by people in their everyday lives. 
Himes' criticism is partially correct. I believe McCormick's notion of salvation is 
quite concrete. Himes' criticism that it is "abstract" is due to the fact that McCormick's 
position on eschatology is presented in an undeveloped form. However, McCormick clearly 
states that human persons are transformed, redeemed, and divinized by the grace of Christ. 
He also states that even though the human person has been redeemed, because of the effects 
of the Fall, there is a need for daily redemption. Therefore, humans are called to grow in the 
fullness of their redemption. This is the basis for understanding the process of conversion 
and growth in the human person. Unfortunately, McCormick fails to articulate fully how the 
human person grows in the fullness ofthis daily redemption. Despite God's enabling grace, 
the human person remains vulnerable to sin. Sin endures but so does the redeeming love of 




says the human person redeemed in Christ becomes a "new creature." How is the grace 
given in Jesus experienced by individuals in their everyday experiences? Stating that the 
human person becomes a "new creature" does little to explain how the ongoing process of 
conversion and redemption takes place. If Jesus is "God's incarnate self-gift" as McCormick 
states, and this is essential to understanding the human person, then Himes is correct in 
stating that attending to the implications of this fact in an experiential way requires more 
effort on McCormick's part. The relation of human nature and grace is essential to 
understanding McCormick's theological anthropology. To understand the human person 
"integrally and adequately" McCormick must be less ambiguous about how redemption is 
experienced in daily life. 
In conclusion, if McCormick is serious when he states that theologians should be 
ready, willing and able to admit mistakes, especially to each other, then he should examine 
these criticisms with an open mind. His theological anthropology is the foundation of his 
ethical methodology. If McCormick fails to address the criticisms directed at his theological 
anthropology, and these criticisms are correct, then his moral epistemology and moral 
criteriology may be compromised. 'Ibis could have dire consequences in regard to treatment 
decisions for defective neonates. 'Ibis is not to say that he must accept the above criticisms 
as correct. However, as he states, "unless a theologian is ready to examine criticisms and 
admit mistakes, differences degenerate into distance and ultimately disorder."208 
208McCormick, The Critical Calling, 144. 
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moral epistemology. It is necessary in the section that follows to examine how McCormick 




Claims to moral knowledge are always made within specific traditions of thought and 
practice. To understand McCormick's ethical position on treatment decisions for defective 
neonates, one must first understand his ethical tradition, and then how his moral positions 
originate and how they are maintained. 
Moral epistemology is the systematic and critical study of morality as a body of 
knowledge. According to Michael J. Quirk: 
It is concerned with such issues as how or whether moral claims can be 
rationally justified, whether there are objective moral facts, whether moral 
statements strictly admit of truth or falsity, and whether moral claims are 
universally valid or relative to historically particular belief systems, 
conceptual schemes, social practices, or cultures. 1 
Specifically, moral epistemology is concerned with the human ways of knowing 
values/disvalues and moral obligations. Once discovering these values/disvalues, the task 
of moral epistemology is to inquire how they may be used in the further investigation of 
knowing whether a particular action is right or wrong. There exists a basic relationship 
between the discovery of these values/disvalues and the judgment of rightness and 
1Michael J. Quirk, "Ethics: Moral Epistemology," Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, rev. 
ed., vol. 2, 727. 
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wrongness of a particular action. This relationship is the foundational framework for what 
McCormick means by moral epistemology. 
The Roman Catholic tradition, at least since the time of St. Thomas, has always made 
a distinction between the discovery of values/disvalues and the judgment of rightness and 
wrongness of a particular action. Thomas refers to this distinction by using the terms 
synderesis and conscience. For Thomas, synderesis refers to the natural habit of moral 
knowledge which operates with regard to the first principles of practical reason in the same 
way as understanding or intuition does for Aristotle with regard to the principles of 
theoretical reason.2 Thomas writes: 
Synderesis is not a power but a habit~ though some held that it is a power 
higher than reason; while others (Alexander of Hales) said that it is reason 
itself, not as reason, but as nature ... [M]an's act ofreasoning, since it is a 
kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things--
namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the 
part of reason, as from an immovable principle,--and ends also at the 
understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, 
we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is 
clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that 
practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, 
bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical 
principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do 
not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called the 
understanding of principles, as the Philosopher explains (Ethics, vi, 6). 
Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not 
belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call 
synderesis. 3 
2John Langan, S.J., "Beatitude And Moral Law In St. Thomas," The Journal Of 
Religious Ethics 5 (Fall 1977): 189. 
3Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia, 79, 12; see also Idem, Summa 
Theologica Ia-llae, 94, 1; Idem, Truth, 16, 1. Emphasis in the original. Thomas further 
states: "Whence synderesis is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as 
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For Thomas, all persons of good will are aware of these most fundamental principles in their 
most general form.4 Therefore, all human persons would agree that in some sense good is 
to be pursued and evil is to be avoided. The basic inclination in human persons is to know 
and do the good. 
On the other hand, for Thomas, conscience is the act of applying moral principles to 
particular concrete actions. 5 Conscience produces a judgment of what a person must do and 
the commitment required to do it. Thomas writes: 
Properly speaking conscience is not a power, but an act . . . For conscience, 
according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge 
to something: for conscience may be resolved into cum alio scientia, i.e., 
knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge 
to something is done by some act . . . Conscience is said to witness, to bind, 
or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the 
application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is 
made in three ways.6 
through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It 
is therefore clear that synderesis is not a power, but a natural habit." Idem, Summa 
Theologica Ia, 79, 12. 
4John Langan argues that Thomas is not clear on what are the things we know 
through this intuitive grasp of first principles. He believes there are several candidates 
proposed in the Summa Theologica Ia-Ilae, 94. The first is "good is to be sought and 
done, evil to be avoided" (Summa Theologica Ia-Ilae, 94, 2). Secondly, Thomas speaks 
of the precept that "we should act intelligently (ut secundum rationem agatur)" in ways 
which make it clear that this is a first principle of practical reason; for it is accepted by all 
persons and from it he holds we can derive more specific c~mclusions (Summa 
Theologica Ia-Ilae, 94, 40). Thirdly, Thomas also says that this precept is equivalent to 
the precept that we should act virtuously (ut secundum virtutem agatur) (Summa 
Theologica Ia-Ilae, 94, 3). See Langan, "Beatitude And Moral Law In St. Thomas," 189. 
5Thomas refers to conscience, but more contemporary theologians in the 
Thomistic tradition would use the term normative moral judgment. 
6 For Thomas the application would be as follows: "One way in so far as we 
recognize that we have done or not done something; Thy conscience knoweth that thou 
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If our conscience tells us that we ought to perform a particular act, then it is our moral duty 
or moral obligation to perform it. On this subject Thomas writes: "Every conscience, 
whether right or wrong, whether it concerns things evil in themselves or things morally 
indifferent, obliges us to act in such a way that he who acts against conscience sins."7 
Thomas does not mean to suggest that there is no such thing as right reason and no such 
thing as an objectively correct moral conscience. For him, ignorance and mistakes are 
possible in moral matters, and the nearer a person comes to particulars the greater is the field 
for error.8 Thomas argues that "although there is necessity in the general principles, the more 
we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. "9 
Since McCormick is a "revised" natural law ethicist who draws heavily upon the 
Roman Catholic ethical tradition, it is reasonable to situate his moral epistemology within 
the Thomistic tradition. 10 He states clearly that "every theologian comes from a tradition 
hast often spoken evil of others (Eccles. vii. 23 ), and according to this, conscience is said 
to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something 
should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In 
the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill 
done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear 
that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. 
Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience dominates an act." Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica Ia, 79, 13. Emphasis in the original. 
7Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 3, 27 (Rome, Italy: Marelli 
Publishers, 1956), 64. 
8F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (London: Penguin Books, 1955), 228. 
9 Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-Hae, 94, 4. This position of Aquinas will serve 
as the basis for McCormick's distinction between the substance of a teaching and its 
formulation. 
10Lisa Sowle Cahill lists three main initiatives of Richard McCormick as a revised 
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and is deeply influenced by it."11 Being part of the Roman Catholic moral tradition, 
McCormick cannot escape reflecting and theorizing as a member of this tradition. However, 
as a "revised" natural law ethicist, McCormick will also reformulate the tradition. Instead 
of restricting moral knowing to a function of the will or the intellect, McCormick 
understands moral knowing as a function and expression of the person "integrally and 
adequately considered."12 In McCormick's view, moral epistemology is the whole person's 
commitment to values and the moral judgment one makes in light of that commitment to 
apply these values. 
This chapter will examine McCormick's moral epistemology both at the level of how 
human persons know values and disvalues, which herein after will be referred to as 
synderesis, and at the level of how human persons know the rightness and wrongness of an 
action, which herein after will be referred to as normative moral judgment. On the one hand, 
from this investigation it appears that McCormick operates with a dual moral epistemology, 
at least at the level of synderesis. This means that at one point in time it appears that a 
natural law ethicist. For a more detailed analysis of these three initiatives, refer to 
Chapter One, Bioethical Methodologies section, Natural Law Methodology sub-section 
above. 
11McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 311. 
12For a detailed discussion of the person "integrally and adequately considered," 
refer to Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section above. 
McCormick argues: "The basic thrust of the natural law was and is that man's being is 
and must be the basis for his becoming. Catholic theologians are more keenly aware of 
the fact that in many respects this being is changeable and changing ... On the other 
hand, in retreating from the unhistorical orthodoxies and instant certainties of the past and 
allowing full range to man's historical existence and creativity, we must retain the 
courage to be concrete." McCormick, "The New Morality," 771. 
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epistemology stems from the fact that he has never articulated it in a systematic manner. 
Before examining each moral epistemology, a general overview of how McCormick 
understands synderesis, normative moral judgment, and the sources of moral wisdom will 
help clarify his two basic epistemological positions. 
As a "revised" natural law ethicist, McCormick, following Thomas, argues that since 
every agent acts for an end, then the end manifests the notion of the good. The good is that 
which all things seek. 14 On this is based the first judgment of the practical reason: the good 
is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. 15 For Thomas, the human person knows 
the good and avoids evil through a reflection on one's natural inclinations. 
14Aquinas writes: "Everything--whether it has knowledge or not--tends toward the 
good. Whatever is oriented or inclined to something by another is inclined to whatever is 
intended by the one inclining or orienting. Therefore, since all natural things have been 
directed by a certain natural inclination toward their ends by the First Mover, God, 
whatever is willed or intended by God is that to which everything is naturally inclined. 
But inasmuch as God's will can have no other end than Himself, and God is essentially 
goodness, everything must be naturally inclined toward good. To desire or have a 
tendency is only to yearn for something, tending as it were toward whatever is suitable 
for oneself. Hence because all things are destined and oriented by God toward a good, 
and this is done so that in each one there is a principle whereby it tends toward good as 
though seeking good itself, we must admit that all things naturally tend toward good. If 
everything tended toward good while lacking within itself any principle of inclination, 
they might be spoken of as being led to good but not tending toward good. But through 
an innate principle everything is said to tend to good as self-inclining. Hence we read in 
Wisdom 8:1 that divine wisdom 'ordered all things sweetly' because each by its own 
action tends toward that to which it has been divinely directed." Thomas Aquinas, De 
Veritate, 22, 1, c, trans. Mulligan-McGlynn Schmidt (Chicago, IL.: Regnery, 1952-54); 
see also Mary T. Clark, An Aquinas Reader (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1972), 
257. 
15Thomas writes: "All things which should be done or which should be shunned 
pertain to precepts of the natural law insofar as practical reason naturally apprehends 
them to be human goods." Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-Hae, 94, 2. 
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For McCormick, at the level of synderesis, all human persons have an innate grasp 
of the good. His anthropology specifies that all human persons know the basic goods that 
define human flourishing by reason reflecting on the natural inclinations. 16 Corresponding 
to each natural inclination is a basic good. In other words, our basic needs direct us toward 
basic goods. Therefore, the natural inclinations guide the human person's discernment of 
objective goods. For McCormick, normative moral judgment or conscience is "neither a 
dictator nor a slave. It is a discerning guide. " 17 Normative moral judgment is the specific 
judgment of the rightness or wrongness of a human action and has its roots in the depths of 
the person innately inclined toward the good, to love of God and love of neighbor. This 
inclination takes more concrete form in general moral knowledge and becomes utterly 
concrete and personal when a person judges about the loving or unloving, selfish or 
unselfish--briefly, about the moral quality--of his or her own actions. 18 Normative moral 
judgment is the act of applying principles to concrete situations. The human person 
apprehends goods and then applies normative theories to gain insight into whether an action 
is right or wrong. 19 The concrete judgment of what a person must do in a particular situation 
is based on personal perception and the grasp of goods or values. In order to understand 
16McCormick's point is that one cannot move from synderesis to the natural 
inclinations without reference to anthropology. 
17McCormick, "The New Morality," 771. 
18McCormick, "Personal Conscience," 243-244. 
19Normative theories formulate and defend a system of fundamental principles and 
rules that determine which actions are right and which are wrong. See Tom L. 
Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles Of Medical Ethics, 3rd ed., 9. 
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McCormick's moral epistemology, it is essential to determine how he believes that we 
discover objective goods or values in each situation. Further, one must also identify the 
sources of moral wisdom that help and guide McCormick to perceive and appropriate the 
truth. 
Based on his theory of knowing, it is possible to classify McCormick as a realist, an 
epistemological position originating out of the "absolutist school" or what is also called the 
"critical cognitivist school."20 Adhering to the natural law tradition, McCormick recognizes 
the objectivity of the moral order rooted in the nature of reality, which can be known through 
human reason. Such knowing requires more than a simple reading of the physical order. 
From McCormick's perspective, the world of human meaning can only be known through 
20James J. Walter and Stephen Happel state that there are three main theories or 
schools of thought that attempt to explain the grounding of moral knowledge and the 
cognitive status of the moral interpretations that emanate from moral apprehensions. 
They write: "First, there is the relativist school, which can be divided into the social-
relativist wing and the personal-relativist wing. For the social relativist, moral 
evaluations are governed by the culturally available categories of a given society ... For 
the personal relativist, moral evaluations must find their ground in personal feelings or 
emotions. Accordingly, an action is right or wrong by reference to whether one approves 
or disapproves of the action and feels happy or sad when the action is performed. The 
second main theory of moral knowledge is found in the noncognitivist school. .. Moral 
statements are simply emotional utterances. The third school or theory is known as the 
absolutist. Briefly stated, those in the absolutist school argue that moral standards are 
about objective common human reality, and thus, that in principle there can be universal 
agreement about the truth and falsity of any particular claim ... The central reason there 
should be universal agreement is that all humans are looked on as attempting, however 
imperfectly, to determine a judgment that comes from a single source." For a more 
detailed analysis, see James J. Walter and Stephen Happel, Conversion And Discipleship: 
A Christian Foundation For Ethics And Doctrine (Philadelphia, PA.: Fortress Press, 
1986), 104-105. Emphasis in the original. 
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an epistemology of realism that is critical.21 
To perceive and appropriate the truth, McCormick will rely on various sources of 
moral wisdom. In general, these sources are multiple with the purpose to guide, direct, and 
illuminate the knowledge of the human person. Without the aid of these multiple sources, 
the human person risks the possibility of error and ignorance in regards to decision-making. 
Along similar lines, Karl Popper argues: 
If we must speak of our sources of ignorance it has to be said that the main 
source of our ignorance lies in the fact that we are human. Our knowledge 
can only be finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite . . . There 
are all sorts of reasons why we remain ignorant; we may be insufficiently 
inquiring or critical, the problem may be too difficult, we may not have the 
requisite tools at our disposal, and so on. But there is no insurmountable 
obstacle to a theoretical kind of knowledge. There may be practical 
difficulties and perhaps impossibilities in certain areas, but there cannot be 
theoretical obstacles of the kind the skeptics present.22 
21Kenneth R. Himes suggests that McCormick is a critical realist. As he puts it: 
"this epistemology accepts the nature of the real as a basis for moral judgment but 
demands a process of critical questioning that takes the subject beyond the world of sense 
data to the world of meaning. Objectivity in the world of sense data requires functional 
sensory organs. Objectivity in the world of meaning asks of us to wed sense data with 
intelligence and reason. Thus, to obtain moral meaning it is insufficient to rely upon the 
immediacy of sense data alone. Meaning comes to be in the encounter of the subject with 
the object of the world of immediacy. The criteria for an authentic encounter are the 
transcendental precepts: Be attentive! Be intelligent! Be reasonable! Be responsible!" 
Himes, "The Contribution Of Theology To Catholic Moral Theology," Moral Theology: 
Challenges For The Future, 56. The classic texts for describing an epistemology of 
critical realism are Bernard Lonergan's Insight: A Study Of Human Understanding 
(London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1957); and Method In Theology (New York: Herder 
and Herder, 1972). 
22Karl Popper, "A Complete Theory Of Knowledge?" in The Theory Of 
Knowledge ed. D. W. Hamlyn (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1970), 284-
285; see also K. R. Popper, Conjectures And Refutations (New York: Harperand Row, 
1968). 
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To overcome such sources of ignorance, McCormick underscores that human persons are 
members of a believing community, an ecclesia. He writes: 
Just as we cannot exist except in community, so also we cannot know except 
as members of a community. Our knowledge of God's being and actions, 
dim and imperfect as it is, is shared knowledge. So is our knowledge of its 
implications for behavior. In other words, we form our consciences in 
community, not in isolation. It is that communitarian aspect that is suggested 
in the words "in the Catholic tradition. "23 
For McCormick, there are three main sources of moral knowledge for the Christian: 
scripture,24 the magisterium of the Church, 25 and human reason. 26 However, as part of human 
23Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition," 
Acta Hosvitalia I (1986): 55. 
24Scripture (as reread and continually reappropriated by the community: tradition) 
is a "moral reminder," and a privileged articulation of what all people of good will can 
know through human reason. For McCormick, "scripture does not immediately yield 
moral norms and rules. But it affects them. The stories and symbols that relate the origin 
of Christianity and nourish the faith of the individual affect one's perspectives ... They 
[persons] do not find concrete answers in the sources of faith, but they bring a worldview 
that informs their reasoning--especially by allowing the basic human goods to retain their 
attractiveness and not be tainted by cultural distortions. This worldview is a continuing 
check on and challenge to our tendency to make choices in light of cultural enthusiasms 
which sink into and take possession of our unwitting, pre-discursive selves." McCormick, 
"Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition," 58. 
25For McCormick, "the magisterium in our time gives us the enlightenment of the 
whole Church. However, it also imposes on us the responsibility of being critical 
Catholics. In this sense, it is both privilege and responsibility. If we are to enjoy the 
privilege, we must incur the responsibility." McCormick further argues that "an effective 
magisterium necessarily involves a teaching-learning process in which teachers learn and 
learners teach. Dissent is an integral part of this process ... Viewing the magisterium as 
involving a processive dialogue is particularly important in medico-moral matters." Ibid., 
61. 
26F or McCormick, human reason refers to "all those dimensions of human 
understanding that play a role in our evaluation of actions as morally right or wrong. 
Among these dimensions are: experience, the sense of profanation, trial and error, 
discourse reasoning, long-term consequences, the experience of harmony or guilt over our 
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reason he will also include: human experience, personal reflection and prayer, the sciences, 
reflection and discussion with other Christians and non-Christians, etc. These sources of 
moral knowledge are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they may be understood as 
complementary. McCormick argues that for the Christian moral knowledge is above all and 
always shared or communal knowledge--knowledge mediated to the person by the 
community of believers. Christians are members of a community and form their consciences 
in a community. This is a community of experience, memory, and reflection. 27 
McCormick recognizes the controversial state of moral epistemology in our time. 
The world is daily becoming more complex, and situations facing humankind are more 
diverse, technical, confusing, and controversial. For him, the current problems facing the 
world can no longer be solved or confined satisfactorily within the normative grammar of 
the classicist view. Christians today are confronted by difficult ethical problems and they 
want to be able to apply their faith to these issues within the cultures in which they live. A 
mere repetition of past formulas is no longer adequate. There is a need for innovation, 
imagination, and creativity, but also faithfulness to the Catholic theological tradition. 
actions. There is always the danger that the term recta ratio will be impoverished by 
collapsing it into a barren rationalism that overlooks the affective richness of human 
understanding." Ibid. 
27McCormick, "Personal Conscience," 243. McCormick continues: "However, if 
the Christian's knowledge of the morally good or bad is to take concrete meaningful 
form, it must also draw upon and integrate the insights and experience of a variety of 
disciplines that study the world and provide the context of decision and choice: 
economics, medicine, psychology and psychiatry, sociology, law, cultural anthropology, 
etc. Thus the light of the Gospel in confrontation with human experience will be the 
source of ever fresh insights into the meaning and challenge of being a Christian in the 
modem world." Ibid. 
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McCormick contends that Vatican II addressed this need by giving the Church a new 
foundation for examining moral problems when it centered on a more personalist approach 
to moral reasoning. The criterion of morality is the human person viewed in his or her 
totality. Change, development, and revision are now viewed as ways of coming to the moral 
knowledge. Human actions are now interpreted from within this context. The historically 
conscious worldview, advanced at Vatican II, does not absolutize any one particular culture 
or any one particular moment in history as having grasped the whole truth, i.e., values, 
judgments of rightness and wrongness, or moral obligation. For McCormick, "if there is one 
thing that is clear about human understanding it is that it is a process--subject to limitations 
of partial insight, historical change, limited philosophical concepts and language, and the 
intransigence and unpredictability of concrete reality. "28 
The changes proposed at Vatican II, especially the emphasis on the human person as 
central to moral reflection, have had a significant impact on McCormick's moral 
epistemology. 29 McCormick positions himself as a moral theologian who seeks 
comprehensive knowledge, recognizes the distinctive roles of faith and reason in moral 
decision-making, and has a great love for the truth wherever found. Grounded in the 
Catholic theological tradition McCormick writes: 
The Catholic tradition from which I come has held, at least since the time of 
St. Thomas, that the sources of faith do not originate concrete obligations 
28McCormick, The Critical Callin~, 3 5. 
29F or a more detailed analysis of the changes proposed at Vatican II that 
emphasize the human person as central to moral reflection, see "Pastoral Constitution On 
The Church In The Modern World," The Documents Of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott. 
(thought to apply to all persons, essential morality) that are impervious to 
human insight and reason. 30 
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According to McCormick, to write and think as a Catholic moral theologian means three 
things. He writes: 
First, religious faith stamps one at a profound and not totally recoverable 
level. Second, this stamping affects one's instincts, sensitivities, imagination, 
etc. and hence influences one's perspectives, analyses, judgments. Third, 
analyses and judgments of such a kind are vitally important in our communal 
deliberations about bioethics.31 
McCormick believes that the Catholic theological tradition has always treasured--even if it 
has not always been ultimately guided or determined by--sound moral analysis. The reason 
for this is found in two convictions that summarize the tradition on the nature of moral 
argument. McCormick argues: 
First, the concrete moral implications of our being-in-Christ can per se be 
known by human insight and reasoning. In other words, those concrete and 
behavioral norms (commands and prohibitions) regarded as applying to all 
persons precisely as human persons, are not radically mysterious. Thus the 
30McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 311. Emphasis in the original. 
McCormick argues that there are four levels at which the term "ethics" is to be 
understood. Those levels are: essential ethic, existential ethic, essential Christian ethics 
and existential Christian ethics. For McCormick an essential ethic means "those norms 
that are regarded as applicable to all persons, where one's behavior is but an instance of a 
general, essential moral norm. Here we could use as examples the rightness and 
wrongness of killing actions, of contracts, of promises and all those actions whose 
demands are rooted in the dignity of the person." It is at this level where explicit faith 
does not "add new content at the material or concrete level. However, revelation and our 
personal faith do influence ethical decisions at the other three levels." For a more 
detailed analysis, see Idem, "Does Religious Faith Add To Ethical Perception?, Readings 
In Moral Theology No. 2: The Distinctiveness Of Christian Ethics, eds. Charles E. Curran 
and Richard A. McCormick, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 156-173; and Idem, 
The Critical Calling, 196. 
31McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 312. 
traditional concept of the natural law (one based in the very being of persons) 
is knowable by insight and reason. Over a period of centuries, therefore, the 
criterion of right and wrong actions was said to be recta ratio [right reason]. 
Second, the tradition has viewed man as redeemed but still affected by 
reliquiae peccati [remnants of sin]. This means that notwithstanding the 
transforming gift of God's enabling grace, we remain vulnerable to self-love 
and self-deception (sin) and that these noxious influences affect our 
evaluative and judgmental processes.32 
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McCormick believes that the balancing of these twin currents in the Catholic tradition is 
often summarized by the lapidary phrase "reason informed by faith." He understands this 
balance to be 
tricky and fragile and has not always been successfully realized . . . When I 
say that "I speak out of the Catholic tradition," I mean to suggest an ideal 
mix of these twin currents, that which very few of us probably achieve, try 
as we may. One of the reasons for this is that the "enlightened" (in reason 
enlightened by faith) still cries out for penetrating and systematic study.33 
McCormick believes his moral epistemology is a way of answering the "cry" of how reason 
is enlightened by faith. 
The remainder of this section will examine McCormick's two moral epistemologies 
both at the level of synderesis and at the level of normative moral judgment. It will show 
how the historical context in which McCormick is operating has had a profound impact on 
his moral epistemology. Finally, this section will conclude with an evaluation of whether 
McCormick has made a significant shift in his moral epistemology or whether his moral 
epistemology is in fact a synthesis, which is the product of the development and maturity in 
his thought process. 
32McCormick, "Moral Arguments In The Catholic Tradition," 5. 
33lbid. Emphasis in the original. 
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First Moral Epistemology--Prior To 1983 
McCormick's first moral epistemology is deeply rooted in the neo-scholastic 
tradition.34 At the level of synderesis, human persons seek goods that define human 
flourishing through a reflection on natural inclinations. 35 The basic needs of persons direct 
them toward basic goods.36 At the level of normative moral judgment, further reflection by 
practical reason on the fundamental natural inclinations of human nature dictates what is 
good and should be pursued and what is evil and should be avoided. 
In the early 1970's McCormick gradually began to be influenced by the school of 
34Neo-scholasticism provided Catholic theology with a common philosophical 
language that facilitated teaching and dialogue; it offered clarity in definition and 
argumentation; and it provided some metaphysical grounding for those natural truths that 
prepare for Christian faith, namely the existence of God, the spirituality of the human 
soul, and the natural moral law. The weaknesses of neo-scholasticism were its lack of 
historical perspective and eclectic confusion of Thomism with the alien doctrines of 
Francisco de Suarez, Duns Scotus, Rene Descartes, G. W. Leibniz, Immanuel Kant and 
idealism; its failure to deal adequately with the findings of modem science and to 
recognize human historicity and subjectivity; and its teaching methods that tended to 
conceptualism, while neglecting to ground principles and definitions in experience. For a 
more detailed analysis, see The Encyclopedia Of Catholicism, 911; refer also to Chapter 
One, Richard A. McCormick, S.J.--Moral Theologian section, above. 
35Thomas argues that there are certain natural impulses that humans share with all 
created things, for example, the impulse to preserve oneself in being. There are other 
inclinations that we share with other animals, for example, the urge to mate and raise 
offspring. Finally, there is an inclination to the good according to the nature of reason, 
peculiar to humans. For example, human persons have the natural inclination to seek the 
truth and live in society. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-Ilae, 94, 2. 
36It should be noted that throughout McCormick's writings he will use basic 
goods and basic values to mean the same thing. I will attempt to be consistent by 
referring to them as "basic goods," however, there will be certain times when I will quote 
McCormick and he will refer to the basic goods as "basic values." It should also be noted 
that John Finnis and Lisa Sowle Cahill will also use "basic goods" and "basic values" to 
mean the same thing. 
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thought represented by John Finnis, J. de Finance, G. de Broglie, G. Grisez and others, 
which deals with the concept of basic human goods. Finnis writes: 
These principia which are fines operabilium are simply the values 
corresponding to our fundamental inclinations, and they are named by St. 
Thomas the first and self-evident principles of natural law. What is 
spontaneously understood when one turns from contemplation to action is not 
a set of Kantian or neo-scholastic "moral principles" identifying this as right 
and that as wrong, but a set of values which can be expressed in the form of 
principles such as "life is a good-to-be-pursued and realized, and what 
threatens it to be avoided. "37 
These basic goods define the scope of the human person's possibility and appeal to the 
person for realization.38 McCormick's attraction to this approach can be attributed to his 
commitment to the Catholic natural law methodology. 39 Finnis' notion of the origin of moral 
obligation and the meaning of natural law (reasonableness) was both persuasive and very 
attractive to McCormick.40 McCormick understands the natural human inclinations to be 
the basis for our interest in specific goods at the level of synderesis. McCormick writes: 
What are the goods or values man can seek, the values that define his human 
37John Finnis, "Natural Law And Unnatural Acts," Heythrop Journal 11 (1970): 
373. 
38McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 451. 
39For a more detailed analysis of the Catholic natural law methodology, refer to 
Chapter One, Bioethical Methodologies section, Natural Law Methodology subsection 
above. 
40Ibid., 453. Finnis writes: "Natural law is not a doctrine. It is one's permanent 
dynamic orientation towards an understanding grasp of the goods that can be realized by 
free choice, together with a bias (like the bias in one's 'speculation' towards raising 
questions that will lead one on from data to insight and from insight to judgment) towards 
actually making choices that are intelligibly (because intelligently) related to the goods 
which are understood to be attainable, or at stake, in one's situation." Finnis, "Natural 
Law And Unnatural Acts," 366. 
opportunity, his flourishing? We can answer this by examining man's basic 
tendencies, for it is impossible to act without having an interest in the object, 
and it is impossible to be attracted by, to have an interest in something 
without some inclination already present.41 
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With no pretense at being exhaustive, McCormick lists the following as the basic inclinations 
present prior to acculturation: 
the tendency to preserve life; the tendency to mate and raise children; the 
tendency to explore and question; the tendency to seek out other men and 
obtain their approval--friendship; the tendency to use intelligence in guiding 
action; the tendency to develop skills and exercise them in play and in fine 
arts.42 
Significantly, McCormick's list of basic inclinations is almost identical with those advanced 
by Finnis.43 
McCormick argues that "in these inclinations our intelligence spontaneously and 
without reflection grasps the possibilities to which they point, and prescribes them. Thus we 
41McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 5. 
42Ibid. 
43Finnis claims that: "Now besides life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, 
friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion, there are countless objectives and forms 
of good. But I suggest that these other objectives and forms of good will be found, on 
analysis, to be ways or combinations of ways of pursuing (not always sensibly) and 
realizing (not always successfully) one of the seven basic forms, or some combination of 
them." John Finnis, Natural Law And Natural Ri~hts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 
90. Lisa Sowle Cahill notes that: "The basic inclinations mentioned by McCormick are 
roughly equivalent to these (though not so definitively enumerated), with the addition of 
'the tendency to mate and raise children.' Procreation is called a basic value by Finnis in 
an article on sexual morality but is not included in the list in his later volume on natural 
rights." Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Teleology, Utilitarianism, And Christian Ethics," 622. See 
also John Finnis, "Natural Law And Unnatural Acts," 385. 
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form naturally and without reflection the basic principles of practical or moral reasoning."44 
This shows the origins of both our knowledge of goods and moral obligation. The basic 
goods toward which these inclinations lead us lay the foundation for whether concrete 
actions are morally right or wrong. Like Finnis, McCormick argues that these basic goods 
are "equally basic and irreducibly attractive."45 By "equally basic" Finnis explains: 
First, each is equally self-evidently a form of the good. Secondly, none can 
be analytically reduced to being merely an aspect of any of the others, or to 
being merely instrumental in the pursuit of any of the others. Thirdly, each 
one, when we focus on it, can reasonably be regarded as the most important. 
Hence there is no objective hierarchy amongst them. 46 
McCormick appears to agree with Finnis, at least initially, that these basic goods are 
incommensurable.47 For McCormick, "each of these values has its self-evident appeal as a 
participation in the unconditioned Good we call God. The realization of these values in 
intersubjective life is the only adequate way to love and attain God."48 What it means to 
44McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 5. 
45lbid.; see also McCormick, "Proxy Consent In The Experimentation Situation," 
in Love And Society: Essays In The Ethics Of Paul Ramsey, eds. James Johnson and 
David Smith (Missoula, MO.: University of Montana Press, 1974), 217. It should be 
noted that in a reprint of this same article in How Brave A New World?, published in 
1981, the section of the article where McCormick states that "these basic values are 
equally basic and irreducibly attractive" has been eliminated. 
46Finnis, Natural Law And Natural Rights, 92. 
47The incommensurability of the basic goods means that they cannot be measured. 
One cannot choose directly against a basic good. Finnis writes: "To choose directly 
against it in favour of some other basic value is arbitrary, for each of the basic values is 
equally basic, equally irreducibly and self-evidently attractive." Finnis, "Natural Law 
And Unnatural Acts," 375. 
48McCormick, "Proxy Consent In The Experimentation Situation," in Love And 
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remain open and to pursue these basic goods comes at the level of normative moral 
judgment. 
In McCormick's first moral epistemology, at the level of normative moral judgment, 
there appear to be two formulations for determining the rightness and wrongness of an 
action. The first formulation is based on Finnis' position, and seems to derive from the fact 
that the basic goods are "equally basic and self-evidently attractive."49 For Finnis, these 
goods or values do not present themselves as what we call "moral values," as a rule of right 
and wrong. Finnis writes: 
Just as all reasoning, even false reasoning, is recognizable as reasoning 
because it draws on self-evident principles of coherent thought, so all human 
activity and practical thinking and choosing, even the most vicious and 
wrongful, draws on and is directed by the natural law, that is, values (and the 
principles expressing those values) which appeal to our intelligence with the 
glow, the self-evidence, of innate intelligibility.so 
These basic goods appeal to human intelligence and will. The moral choice is that which 
realizes or suppresses the basic goods in particular concrete situations. Thus, the morally 
right act is the one that maximizes these basic goods to the extent concretely possible.s 1 In 
Society, 217. 
49Finnis, "Natural Law And Unnatural Acts," 375. 
solbid., 368. 
s1Finnis writes: "What is (what we call) 'morally' right and wrong, virtuous and 
vicious, emerges only as the product of a further understanding (which may of course be 
spontaneous or reflective) of what particular forms of pursuit and realization of these 
values do represent, in concrete types of situation, an adequate openness to and tension 
towards the God who is the source of the irreducible claritas of each of the fundamental 
values of human living." Finnis, "Natural Law And Unnatural Acts," 373. Emphasis in 
the original. 
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Finnis' view, these goods are equally fundamental, for each, when focused upon, can be 
regarded "reasonably" as the most important. Since there is no objective priority among 
them, it is never right to sacrifice one for another. Further, it is never right to act directly 
against them. Each act must retain "openness" to each of these goods and so "remain open 
to the ground of all values."52 Lisa Sowle Cahill argues: 
The essential truth ofFinnis' proposal lies in his perception that at the heart 
of natural-law theory is a commitment to certain basic goods which in 
themselves are attractive to human freedom and intelligence and to which 
human nature inclines. McCormick certainly concurs in this insight. 53 
For McCormick, the rightness and wrongness of an action is determined by further 
reflection of practical reason on the basic goods. Such reflection informs the human person 
about what it means to remain open to and pursue these basic human goods. McCormick 
writes: 
First, we must take them into account in our conduct. Simple disregard of 
one or the other shows we have set our mind against this good and, in the 
process, against both the unconditioned Good who is its source and ourselves. 
Immoral action is always self-destructive in its thrust. Secondly, when we 
can do so as easily as not, we should avoid acting in ways that inhibit these 
values, and prefer ways that realize them. Thirdly, we must make an effort 
on their behalf when their realization in another is in extreme peril. If we fail 
to do so, we show that the value in question is not the object of our 
efficacious love and concern. Finally, we must never choose directly against 
a basic good. For when one of the irreducible values falls immediately under 
our choice, to choose against it in favor of some other basic value is arbitrary; 
for all the basic values are equally basic and self-evidently attractive. What 
is to count as "turning against a basic good" is, of course, a crucial moral 
question. It need not be discussed here. My only point is that particular 
moral judgments (e.g., about sustaining life and health, or taking life, what 
52Ibid., 375. 
53Cahill, "Teleology, Utilitarianism, And Christian Ethics," 622. 
is morally legitimate or illegitimate in dealing with life and health, etc.) are 
incarnations of these basic normative positions, positions that have their roots 
in spontaneous, pre-reflective inclinations. 54 
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Finnis and McCormick maintain that these goods hold together and that a person can 
never directly act against a basic good. 55 When conflict arises, Finnis and McCormick argue 
that this is only an apparent conflict. McCormick writes: 
[O]ne does not suppress one basic good for the sake of another one equally 
basic. The only way to cut the Gordian knot when basic values are conflicted 
is to only indirectly allow the defeat of one as the other is pursued.56 
As a result of the incommensurabilty of the basic goods, certain acts are always intrinsically 
evil in and of themselves. 57 
54McCormick, "Proxy Consent In the Experimentation Situation," in Love And 
Society, 217-218. Emphasis mine. 
55Finnis writes: "So where one of these irreducible values falls immediately under 
our choice directly to realize it or spurn it, then, in the Christian understanding, we 
remain open to that value, that basic component of the human order, as the only 
reasonable way to remain open to the ground of all values, all order. To choose directly 
against it in favour of some other basic value is arbitrary ... " Finnis, "Natural Law And 
Unnatural Acts," 375. 
56McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology 1965 Through 1980, 717. Emphasis in 
the original. McCormick goes on to quote Paul Ramsey who writes: "My own view is 
that the distinction between direct and indirect voluntariety is pertinent and alerts our 
attention as moral agents to those moral choices where incommensurable conflicting 
values are at stake, where there is no measurable resolution of value conflicts on a single 
scale, where there are gaps in any supposed hierarchy of values, and therefore no way to 
determine exactly the greater or lesser good or evil. .. Where there is no single scale or 
common denominator, or where there is discontinuity in the hierarchy of goods or evils, 
one ought not to turn against any human good." McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve 
Good, 85. 
57Traditional moralists have claimed that certain actions (such as masturbation, 
artificial contraception, direct sterilization, artificial insemination, direct killing of the 
innocent, divorce and remarriage) were intrinsically morally evil. These actions were 
regarded as such either by being contrary to nature (following the "order of nature" 
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The second formulation, at the level of normative moral judgment, in McCormick's 
first moral epistemology came as a result of: Vatican II, the birth control debate that 
surrounded the promulgation of Humanae Vitae in 1968, and the proportionalism debate. 
Due to the influence of these three events, McCormick separated himself from the school of 
Finnis and Grisez. McCormick writes: 
The problem centers around the matter of choice "directly and positively 
against a basic value." Finnis admits that there is room for dispute about 
whether a choice actually is directly against a basic value or not. But he does 
not pursue the matter and ask why there is room for dispute, and what the 
methodological implications of this fact might be. The crucial question one 
must raise with both Grisez and Finnis is: What is to count for turning against 
a basic good, and why? At this point I find them both unsatisfactory. 58 
Following this, McCormick began to reevaluate the genuine objectivity required in ethics. 
Moral significance does not only refer to mere physical acts. Rather, it is an assessment of 
an action's relation to the order of persons, that is, to the hierarchy of personal value.59 
interpretation of natural law) or by defect of right. To qualify any action as intrinsically 
morally evil means that no intention or set of circumstances could ever justify it. Its 
moral quality is already determined before the person does it in whatever circumstances. 
For a more detailed analysis, see Richard M. Gula, Reason Informed By Faith, 268. 
58McCormick continues his discussion by stating: "Finnis argues that whenever 
one positively suppresses a possible good, he directly chooses against it. And since one 
may never do this, he argues, there are certain actions that are immoral regardless of the 
foreseeable consequences. This is a sophisticated form of an older structuralism. A 
careful study of Christian moral tradition will suggest that an action must be regarded as 
'turning directly against a basic good' only after the relation of the choice to all values 
has been weighed carefully." McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 
1980, 453. 
59McCormick writes: "There are two facts that profoundly affect the significance 
of human activity. First, we are changing beings. Our self-experience and self-definition 
emerge from a consciousness in contact with a rapidly changing world. Secondly and 
consequently, our assessment of significance is conditioned by a host of personal and 
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McCormick does not totally disagree with Finnis and Grisez, especially at the level of 
synderesis. However, at the level of normative moral judgment, McCormick finds their 
theory unpersuasive and inconsistent. He states in a personal interview that: 
I learned personally from Germain Grisez, whom I think has many good 
things to say. I like his views on the development of moral obligation--his 
understanding and interpretation of St. Thomas, the basic inclinations toward 
certain basic goods. I found that as satisfying as anything else I have ever 
encountered. However, I do not think his applications of his moral theory are 
persuasive. 'You never turn against a basic good.' What does that mean? I 
think that doesn't make sense. All the same, I find his basic understanding 
of moral obligation very helpful and enlightening.60 
This marked a significant shift in how McCormick determines the rightness and wrongness 
of a moral act. To understand this shift, one must examine it further within its historical 
context. 
Vatican II introduced a historically conscious worldview and stressed the centrality 
of the human person "integrally and adequately considered" in moral thought. Physicalism 
gave way to personalism. McCormick writes: 
In an earlier period, significance was drawn from an analysis of faculties and 
finalities . . . Gaudium et Spes asserts that the "moral aspect of any procedure 
. . . must be determined by objective standards which are based on the nature 
of the person and the person's acts."61 
social factors whose limitations we are incapable of perceiving with the clarity we would 
like. We swim in the historico-cultural stream. Thus we analyze ourselves, our world, 
our actions, out of the limitations of philosophical systems, out of changing cultural 
conditions, as well as out of our own only partial personal maturity. These two facts 
suggest that our grasp of significance is always partial and imperfect." McCormick, "The 
New Morality," 771. 
600dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 160. 
61McCormick, The Critical Calling, 14; see also "The Pastoral Constitution On 
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McCormick now believes the Council encourages not only tentativeness in moral judgments, 
but also leaves room for dissent. 62 
During this time period, Peter Knauer, S.J., published his first of several articles in 
which he argued that the four conditions of the principle of double effect could properly be 
reduced to the requirement of proportionate reason. In other words, Knauer believed that an 
evil effect would be either direct or indirect according to the presence or absence of 
proportionate reason.63 McCormick's initial reaction to this article was critical. 64 He argued 
The Church In The Modern World," no. 51, 256. 
62McCormick writes: "Two influences have combined to lead us to a renewed 
awareness of the necessary tentativeness of our formulations: the complexity and 
changeability of reality and a knowledge of the cultural influences that went into past 
formulations. This suggests powerfully to us that our grasp of significance is at any time 
limited, rooting as it does in limited self-awareness and imperfect formulations. This 
tentativeness was explicitly recognized by the Vatican Council. Following John XXIII, it 
states, 'The deposit of faith or revealed truths are one thing; the manner in which they are 
formulated without violence to their meaning and significance is another.' Here we have 
a clear distinction between the substance of a teaching and its formulation." Ibid., 16; see 
also, John XXIII, "Speech delivered on October 11, 1962, at the beginning of the 
Council," Acta Apostolicae Sedis 54 (1962): 792. 
63James J. Walter, "The Foundation And Formulation OfNorms," in Moral 
Theology: Challenges For The Future, 125. See also Peter Knauer, S.J., "La 
determination du bien et du ma/ moral par le principe du double effet," Nouvelle Revue 
Theologigue 87 (1965): 356-376. 
64 McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 8-13. It is 
interesting to note that Odozor believes McCormick, in his doctoral dissertation, was 
already engaged in the reinterpretation of the principle of double effect. Odozor argues 
that, McCormick, without saying it, had already decided to consider moral evil as a 
premoral disvalue sanctioned or caused without proportionate reason while still operating 
out of the manual tradition. Odozor writes: "McCormick located proportionate reason in 
a hierarchy of values (ordo bonorum). He claimed that the distinction between direct and 
indirect killing cannot be determined by cause and effects relationship alone. He only 
insinuated but did not claim clearly that this intentionality (that is, direct and indirect) 
also hinges on proportionate reason. McCormick's use of proportionate reason represents 
181 
that Knauer's interpretation would destroy the notion of intrinsic evil ex objecto. However, 
by 1970 Joseph Fuchs, McCormick's mentor, had endorsed Knauer's view on proportionate 
reason. McCormick at this point is writing "Moral Notes" for Theological Studies and has 
become deeply involved in the proportionalism debate. 
By 1970 Knauer has published two additional articles on this topic. 65 Knauer applies 
the general theory of double effect to the question of contraception. In response McCormick 
writes: 
It hardly needs to be recalled that Paul VI taught in Humanae Vitae that each 
conjugal act must remain open to the transmission of life. Knauer questions 
whether this conclusion follows from the general principle that married love 
must remain open to the transmission of life. 66 
Knauer's basic thesis is that moral evil. i.e., moral wrongness, consists in the permission or 
causing of a physical evil which is not justified by commensurate reason. For Knauer, it is 
with this in mind that ethicists must understand the terms direct and indirect. In the past 
not only a radical departure from the position of the manuals, but it also anticipates Peter 
Knauer's efforts to reinterpret the principle of double effect." Odozor does state that 
McCormick may not have been aware of this fact. And, even if he was aware of it he 
could not have articulated it. "For ifhe even questioned the objectively evil nature of 
exposing an innocent life to danger of death, on the grounds that there can be 
proportionate reasons for doing so, he would have been in conflict with the tradition." 
McCormick was not yet prepared to question the notion of intrinsic evil. For a more 
detailed analysis, see Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And the Renewal Of Moral 
Theology, 17-24. 
65See Peter Knauer, SJ. "Vberlegungen zur moraltheologischen Prinzipienlehre 
der Enzyklika 'Humanae Vitae, "' Theologie und Philosophie 45 (1970): 60-74; and Idem 
"The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect," Natural Law Forum 12 
(1967): 132-162. 
66McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 311. 
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these terms have been tied too closely to physical causality. Knauer stresses that reason is 
not commensurate because it is sincere, meaningful, or even plain important. Reason is 
commensurate if the value realized here and now by measures involving physical evil in a 
premoral sense is not in the long run undermined or contradicted by these measures but 
supported and maximized.67 Influenced by Knauer's articles and also by an article by Bruno 
Schiiller concerning the "direct/indirect" distinction,68 McCormick concluded the following: 
First, there is evidence to suggest that our contemporary notion of direct 
intent of evil, with its very close reliance on direct physical causality, may 
have narrowed and distorted rather than advanced the original Thomistic 
analysis . . . Second, I believe Schuller has convincingly argued that behind 
our formulated norms in control of concrete conduct is a more general 
preference-principle from which these norms derive. If this is true, we must 
approach some traditional conclusions to see if they square with this 
derivation. 69 
Following these three events, McCormick soon became a leading proponent of 
proportionalism in the United States70 and declared his objection to the central thesis of 
67Ibid., 312-314. 
68See Bruno Schuller, S.J., "Zur Problematik allgemein verbindlicher ethischer 
Grundsiitze," Theologie und Philosophie 45 (1970): 1-23. 
69McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 318. 
70This became apparent with the publication of his Pere Marquette Theology 
lecture "Ambiguity In Moral Choice" in 1973. Like the other proportionalists, 
McCormick began to view the human act as a structural unity. Therefore, one cannot 
isolate the object of an act and morally appraise it apart from the other components of the 
unified action. James Walter states: "Once one denies that the object (objectum actus) 
can be abstracted from the total act and judged separately, the theory of intrinsic evil in 
the way that the tradition has established this notion deontologically is denied. 
Revisionists do not deny the notion of intrinsic evil altogether, but for them it can only be 
determined concretely not abstractly, after considering all the relevant factors in a 
situation." Walter, "The Foundation And Formulation OfNorms," 128. Emphasis in the 
original. See also McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 71 O; and 
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Humanae Vitae. From within this historical context, it is now possible to understand why 
McCormick made this significant shift at the level of normative moral judgment. 
In this second formulation (of his first moral epistemology), at the level of normative 
moral judgment, McCormick believes there is room for commensuration even in situations 
involving apparently incommensurable and indeterminate goods. Further, he argues that 
indeterminacy and incommensurability can be overcome by means of a hierarchy of values. 71 
He holds that the basic goods exist in a hierarchy that he referred to as the "association of 
basic goods. "72 This means that the basic goods are associated to each other in such a way 
Joseph Fuchs, S.J., "The Absoluteness Of Moral Terms," in Readings In Moral Theology 
No. 1, eds. Richard A. McCormick and Charles E. Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 
1979), 126. It should also be stated that proportionalists take into consideration "all the 
circumstances" of an act. This includes foreseeable consequences. Some critics have 
accused McCormick and other proportionalists as being mere consequentialists. This is a 
misrepresentation of their position. What is true of proportionalism is that this structure 
of moral reasoning, appraisal of human acts, and its grounding of behavioral norms is 
teleological, i.e., it always, but not only, looks to and includes an assessment of 
consequences. Walter, "The Foundation And Formulation Of Norms," 129. 
71 To explain this McCormick writes: "\Ve go to war to protect freedom. That 
means we are willing to sacrifice life to protect this good. If 'give me liberty or give me 
death' does not involve some kind of commensurating, then I do not know what 
commensurating means. Our tradition allows violent, even, if necessary, lethal, 
resistance to rape attempts. If this does not mean measuring somehow or other sexual 
integrity against human life, I fail to see what it means. Our tradition allows (perhaps 
incorrectly) capital punishment as a protection and deterrent. That involves weighing one 
individual's life against the common safety which he threatens." McCormick, Doing Evil 
To Achieve Good, 227. Emphasis in the original. 
72McCormick writes: "What I have suggested is that the interrelatedness of human 
goods, their associatedness, means that in a sense there is a single scale, but the means of 
assessing the greater and lesser evil are more difficult, uncertain, and obscure because the 
assessment must be done at times through associated goods ... To reword the matter, I 
would suggest that the scale is indeed single in a sense (through the association of basic 
goods) but the means of assessing the lesser evil more difficult and hazardous, a prudent 
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that harm to or protection of one or the other will probably or necessarily harm or enhance 
others. 73 The basic goods are commensurable because they can conflict with one another, 
thus the human person is forced to compare and choose between them. For McCormick, it 
is prudence that dictates which of these goods should be chosen in times of conflict. 
McCormick uses the example of how human persons are willing at times to sacrifice lives 
to protect their political freedom. 74 McCormick justifies this by arguing: 
bet if you will. When life is at stake (or liberty, or what have we) in certain tragic 
conflict situations, I am not exactly weighing life against other values, but attempting to 
discover what is best in the service of life itself in terms of its relationship to other 
values." Ibid., 229-230. Emphasis in the original. It should also be noted that 
McCormick uses the cluster theory of virtues to add support to his notion of the 
association of basic values. But as James Walter notes, McCormick offers no support for 
this theory. Walter writes: "McCormick has used the cluster theory of virtues, in which 
the virtues are viewed as a kind of seamless fabric, to show that all the basic values are 
interrelated. Without offering any proof for this cluster theory of virtues, he postulated 
that to weaken any one of the virtues is to weaken all the others. Now, on the basis of 
analogy to the virtues he assumed that to attack any one of the basic values would be to 
attack all the others associated with it. McCormick's reasoning here appears very close 
to Finnis' position on the basic goods, but the associating of these values did give him the 
basis on which to show why the direct killing of noncombatants is morally wrong." 
Walter, "The Foundation and Formulation Of Norms," 138; McCormick, Doing Evil To 
Achieve Good, 253; and John Langan, "Augustine On The Unity And The 
Interconnection Of The Virtues," Harvard Theological Review 72 (January-April 1979): 
81-95. 
73 McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 228. 
74McCormick writes: "Do we not go to war (involving killing, the suppression of 
a basic human good) to protect our political freedom? Is there not some kind of 
commensuration there even though the values involved are 'objectively 
incommensurable'? Have we not corporately concluded ('adopted a hierarchy') that 
political freedom is so basic a value that it is worth sacrificing lives to preserve it? It 
seems so. It seems that we might argue that the conclusions of traditional Christian ethics 
here (the just-war theory) are the community's adoption of a hierarchy of values which 
relates the violence and death involved in war to other basic values." Ibid., 252. 
Emphasis in the original. 
Because we are finite, all our acts are metaphysically imperfect. They do not 
and cannot embody all values. This radical metaphysical limitation will 
obviously manifest itself at the level of concrete external activity.75 
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The human person can realize only certain limited values, and in doing so must at times do 
so to the neglect of other values or at the expense of associated disvalues. In this light every 
choice represents the resolution of a conflict. McCormick writes: 
This means that the concrete moral norms that we develop to guide human 
conduct and communicate human convictions and experience to others are all 
conclusions of and vehicles for a larger, more general assertion: in situations 
of conflict, where values are copresent and mutually exclusive, the reasonable 
thing is to avoid what is, all things considered, the greater evil or, positively 
stated, to do the greater good. This means, of course, that we may cause or 
permit evils in our conduct only when the evil caused or permitted is, all 
things considered, the lesser evil in the circumstances. In other words, we 
may cause a premoral evil only when there is a truly proportionate reason. 76 
From this, it is clear that McCormick establishes his stress on proportionate reason through 
his theory of associated goods. 77 
75McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 123. 
76McCormick, "The New Medicine And Morality," 316. Emphasis in the original. 
770dozor argues that establishing proportionate reason through the theory of 
associated goods "helps McCormick to give persuasive answers to critics who charge that 
proportionate reasoning cannot apply to cases of justice without employing a utilitarian 
calculus. In the case of the sheriff with an innocent black prisoner, this would imply that 
he must hand over the innocent black man or risk the 'greater evil' of widespread rioting, 
murder, and arson. Applying the principle of associated good, McCormick insists that 
the sheriff ought not to give in to the mob demand because to do so would imply that the 
protection of the human good, in this case life, property, and so on, by framing an 
innocent person will undermine that good in the long run 'by serious injury to an 
associated good (human liberty).'" Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of 
Moral Theology, 114-115; see also McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 229; and 
Idem, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Throu2h 1980, 720. Odozor also argues that 
besides the principle of associated goods, McCormick introduces the principle of 
necessity to explain more clearly the meaning of proportionate reason. He writes: "The 
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In the second formulation at the level of normative moral judgment, McCormick 
agrees with Finnis et al. that there exist basic goods that define human well-being and give 
rise to moral obligations and value commitments. However, McCormick disagrees with the 
methodological implications of this starting point. Whereas Finnis et al. regard directly 
turning against a basic good to be intrinsically morally evil, McCormick regards turning 
against a basic good to be a premoral evil, 78 which requires the justification of proportionate 
principle of necessary connection as an aspect of the notion of proportionate reasoning 
expresses the conviction that 'it is wrong to do evil when the evil has no necessary 
connection to the good being sought.' This connection does not exist when evil is done 
'to convince a free and rational agent to refrain from evil."' McCormick writes: "Let us 
put this in another way and explicitly in Christian terms. It is the Christian's faith that 
another's ceasing from his wrongdoing is never dependent on my doing nonmoral evil. 
For the Christian believes that we are truly what we are, redeemed in Christ. We are still 
threatened by reliquiae peccati but we are free and powerful in Christ's grace." Odozor, 
Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 115. Emphasis in the 
original. See also McConnick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 236; Idem, Notes On 
Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 720; and Sanford S. Levy, "Richard McCormick 
And Proportionate Reason," Journal Of Religious Ethics 13 (1985): 259. 
78McCormick refers to premoral evils as, "harms, lacks, pains, deprivations, etc. 
that occur in or as a result of human agency." McCormick, "Notes On Moral Theology: 
1985," Theological Studies 47 (1986): 86. There are various terms for premoral evil. 
Premoral is used by Josef Fuchs; physical evil is used by Peter Knauer; nonmoral evil is 
used by McCormick and Bruno Schiiller; and ontic evil is used by Louis Janssens. All of 
these terms--physical evil, premoral evil, nonmoral evil, ontic evil, and premoral 
disvalue--refer to the same reality, and they are used interchangeably in the discussion. 
Premoral, physical, nonmoral, and ontic evils refer to the lack of perfection in anything 
whatsoever. As pertaining to human actions, it is the aspect which we experience as 
regrettable, harmful, or detrimental to the full actualization of the well-being of persons 
and of their social relations. Since we never get away from these features of our actions, 
we must learn to live in ways which will keep premoral, ontic, nonmoral, physical evils 
features to a minimum, even though we cannot completely eliminate them in all their 
forms. For a more detailed analysis of premoral evils, see Gula, Reason Informed By 
Faith, 269. 
reason.79 For example, McCormick writes that 
causing certain disvalues ( ontic, nonmoral, premoral evils) in our conduct 
does not ipso facto make the action morally wrong. The action becomes 
morally wrong when, all things considered, there is no proportionate reason 
to justifying it. 80 
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For McCormick, moral wrongness occurs when a premoral evil is caused without 
proportionate reason. Thus, the notion of premoral evil is an admission of imperfection and 
conflict of values. 81 Before an action can be determined to be intrinsically morally evil, an 
individual must now assess morally relevant factors, which include: the action itself, the 
intention, circumstances, consequences, values and norms. In conflict situations, the rule of 
Christian reason, if we are governed by the ordo bonorum, is to choose the lesser evil. 
79McCormick in his writings defines proportionate reason as the basic analytic 
structure of moral reasoning in conflict situations and moral norming. See McCormick, 
Ambiguity In Choice, 76-77; Idem, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 215, 232; and Idem, 
"Notes On Moral Theology: 1984," Theological Studies 46. (1985): 62. James J. Walter 
argues that this definition advanced by McCormick is really the definition of 
proportionalism. He writes: "In other words, proportionalism is the general analytic 
structure of determining the objective moral rightness and wrongness of acts and of 
grounding concrete behavioral norms. This structure of moral reasoning as such is 
committed to assessing all relevant circumstances, viz. all aspects of the unified human 
act, consequences, premoral values/disvalues, institutional obligations, etc. before 
arriving at a final moral determination of an act. 'Proportionate reason,' on the other 
hand, is the moral principle used by proportionalists to determine concretely and 
objectively the rightness and wrongness of acts and the various exceptions to behavioral 
norms." Walter, "The Foundation And Formulation Of Norms," 132. 
80McCormick, The Critical Calling, 134. McCormick writes: "Thus just as not 
every killing is murder, not every falsehood a lie, so not every artificial intervention 
preventing (or promoting) conception is necessarily an unchaste act. Not every 
termination of a pregnancy is necessarily an abortion in the moral sense. This has been 
called 'proportionalism. '" Ibid. 
81McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 317; see also 
Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 110. 
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McCormick's use of proportionate reason is to determine when premoral evil can be allowed 
and when an action that contains premoral evil can only be permitted. 82 Furthermore, 
McCormick's point of proportionate reason is to prove that the traditional notion of intrinsic 
moral evil cannot be sustained in the way it has been formulated. 83 Proportionate reason 
becomes McCormick's criterion of determining moral rightness and wrongness.84 
McCormick offers three modes of knowing to determine whether his criteria for 
proportionate reason have been fulfilled and that a proportionate reason exists. The first way 
82F or McCormick, an action can be regarded as "turning against a basic value" 
only after the relation of that choice to all values has been considered. This inevitably 
involves a balancing of values that Finnis et al. do not want to make. For McCormick, 
these values are associated and a direct sacrifice of a particular value may be justified in 
certain situations. McCormick argues that a premoral value can be sacrificed directly in 
favor of one which is higher or at least equal. 
830dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 110. 
McCormick writes: "Proportionate reason represents above all a structure of moral 
reasoning and moral norming, teleological in character, whose thrust is that concrete 
norms understood as exceptionless because they propose certain interventions dealing 
with nonmoral goods as intrinsic evils cannot be sustained." McCormick, Doing Evil To 
Achieve Good, 232. Emphasis in the original. McCormick goes on to explain that 
although there cannot be exceptionless moral norms there can be norms that are "virtually 
exceptionless." McCormick borrows this notion from Donald Evans. By this 
McCormick means that the theoretically possible exceptions are virtually zero in their 
practical possibility. For a more detailed analysis of "virtually exceptionless norms," see 
McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965-Through 1980, 433; see also Donald 
Evans, "Paul Ramsey And Exceptionless Moral Rules," 184-214. 
84McCormick first proposed his criteria for a proportionate reason in his Pere 
Marquette Lecture of 1973, "Ambiguity In Moral Choice," and subsequently reworked 
them in response to criticisms of his first effort. The substance of the criteria are as 
follows: First, the means used will not cause more harm than necessary to achieve the 
value. Second, no less harmful way exists at present to protect the value. Third, the 
means used to achieve the value will not undermine it. For a more detailed analysis, see 
McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 193-267; and Gula, Reason Informed By 
Faith, 273-275. 
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of knowing whether a proper relation exists between a specific value and all other elements 
of an act is through human experience. For example, human experience tells us that private 
property is essential to the overall well-being of persons and their social relations, therefore, 
robbery is counterproductive or disproportionate. Second, McCormick maintains we can 
know prediscursively through a sense of profanation, outrage or intuition that some actions 
are disproportionate. The examples of torture and forms of fanatical human experimentation 
fall within this category. Third, he believes that a person can come to know some actions 
to be disproportionate only gradually by the methods of trial and error. This mode of 
knowing pertains to areas where we have little experience as yet and should proceed 
cautiously such as, whether recombinant D.N.A. research should be permitted. 85 In 
conclusion, McCormick now rejects Grisez' s deontological interpretation of the meaning of 
direct and indirect voluntariety. For McCormick, proportionate reason is the criterion for 
determining objective moral rightness and wrongness. 
In this second formulation at the level of normative moral judgment, McCormick will 
draw upon the various sources of moral wisdom to perceive and appropriate the moral truth, 
(i.e., judgments of rightness and wrongness or moral obligations) in any situation. 
McCormick's renewed awareness of the human person's historicity affects his understanding 
85See McCormick, "Notes On Moral Theology: 1980," Theological Studies 42 
(March 1981): 74-90. James J. Walter builds on McCormick's foundation and suggests 
three additional ways of knowing whether a proper relationships exists. He adds the 
mode of discursive reasoning or rational analysis and argument, long-term consequences, 
and our experience of harmony and guilt over our actions. For a more detailed analysis, 
see James J. Walter, "Proportionate Reason And Its Three Levels Oflnquiry: Structuring 
The Ongoing Debate," Louvain Studies 10 (Spring 1984): 30-40; see also Gula,, Reason 
Informed By Faith, 275-276. 
of the traditional sources of moral wisdom. For him, this means 
raking our culture seriously as soil for the "signs of the times," as framer of 
our self-awareness. That means a fresh look at how Christian perspectives 
ought to read the modem world so that our practices are the best possible 
mediation of gospel values in the contemporary world. 86 
190 
Scripture, tradition, and the magisterium must now be sensitive to changing historical and 
cultural factors. 
For example, scripture, as a source of moral wisdom, nourishes the overall 
perspectives of the human person. Where in the past, scripture was used in the form of 
proof-texting, now scripture identifies various insights and key perspectives that help inform 
human reasoning. The magisterium can no longer mean the "hierarchical issuance of 
authoritative decrees. "87 As the articulated wisdom of the community, the magisterium 
enlightens the conscience instead of replacing it. McCormick writes: 
This renewed awareness of man's historicity will affect our understanding of 
the Church's non-infallible magisterium and our reading ofits past teachings. 
The magisterium will realize that its teachings must be developed out of an 
ever increasing range of competences. Furthermore, an enlightened 
sensitivity to changing historical and cultural factors will recommend to the 
magisterium great caution in descending to detailed specifications of the 
demands of radical Christian love. 88 
As the Pastoral Constitution On The Church Jn The Modern World observes: 
Let the layman not imagine that his pastors are always such experts that to 
every problem which arises, however complicated, they can readily give him 
a concrete solution, or even that such is their mission. Rather, enlightened 
86McCormick, The Critical Calling, 9. 
87lbid., 19. 
88McCormick, "The New Morality," 771. 
by Christian wisdom and giving close attention to the teaching authority of 
the Church, let the layman take on his own distinctive role. 89 
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The magisterium will assist persons in moral deliberations by being broadly consultative, 
questioning, critical, open, and appropriately tentative.90 Therefore, if the magisterium is to 
be a confirming source of moral wisdom for the human person in determining the moral 
rightness or wrongness of an action, it must have the competence to understand and judge 
the many factual dimensions involved in modem complex ethical problems.91 Thus, it is 
necessary for the magisterium to be in dialogue with the other sciences. 92 More attention 
must be given to evidence and analysis in evaluating moral teachings. Only persuasive 
reasons will command assent. McCormick believes that a human person with a well-formed 
conscience, that is, one formed in community and one that draws upon the diverse sources 
of moral wisdom, can use proportionate reason to determine concretely and objectively the 
moral rightness and wrongness of a particular action. 
In conclusion, McCormick utilizes this moral epistemology up until 1983. At the 
89 
"Pastoral Constitution On The Church In the Modem World," no. 43, 244. 
90McCormick believes after Vatican II a fresh notion of the teaching function of 
the Church unfolded. This notion has the following three characteristics: "(l) the 
learning process is seen as essential to the teaching process; (2) teaching is a 
multidimensional function, of which the judgmental or decisive is only one aspect; (3) the 
teaching function involves the charisms of many persons." McCormick, The Critical 
Calling, 20. 
91Ibid., 84. 
92For example, the magisterium cannot be in full possession of the truth where the 
ethics of recombinant D.N.A. research is involved. Therefore, many competencies are 
needed to face the rapidly changing times and the ethical problems these times are 
producing. The magisterium must consult with the sciences and allow for an openness of 
dialogue. 
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level of synderesis, the human person seeks the goods or values that define human 
flourishing by reflection on the natural inclinations. At the level of normative moral 
judgment, it is proportionate reason that determines the rightness and wrongness of a human 
action. In 1983 McCormick makes a significant epistemological shift, at least at the level 
of synderesis, thus formulating a new moral epistemology. 
Second Moral Epistemology--After 1983 
In 1983 McCormick began to write primarily in the area of bioethics, and it appears 
that he made a conscious effort to approach bioethics from a theological perspective. One 
reason for this move may be McCormick's involvement in the question of the distinctiveness 
of Christian ethics discussion. 93 This discussion appears to have provoked in him the need 
to articulate what Christian faith adds to the essential level of ethics. From this point 
onward, McCormick will continue to rely on right reason, but he will incorporate the 
Christian story both at the level of synderesis and at the level of normative moral judgment. 94 
93F or a more detailed analysis of this discussion, see McCormick, "Does Religious 
Faith Add To Ethical Perception?," Readings In Moral Theology No. 2: The 
Distinctiveness Of Christian Ethics, 156-173. 
94McCormick spells out the key elements of the Christian story. He writes: "The 
Christian story illumines for us that God is author and preserver of life; the human person 
has a supernatural destiny; God has been disclosed to us in Jesus Christ; in Jesus' life, 
death and resurrection we have been totally transformed into 'new creatures' --into a 
community of the transformed; we remain subject to sin, although sin and death have met 
their victor; we are a eucharistic community and a pilgrim people called to love one 
another in manifestation of the new life in Christ; and the ultimate destiny of our 
combined journeys is the coming of the kingdom." For a more detailed analysis, see 
McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 49. 
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In this way, McCormick can show what relation his natural law commitments bear to more 
specifically Christian ones. He argues that "the Christian story will influence not only 
personal dispositions, but also moral judgments--but in a rather general way."95 The 
Christian story will help guide the human person's discernment of objective morality. 
Another impetus for the inclusion of the Christian story in his moral epistemology 
appears to be Vatican II' s appeal to show the relation of religious belief to concrete areas of 
human behavior. The Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modern World states 
clearly that "Faith throws a new light on everything, manifests God's design for man's total 
vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions that are fully human."96 McCormick is 
making a conscious effort to explore, to clarify, and to make more persuasive how faith 
enlightens and directs the mind to solutions, especially in the concrete area of bioethics. 97 
Right reason remains at the center of McCormick's second moral epistemology, but it is right 
95McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 20. 
96 
"Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modem World," no. 11, 209. 
McCormick further quotes this document by stating: "But only God who created man to 
His own image and ransoms him from sin provides a fully adequate answer to these 
questions. This He does through what He has revealed in Christ His Son, who became 
man. Whoever follows after Christ, the perfect man, becomes himself more a man." 
Ibid., no. 41, 240. 
97This is in response to a statement McCormick made in regards to a self-
assessment. He writes: "I think my greatest failing as a moral theologian (others will 
certainly note many others) has been my failure to explore and make clearer and more 
persuasive Vatican Il's statement: 'Faith throws a new light on everything, manifests 
God's design for man's total vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions that are fully 
human.' But, as I stated at the outset, the body is still warm and twitching." McCormick, 
"Self-Assessment And Self-Indictment," Corrective Vision, 45; refer also to Chapter 
One, Richard A. McCormick, S.J.--Moral Theologian section above. 
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reason informed by faith. 
To understand McCormick's second moral epistemology (after 1983) one must 
analyze how he interprets "reason informed by faith." McCormick understands human 
reason to mean 
all those dimensions of human understanding that play a role in our 
evaluation of actions as morally right or wrong. Among those dimensions 
are: experience, the sense of profanation, trial and error, discursive reasoning, 
long-term consequences, the experience of harmony and guilt over our 
actions. There is always the danger that the term recta ratio will be 
impoverished by collapsing it into a barren rationalism that overlooks the 
affective richness of human understanding. 98 
The incorporation of the Christian narrative can help overcome the problem of barren 
rationalism. For McCormick, reason informed by faith is neither reason replaced by faith 
or reason without faith. It is reason shaped by faith and this shaping takes the form of 
perspectives, themes, and insights associated with the Christian story that aid the human 
person to construe the world. 99 In discussing how reason informs faith, McCormick writes: 
I am suggesting that the stories and symbols that relate the origin of 
Christianity and nourish the faith of the individual affect our perspectives by 
intensifying and sharpening our focus on the human goods definitive of our 
flourishing. It is persons so informed, persons with such "Christian reasons" 
sunk deep in their being, who face new situations, new dilemmas and reason 
together as to what is right and wrong. They do not find concrete answers in 
98McCormick, "Health And Medicine In the Catholic Tradition," 61. It should be 
noted that although McCormick does not cite James J. Walter's essay ("Proportionate 
Reason And Its Three Levels Of Inquiry: Structuring The Ongoing Debate," Louvain 
Studies 10 (Spring 1984): 30-40) nonetheless he incorporates Walter's three additional 
ways of knowing--discursive reasoning or rational analysis and argument, long-term 
consequences, and our experience of harmony and guilt over our actions--into his own 
dimensions of human understanding in this 1986 article. 
99McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 48. 
their tradition, but they bring a worldview that informs their reasoning--
especially by allowing the basic human goods to retain their original 
attractiveness and not be tainted by cultural distortions. 100 
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For McCormick, the sources of faith do not originate concrete moral obligations that are 
impervious to human insight and reasoning. However, they do confirm them. 
Christian morality, while theological at its core, is not isolationist or sectarian. 
Isolating accounts of the Christian story would repudiate a constant of the Catholic 
theological tradition: that God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ does not obliterate the human 
but illuminates it. 101 For McCormick, Christian commitment shapes human perspectives, 
motivation, and processes of reasoning, but only in a general way. In the process faith 
encourages certain insights, which are inherently intelligible and commendable. What 
McCormick emphasizes is that a Christian's conclusions will not be substantively different 
from those yielded by objective and reasonable but nonreligious analysis. For McCormick, 
"Christian emphases do not immediately yield moral norms and rules for decision-making, 
100McCormick, "Bioethics And Method," 310. 
101 McCormick, Corrective Vision, 28. McCormick follows the Catholic 
theological tradition on natural law that implies an understanding that "moral values and 
obligations are grounded in a moral order known by human reason reflecting on 
experience." McCormick is convinced that moral order is grounded in the being of the 
human person as such. Odozor states: "In 1965 he [McCormick] wrote that natural law is 
the law 'inscribed in our being by the creative act of God,' the dictates ofreason, "as 
historical man confronts his inclinations, drives, tendencies, and potentialities.' Besides 
being inscribed in our hearts, natural law is natural because it is founded in nature and 
can, for this reason, be known without supernatural assistance." Odozor, Richard A. 
McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 26-27; see also Cahill, "On Richard 
McCormick," 111; and McCormick, "Practical And Theoretical Considerations," in The 
Problem Of Population: Vol. 3 Educational Considerations (Notre Dame, IN.: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 61. 
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nor do they conduce to concrete answers unique to that tradition."102 Human reason, unaided 
by explicit faith, can come to the same judgments about rightness and wrongness. 103 
McCormick's understanding of "reason informed by faith" is the foundation upon 
which he constructs his second moral epistemology. In order to understand this second 
moral epistemology, an in-depth analysis will be given at both the level of synderesis and 
at the level of normative moral judgment. 
At the level of synderesis, McCormick introduces the idea that the basic goods that 
define human flourishing are discovered and known by the human person's prediscursive 
reason informed by the Christian story. McCormick explains that this type of knowledge is 
prereflective or prethematic, or connatural. 104 Prediscursive knowledge is prior to cultural 
differentiations, although its judgments can be affected by cultural distortions. To explain 
102McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 329. 
103For example, McCormick writes: "Since Christian ethics is the objectification 
in Jesus Christ of every person's experience of subjectivity, 'it does not add and cannot 
add to human ethical self-understanding as such any material content that is, in principle 
strange or foreign to man as he exists and experiences himself in this world.' However, a 
person within the Christian community has access to a privileged articulation, in 
objective form, of this experience of subjectivity. Precisely because the resources of 
Scripture, dogma, and Christian life (the 'storied community') are the fullest available 
objectifications of the common human experience, 'the articulation of man's image of his 
moral good that is possible within historical Christian communities remains privileged in 
its access to enlarged perspectives on man."' McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical 
Ethics," 331. See also James F. Bresnahan, S.J., "Rahner's Christian Ethics," America 
123 (1970): 351-354. 
1041t should be noted that McCormick refers to this type of knowledge as 
"prereflective" in McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," 
How Brave A New World?, 4. He refers to it as "prethematic" and "connatural" in 
McCormick, Doin~ Evil To Achieve Good, 250. 
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the meaning of prediscursive reason McCormick considers the example of slavery. He 
writes: 
We find this demeaning and immoral not because of rational (discursive) 
argument--which is not to say that rational arguments will not support the 
conclusion. Rather, over time our sensitivities are sharpened to the meaning 
and dignity of human persons. We then experience the out-of-jointness, 
inequality and injustice of slavery. 105 
To clarify further his meaning of prediscursive reason, McCormick quotes Nobel laureate 
Peter Medawar who discusses the difference between a humanizing and dehumanizing use 
of technology. Medawar states that the answer we give in practice 
is founded not upon abstract moralizing but upon a certain natural sense of 
the fitness of things, a feeling that is shared by most kind and reasonable 
people even if we cannot define it in philosophically defensible or legally 
accountable terms. 106 
Therefore, it seems for McCormick that prediscursive reason is the inner structure of the 
heart that can know human moral reality. For McCormick, prediscursive reasoning appears 
to be similar to what Thomas meant by connatural knowledge. 
After reviewing McCormick's writings, it becomes evident that his understanding of 
prediscursive reason is ambiguous. The basis of McCormick's view of prediscursive reason 
can be traced to Thomas, but it also appears that McCormick relies on Rahner's notion of the 
"moral instinct of faith" and Daniel Maguire's understanding of the affections. McCormick 
agrees with Rahner that there is a "moral instinct of faith." He writes: 
105McCormick, "Bioethics And Method," 304. 
106McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 250; see also Peter B. Medawar, 
The Hope Of Progress (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1973), 84. 
This instinct can be called by any number of different names; but the point 
is that there is a component to moral judgment that cannot be adequately 
subject to analytic reflection. But it is this component that is chiefly 
responsible for one's ultimate judgments on concrete moral questions. In this 
sense these ultimate judgments are not simply the sum of the rational 
considerations and analyses one is capable of objectifying and no adequate 
understanding of proportionate reason implies this. 107 
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McCormick argues that if human moral sensitivities are outraged, for example, by the sheriff 
who would frame and execute one innocent man to pacify a riot-prone mob bent on 
indiscriminate killing, then "I am prepared to trust this instinctive reaction. " 108 For 
McCormick, even though the person's spontaneous and instinctive moral judgments can be 
affected by cultural distortions and can be confused with deeply ingrained conventional fears 
and biases, they still remain a more reliable test of the humanizing and dehumanizing, than 
that of our discursive reasoning. 109 Unfortunately, even with this explanation one is still left 
with a sense of ambiguity in regards to what McCormick means by prediscursive reasoning. 
McCormick's understanding of prediscursive reason has also been influenced by 
Daniel Maguire's notion of the affections. Maguire is convinced of the natural moral 
107McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 250-251. Rabner uses as an 
example the rejection of Artificial Insemination by a Donor (A.l.D.). Rabner states 
explicitly "all the 'reasons' which are intended to form the basis for rejecting genetic 
manipulation (namely A.l.D.) are to be understood, at the very outset, as only so many 
references to the moral faith-instinct. .. For in my view the moral faith-instinct is aware 
of its right and obligation to reject genetic manipulation, even without going through (or 
being able to go through) an adequate process ofreflection." Karl Rabner, S.J., "The 
Problem Of Genetic Manipulation," Theological Investigations Vol. 9 (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1972), 243. 
108McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 251. 
109Ibid. 
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instinct. Maguire presents the thesis that there is "an intellectualistic fallacy rampant in 
contemporary ethical deliberation, an analytic and rationalistic approach that assumes that 
morality becomes intelligible in the same way that mathematics and logic do." 110 Maguire 
argues that recta ratio in Thomas is profoundly shaped by an affective component. Maguire 
writes: "While Thomas does not systematize this notion, it is undeniably present in many of 
his treatises: on prudence, wisdom, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, delight, and faith." 111 For 
Maguire, "moral knowledge is born in the awe and affectivity that characterizes the 
foundational moral experience--the experience of the value of persons and their 
environment. " 112 Maguire concludes that human persons can know much of what is right or 
wrong but that they should be a bit more modest about the claims of reason. 113 
McCormick agrees with Maguire's contention that the affections shape moral 
knowledge. On this subject McCormick writes: 
Maguire's insistence on the affective shaping of moral knowledge is certainly 
correct. It suggests many things. One thing I want to highlight is the 
expansive and deepening role of affect in moral knowledge. From the 
Christian point of view, faith creates sensitivities in the believer beyond the 
reach of natural vitalities. It bestows sensitivity to dimensions of possibility 
110McCormick, Notes On Moral Theolo~y: 1981 Throu~h 1984, 121; see also 
Daniel Maguire, "Reeta Ratio And The Inte11ectualistic Fallacy," Journal Of Reli~ious 
Ethics 10 (1982): 22-39. 
111 Ibid. For example, where prudence is concerned, that virtue perfects reason by 
being conjoined with the moral virtues. But the moral virtues attune a person to the 
morally good so that it becomes connatural to judge correctly about the good. This 
connaturalizing effect of virtue affects the manner of knowing and perceiving the good. 
The way of knowing is affectively qualified. Ibid. 
112Ibid., 122. 
113lbid. 
not otherwise suspected, or what Thomas Clarke, SJ. refers to as "distinctive 
habits of perception and response." This is no call to true obscurantism, nor 
is it an invitation to authority to press unsupportable claims. It is simply an 
acknowledgment of the depth and beauty of the spiritual life, the complexity 
of reality, and therefore of the many-faceted ways of discovering moral 
truth. 114 
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Maguire suggests Thomas understood that the affections are implicated in the work of 
practical reason, in the deliberation of reasonableness. Being Thomistic in his approach, it 
seems to follow that McCormick would agree with Maguire's approach drawing some of his 
understanding of prediscursive reasoning from Thomas. However, what McCormick means 
precisely by "prediscursive reason" is still not clear. It is clear that McCormick believes that 
moral sensitivities--affections and feelings--and even intuition, play a distinctive role in 
discovering the basic goods that define human flourishing and moral obligations. 
McCormick writes: "Judgments of the moral 'ought,' have deep roots in our sensitivities and 
emotions."115 Therefore, one might well conclude that, for McCormick, prediscursive reason 
in one respect is another name for the affections. Not only does the human person discover 
the basic goods through the affections, but they also ground and animate McCormick's 
ethical positions. 
The influence of the Christian narrative on the affections is such that it is much more 
a value-raiser than an answer-giver. 116 It affects basic human goods at the spontaneous, 
114lbid.; see also Thomas Clarke, S.J. "Touching In Power: Our Health System," 
Above Evezy Name (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1980), 252. 
115McCormick, "Man's Moral Responsibility For Health," 18. 
116McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 638. 
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prethematic level. The Christian story sensitizes the believer beyond the reach of natural 
vitalities. It bestows sensitivity to "dimensions of possibility" not otherwise suspected. 117 
McCormick writes: 
One who has accepted in faith God's stupendous deed in Christ, one who sees 
in Christ God's self-disclosure and therefore who sees (and accepts) in the 
Christ-event the central fact of human history, will come to be (by God's 
healing grace) stamped by the dispositions associated with that event. Some 
are putting others' needs ahead of our own; seeking God's will in hard times; 
carrying one's cross in imitation of Christ; giving one's life for one's friends; 
turning the other cheek; seeking Christ in the neighbor; subordinating 
everything to the God-relationship; trusting in God's providential care. Such 
dispositions do not, of course, solve problems. They do however incline us 
to seek out and discern the morally right. Good people will strive to do 
morally right things. 118 
The Christian story sinks deep into the person and sensitizes the human person to the 
meaning of life and to the goods that are definitive of human flourishing. Even though the 
human person can know the basic goods prior to acculturation, McCormick argues that they 
can still exist as culturally conditioned. For McCormick, the Christian story attends to and 
lifts out those cultural leanings and biases that may distort our grasp of the basic goods. 119 
It is the person of Jesus Christ who sensitizes the human person to the meaning of persons. 
For example, McCormick writes: 
Faith in the Christ-event, love and loyalty to Jesus Christ, yields a decisive 
way of viewing and intending the world, of interpreting its meaning, of 
hierarchizing its values. In this sense the Christian tradition only illumines 
basic human values, supports them, and provides a context for their reading 
117McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Theology And Bioethics, 110. 
118McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 20. Emphasis in the original. 
119McCormick, "Man's Moral Responsibility For Health," 19. 
at given points in history. It aids us in staying human by underlining the truly 
human against all cultural attempts to distort the human. 120 
202 
The way the person perceives and relates to the basic human goods is shaped by how 
he or she views the world. The Christian story brings about a worldview that informs human 
reasoning--especially as this reasoning touches the basic goods. McCormick argues that: 
This world view is a continuing check on and challenge to our tendency to 
allow cultural enthusiasms to sink into and take possession of our 
prediscursive selves. Such enthusiasm can reduce the good life to mere 
adjustment in a triumph of the therapeutic, collapse an individual into his 
functionality, exalt his uniqueness into a lonely individualism or crush it in 
a suffocating collectivism. In this sense it is true to say that the Christian 
story is much more a value-raiser than an answer-giver. 121 
At the level of normative moral judgment, the moral rightness and wrongness of an 
act is determined by the discursive reason informed by the Christian story. At this level, 
McCormick no longer speaks about the "association of basic goods." He will continue to 
use proportionate reason in determining the rightness and wrongness of a human action. 
However, it should be noted that McCormick introduces a new criterion of morality, that is, 
the person "integrally and adequately considered." Proportionate reason becomes a tool for 
establishing what is promotive or destructive of the whole person. This criterion will be 
examined in detail in the next chapter. 
After the affections discover and identify the basic human goods, discursive moral 
reason is concerned with rational analysis and the adoption of a hierarchy of goods. For 
McCormick, in order to determine the moral rightness and wrongness of an action, a person 
120McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 315. 
121McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 638. 
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must take these apprehensions discovered intuitively and test them by critical rational 
analysis within a larger community, to determine what is more promotive of the human 
person "integrally and adequately considered." This critical analysis occurs by discursive 
reason informed by the Christian story. 
At the level of normative moral judgment, the Christian story influences moral 
judgments in a rather general way. The Christian story does not yield moral rules and norms 
for decision-making. But it does influence and affect them. The stories and symbols provide 
both the perspectives from which choices can be made and the confirmatory warrant for 
testing their validity. 122 McCormick writes: 
The Christian story tells us the ultimate meaning of ourselves and the world. 
In doing so, it tells us the kind of people we ought to be, the goods we ought 
to pursue, the dangers we ought to avoid, the kind of world we ought to seek. 
It provides the backdrop or framework that ought to shape our individual 
decisions. When decision-making is separated from this framework, it loses 
its perspective. It becomes a merely rationalistic and sterile ethic subject to 
the distortions of self-interested perspectives and cultural fads, a kind of 
contracted etiquette with no relation to the ultimate meaning of persons. 
Indeed. even when our deliberations are nourished by the biblical narratives, 
they do not escape the reliquiae peccati [remnants of sin] in us. 123 
The Christian story serves as a "corrective" for the human person. Because of the human 
condition, we have a tendency to make idols, to pursue the basic goods as ends in 
themselves. 124 This is what McCormick refers to as secularization. It is discursive reason 
1220dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 156. 
123McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 50. 
124For a more detailed analysis of why human persons have a tendency to pursue 
the basic goods as ends in themselves, refer to Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological 
Anthropology section, Doctrine Of The Fall subsection above. 
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informed by the Christian story that assists the human person in radically relativizing all 
human goods. Imitating Christ, means, negatively, never pursuing human goods as final 
ends, and positively, pursuing them as subordinate to the God-relationshipY5 For 
McCormick, the Christian story informs discursive reason and helps to shape the human 
person's moral vision. The very meaning, purpose, and value of a person is grounded in and 
ultimately explained by this story. When it informs the discursive reason, it gives shape to 
a person's ethical deliberations. For McCormick, "the Christian story itself is the 
overarching foundation and criterion of morality. It stands in judgment of all human 
meaning and actions. Actions which are incompatible with this story are thereby morally 
wrong."126 
The Christian story furnishes the Christian with a knowledge of the human person's 
integral vocation. For McCormick, the Christian story is mediated through the believing 
community by trad~tion, the magisterium, personal reflection and prayer, reflection and 
discussion with other Christians and non-Christians, and theological scholarship. However, 
if Christian knowledge is to take concrete meaningful form, it must also draw upon and 
integrate the insights and experiences of a variety of disciplines that study the world and 
provide the context of decision and choice. These include: economics, medicine, psychology 
and psychiatry, sociology, law, cultural anthropology, etc. For McCormick, these sources 
of knowledge are not mutually exclusive, but are complementary. This variety of sources 
125McCormick, "Theology And Bioethics," Corrective Vision, 143. 
126McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 318. 
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aid moral reasoning and insight. 127 The Christian story in "confrontation with human 
experience will be the source of ever fresh insights into the meaning and challenge of being 
a Christian in the modem world. " 128 Although discursive knowledge is communal in its 
sources, judgment of rightness and wrongness is a personal judgment. 129 Discursive reason 
informed by the Christian story determines objectivity and reasonableness. It is an 
objectivity that is structured, but not held captive, by a person's subjectivities. 130 
In conclusion, because of developments in his career as a moral theologian, there has 
been a significant shift in McCormick moral epistemology at least at the level of synderesis. 
In his first moral epistemology (prior to 1983), one apprehends the basic goods through the 
127McCormick, "Personal Conscience," 243. One example of the 
complementarily of the sources of moral knowledge would be the magisterium's reliance 
on the sciences in regards to discerning its position on complex issues like genetic 
manipulation, fetal tissue transplants, treatment decisions for defective neonates, etc. For 
McCormick, the teachings of the magisterium are to enlighten the conscience not replace 
it. Its teachings are made within the community of experience, reflection, and memory. 
In this day and age when science and technology are developing complex new techniques 
on a daily basis, it is imperative that the magisterium be in consultation with authorities 
within these fields. The magisterium cannot be expected to be competent in all areas of 
modem medicine and technology. Therefore, it must rely on and learn from those who 
have the proper competence in order to help inform and enlighten the faithful. 
McCormick writes: "Christ did not promise us that as individuals we would always be 
right when deliberating about practical implications of 'being in Christ.' He did not 
promise that the ultimate official teaching would always be right. He did say, in the fact 
of our being a community of believers, that there is no better way of walking the narrow 
path than to walk it together--with the combined eyes and strength and experience of the 
entire people, all supporting each other's charisms and gifts." McCormick, The Critical 
Cal ling, 44-45. Emphasis in the original. 
128McCormick, "Personal Conscience," 243. 
129Ibid. 
1300dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 155. 
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experience of and reflection on our natural inclinations. After 1983, McCormick makes a 
conscious decision to write primarily in the area of bioethics from a theological perspective. 
Because of this development in his career there is now a significant shift in his moral 
epistemology. In his second moral epistemology, one apprehends the basic values though 
one's affections influenced by the Christian story. The Christian story plays an integral role 
by both sensitizing the person and maintaining one's focus on the basic values. The 
affections influenced by the Christian story represent a major shift at the level of synderesis 
in McCormick's moral epistemology. 
At the level of normative moral judgment, it appears that McCormick's moral 
epistemology is the product of a developing synthesis. In his first moral epistemology, 
McCormick moved from the basic goods being incommensurable, following the school of 
Finnis et al., to the position that these basic goods can in fact conflict ·with one another. This 
conflict is due to the fact that for McCormick there is an association of basic goods. 
Proportionate reason became the principle to determine concretely and objectively the 
rightness and wrongness of acts and the various exceptions to behavioral norms. In his 
second moral epistemology, the discursive reason informed by the Christian story can know 
the objective moral rightness and wrongness of an act by determining what constitutes the 
good of the human person "integrally and adequately considered." Proportionate reason 
continues to play a vital role in determining the rightness and wrongness of an action, but it 
does so in association with the criterion of the whole human person. 
McCormick's moral epistemology, which has developed over the years, has much 
to offer Christian ethics. He argues that his epistemological foundation, which is based on 
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reason informed by faith, leads to sound moral analysis. His emphasis on the affective 
component in moral conviction, he believes, has particular application in the area of 
bioethics. McCormick writes: 
Judgments of the moral "ought," what I as a Christian should do or avoid, 
and actions upon such conclusions, originate not simply in rational analysis, 
book learning or exposure to sociological facts. They have deep roots in our 
sensitivities and emotions. This has particular relevance where health needs 
of the elderly and dependent (fetuses, infants, retarded, the poor) are 
concerned. 131 
McCormick's moral epistemology, both at the level of synderesis and normative moral 
judgment, specifies practical implications as applied to treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. The following section will examine what we know from McCormick's moral 
epistemology and will apply it to treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
Practical Implications Of McCormick's Moral Epistemolo~y (After 1983) As Applied To 
Treatment Decisions For Defective Neonates 
McCormick's moral epistemology guides the human person toward becoming more 
humane by informing our reasoning about what it means to be fully human. He writes: "It 
is only against such understandings that our concrete deliberations can remain truly humane 
and promote our best interests."132 For the human person, reason informed by faith results 
in various enlightening perspectives, insights, and themes that have a direct bearing on 
131McCormick, "Man's Moral Responsibility For Health," 1°8. Emphasis mine. 
132McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 320. 
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bioethics. 133 McCormick does caution that there are five aspects that need to be noted about 
these themes and perspectives. He writes: 
First, they are by no means an exhausting listing ... Second, these themes 
do not immediately yield concrete moral judgments about the rightfulness or 
wrongfulness of human actions. Rather, they direct and inform our view of 
the world. Third, they are not ultimately mysterious. They find resonance 
in broad moral experience and in this sense are not impervious to human 
insight. Fourth, they are capable of yielding different applications in 
different times and circumstances. Finally, they are themes or perspectives 
that stem from the Christian story in a dynamic sense: as the story is 
continuously appropriated in a living tradition. 134 
With these qualifications, this section will examine three specific insights or perspectives 
that inform human reasoning in regards to treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
Human Life Is A Good But Not An Absolute Good 
At the level of synderesis, McCormick has determined that human life is a basic 
good, but not an absolute one. According to McCormick, there is a hierarchy of goods that 
is teleological in nature. Each good exists in an interrelationship that consists in a single 
scale. The ultimate good, the highest good, the End of ends is God. Therefore, human life 
is a relative good, because there are higher goods for which life can be sacrificed. 135 At the 
133McCormick lists six such themes: "( 1) Life as a basic but not absolute value. 
(2) The extension of this judgment to nascent life. (3) Human relationships as the basic 
quality of human physical life to be valued as the conditio sine qua non for other values. 
( 4) Our essential sociality. ( 5) The unity of the spheres of life-giving (procreative) and 
love-making (unitive). (6) Heterosexual, permanent marriage as normative." Ibid., 329. 
134McCormick, "Bioethics And Method," 311. 
135For a more detailed analysis of human life as a relative good, refer to Chapter 
Two, McCormick Theological Anthropology section above. 
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level of normative moral judgment, it is the discursive reason informed by the Christian story 
that determines if the presence of proportionate reason exists to determine if one value can 
be sacrificed for another in a conflict situation, for the good of the whole person. 
For McCormick, the Christian story influences both personal dispositions and moral 
judgments. He writes: "In the Christian story we are baptized into the mysterious drama of 
Christ's passion, death and resurrection. Just as he rose from the dead and lives, so too will 
we."136 The belief that we are pilgrim people with no lasting home here on earth yields an 
immediate value judgment on the meaning of life: life is a good but not an absolute good. 
McCormick will rely upon both scripture and the magisterium to confirm this value 
judgment. 137 
In McCormick's view, human life is a relative good, and the duty to preserve it is a 
limited one. Therefore, human life need not be preserved at any cost and with every means 
if there is a proportionate reason for not prolonging it. McCormick bases this in the Catholic 
theological tradition. On this subject McCormick writes: 
Life is not a value to be preserved in and for itself. To maintain that would 
commit us to a form of medical vitalism that makes no human or Judaeo-
Christian sense. It is a value to be preserved precisely as a condition for other 
values, and therefore insofar as these other values remain attainable. 138 
136McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 20. 
137For a more detailed analysis of how scripture and the magisterium confirm this 
value judgment, see Ibid. Refer also to Chapter Two, Practical Implications Of 
McCormick's Theological Anthropology As Applied To Treatment Decisions For 
Defective Neonates section, Human Life Is A Basis But Not Absolute Good subsection 
above. 
138McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 349. 
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For the Christian, reason informed by faith knows that death is a natural part of the rhythm 
of life. It is not the absolute end for the Christian. It is a transition, the end of one stage--
physical life--and the beginning of another, eternal life. McCormick writes: 
Excessive concern for the temporal is at some point a neglect of the eternal. 
An obligation to use all means to preserve life would be a devaluation of 
human life, since it would remove life from the context or story that is the 
source of its ultimate value. 139 
The practical implications of this reasoning are significant regarding treatment 
decisions for defective neonates. Since life is a relative good, then under certain 
circumstances, all things considered, not all means need to be used to preserve the physical 
life of a defective neonate. 140 McCormick argues that it is within this context that prevents 
the absolutization oflife that decision-makers are prepared intellectually and psychologically 
to say at some point "enough." McCormick explains: 
Without such a context (established by the informing faith), we are in 
constant danger of falling prey to merely technological judgments. Such 
judgments can push us to either of two extremes: (1) If it can be done, it 
ought to be done (thus people are kept on respirators in a permanent 
vegetative state when they can benefit not a whit from such continuance). (2) 
The dying process is abbreviated by active euthanasia. The notion of the 
patient's "best interests" is collapsed into what medical technology and 
expertise can do. 141 
139McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 52. 
140This statement has its basis in the centuries-long tradition of the Catholic 
Church on the duty to preserve life. In 1595 Domingo Banez formulated the distinction 
between extraordinary and ordinary means, by which was meant measures proportionate 
to one's condition in life. For a more detailed historical analysis, see Richard 
McCormick and John Paris, "The Catholic Tradition On The Use Of Nutrition And 
Fluids," America 156 (May 2, 1987): 356-361. 
141McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 20-21. 
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This suggests that the basic value of human life can call forth different obligations at various 
stages or phases of existence. He argues that to say there is a proportionate reason for not 
using all means to preserve this particular life in this particular situation, all things 
considered, is to say simply that there is a point where one judges it to be in the best interests 
of this defective neonate and all concerned to allow death to occur naturally. What is judged 
to be the good of this neonate and all concerned is rooted in Christian attitudes concerning 
the meaning of life and death, attitudes that value life without absolutizing it, and that fear 
and avoid death without absolutizing it. 142 If a defective neonate's bodily existence 
represents a value that conflicts with another more important and even preferred value, such 
as personal dignity and eternal life, then one may sacrifice bodily existence for this higher 
value. 
Human Life Is Sacred And Cannot Be Directly Terminated 
At the level of synderesis, McCormick argues that since human life is a basic good 
on which many other basic goods depend, and since human life is created by God, then 
human life is also sacred. Created in the image and likeness of God, makes every human life 
sacred and therefore to be treated with dignity and respect. 143 The human affections informed 
142McCormick, "The New Medicine And Morality," 317. 
143For a more detailed analysis of the sacredness of human life as derived from the 
Christian story, refer to Chapter Two, Practical Implications Of McCormick's 
Theological Anthropology As Applied To Treatment Decisions For Defective Neonates 
section, Human Life As Sacred subsection above. McCormick writes: "Human life is 
sacred because of its origin and destiny, because of the value God places on it;" 
McCormick, The Critical Calling, 268. 
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by the Christian story discover human life to be not only a basic good, but a basic good that 
carries the qualification of being sacred. 
At the level of normative moral judgment, McCormick uses discursive reason 
informed by the Christian story to determine that human life may not be directly terminated. 
Drawing on the doctrine of creation and the lordship of God over all creation, McCormick 
writes: "If all persons are equally the creatures of the one God, then none of these creatures 
is authorized to play God toward any other. And if all persons are cherished by God, 
regardless of merit, we ought to cherish each other in the same spirit. " 144 This means that 
even the most defective neonates, those who experience extreme pain and suffering, can 
never be denied their dignity and respect. Adhering to the Catholic theological tradition, 
McCormick argues that pain and suffering have a special place in God's saving plan. 
Without glorifying pain and suffering, the Catholic theological tradition has viewed suffering 
and even death within a larger perspective, that of the redemptive process. In suffering, 
Christians participate in the Paschal mystery. 145 For McCormick, grave illness is to be seen 
as an intensifying conformity to Christ. The Catholic theological conviction is that grave 
illness should be a time of grace, of the gradual shedding of the sinful self. 146 
Based on the Catholic ethical tradition, the magisterium confirms McCormick's 
144McCormick, "Public Policy On Abortion," How Brave A New World?, 197. 
145McCormick writes: "Just as Christ suffered and died for us to enter his glory, so 
we who are 'in the Lord,' who are inserted into the redemptive mystery, must expect that 
our growth 'to deeper life' will share the characteristic of God's engendering deed in 
Christ." McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 116-117. 
146Ibid., 118. 
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rejection of the direct termination of a defective neonate. The magisterium has always made 
a distinction between allowing to die versus direct termination of human life. The direct 
termination of one's life is morally wrong, 
because such an action on the part of a person is to be considered as a 
rejection of God's sovereignty and loving plan ... However, one must 
clearly distinguish suicide from that sacrifice of one's life whereby for a 
higher cause, such as God's glory, the salvation of souls or the service of 
one's brethren, a person offers his or her own life or puts it in danger (cf. 
John 15:14). 147 
Epistemologically, McCormick finds unsatisfying the two central positions taken on 
whether an irreversibly dying life may be terminated directly. Concerning the first, he 
writes: 
Those who argue the immortality of positive euthanasia by appeal only to the 
inherent value of human life, even dying life, and therefore to the general 
disproportion at the heart of the prohibition of killing and suicide in general, 
forget that they have already abandoned this evaluation when they have 
provided for passive euthanasia. They have already said of the basic value 
of human life that it need not be supported while dying in the same way and 
with the same means as it need be while in a non-dying condition. In other 
words, they have evaluated dying life differently but then return to and appeal 
to the evaluation of non-dying life where direct intervention is concerned. 
This is inconsistent. 148 
This is the position that McCormick held in the first formulation at the level of normative 
moral judgment in his first moral epistemology (prior to 1983). The second position is held 
by Joseph Fletcher and those who see no difference between direct termination and allowing 
147The Congregation For The Doctrine Of The Faith, Declaration On Euthanasia, 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1980), 2-3. 
148McCormick, "The New Medicine And Morality," 317. 
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to die. 149 McCormick writes: "For them, ifthere is a truly proportionate reason to allow to 
die, then there is also thereby a proportionate reason to end life by positive direct 
intervention."15° For the proponents ofthis position there is no moral difference between 
direct termination and allowing to die, therefore, a reason that justifies one justifies the other. 
Once death is imminent and inevitable, then it makes no difference how it occurs. 
McCormick disagrees with both positions. 151 McCormick argues, what is "proportionate for 
allowing a terminal patient to die is not proportionate for directly causing death."152 For 
McCormick, "proportionate reason, if it is adequately developed must include all the effects 
of a proposed course of action, its relationship to all the values. In this sense, it is not the end 
that justifies the means, as Fletcher contends, but the ends."153 McCormick states his moral 
position quite clearly: "there is no proportionate reason for directly dispatching a terminal 
149See Joseph Fletcher, "Ethics And Euthanasia," American Journal Of Nursing 73 
(1973): 670-675. This article also appears as a chapter in To Live And To Die. ed. 
Robert H. Williams (New York: Spinger-Verlag, 1973), 113-122. 
150McCormick, "The New Medicine And Morality," 318. 
151McCormick writes: "Descriptively different actions may have different short 
and/or long range implications and effects. And it is these effects, either feared, 
suspected, unknown, or clearly foreseen that could spell, or at least reveal, the moral 
difference between omission and commission where the dying are concerned. In other 
words, mere omission may not entail, either logically or factually, the same consequences 
as direct commission would. And if this is so, a different calculus of proportion may be 
called for. For proportion must encompass the good of the patient and all concerned." 




or dying patient. " 154 Not only would the direct termination of a defective neonate's life show 
a complete utter disrespect for the dignity of that life, it would also involve dangers for the 
living. 155 McCormick is once again pushing in the social direction, stressing the inevitability 
of human interdependence. Therefore, McCormick argues that the harm involved in direct 
termination is disproportionate to the benefits, not only for the neonate but for society as a 
whole. For McCormick, human life is sacred and the direct killing of an innocent life is a 
virtually exceptionless norm. 156 
Medical Technology Is A Good, But A Good That Is Limited And To Be Used Responsibly 
At the level of synderesis, medical technology is the result of the basic inclination or 
"tendency to explore and question."157 Created in the image and likeness of God and graced 
with free will and reason, the human person has been enabled by God to use these gifts in 
creative ways that can help transform self, others, and the world. As a gift from God, 
medical technology has given neonatologists the ability to save the lives of many defective 
154Ibid., 316. 
155For a more detailed analysis of how positive euthanasia causes dangers for 
society McCormick refers to two articles: Merle Longwood, "Ethical Reflections On The 
Meaning Of Death," Dialog 11 (1972): 195-201; and David W. Louisell, "Euthanasia 
And Biathanasia: On Dying And Killing," Linacre Quarterly 10 (1974): 14-22. 
156For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's understanding of "virtually 
exceptionless norms," see McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology 1965 Through 1980, 
433. 
157This is one of the human persons' basic inclinations present, according to 
McCormick, prior to acculturation. See McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition 
And Bioethical Codes," How Brave A New World?, 5. 
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neonates. However, as a good, it also has the potential to be abused. 
At the level of normative moral judgment, McCormick's use of discursive reason 
informed by the Christian story helps him remain focused on the basic goods. Therefore, 
medical technology must be used in a responsible manner that will advance the good of 
humankind. Like Daniel Callahan, McCormick is concerned that humanity today has 
become corporately homo technologicus. In this situation, some believe the best situation 
to the dilemmas created by technology is more technology. McCormick argues that we tend 
to eliminate the maladapted condition (defectives, retardates, and so on) rather than adjust 
the environment to it. 158 Because of this model of the human person, cultural biases have 
affected how persons view the meaning of life and thus, how persons view the meaning of 
death. McCormick believes there is a virtual consensus in America today that individuals 
have successfully conspired to suppress death into the realm of the unreal. Death has 
become the enemy to be defeated at all costs. However, it is the Christian story informing 
reason that allows the individual to identify these cultural biases and to overcome them. 
McCormick writes: 
Only when this task is accomplished will we be able to make quality-of-life 
decisions without forfeiting true quality. Only then will we be able to avoid 
both a demeaning vitalism that canonizes physiological processes and an 
Orwellian interventionism that collapses the physical as meaningless. Only 
then will we be able to view death as both a rhythm of nature and yet as the 
inimical wages of sin, as both choice and yet submission. Only then will the 
physician grow tolerably comfortable with the paradox at the heart of his 
profession: the commitment to preserve life and health, yet acceptance that 
158McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 7. 
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ultimate defeat is inevitable. 159 
The responsible use of medical technology must consider the good of the whole person and 
the common good of society, not just a particular problem. 
As finite creatures, the goods of creation are limited. Therefore, these goods must 
be allocated in a responsible way. In considering the good of society, McCormick argues 
that we must examine the escalating costs of health care. This is due to many factors, such 
as increasing sophistication of services, higher wages, more personnel, cost pass-along 
systems, and inflation. These cost factors have forced allocation questions and decisions of 
the most painful kind. Are we using neonatal intensive care units effectively? Must we 
begin to exclude some categories of defective neonates from these sophisticated services?160 
Cost factors raise very difficult questions and demand even more difficult decisions 
regarding treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
McCormick is concerned that both the human and the moral good will be identified 
with what is technologically possible and affordable, with the result being that technology 
will create its own morality regarding treatment decisions for defective neonates. For 
McCormick, discursive reason informed by the Christian story determines when there is 
proportionate reason to either use or not use specific medical treatments for defective 
neonates. The Christian story provides a framework by which the Christian can reasonably 
159McCormick, "The New Medicine And Morality," 3 21. 
160See Richard A. McCormick, SJ., "Bioethical Issues And The Moral Matrix Of 
U.S. Health Care," Hospital Pro~ress 60 (May 1979): 42; See also Idem, "1973-1983: 
Value Impacts Of A Decade," Hospital Pro~ress 63 (December 1982): 41. 
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determine what is truly in the "best interests" of the defective neonate against any cultural 
attempts to distort it. 
In conclusion, when McCormick's moral epistemology is applied to treatment 
decisions for defective neonates, various moral judgments can be derived that are not only 
reasonable but firmly grounded in the Catholic theological tradition. However, not all of 
McCormick's ethicist colleagues concur with this evaluation. Various criticisms have been 
directed at McCormick's moral epistemology that must be addressed in order to have a 
comprehensive view of how he makes moral decisions regarding treatment decisions for 
defective neonates. To complete the analysis of McCormick's moral epistemology the next 
section will articulate, analyze, and evaluate some of these criticisms. 
Criticism 
Serious criticisms have been directed at McCormick's moral epistemology at both 
the foundational and structural levels. These criticisms range from questions concerning the 
shift in his moral epistemology to inconsistency in regards to language. Further, others 
question the ambiguity in McCormick's moral epistemology and whether he is a critical or 
naive realist. McCormick has stated on a number of occasions that "theologians should 
become more critical of one another--in a courteous and disciplined way."161 This section 
will respond to McCormick's invitation by examining a number of major criticisms directed 
at his moral epistemology. 
161McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 667. 
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First, as we have seen, McCormick has made a significant shift in his moral 
epistemology at the level of synderesis. In the first moral epistemology (prior to 1983), the 
human person knows the basic goods that define hwnan flourishing by reason reflecting on 
the human person's basic tendencies or inclinations. McCormick writes: "For it is 
impossible to act without having an interest in the object, and it is impossible to be attracted 
by, to have an interest in, something without some inclination already present."162 In the 
second moral epistemology (after 1983), it is through the person's feelings or affections, 
informed by the Christian story, that one becomes aware of the basic goods. At the level of 
synderesis, there has been a significant shift from reason reflecting on the basic inclinations 
to the affections informed by the Christian story discovering the basic goods. 
The problem with this movement from the first to the second moral epistemology is 
that McCormick fails to articulate or give a systematic explanation for why he made this 
epistemological shift. Literally, McCormick creates a second moral epistemology at the 
level of synderesis and proceeds to apply it to the area of bioethics without any 
acknowledgment that he has made an epistemological change. From 1983 onward, it will 
be the affections informed by the Christian story that discover the basic goods, not reason 
reflecting on the basic inclinations. This creates serious methodological questions and has 
been the source of much confusion. McCormick's many contributions to Christian ethics 
could benefit greatly from a systematic analysis of his moral epistemology, by himself or a 
third party, especially at the level of synderesis. The problem is that McCormick does not 
162McCormick, "Proxy Consent In The Experimentation Situation," Love And 
Society, 21 7. 
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see himself as a "system-builder." He basically approaches moral problems as they arise 
in life. 163 This has far-reaching ramifications for him as a moral theologian and for his 
ethical positions. McCormick is looked to by his colleagues and by the Catholic Church for 
his moral evaluations on bioethical issues affecting the faithful today. Unless his moral 
epistemology is clearly articulated and systematically presented, his moral positions on 
bioethical issues can become suspect and open to a wide range of criticisms. 
Second, both of McCormick's moral epistemologies have inconsistencies in language 
and ambiguities in application. For example, in one of his earliest articles published in 197 4 
he writes that the basic values are "equally basic and irreducibly attractive."164 In a reprint 
of the same article published in 1981, this section of the original article has been 
eliminated. 165 In 1981, McCormick published an article in which he argues that the basic 
values are now "equally underivative and irreducibly attractive."166 In the 1974 article, 
1630dozor writes: "McCormick himself acknowledged this in my interview with 
him in this description of how the late Dr. Andre Hellegers, the founder of the Kennedy 
Institute of Bioethics at Georgetown University, used to introduce him and others to 
visitors at the Institute. Dr. Hellegers would show people around the Institute and tell 
them who was there. He'd say, 'Well, this is Leon Kass over here, he is our Jewish 
scholar ... and this is McCormick's office. He puts out fires.' People would say, 'What 
do you mean?' Hellegers would say, 'McCormick and I put out fires. We respond to 
problems. We have no eternally valid ten year schemes or methodological revolutions. 
All we do is respond to fire alarms."' Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal 
Of Moral Theolo~y, 23. 
164McCormick, "Proxy Consent In The Experimentation Situation," in Love And 
Society, 217. Emphasis mine. 
165See McCormick, "Proxy Consent In The Experimentation Situation," How 
Brave A New World?, 51-71. 
166 McCormick "Bioethics And Method," 305. Emphasis mine. 
221 
"Proxy Consent In The Experimentation Situation," McCormick appears to be closely 
aligned with Finnis' theory of equally fundamental basic goods. The fundamental change 
of terminology in the later article, "Bioethics And Method," reveals a shift in formulation 
at the level of normative moral judgment in his first moral epistemology. Regrettably, this 
is done without any explanation or justification. On this subject, Lisa Sowle Cahill has 
observed: 
In a personal communication (8/18/81 ), McCormick has indicated that the 
basic goods are to be spoken of properly as "equally underivative" rather than 
"equally basic." He notes that this shift in language might imply conclusions 
about the goods other than those drawn by Finnis. A systematic exposition 
by McCormick of the quality of being "underivative" would no doubt have 
a significant impact upon the critique that follows in the present essay, 
inasmuch as the latter is premised precisely on the hypothesis that Finnis' 
conclusions do not find adequate warrants in McCormick's general 
perspective. 167 
To date, McCormick has yet to provide a systematic exposition of the quality of being 
'"underivative." This example demonstrates not only inconsistencies in McCormick's use 
of terminology, but also indicates a shift in formulation in his first moral epistemology at the 
level of normative moral judgment. This fundamental shift demands a systematic 
explanation and analysis, or an admission that the author has in fact changed his mind. 
It is possible to point out additional examples of inconsistency in terminology and 
ambiguity in application. For example, McCormick writes: "Thus I see 'association of basic 
values,' 'proportionate reason,' and 'adoption of a hierarchy of values' as attempting to say 
167Cahill, "Teleology, Utilitarianism, And Christian Ethics," 621. 
the same thing, or at least very closely related. " 168 Again McCormick writes: 
In summary, then, proportionate reason as I understand it can be explained 
in several different ways, no one of which need reduce to 'greatest net good.' 
Namely, one can speak of association of basic goods (rather than 
commensuration); one can speak of corporate adoption of a hierarchy; or one 
can speak of a certain equivalence (aggression against liberty is tantamount 
to aggression against life). 169 
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Each of these terms must be more clearly defined. 170 A further example is McCormick's 
response to an article written by Sanford Levy. McCormick writes: 
Levy makes some worthwhile points, particularly in reference to my proposal 
of a "theory of associated goods." He does not think much of it, and I would 
add that I am not wedded to it. However, I am convinced that our 
assessments of proportion and disproportion are destined to remain somewhat 
intuitive without our full ability to state them adequately in reasoned 
analysis. 171 
Important questions remain: what does McCormick mean that he is not wedded to the theory 
of associated goods? Did he not formulate his hierarchy of goods through the theory of 
associated goods? Why does he no longer refer to the "association of basic goods" after 
1983? 
168McCormick, Doin~ Evil To Achieve Good, 253. 
169Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
170James J. Walter agrees with this point. Walter writes: "It could be argued, as I 
have above, that the 'association of basic values' and the 'adoption of a hierarchy of 
values' more properly relate to the discussion of the general level of how we know that a 
proportionate reason can be obtained and more particularly to the mode of discursive 
reasoning." For a more detailed analysis, see James J. Walter, "Proportionate Reason And 
Its Three Levels Oflnquiry: Structuring The Ongoing Debate," 40. 
171McCormick, "Notes On Moral Theology: 1985," Theolo~ical Studies 47 
(1986): 87. Emphasis mine. See also Sanford S. Levy, "Richard McCormick And 
Proportionate Reason," 261. 
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McCormick is also ambiguous in his second moral epistemology concerning the 
meaning of prediscursive reason or the affections. Unfortunately, throughout the entire 
discussion he never clearly articulates what is meant by this term. McCormick argues that 
human affectivity plays a major role in discovering the basic goods. However, McCormick 
fails to elaborate on what is meant by feelings or the affections. McCormick states that, 
"judgments of the moral 'ought' have deep roots in our sensitivities and emotions. This has 
particular relevance where the health needs of the elderly and dependent (fetuses, infants, 
retarded and poor) are concemed."172 If this is true, then McCormick needs to be clear on 
what he means by the affections. After reviewing McCormick's views on feelings, 
affections, aspirations, etc., questions remain: what does McCormick mean by prediscursive 
reason? Are connatural knowledge and "moral instincts of faith" the same? Or, does 
McCormick have two different senses of the idea ofprediscursive reason? 
James J. Walter believes that various terms used by McCormick to describe 
prediscursive reason appear to create two slightly different senses of the idea. Walter argues: 
In his discussion of natural inclinations, which are the basis for our interest 
in specific values, he [McCormick] claimed that our intelligence 
spontaneously and without reflection grasps the possibilities to which they 
point . . . As a moral instinct of faith, this latter aspect of moral knowing 
cannot be adequately subjected to analytic reflection, but it is responsible for 
one's ultimate judgments on concrete moral issues. 173 
Odozor responds to Walter's criticism by observing that: 
Ultimately we are not speaking of two distinct realities. Prediscursive 
172McCormick, "Man's Moral Responsibility For Health," 18. 
173Walter, "The Foundation And Formulation Of Norms," 140. 
knowledge described as connatural knowledge or as the "moral instinct of 
faith," "cannot be adequately subject to analytic reflection." In spite of 
possible distortions due to personal or cultural biases they remain, "a more 
reliable test of humanizing and dehumanizing, of the morally right and 
wrong, of proportion, than our discursive arguments."174 
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While these two aspects may not be two distinct realities in McCormick's mind, they can 
certainly cause confusion in the minds of others. If sensitivities and emotions have 
"particular relevance" in treatment decisions for defective neonates, then McCormick must 
clarify what is meant by prediscursive reasoning. 
These examples present both inconsistencies in terminology and ambiguities in 
application throughout McCormick's first and second moral epistemologies. McCormick 
has yet to address adequately these criticisms. It is possible to speculate that the cause for 
these inconsistencies and ambiguities might be the direct result of his writing the "Notes On 
Moral Theology." While he was writing these "Notes On Moral Theology" he was called 
upon to address a wide range of topics, and to offer his critique of these issues. He was 
challenged to reflect on and respond to new ideas that were being presented in various 
articles. He articulated these new ideas and at times responded to them in a rather 
"offhanded" manner. In the process he would accept new ideas and principles or reject old 
ones without needing to provide any sustained justification. 175 On a broader scale, his lack 
of clarity has added to the confusion surrounding such fundamental issues as 
1740dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theolo~y, 86; see 
also McCormick, Doin~ Evil To Achieve Good, 251. 
175 A prime example would be the Levy article when he states that he is not 
wedded to the theory of associated goods. He simply stated this without any analysis or 
justification. 
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proportionalism, premoral evils, etc. One could speculate that the conflicts that have 
developed between the magisterium and proportionalists might have been lessened if the 
language used to explain notions such as proportionate reason and premoral evils were 
consistent and precise. Much of the criticism directed at many of McCormick's ethical 
positions may not have been necessary if his moral epistemology were more systematically 
presented. 
writes: 
Third, there are many critics of McCormick's hierarchy of values. James J. Walter 
I think McCormick's original intuitions, ifl may call them that, were correct 
about the need for a hierarchy of values; however, I remain relatively 
unconvinced of the way in which he has demonstrated this hierarchy and how 
he has construed the conflicts between the associated goods. 176 
Finnis et al. do not believe there is a hierarchy of values, because the basic goods are equally 
basic and irreducibly attractive. Ronald McKinney, S.J. 177 and Garth Hallett, S.J.178 both 
argue that it is not only unnecessary but impossible analytically to develop a hierarchy of 
values. Walter believes that these latter assessments are important not only in themselves 
but because these authors are known proportionalists. 179 Walter's criticism appears to be 
well-founded. McCormick spends a great deal of time talking about the hierarchy of values 
176Walter, "The Foundation And Formulation OfNorms," 145. 
177Ronald H. McKinney, S.J., "The Quest For An Adequate Proportionalist 
Theory Of Value," Thomist, 53 (January 1989): 56-73. 
178Garth L. Hallett, S.J., Christian Moral Reasonin~: An Analytic Guide (Notre 
Dame, IN.: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1983): 137-143. 
179Walter, "The Foundation And Formulation Of Norms," 145. 
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and in fact, the hierarchy of values is the one consistent element that underlies both of his 
moral epistemologies. However, he never clearly articulates how this hierarchy is 
established. Odozor argues that 
McCormick assumes a hierarchy of values (ordo bonorum). Prudence 
dictates which of these goods should be chosen in times of conflict. This 
choice is not made arbitrarily, because some obligations are certain in all 
circumstances, even if there is a doubt of fact, because the good to be 
protected and secured, "prevails over any good which can be adduced as 
incommodum." Prudence merely dictates what is proportionate reason 
according to this prevalence of goods. 180 
Odozor further states: 
I do not share Cahill' s view that the difficulty in discerning and agreeing on 
a hierarchy of values constitutes "an undeniable shortcoming" in 
McCormick's teleology. Instead, it indicates that there is no other route to 
ethics but through responsible teleology. This is because the difficulty she 
points out stems from the human condition--our individual, social, and 
cultural differences as well as our finiteness. Although determining a 
hierarchy of values might involve "an intricate conceptualization of relative 
values and disvalues," it is not foreign to any normal adult. Nor is it 
something "theoreticians" instead of "decision-makers" do. 181 
To say that the virtue of prudence plays an integral role in determining the hierarchy of 
values unfortunately provides little clarity. McCormick refers to prudence a number of times 
in both of his moral epistemologies, but he never defines the virtue or explains how he uses 
it. 182 
1800dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 17-18. 
181lbid., 108-109; see also Cahill, "Teleology, Utilitarianism, And Christian 
Ethics," 617. 
182Throughout both his moral epistemologies McCormick refers to the "prudent 
person"; how in assessing if there is a proportionate reason in a conflict situation that it is 
a "prudent bet"; and "the use of prudence must conform to an objective scale ... " 
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Odozor attempts to clarify further McCormick's understanding of the hierarchy of 
values as he writes: "McCormick's casuistry is, in a way, a constant search for the order in 
this value system. This search is conducted, not in spite of, but in accord with human 
experience."183 Again, Odozor's explanation lends little clarity. Instead, more questions 
remain: Does this mean that in the hierarchy of values, the values are constantly in flux? Is 
proportionate reason the tool for determining the placement of the values within the 
hierarchy? Or, is it human experience? There is a need for a hierarchy of values, as 
McCormick contends. However, until he can articulate how this hierarchy is formed, one 
is left to mere speculation on how the values are placed within the hierarchy. 
A further criticism with respect to the hierarchy of values has to do with confusing 
premoral and moral values within the hierarchy. McCormick has claimed that the basic 
values can in fact conflict. In this case, the human person must compare and choose among 
them. Walter believes that one of the possible difficulties in McCormick's position may be 
related not to his claim that the basic goods are associated, but rather with the fact that he 
might have included both premoral and moral values into his category of basic goods. 184 
There are two distinct examples of this in McCormick's writings that support this criticism. 
Prudence obviously plays a major role in how a person determines the measure of 
proportionate reason. One could assume that because McCormick is a natural law 
ethicist~ albeit revised, in the Catholic Thomistic tradition, that he agrees with Thomas' 
understanding of prudence. However, this would be speculation at best. For a more 
detailed analysis of Thoms' position on prudence, see Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-
Ilae, 61. 
1830dozor, Richard A. McComiick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 158. 
184Walter, "The Foundation And Formulation OfNorms," 145. 
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The first centers on the example McCormick uses of the sheriff in the southern town who is 
faced with two alternatives in a rape case of either framing a black suspect (whom he knows 
to be innocent) or carrying on a prolonged search for the real culprit. The immediate 
indictment and conviction of the suspect would save many lives and prevent other harmful 
consequences. There seems to be two different types of values being weighed in this conflict 
situation--freedom (political liberty) and the protection of life. 185 James Walter has written: 
One might argue that life is a premoral value but that liberty (political 
freedom) is a moral value because the latter value describes a quality of moral 
persons as they confront various situations. If my suggestion is correct, then 
the conflict is not between values as associated but between values of a 
different kind. 186 
Walter's position is further clarified by ethicist Timothy O'Connell who argues that moral 
values describe qualities of moral persons themselves as they confront and correctly deal 
with their situations. 187 
The second example centers on the basic values that McCormick takes from Finnis 
et al. 188 Included is the basic value of friendship which many critics argue is a moral value 
185McCormick, Doin~ Evil To Achieve Good, 252. 
186Walter, "The Foundation And Formulation Of Norms," 145. Emphasis in the 
original. 
1870'Connell writes: "They describe the kind of persons they should be. If we 
name these values by using adjectives (fair, honest, just, chaste, etc.), then the adjectives 
are most appropriately modifiers of moral agents themselves. They describe their way of 
being, they report their success and failure in maximizing the premoral good and 
minimizing the premoral evil in a particular area of life. For this reason, again, they are 
called 'moral values.'" Timothy O'Connell, Principles For A Catholic Morality (San 
Francisco, CA.: Harper & Row, 1978), 159. Emphasis in the original. 
188See McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 5. 
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and thus should be reclassified. On this subject Cahill writes: "Friendship, as distinct from 
mere social interaction, connotes moral virtues such as love, justice, honesty, and fidelity." 189 
Cahill argues that friendship is distinct from the basic value of procreation and life. Cahill 
views both of these values as being premoral. Each of these examples demonstrates that 
McCormick has mixed premoral and moral values within his hierarchy of values. 
McCormick is unable to explain not only how he forms the hierarchy of values, but it is 
apparent that there is confusion on how the values are construed and how conflicts are 
understood. It appears that McCormick's understanding of basic values entails both 
premoral and moral values. Since the hierarchy of values is foundational to both forms of 
McCormick's moral epistemology, a more systematic analysis and justification of how he 
forms the hierarchy is required. 
Fourth, it appears that McCormick identifies himself as a critical realist. It is possible 
to question if this has always been the case. A naive realist knows human reality on the 
model of taking a look at what is already out there to be looked at. Reaching an objective 
judgment is just verifying that something is true or real or valuable by using the standards 
of empirical observation based on one's sensory faculties. The critical realist, on the other 
hand, acknowledges that the facts of human knowing and judging values are related to the 
appropriation of our own operations of self-transcendence. The real world is the world 
mediated by meaning and motivated by value, and it is constituted by reference to the 
189Cahill, "Teleology, Utilitarianism, And Christian Ethics," 623. 
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invariant process of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deliberating. 190 One could 
question whether McCormick is a naive realist in regards to the basic goods. For 
McCormick, are the basic goods something "out there to be looked at?" In McCormick's 
first moral epistemology, at the level of normative moral judgment, is physicalism and its 
deductive method a form of naive realism? A number of ethicists, including Charles E. 
Curran, suggest that physicalism reflects a naive realism. 191 If this is true, then McCormick 
has not always been a critical realist. 
Finally, McCormick places emphasis on scripture as a traditional source of moral 
wisdom. He believes the renewal of moral theology entails using scripture more effectively. 
Unfortunately, this is not clear in his own moral epistemology. Odozor writes: 
Although McCormick is aware of the importance of scripture for ethics, he 
is not inclined to use particular texts to buttress his points or even ask 
questions about the meaning of particular texts for contemporary society. It 
is not that this does not matter. For him, scripture is a "moral reminder," and 
a privileged articulation of what everyone can know through human reason. 
Apart from the danger that this attitude may fail to see that sacred scriptures 
command us to love our neighbor in a particular way, it makes McCormick's 
work no more scriptural than the theology of the manuals. 192 
19
°For a more detailed evaluation of naive and critical realism, see Walter and 
Happel, Conversion And Discipleship, 74-75; 106. 
191 At the level of normative moral judgment, Curran argues that physicalism 
reflects the naive realism of the classicist wordview. This means that physicalism is 
based on an essentialist definition of human nature which has no room for change; it 
views nature as a finished product so that change and historical process are incidental; 
also, it depends on a moral order that is fixed and undeveloping. See Charles E. Curran 
"Absolute Norms And Medical Ethics," Absolutes In Moral Theology? (Washington, 
D.C.: Corpus Books, 1968), 108-153; see also Gula, Reason Informed By Faith, 234. 
1920dozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 45-46. 
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McCormick stresses the importance that theologians should follow the guidelines suggested 
at Vatican II, especially its insistence that morality's scientific exposition should be more 
thoroughly nourished by scriptural teaching. 193 He states: "Scripture nourishes our overall 
perspectives, tells us through Christ the kinds of people we ought to be and become, the type 
of world we ought to create."194 It is possible to ask that, if scripture is so integral to his 
moral epistemology, then why does he use it so sparingly and selectively? Cahill observes 
that McCormick appears to limit himself to the gospel of John and the epistles of Paul. 195 
If the stories of the Christian narrative nourish the faith of the individual and affect 
perspectives, and if they sharpen and intensify our focus on the human goods that are 
definitive of our flourishing, then McCormick ought to allow scripture to nourish his moral 
epistemology in a more comprehensive manner. With an emphasis on scripture, McCormick 
can show his critics that he is not presenting some radically new morality. Instead, he can 
show that he is only trying to recapture the sources of a quite old one and hence represent a 
healthy exercise in Christian memory. 196 
In conclusion, McCormick has always underscored the primacy of method. In the 
conclusion to his review of Joseph Fletcher's book on situation ethics McCormick argues 
that Fletcher has not made up his mind on how moral judgments are made. He added: 
As long as this remains unclear, he can squeeze out of any epistemological 
193McCormick, "The New Morality," 772. 
194McCormick, "Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition," 56. 
195Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," 89. 
196McCormick, "The New Morality," 772. 
comer, because he has none he calls his own. And as long as he has none he 
calls his own, one can say that he has adopted a method (and its content-
conclusion) without first solving the problem of methodology. 197 
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McCormick criticizes Fletcher for excessive ambiguity. This same criticism might also be 
leveled against McCormick and his moral epistemology. There is a critical need for 
McCormick to articulate systematically his moral epistemology so that any ambiguity that 
exists can be clarified. Ifhe fails to do this, it may have dire consequences in many diverse 
areas of bioethics, but in particular, in regards to treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
Conclusion 
Daniel Maguire believes that "moral theology would benefit tremendously from a 
full statement of method from McCormick."198 This critical analysis of McCormick's moral 
epistemology certainly reinforces Maguire's criticism. McCormick has made a significant 
shift in his moral epistemology at the level of synderesis. At the level of normative moral 
judgment, it appears that McCormick's moral epistemology is a synthesis, which is the 
product of development and maturity in his thought process. Because of the numerous 
criticisms that surround McCormick's moral epistemology, and the ambiguity that it entails, 
McCormick needs to articulate his theoretical foundations clearly and develop them 
systematically and coherently. Numerous moral theologians have called for him to do this, 
197McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, 77; see also 
Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 176-177. 
198Daniel Maguire, review of Doing Evil To Achieve Good, by Richard A. 
McCormick, S.J., in Journal Of Religion 61 (1981): 117. 
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yet he has not responded. 199 A systematic understanding of McCormick's moral 
epistemology is not only necessary but crucial in determining treatment decisions for 
defective neonates. It is necessary because it is the basis of moral decision-making. It is 
crucial because the life and death of defective neonates may hang in the balance. 
Once McCormick has established how a person knows, it becomes important to 
determine the criteria, that is, norms or tests, by which one may judge what is true and 
certain in human reasoning. Criteriology is the science of true and certain knowledge and 
complements moral epistemology. If McCormick's moral epistemology is the basis for life 
and death decisions regarding defective neonates, then the moral criteria one uses to 
determine life and death decisions are equally important. The next chapter will focus on 
substantive issues, that is, what McCormick believes are the appropriate standards or criteria 
for making treatment decisions for defective neonates. 




In philosophical and theological inquiry a criterion is understood as a means or rule 
of discrimination, whereby a person can distinguish one thing from another.' It is a standard 
or basis for judging quality. The study of such a criterion or set of criteria is called 
criteriology. In the area of ethics, moral criteriology is frequently used as a synonymous 
term for moral epistemology.2 However, in reality, they are two distinct components of an 
ethical methodology with two distinct purposes. Once the human ways of knowing 
values/disvalues and moral obligations have been established, there is a need to formulate 
some criterion or set of criteria, which guides moral reasoning in measuring human actions. 
Moral criteria span a number of uses. Moral criteria function both as a standard for 
determining the rightness and wrongness of actions, and they function in terms of the 
discernment process. These dual aspects are distinguishable, but there are times when they 
overlap in the decision-making process. The function of moral criteria in terms of the 
1Celestine Bittle, Reality And The Mind (Milwaukee, WI.: Bruce Publishing 
Company, 1936), 291. 
2Criteriology comes from the Greek Kpi vw meaning to distinguish or judge, 
which implies the testing of knowledge to distinguish the right from the wrong. 
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discernment process is how moral criteriology is linked to moral epistemology. 
For McCormick, a moral criterion concerning treatment decisions for defective 
neonates addresses both substantive and procedural issues. The substantive issues focus on 
the appropriate standard for making treatment decisions and present various options. Aaron 
L. Mackler argues that these options can be narrowed down to four specific approaches. He 
writes: 
One basic option would be to treat every newborn as aggressively as possible. 
A second option is selective treatment based in the balance between direct 
benefits and burden of care. Another set of approaches, focusing on the best 
interests of the infant, argues that treatment should be limited only if 
suffering or a radically diminished quality of life would make existence a net 
burden to the infant. The fourth approach considers the personal and 
financial costs to the family and to society (at least in extreme cases). 
Alternatively, some argue that there are limitations on personal and societal 
obligations to help in such cases because the resources used might save or 
improve the lives of others. 3 
Procedural issues focus on how such treatment decisions are made and by whom. The 
procedural issues will be articulated and analyzed in chapter five. 
Parents and health care professionals are often forced to draw lines between neonates 
who will be treated and those who will not be. If these lines are being drawn, then 
McCormick argues "it is of public importance that we find out the criteria by which they are 
being drawn. My attempt is to search our tradition on the meaning of life and so forth and 
see if we couldn't develop criteria."4 McCormick will determine where the lines are to be 
3 Aaron L. Mackler, "Neonatal Intensive Care," Scope Note 11, I. 
4James Castelli, "Richard A. McCormick, S.J. And Life/Death Decisions," St. 
Anthony Messenger 83 (August 1975): 34. McCormick, as interviewed by Castelli. 
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drawn and will establish moral criteria as a "revised" natural law ethicist in the Catholic 
tradition. In this process he will demonstrate both the suppleness and the commonsense 
basis of natural law thinking, while stretching it to new applications. 5 
This chapter will focus on McCormick's set of moral criteria as applied to the area 
of bioethics, specified for never-competent patients. While this set of criteria can also be 
applied to those who are competent and those who were once competent, the focus of this 
chapter will be on the never-competent because defective neonates fall only within this 
category. McCormick's moral criteria for treatment decisions for defective neonates is based 
on a patient-centered approach. The structure and individual components that make up 
McCormick's moral criteria for decision-making are normative; they center on what "ought" 
to be the case, not what "is" the case. By normative McCormick means what the never-
competent patient would want because he or she "ought" to want it. The never-competent 
patient "ought" to make this choice because it is in his or her "best interests."6 
It appears that over the years McCormick has used four distinct criteria in moral 
decision-making regarding treatment decisions for the never-competent patient. The first is 
the "reasonable person standard." The second is proportionate reason. The third is the 
person "integrally and adequately considered." Finally, there is his quality-of-life criterion, 
which is based on a normative understanding of what is in the "best interests" of the 
5See Lisa Sowle Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," 91. 
6For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's position on a normative· 
understanding of his patient-centered approach, see McCormick, "The Rights Of The 
Voiceless," How Brave A New World?, 99-113. 
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defective neonate. To further specify his moral criteria, in particular the quality-of-life 
criterion, McCormick uses both guidelines and norms. In addition, McCormick uses various 
moral principles to assist him in further specifying his moral criteria. The moral principles 
he uses both implicitly and explicitly are charity, autonomy, justice, beneficence, and 
nonmaleficence. These moral principles will be highlighted as they impact on his moral 
criteria. However, a brief analysis of each might be helpful in order to understand how 
McCormick utilizes them. 
The primary moral principle is charity, which is the foundation of all the other moral 
principles. McCormick reiterates the Thomistic dictum: "Charity is the form of the virtues. "7 
Charity does not destroy the individuality of virtuous acts, or make them all uniquely and 
identically acts of charity alone. Rather, McCormick argues that human actions possess 
ultimate meaning only insofar as they are caught up in the conferred divine life. For the 
"new creature" it is charity that expresses this "being caught up in," this "being grasped by 
God in Christ," this ordering to an end, this animating or forming. 8 Thus, all the other 
7McCormick explains Thomas' reasoning as follows: "That which ordains an act 
to its end gives it its form. But charity is the virtue which ordains to its end all virtuous 
acts, either acts or omissions. Therefore, charity gives form to all virtuous acts." 
McCormick, "The Primacy Of Charity," 21 ; see also Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ila-
Ilae, 23, 8. 
8McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 34. For 
McCormick, as for Thomas, "charity does not destroy or replace the other virtues; but the 
virtues are rooted in and depend on charity, and in such a way that there is no true virtue 
in the fullest sense without charity. Thus the virtues, while retaining their identity, are 
participants in charity so that they and their acts are in some sense emanations of and acts 
of charity." Ibid., 35. The same can be said for the relationship of charity to the moral 
principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence. 
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principles are rooted in charity. Autonomy is rooted in the dignity of the human person. For 
McCormick, "self-determination is a conditional or instrumental good--that is, a good 
precisely insofar as it is the instrument whereby the best interests of the patient are served 
by it. ''9 The right of autonomy is always rooted in the best interests of the person. In regard 
to treatment decisions, autonomy is "simply an acknowledgment that treatment is always 
treatment of a person with values and beliefs, and that it must take these into account if it is 
to remain humane and respectful of human dignity." 10 The third moral principle is justice. 
Christians maintain that charity enters the very definition of justice. For McCormick, 
if we define justice simply as the habit that inclines one to render to another 
his or her due, we have disengaged it from the subject and from that which 
confers its complete Christian intelligibility. We have conceptualized it with 
no reference to the Christian context. 11 
Created in the image of God, all persons are radically equal before God. 12 As social beings 
who are interrelated and interdependent, we must realize that decisions we make or that are 
made for us have a profound impact on family and society. Therefore, justice as the 
mediation of charity, ought to incorporate both familial and social factors when determining 
the best interests for a never-competent patient. Finally, there are the moral principles of 
beneficence and nonmaleficence. Beneficence involves duties to prevent harm, remove 
harm, and promote the good of another person. Nonmaleficence prohibits the infliction of 
9McCormick, "The Moral Right To Privacy," How Brave A New World?, 369. 
10McCormick, The Critical Calling, 365. Emphasis in the original. 
11McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 36. 
12For a more detailed theological analysis, refer to Chapter Two, McCormick's 
Theological Anthropology section above. 
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harm, injury, or death upon others. These are companion moral principles that are derived 
from the idea that one should maximize the benefits for a patient, and minimize the harms. 
This is accomplished when both of these principles are rooted in charity. 
This chapter will examine and analyze each of McCormick's four moral criterion. 
However, the bulk of this section will center on his quality-of-life criterion based on a 
normative understanding of the "best interests" of a never-competent neonate, because this 
criterion has evolved into McCormick's primary criterion for moral decision-making 
regarding treatment decisions for defective neonates. Finally, this chapter will examine and 
analyze the criticisms directed against McCormick's moral criteria. This chapter will deviate 
from the structure of the earlier chapters by not presenting any practical implications of 
McCormick's moral criteriology. The reason for this is that chapter five will be a complete 
examination and analysis of how McCormick's moral criteriology is applied to the four 
diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates. 
McCormick's Ethical Criteria 
As a "revised" natural law ethicist in the Catholic tradition, McCormick has always 
sought a balanced middle course between extreme positions--a course which he understands 
as characteristic of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. 13 This tendency holds true in his 
13McCormick uses as an example the traditional Christian obligation to preserve 
life. He argues that the Christian tradition "has always strived to maintain a middle 
course between two extremes: medical-moral utopianism, i.e., sustaining life at all costs 
and with all means because when life is over everything is over and death is an absolute 
end, and its opposite, medical-moral pessimism, i.e., there is no point in sustaining life if 
it is accompanied by suffering, lack of function, etc. Both of these extremes are basic 
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understanding of moral criteriology. McCormick believes that few, if any, physicians are 
willing to make substantive criteria when it comes to treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. On the other hand, moral theologians, in their concern to avoid total normlessness 
and arbitrariness, can easily become quite dogmatic. 14 Between the two extremes of sheer 
concretism and dogmatism, McCormick argues that there is a middle course that entails 
substantive criteria to assist decision-makers regarding treatment decisions for defective 
neonates. For McCormick, a moral criterion is not to be viewed as a slide rule that makes 
decisions. It is far less than that. He argues: 
It is more like a light in a room, a light that allows the individual objects to 
be seen in the fullness of their context. Concretely, ifthere are certain infants 
whom we agree ought to be saved in spite of illness or deformity, and if there 
are certain infants whom we agree should be allowed to die, then there is a 
line to be drawn. And if there is a line to be drawn, there ought to be some 
criteria, even if very general, for doing this. 15 
McCormick's moral criteria for decision-making, functioning both in terms of the 
discernment process and the judgment of the rightness and wrongness of actions, have gone 
through four distinct stages of development. Each moral criterion will be analyzed generally 
and, when McCormick further specifies his criterion, there will be a further analysis of the 
appropriate guidelines, norms, and moral principles. The "reasonable person" criterion will 
devaluations of human life because they remove life from the context which gives it its 
ultimate significance. The middle path is a recognition of the facts that human life is a 
basic value, the most basic value, because it is the foundation for all other values and 
achievements, but that life is not the absolute good and death the ultimate and absolute 
evil." McCormick, "A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' Criteria For Sustaining Life," 76. 
14McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 342. 
15Ibid., 342-343. 
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be analyzed first, not because it was the first to be used but because it is the only one of the 
four that McCormick has completely abandoned. 
The "reasonable person standard" attempts to determine what a reasonable person in 
a normative sense would want in a particular situation. It became the basis for how 
McCormick determined substituted judgments for never-competent patients. McCormick 
borrowed the notion of "reasonable person" from ethicist Robert Veatch. 16 Veatch's 
interpretation of a reasonable person is based on the "reasonable man" standard in tort law. 17 
James Walter argues that McCormick makes several assumptions that ground the possibility 
of constructing and employing the "reasonable person standard." Walter writes: 
First, he assumes a normative social anthropology which views our well-
being as necessarily linked to the pursuit and attainment of fundamental 
16For a more detailed analysis ofVeatch's interpretation of the "reasonable person 
standard," see Robert Veatch, Death. Dying And The Biological Revolution (New Haven, 
CT.: Yale University Press, 1976). 
17In tort law, the whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard 
of behavior. The standard of conduct which the community demands must be an external 
and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular 
actor; and it must be, so far as possible, the same for all persons, since the law can have 
no favorites. At the same time, it must make proper allowance for the risk apparent to the 
actor, for his or her capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under which he or she 
must act. The courts have dealt with this very difficult problem by citing a fictitious 
person, who never has existed on land or sea: the "reasonable man of ordinary prudence." 
Sometimes he is described as a reasonable man, or a prudent man, or a man of average 
prudence, or a man of ordinary sense using ordinary care and skill. The actor is required 
to do what such an ideal individual would do in his place. A model of all proper 
qualities, with only those shortcomings and weaknesses which the community will 
tolerate on the occasion, "this excellent but odious character stands like a monument in 
our Courts of Justice, vainly appealing to his fellow-citizens to order their lives after his 
own example." For a more detailed analysis of the "reasonable man standard" in tort law, 
see W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser And Keeton On The Law Of Torts, 5th ed. (St. Paul, 
MN.: West Publishers, 1984), 149-180. 
goods for ourselves and others. Second, he assumes that we can know the 
morally good and that such insights are available in principle to everyone. 
Third, he assumes that the "reasonable" in a normative sense is not arbitrary 
but objective, i.e., it is not concerned with frivolous or eccentric desires or 
what we might desire when we commit sin. 18 
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For McCormick, there must be a standard that is objectively reasonable. He writes, 
"otherwise there would be no standard against which we could identify the eccentric, the 
idiosyncratic, the wrongful."19 McCormick makes the assumption that most people are 
reasonable, and as such they will choose what is in their or others' best interests. 20 
However, he does recognize that not all people are reasonable nor do all people want always 
to act reasonably. McCormick's understanding of the "reasonable person standard" is very 
similar to how tort law understands the "reasonable man." This does not mean that the 
"reasonable person" is an actual person. It is an ideal, not unlike Veatch' s ideal observer 
theory. 21 McCormick argues that the "reasonable person standard" "is an appeal to what 
18James J. Walter, "A Public Policy Opinion On The Treatment Of Severely 
Handicapped Newborns," 243; see also McCormick, "The Rights Of The Voiceless," 
How Brave A New World?, 109. 
19McCormick, "The Rights Of The Voiceless," How Brave A New World?, 109. 
20McCormick writes: "I believe the broad lines of what is in our best interests is 
available to human insight and reasoning--that is, there are certain actions objectively 
destructive or promotive of us as persons. Furthermore, I believe that such perceptions 
should form the basis on which we build our judgments about what is in the best interests 
of incompetent persons." Ibid., 108. 
21For a more detailed analysis of the "ideal observer theory," see Robert Veatch, A 
Theory Of Medical Ethics (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1981 ), 116-118; see also 
Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism And The Ideal Observer," Philosophy And 
Phenomenological Research 12 (March 1952): 326. Roderick Firth was the first to 
originate the "ideal observer theory." Firth defines the statement "Xis right" and "X 
would be approved by an ideal observer who is omniscient, omnipercipient, disinterested, 
dispassionate, and otherwise normal." Here Firth is taking the view that knowledge that is 
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most of us, in similar circumstances would do--as reasonable people--with healthy outlooks 
on the meaning of life and death. "22 As reasonable people, persons should act in the same 
way under similar conditions. For McCormick, this means that there is a normative set of 
insights that all reasonable persons can know. This mutually-related set of theoretic and 
practical insights originate in the interplay between concrete experience and thoughtful 
reflection, and they are constantly open to further correction in this interplay. This set of 
insights comes closest to an approximation of what any reasonable person can know at any 
given time of the objective moral order based upon the nature of persons.23 To determine 
what is objectively valuable for a person in a particular situation requires some kind of 
empirical means of evaluation. For McCormick, "that would be asking what is reasonably 
seen as objectively valuable by a reasonable person. "24 
McCormick's understanding of the "reasonable person standard" is grounded in his 
theological anthropology. As pilgrim people, persons are subject to the human conditions 
of sinfulness and finitude. 25 Thus, we can never know with absolute or metaphysical 
mediated by our perceptions of reality is something that we obtain under certain kinds of 
conditions. Stating the conditions under which we obtain particular perceptions will 
define what we mean by a particular word that we use to identify some part of the real 
world. For a more detailed analysis, see Arthur J. Dyck, On Human Care: An 
Introduction To Ethics (Nashville, TN.: Abingdon, 1977), 141-15 5. 
22McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New 
World?, 409. 
23Walter, "A Public Policy Opinion," 243. 
24McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1981Through1984, 35. Emphasis in 
the original. 
25For a more detailed analysis of this theological grounding, refer to Chapter Two, 
244 
certitude what is required of us in any particular situation. But this does not mean that we 
cannot know, as reasonable persons, the general moral requirements and their limits that all 
human persons are subject to with probable certitude. James Walter argues that 
McCormick's notion of the "reasonable person standard" is a 
heuristic way of expressing those moral requirements and their limits which 
impinge upon us all as persons. Because our moral reasons are historically 
conditioned, the set of normative insights can fluctuate between advance and 
decline depending upon our/society's historical-cultural situation.26 
For McCormick, the "reasonable person standard" is a formal criterion. However. 
it does not specify the actual guidelines or norms that reasonable people would use in making 
moral decisions. It is the root of and the justification for both hypothetical substituted 
judgments and guardian substituted judgments. 27 As a formal criterion, the "reasonable 
person standard" guides the human person on both the requirements and the limits of moral 
obligation. McCormick writes: "The judgment of reasonable people is not constitutive of 
the rightness of a decision. It is merely confirmatory that the criterion is close to the mark. "28 
By this McCormick correctly means that 
McCormick's Theological Anthropology section above. 
26Walter, '"A Public Policy Opinion," 243. 
27Hypothetical substituted judgments are defined as those which judge what 
would be chosen or decided by a person who for some reason lacks the capacity de facto 
to make a decision in a given case. On the other hand, guardian substituted judgments 
objectively assess what constitutes a person's best interests all things considered. For a 
more detailed analysis, see Edmund N. Santurri and William Werpehowski, "Substituted 
Judgment And the Terminally-Ill Incompetent,'~ Thou~ht 57 (December 1982): 484-501; 
see also Walter, "A Public Policy Opinion," note 19, 244. 
28McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New 
World?, 409. Emphasis in the original. 
if the situation is such that most or very many of us would not want life-
preserving treatment in that condition, it would be morally prudent 
(reasonable) to conclude that life-preserving treatment is not morally required 
for this particular patient. But once again, it is not the consensus that 
constitutes the reasonableness. Rather, reasonable people can be presumed 
to be drawing the line on the kind of life being preserved at the right place--in 
the best overall interests of the patient. 29 
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As a "revised" natural law ethicist, McCormick presumes that most people will come to the 
same conclusions, because he has assumed that most people are or want to approximate 
reasonableness. Therefore, the consensus of reasonable people confirms what would be 
objectively valuable for the never-competent patient in a particular condition. 
The major problem with McCormick's "reasonable person standard" is that the actual 
criterion or standard lacks clarity. The reason for this is that as a moral criterion its 
foundation is too general. Both Veatch's interpretation of the "reasonable person standard" 
and the original interpretation in tort law are vague. After being criticized that the 
"reasonable person standard" was too vague and too subjective, McCormick abandoned it 
as a moral criterion. He did so in a very subtle way without any explanation or justification, 
which has become somewhat typical of his style. 30 Even though he abandoned the 
"reasonable person standard" as a moral criterion, McCormick continues to place great 
29lbid., 410. Emphasis in the original. 
30After reviewing his ''Notes On Moral Theology" in Theolo~ical Studies, one 
becomes accustomed to the fact that McCormick becomes attached to a particular notion 
that he has read about, will take it into consideration for a brief period of time,- and then 
abandons it without explanation or justification. There are numerous examples, such as: 
the association of basic good, the reasonable person standard, etc. 
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emphasis on the reasonableness of the human person.31 
McCormick's second moral criterion is proportionate reason. For him, proportionate 
reason "is a general term for those characteristics of an action that allow us to conclude that, 
even though the action involves nonmoral evil, it is morally justifiable when compared to the 
only alternative (its omission)."32 It refers to both a specific value and its relation to all 
elements, including nonmoral evils in the action. 33 The rules for proportionate reason were 
first proposed in McCormick's Pere Marquette Lecture in 1973, "Ambiguity In Moral 
Choice," and subsequently reworked in response to criticisms of his first effort. The 
substance of the criterion is as follows: First, the means used will not cause more harm than 
necessary to achieve the value. Second, no less harmful way exists at present to protect the 
value. Third, the means used to achieve the value will not undermine it. 34 Proportionate 
reason defines what a person is doing in a particular action. One must consider the 
proportionate relationship of the material action and the intention in the total set of essential 
circumstances. Like other proportionalists, McCormick began to view the human act as a 
structural unity; therefore, one cannot isolate the object of an act and morally appraise it 
apart from the other components of the unified action. McCormick writes: 
31For an example of how McCormick continues to emphasize the 
"reasonableness" of the human person, see McCormick, "Life And Preservation," 
Theological Studies 42 (1981): 100-110. 
32McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 232-233. 
33Walter, "Proportionate Reason And Its Three Levels Oflnquiry," 32. 
34For a more detailed analysis, see McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 
193-267; see also Gula, Reason Informed By Faith, 273-275. 
This means that the concrete moral norms that we develop to guide human 
conduct and communicate human convictions and experience to others are 
conclusions of and vehicles for a larger, more general assertion: in situations 
of conflict, where values are copresent and mutually exclusive, the reasonable 
thing is to avoid, all things considered, the greater evil or, positively stated, 
to do the greater good. This means, of course, that we may permit evil in our 
conduct only when evil caused or permitted is, all things considered, the 
lesser evil in the circumstances. In other words, we may cause a premoral 
evil only when there is a truly proportionate reason.35 
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For McCormick, causing certain disvalues does not ipso facto make a particular action 
morally wrong. A particular action becomes morally wrong when, all things considered, 
there is no proportionate reason justifying it. 36 For McCormick, proportionate reason serves 
as a moral criterion to determine the moral rightness and wrongness of an action. 37 
Proportionate reason became the main moral criterion McCormick used for 
determining if there is a sufficient reason for treating a never-competent patient. For 
McCormick, medical treatments should be provided that are proportionate to the patient's 
condition and are beneficial and promotive of the whole person. Without explanation or 
justification, this notion of the good of the whole person gradually became central to 
McCormick's understanding of the moral criterion governing treatment decisions. The 
criterion of proportionate reason was not abandoned. Rather, it appears to have been 
synthesized into a new moral criterion, which is the person "integrally and adequately 
35McCormick, "The New Medicine And Morality," 315-316. Emphasis in the 
original. 
36McCormick, The Critical Calling, 134. 
37F or a detailed historical analysis of the proportionalism debate and 
McCormick's involvement, refer to Chapter Three, McCormick's Dual Moral 
Epistemology section above. 
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considered. "38 
McCormick's third moral criterion is "integral personalism" or what he refers to as 
the person "integrally and adequately considered." The move away from neo-scholasticism 
that characterized so much of Vatican II brought with it this "methodological shift" to 
personalism. 39 McCormick argues that the importance of this criterion can scarcely be 
overstated. He writes: "If the person 'integrally and adequately considered' is the criterion 
for rectitude, it means that a different (from traditional) type of evidence is required for our 
assessment of human actions. "40 Here again, McCormick is referring to a moral criterion to 
decide the moral rightness and wrongness of an action. The nature of the whole human 
person now becomes McCormick's objective criterion. Proportionate reason becomes the 
"tool" or device for determining what is promotive or destructive of the good of the human 
person "integrally and adequately considered." The source of this criterion can be found in 
both Vatican II and St. Thomas Aquinas.41 
McCormick's understanding of the human person "integrally and adequately 
considered" builds upon the anthropology of Vatican II, but one can also infer from his 
38For a more detailed analysis of what brought about this shift, refer to Chapter 
Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section above. 
39McCormick, The Critical Calling, 156. 
40Ibid. 
41For a more detailed analysis of how the source of McCormick's criterion of the 
person "integrally and adequately considered" can be found in the Vatican II document 
"The Pastoral Constitution On The Church In The Modern World, and in the writings of 
Thomas Aquinas, refer to Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section 
above. 
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writings that he has adopted Louis Janssens' concept of the human person. Janssens' 
concept of the human person seeks to understand the human person in all his or her essential 
aspects.42 To base moral evaluation on the nature of the whole person means to consider not 
only the individual person, but to consider the person and his or her relations to the world, 
to others, to social groups, and to God. This will have direct implications for McCormick 
in regard to treatment decisions for never-competent patients. Not only must he consider the 
good of the never-competent patient, but he must also consider social and familial factors. 43 
The moral criterion of the human person "integrally and adequately considered" calls 
for an inductive approach, which is committed to the relevance of human experience, the 
sciences, and personal reflection. Therefore, actions that undermine the person "integrally 
and adequately considered" are morally wrong. Actions which are judged to be promotive 
and supportive of the human person in the sum of his or her essential dimensions are morally 
right.44 Gradually this criterion also became translated into a normative understanding of the 
42Janssens' lists eight essential aspects of the human person. For a more detailed 
analysis, refer to Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section above. 
43To understand what McCormick means by the person "integrally and adequately 
considered" it is helpful to examine the American Fertility Society's "Ethical 
Considerations Of The New Reproductive Technologies." McCormick states that he takes 
full responsibility for its use in this document. The document states: '"Integrally and 
adequately' refers to the sum of dimensions of the person that constitute human well-
being: bodily health; intellectual and spiritual well-being, which includes the freedom to 
form one's own convictions on important moral and religious questions; and social well-
being in all its forms: familial, economic, political, international and religious." 
McCormick, "Surrogacy: A Catholic Perspective," Corrective Vision, 202; see also 
American Fertility Society, "Fertility And Sterility," Supplement 2 53, no. 6 (1990): 1 S. 
44McCormick, Corrective Vision, 202. 
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"best interests" of the patient. 
McCormick's fourth criterion of morality in determining treatment decisions for 
never-competent patients is his quality-of-life criterion, which he identifies with the category 
of the patient's "best interests." This is a patient-centered, teleological assessment of what 
is considered to be in the "best interests" of the patient. On initial examination it may appear 
that the criterion for decision-making is the "best interests" standard. However, after 
examining the writings of McCormick, I am convinced that his quality-of-life criterion is 
really a further specification of his normative understanding of a patient's "best interests. "45 
Initially, McCormick argued that there are only two test formulations for determining 
moral decisions for the incompetent: the hypothetical test and the best interests test. For 
McCormick, these two tests are interrelated. In fact, he argues later that there is really only 
one test or criterion that can be applied to never-competent patients and that is the "best 
interests test."46 McCormick has a normative understanding of "best interests" because, "as 
social beings, our good, our flourishing (therefore, our best interests) is inextricably bound 
45Robert Weir disagrees with McCormick. Weir believes that the quality-of-life 
criterion and best interests criterion are distinct and separate. McCormick responds to 
Weir by stating: "I believe Weir is wrong when he asserts that for those who use quality-
of-life assessments, 'it is not necessary to consider the best interests of the neonate.' It is 
precisely because one is focused on best interests that qualitative considerations cannot be 
ignored but indeed are central. Weir is clearly afraid that quality-of-life considerations 
will be unfair. But they need not be. It all depends on where the line is drawn. I am all 
the more convinced of the inseparable unity and general overlap of best interests and 
quality-of-life considerations when I study Weir's clinical applications of his ethical 
criteria." McCormick, review of Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, by 
Robert Weir, in Perspectives In Biology And Medicine 29 (Winter 1986): 328. 
46McCormick, "The Rights Of The Voiceless," How Brave A New World?, 112. 
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up with the well-being of others."47 James Walter believes that two things need to be noted 
about McCormick's understanding of "best interests." Walter writes: 
First, "best interests" are normatively defined in terms of those fundamental 
values to which our natural tendencies incline us. As we have seen, our 
openness to and pursuit of these values enable us to share in human 
flourishing, i.e., the summum bonum. Second, McCormick places his 
definition squarely within the context of his social anthropology. Thus, "best 
interests" include, in part at least, the family's interests, since the newbom's 
interests are most intimately bound up with those upon whom it must rely.48 
Initially, McCormick's "best interest" standard was determined by the "reasonable 
person standard." McCormick writes: 
The standard for treating incompetents is to discover whether the treatment 
would be objectively valuable for a patient in that condition. In order to 
determine this, we have to resort to some empirical means. For me, that 
would be asking what is reasonably seen as objectively valuable by a 
reasonable person. It is the "best interests" standard controlled by the 
"reasonable person" standard that Veatch and I proposed . . . "Best interests" 
as controlled by the "reasonable person" standard may permit a range. But 
a range is not necessarily subjective.49 
The construction of the "reasonable person standard" allowed McCormick to understand 
47lbid., 101. McCormick argues: "That is one reason why, for instance, a long 
Christian (in this case Catholic) tradition has held it to be morally acceptable for an 
individual to forego expensive life-saving medical treatment if such treatment would 
exhaust family savings, plunge the family into poverty, and deprive other members of the 
family of, for example, educational opportunity. In such an instance, it would be in the 
best interests of the ill individual because his best interests include his family." Ibid. For 
a more detailed analysis on the Catholic tradition on the duty to preserve life, see 
McCormick and John Paris, "The Catholic Tradition On The Use Of Nutrition And 
Fluids," America 156 (May 2, 1987): 356-361. 
48Walter, "A Public Policy Opinion," 245. 
49McCormick, "Life And Its Preservation," Theolo~ical Studies 42 (1981 ): 108. 
Emphasis in the original. 
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"best interests" normatively.50 However, once this standard was criticized for being 
subjective and utilitarian in nature, McCormick abandoned it. 51 Despite this set back, 
McCormick remained committed to the possibility of formulating a consensus about what 
constitutes the "best interests" of patients. 
Three factors influenced McCormick to propose his quality-of-life criterion as a 
further specification or basis of his normative understanding of a patient's "best interests." 
The first was a conscious decision on McCormick's part in 1983 to write in the area of 
bioethics and to do so from a theological perspective. After 1983, McCormick introduces 
a new moral epistemology at the level of synderesis. 52 The affections informed by the 
Christian story create certain dispositions within the Christian person. He argues that "such 
dispositions will prepare us and incline us to seek out the best interests of the child. "53 The 
Christian story influences not only personal dispositions, but also moral judgments in a 
50Walter writes: "Thus, this test must necessarily exclude all eccentric wants and 
preferences as well as all sinful desires. Only those desires that incline us to the 
fundamental goods and conform to the objective hierarchy of values are included in and 
interpreted by the reasonable person standard. What McCormick means when he says 
that most people are or desire to be reasonable is that most people seek what is in their 
best interests." Walter, "A Public Policy Opinion," 245-246; see also McCormick, "The 
Rights Of The Voiceless," How Brave A New World?, 105 and 110. 
51Ramsey was one of McCormick's major critics in regard to using the 
"reasonable person standard" as the basis for "best interests." In contrast, Ramsey 
argues that his "medical indications policy" is more objective. See Paul Ramsey, 
"Euthanasia And Dying Well," Linacre Quarterly 44 (1977); Idem, "Prolonged Dying: 
Not Medically Indicated," Hastings Center Report 6 (February 1976). 
52F or a more detailed analysis of this moral epistemology, refer to Chapter Three, 
McCormick's Dual Moral Epistemology section, Second Moral Epistemology--After 
1983 subsection above. 
53McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 20. 
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rather general way. This new moral epistemology establishes a context in which human 
reason and calculation ought to operate. 54 It is a context that prevents the absolutization of 
life, and allows decision-makers to make treatment decisions for never-competent patients 
based on "best interests" that will now include some consideration of future quality of life. 
The second influence on McCormick's decision to include some consideration of 
future quality of life in determining the "best interests" of a patient was the controversy that 
Judge Robert Meade created in the Brother Joseph Charles Fox case.55 Judge Meade rejected 
a substituted judgment approach that had been previously accepted in the Quinlan case and 
the Saikewicz case.56 Meade argued that "by its very nature the right to decline life-saving 
treatment can be exercised by the individual alone, for it is a right of the individual to make 
up his or her own mind. "57 McCormick understood this ruling to have dire consequences for 
never-competent patients. McCormick points out that: 
54lbid. 
550n October 2, 1979, Brother Fox, an eighty-three year-old member of the 
Society of Mary religious order, underwent hernia surgery. During the surgery he 
suffered severe cardiorespiratory arrest, which resulted in diffuse cerebral and brain-stem 
anoxia. Brother Fox lost spontaneous respiration and had to be maintained on a 
respirator. His physicians concluded he was in a "persistent vegetative state." Rev. 
Philip K. Eichner, religious superior for Brother Fox, after consulting his only surviving 
relatives (ten nieces and nephews), requested removal of the respirator. For a more 
detailed analysis of this case, see McCormick, "The Preservation Of Life And Self-
Determination," How Brave A New World?, 381. 
56For a detailed analysis of the Quinlan case, see McCormick, "The Moral Right 
To Privacy," How Brave A New World?, 362-371. For a detailed analysis of the 
Saikewicz case, see Idem, "The Case Of Joseph Saikewicz," How Brave A New World?, 
372-380. 
57lbid., 383. Emphasis in the original. 
If Judge Meade disallows substituted judgment in cases of perpetual 
incompetency such as Saikewicz (he refers to any attempt to discern the 
actual interests and preferences of Saikewicz as "a ritualistic exercise, 
necessarily doomed to failure"), it is clear a fortiori that he would have to do 
the same for infants. That would imply that no dying infant could ever be 
withdrawn from life-sustaining equipment if such equipment could continue 
to keep that life going--regardless of condition or prognosis. This seems to 
us at odds with humane medical practice and good morality. 58 
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McCormick understood Judge Meade's ruling to have "driven a wedge between true best 
interests and personal desires, favored the latter as the basis of treatment, and left 
certification of these desires in the hands of the nearest kin. "59 For McCormick, this would 
leave open the possibility for abuse in determining what are the "best interests" for a never-
competent patient. As a result, McCormick proposed a quality-of-life criterion to assist 
decision-makers in discerning treatment decisions for never-competent patients. 
The third influence was McCormick's belief that the quality-of-life criterion best 
summarizes what the Catholic tradition meant by the ordinary/extraordinary means 
distinction. Decisions about medical treatment and life-preservation have for years been 
formulated in terms of what has been called "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means.60 
McCormick argues that the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction has always focused on 
the means necessary to sustain life, which implies a quality of life orientation. McCormick 
581bid., 384. Emphasis in the original. 
59lbid. 
60McCormick writes: "If the means could be characterized as 'extraordinary,' 
there is no obligation per se for the patient to use them, or for those with proxy rights 
(such as parents) to decide to use them for incompetents. If, all things considered, they 
were to be characterized as 'ordinary,' they were seen as obligatory." McCormick, "The 
Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New World?, 394. 
writes: 
But often enough it is the kind of, the quality of life thus saved (painful, 
poverty-stricken and deprived, away from home and friends, oppressive) that 
establishes the means as extraordinary. That type of life would be an 
excessive hardship for the individual. It would distort and jeopardize his 
grasp on the over-all meaning of life. 61 
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The sophistication of contemporary medicine obviates the need to consider the means used 
to sustain life and places the judgmental burden on the hope of benefit for the patient or the 
quality of life involved. 62 For McCormick, the quality-of-life criterion is a 
reconceptualization of the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction in order to address new 
medical circumstances so that it can be used to assist the appropriate decision-makers in 
determining which treatments are in the "best interests" of never-competent patients. 
Due to the fact that the notion of "best interests" is so central to treatment decisions 
for the never-competent, there are three elements of the notion that McCormick underlines 
because he believes they can be easily obscured. These three elements are: 
First, there is the danger of the determination. The key danger is that the 
concerns of parent, physician, and hospital will be allowed to play too early 
and too decisive a role in determining the child's best interests. Second, there 
is the difficulty of the determination of best interests. Medical uncertainties 
and contingencies head the list of factors that constitute this difficulty. 
Decisions must be made at the very time when prognoses are most 
problematic. Third, there is the depth of the notion of best interests.63 
61McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 347. Emphasis 
in the original. 
62McCormick, "A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' Criteria For Sustaining Life," 
78. 
63For a more detailed analysis of these three aspects, see McCormick, "The Best 
Interests Of The Baby," 21-22. Emphasis in the original. 
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To make his notion of"best interests" more specific and objective, McCormick incorporates 
Edmund Pellegrino' s four components of "best interests" into his own interpretation. 64 
McCormick believes that the most informed moral decision should attend to all four 
components. The following is McCormick's interpretation of Pellegrino's four components: 
( 1) Medical good. This refers to the effects of medical intervention on the 
natural history of the disease being treated, to what can be achieved by 
application of medical knowledge: cure, containment, prevention, 
amelioration, prolongation of life. This good can vary. 
(2) Patient preferences. The scientifically correct (medically good) decision 
must be placed within the context of a patient's life situation or value system. 
Thus to be good in this sense a decision must square with what the patient 
thinks worthwhile. 
(3) The good of the human as human. This refers to the good proper to 
humans as humans. Pellegrino notes that this is philosophically debatable: 
among the various values associated with this good are freedom, rationality, 
consciousness, and the capacity for creativity. One thing is not debated: 
unique to humans is the very capacity to make choices, to set a life plan. 
This capacity is frustrated if choice is not free. To be treated as humans 
includes being accorded the dignity of choosing what we believe to be good. 
Therefore, all other things being equal, a treatment that preserves the capacity 
to choose is to be preferred to one that does not. In this sense it is the 
patient's best interests. 
( 4) The good of last resort. This is the good that gathers all others, is their 
base and explanation. It gives life ultimate meaning. It will or should inform 
and explain patient preferences and life plans. 65 
64For a more detailed analysis, see Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., "Moral Choice, 
The Good Of The Patient And The Patient's Good," in Ethics And Critical Care 
Medicine, ed. J.C. Moskop and L. Kopelman (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1985), 
117-138. 
65McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 115-116. 
Emphasis in the original. It should be noted that for both Pellegrino and McCormick 
there is a hierarchy to these four components. When dealing with situations of conflict 
the good of last resort takes preference over the good of the human as human, the good of 
the human as human takes preference over patient preference, and patient preference 
takes preference over medical good. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, "Moral Choice, The 
Good Of The Patient, And The Patient's Good," in Ethics And Critical Care Medicine, 
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The fourth component of McCormick's notion of "best interests" serves as the foundation 
for his quality-of-life criterion. McCormick argues: 
With the always incompetent (and babies are included here), it is this good 
that will undergird the judgment of best interests simply because the second 
and third components are irrelevant to babies. And this only complicates 
matters, for reasonable persons may have differing theologies, differing 
conceptions of last resort. 66 
It is the "good of last resort" that should inform the appropriate decision-makers what the 
never-competent patient ought to want in a particular situation. For McCormick, '"best 
interests,' being a dangerous, difficult, and profound notion, will involve elements of the 
intuitive, the imaginative, and the unexplainable. That is because we are dealing with a 
humanjudgment, not a straight-forward scientific one."67 McCormick understood that the 
same could also be said about his quality-of-life criterion. Nonetheless, McCormick is 
committed to the possibility of hammering out some consensus about quality oflife.68 Such 
117-138. 
66McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 23. McCormick gives two 
examples how belief systems play a role in decision-making. He writes: "For example, 
the Orthodox Jew may regard every moment of life as precious, as absolute. For the 
Catholic, physical existence is relativized by the death-resurrection motif. The 
accumulation of minutes is not the Catholic criterion of dying well. Therefore, I might be 
willing to say 'enough' somewhat sooner than others when dealing with problems of life-
prolongation. Second, with the always incompetent patient, it will be this good that will 
undergird the judgment of 'best interests.' Therefore judgments of best interests may 
differ. Reasonable persons may have differing theologies. For instance, with my beliefs, 
I could easily conclude that chemotherapy was not in Saikewicz's best interests. Some 
one else could disagree, and with plausibility, because of a different good of last resort." 
Ibid.; and McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 116. 
67McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 23. 
68Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," 94. 
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a consensus must be both based in reason and rooted in the Christian context. 
McCormick's quality-of-life criterion is a synthesis of both the proportionate reason 
criterion and the criterion of the person "integrally and adequately considered." He 
understands "quality of life" to be an elusive term whose meaning varies according to 
context.69 However, at a more profound level, when the issue is preserving human life, the 
term assumes a more basic meaning. McCormick writes: 
Just as life itself is a condition for any other value or achievement, so certain 
characteristics of life are the conditions for the achievement of other values. 
We must distinguish between two sets of conditions: those that allow us to 
do things well, easily, comfortably, and efficiently, and those that allow us 
to do them at all. 70 
To assist McCormick in making quality-of-life judgments, he uses proportionate reason as 
a '"tool" for establishing what is promotive or destructive for the good of the whole person. 
This synthesis of proportionate reason and the person "integrally and adequately considered" 
assists McCormick in determining what is an acceptable quality of life on the basis of the 
never-competent patient's "best interests." For him, "judgments about the preservation of 
life increasingly are made in terms of quality of life, i.e., procedures are extraordinary or 
ordinary according to their capacity to give a patient a certain 'level' of life."71 
McCormick's quality-of-life criterion respects not only the value of the whole person, but 
69For example, quality of life can mean a clean environment, free of industrial 
pollution; moderate temperatures and humidity; the absence of excessive noise; or 
efficient traffic patterns. McCormick, "A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' Criteria For 




it affirms that respect for the human person entails considering all the relevant factors and 
circumstances that are involved in any situation. 
McCormick understands the difficulties in trying to establish a perfectly rational 
criterion for making quality-of-life judgments. However, he believes, "we must never cease 
trying--in fear and trembling--to be sure. Otherwise we have exempted these decisions in 
principle from the one critique and control that protects against abuse. Exemption of this sort 
is the root of all exploitation, whether personal or political."72 To make his quality-of-life 
criterion more concrete, McCormick will establish two guidelines and four norms that will 
further specify his criterion. 73 McCormick will also utilize moral principles to help clarify 
and specify his quality-of-life criterion. These moral principles will be highlighted as they 
impact on the quality-of-life criterion. 
The first guideline that specifies McCormick's quality-of-life criterion is the potential 
for human relationships associated with the infant's condition. The second, which is a 
further specification of the first, is the benefit/burden calculus. Both guidelines demonstrate 
the commonsense basis of McCormick's natural law reasoning and how it creatively 
connects with the Catholic moral tradition, relating it both to religious commitment and to 
a reasonable hierarchy ofvalues.74 To understand McCormick's quality-of-life criterion both 
72McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 343-344. 
73 A guideline for McCormick is a general and fundamental "standard" that serves 
to specify his normative criterion. A norm is more specific to contexts and more 
restricted in scope. A norm seeks to specify in content what the guideline requires. 
74Lisa Sowle Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," 91. 
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to withhold treatment and allow the patient to die.78 McCormick claims this quality-of-life 
approach has its foundation in the traditional ordinary/extraordinary means distinction that 
was later clarified by Pius XII.79 McCormick has never claimed that this is an easy guideline 
to apply, especially in the case of never-competent patients. He also understands that some 
bioethicists will want to continue to use the extraordinary means language to justify not 
treating particular defective neonates. McCormick believes this is fair, but he adds a caution. 
He argues that 
writes: 
they should realize that the term "extraordinary" has been so relativized to the 
condition of the patient that it is this condition that is decisive. The means 
is extraordinary because the infant's condition is extraordinary. And if that 
is so, we must face the fact head-on--and discover the substantive standard 
that allows us to say this of some infants, but not others. 80 
To make this point clear, McCom1ick attaches four caveats to this first guideline. He 
First, this guideline is not a detailed rule that pre-empts decisions; for 
relational capacity is not subject to mathematical analysis but to human 
judgment. However, it is the task of physicians to provide some more 
concrete categories or presumptive biological symptoms for this human 
78lt should be noted here that the basis of these decisions are found in 
McCormick's theological anthropology, i.e., the meaning of life in love. For a more 
detailed analysis, refer to Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section 
above. 
79McCormick quotes Pius XII as saying that an obligation to use any means 
possible "would be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment of the 
higher, more important good too difficult." Pius XII, "The Prolongation Of Life," Acta 
Avostolicae Sedis 49 ( 1957): 1,031-1,032. McCormick understands Pius XII to say that 
certain treatments may be refused because it would lead to a life that lacks the proper 
quality. Weber, Who Shall Live?, 69. 
80McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 349. 
judgment. Second, because this guideline is precisely that, mistakes will be 
made. Third, it must be emphasized that allowing some infants to die does 
not imply that "some lives are valuable, others not" or that "there is such a 
thing as a life not worth living." Every human being, regardless of age or 
condition, is of incalculable worth. Fourth, this whole matter is further 
complicated by the fact that this decision is being made by someone else.81 
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In essence, this guideline requires that the appropriate decision-makers must be able to 
determine if a minimally accepted "quality of life" can be expected. This determination 
ought to be made on the basis of the never-competent' s "best interests" understood 
normatively. This guideline does not depreciate the value of the never-competent individual 
but affirms that a genuine respect for the person demands attention to the prospects held out 
by continued life.82 
In this first guideline, McCormick argues that the value of the human person is 
affirmed by showing how it is rooted in his theological anthropology. The Christian story 
does not yield concrete answers and fixed rules, but it does yield various perspectives and 
insights that inform human reasoning. One such insight is that human life is a "relative" 
good. McCormick writes: 
The fact that we are (in the Christian story) pilgrims, that Christ has 
overcome death and lives, that we will also live with Him, yields a general 
value judgment on the meaning and value of life as we now live it. It can be 
formulated as follows: life is a basic good but not an absolute one. It is basic 
because it is the necessary source and condition of every human activity and 
of all society. It is not absolute because there are higher goods for which life 
can be sacrificed. 83 
81For a more detailed analysis, see Ibid., 349-350. 
82Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," 91. 
83McCormick, The Critical Calling, 202. 
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Human life is not a value to be preserved in and of itself. It is a value to be preserved as a 
condition for other values, and therefore, as far as these other values remain attainable. Since 
these other values cluster around and are rooted in human relationships, it seems to follow 
that life is a value to be preserved only insofar as it contains a potentiality for human 
relationships. When in human judgment this potentiality is totally absent or would be, 
because of the condition of the individual, totally subordinated to the mere struggle for 
survival, that life can be said to have achieved its potential. 84 
McCormick bases this potential for human relationships in the Catholic tradition. 
The Catholic tradition has always maintained that since life is a relative good, and the duty 
to preserve it is a limited one, then it is not always morally obligatory to use all means to 
preserve human life if a person cannot attain the higher more important good. 85 For 
McCormick, the "higher" more important good is the capacity for relationships of love. The 
core of this guideline is developed from the love commandment found in the New 
Testament. 86 
For McCormick, the love of neighbor is in some real sense the love of God. He 
understands this to mean that: 
The good our love wants to do Him and to which He enables us, can be done 
only for the neighbor, as Karl Rahner has so forcefully argued. It is in others 
84McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 54. 
85McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 345. 
86This is what McCormick means by the principle of charity. It is charity that 
underlines McCormick's first guideline in his quality-of-life criterion. The good that is 
higher than human life is the capacity for relationships of love. 
that God demands to be recognized and loved. If this is true, it means that, 
in Judaeo-Christian perspective, the meaning, substance, and consummation 
of life are found in human relationships, and the qualities of justice, respect, 
concern, compassion, and support that surrounds them. 87 
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The loving and graced relationship or covenant between God and humanity is a metaphor for 
the human person's social and relational nature.88 In this relationship God gives God's love 
freely and waits for a response. McCormick argues that: "Our radical acceptance of God is 
tied to the love of neighbor--a love that secures rights, relieves suffering, promotes growth. 
God is speaking to us in history and we are not free to be uninvolved. "89 If a human person 
is devoid of the possibility of experiencing human love, then that life has achieved its 
potential. Lacking the potential for human relationship does not mean that this particular 
person is not of incalculable worth. For McCormick it means: 
One can and I believe should say that the person is always of incalculable 
value, but that at some point continuance in physical life offers the person no 
benefit. Indeed, to keep "life" going can easily be an assault on the person 
and his or her dignity. 90 
87McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 346. Emphasis 
in the original. The religious commitment that the love of God is accomplished through 
the love of neighbor can be further specified by Josef Fuchs and Karl Rabner. See Josef 
Fuchs, "Christians Existence And Love Of Neighbor," Personal Responsibility And 
Christian Morality (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983): 28-31; see 
also Karl Rabner, "Reflections On The Unity Of The Love Of Neighbor And The Love 
Of God," Theological Investigations vol 6, 231-249. 
88For a more detailed analysis of the social and relational nature of the human 
person, refer to Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section, Doctrine 
Of Creation subsection above. 
89McCormick, The Critical Calling, 12. 
90McCormick, "Quality Of Life, Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New World?, 
406. Emphasis in the original. 
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Human reason informed by the Christian story prevents the absoluti:zation of life; human life 
is not preserved just for biologic processes. To preserve life in this manner is a form of 
medical vitalism that is rejected by the Judaeo-Christian tradition.91 What the Christian 
context prepares us for both intellectually and psychologically is to say at some point, 
"Enough. "92 For McCormick, it is the "quality" of a person's life that makes its preservation 
not worthwhile to the person. If the "quality" of a patient's life would entail an excessive 
hardship for the patient, then one may be permitted to forgo or withdraw medical treatment. 
To continue treatment or to initiate treatment in this case would not be acting in the patient's 
"best interests."93 This is a quality-of-life judgment and, for McCormick, it is based on the 
91This does not mean that once a decision has been made to forgo treatment that 
the dying person is not treated with dignity and respect. For McCormick, even though a 
person has reached his or her potential and no treatment is recommended, as members of 
society we still have a moral obligation to care for the person while he or she is in the 
dying process. McCormick's position on the dignity of human life is grounded in the 
Christian context and his position on respect for the treatment of preembryos. 
McCormick's position on the preembryo is pertinent because it shows that his respect for 
human life is consistent from conception to death. If McCormick believes we have a 
moral obligation to treat the preembryo, which has the potential for personhood, with 
dignity and respect, then this should support his belief in the moral obligation to care for 
the dying person when the decision to forgo treatment has been made. See McCormick, 
"Who Or What Is The Pre-Embryo?," Kennedy Institute Of Ethics Journal 1 (March 
1991): 1-5; Idem, "The Pre-Embryo As Potential: A Reply To John A. Robertson," 
Kennedy Institute Of Ethics Journal 4 (December 1991): 303-305. Emphasis mine. 
92McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 20. 
93Physical life, the condition of other values, would become itself the ultimate 
value. When this occurs, the value of human life has been distorted out of context. When 
the condition of human life makes it impossible to realize or attain other values, there is 
no reason to preserve such a life. See McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A 
New World?, 348. 
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potential for relationality, not on any arbitrary judgment about the value of a person's life. 94 
This guideline of the potential for human relationships has been criticized for being 
too general and open to possible abuse. McCormick himself stated when he advanced this 
guideline that it had to be further specified. He argues: 
The guideline is general and rather vague. But this is the way it is with all 
moral norms. They really root in general assertions that must be fleshed out 
by experience, modified by discussion and consultation, propped up and 
strengthened by cautions and qualifications. It is in the process of their 
application that moral norms take on added concreteness. 95 
Despite being convinced that this guideline is fundamentally sound, McCormick understood 
that he must further concretize it. Specifically, there are those circumstances when the never-
competent patient has the potential for human relationships, but the underlying medical 
condition is critical and will result in imminent death, or after treatment has been initiated 
it becomes apparent that the treatment is medically futile. In these two situations it is clear 
that, besides the potential for human relationships, McCormick must incorporate an 
additional guideline that can weigh the proportionate and disproportionate benefits of certain 
treatments. 
The second guideline of McCormick's quality-of-life criterion is the benefit/burden 
calculus. McCormick argues: 
Where medical procedures are in question, it is generally admitted that the 
criterion to be used is a benefits/burdens estimate ... The question posed is: 
Will the burden of the treatment outweigh the benefits to the patient? The 
94Weber, Who Shall Live?, 71. 
95McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die: State Of The Questions," America 131 
(October 5, 1974): 171. 
general answer: If the treatment is useless or futile, or it imposes burdens that 
outweigh the benefits, it may be omitted. 96 
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Like his first guideline, McCormick claims the benefit/burden calculus emerges out of the 
ordinary/extraordinary means distinction. He will justify this claim by examining the 
sources of Christian ethics. 
For McCormick, "moral-theological argument gathers all the warrants it can from 
revelation, Christian tradition, human experience, and reasoning in an attempt to lift out what 
appears to be the more human Christian policy."97 He begins his analysis of the 
benefit/burden calculus by examining the Catholic tradition. The Catholic tradition 
maintains that if a medical intervention was judged to be ordinary it was viewed as morally 
mandatory. If extraordinary, it was morally optional. It was said to be ordinary if it offered 
some reasonable hope of benefit for the patient and could be used without excessive 
inconvenience (risk, pain, expense, etc.). If it offered no reasonable hope or benefit or was 
excessively burdensome, it was extraordinary.98 Pope Pius XII further clarified the 
ordinary/extraordinary means distinction when he declared that "we are morally obliged to 
use only ordinary means to preserve life and health--according to circumstances of persons, 
96Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Technology And Morality: The Example Of 
Medicine," New Theolo~y Review 2 (November 1989): 26. 
97McCormick continues by stating: "Where values are concerned, especially basic 
values, we are dealing with something quite original, like color. One can assemble and 
order a convergence of probabilities to persuade to a point of view, but ultimately we can 
only be pointed in the direction and asked to see if it is so or not." McCormick; "To Save 
Or Let Die: State Of The Questions," 171. 
98McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 145. 
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places, times, and culture--that is to say means that do not involve any grave burden for 
oneself or another. "99 Pius XII bases the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary 
means on the idea that human life is a basic good, but a good to be preserved precisely as a 
condition of other values. One must examine the particular situation's circumstances, 
because these circumstances dictate the balance to be considered between life and these other 
values. McCormick also cites ethicist Gerald Kelly, S.J., and his classic interpretation of 
ordinary/extraordinary means distinction in the Catholic tradition. Kelly explains that 
ordinary means of preserving life are all medicines, treatments, and 
operations, which offer a reasonable hope of benefit for the patient and which 
can be obtained and used without excessive expense, pain, or other 
inconvenience. Extraordinary means are all medicines, treatments, and 
operations, which cannot be obtained or used without excessive expense, 
pain, or other inconvenience, or which, if used, would not offer a reasonable 
hope of benefit. 100 
The theological measure of ordinary and extraordinary means clearly focuses on the patient's 
best interests. 101 Only the patient or the patient's proxy can weigh adequately the factors of 
"excessive expense" or "pain." This is the basis for McCormick's claim that his quality-of-
99Pius XII, "The Prolongation Of Life," Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1,032. Pius XII 
continues stating: "A more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most men and 
would render the attainment of the higher, more important good too difficult. Life, 
health, all temporal activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends. On the other 
hand, one is not forbidden to take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve life 
and health, as long as he does not fail in some more serious duty." Ibid. 
100Gerald Kelly, S.J., Medico-Moral Problems (St. Louis, MO.: The Catholic 
Health Association Of The United States And Canada, 1958), 129. Emphasis in the 
original. 
101For a more detailed view of the Catholic tradition's position on the . 
ordinary/extraordinary means distinction, see McCormick & Paris, "The Catholic 
Tradition On The Use Of Nutrition And Fluids," 358-360. 
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life approach is patient-centered. 
McCormick believes that his notion of benefit/burden calculus within his quality-of-
life criterion is a logical development of the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction, or 
what he refers to as an extension of the tradition into new problem areas. 102 McCormick 
believes that the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction has an honorable history and an 
enduring validity. However, he argues that these terms "summarize and promulgate 
judgments drawn on other grounds. It is these 'other grounds' that cry out for 
explication."103 McCormick writes: 
We must admit that the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" are but code 
words. That is, they summarize and are vehicles for other judgments. They 
do not solve problems automatically. Rather they are emotional and mental 
preparations for very personal and circumstantial judgments that must take 
into account the patient's attitudes and value perspectives, or "what the 
patient would have wanted." "Ordinary" and "extraordinary" merely 
summarize other underlying judgments. They say very little in and of 
themselves. 104 
To further explain these "other grounds," McCormick reformulates the 
ordinary/extraordinary means distinction by advancing his benefit/burden calculus. An 
102McCormick writes: "A basic human value is challenged by new circumstances, 
and these circumstances demand that imagination and creativity be employed to devise 
new formulations, a new understanding of this value in light of these new circumstances 
while retaining a basic grasp upon the value. For example, in-vitro fertilization poses 
questions about the meaning of sexuality, parenthood, and the family because it 
challenges their very biological roots." McCormick, "A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' 
Criteria For Sustaining Life," 76. 
103McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 19. 
104McCormick, "A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' Criteria For Sustaining Life," 
77. 
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extraordinary means is one that offers the patient no real benefit, or offers it at a 
disproportionate cost. For McCormick, one is called to make a moral judgment: Does the 
benefit of a proposed medical intervention really outweigh the harm it will inevitably 
concurrently produce? This is a quality-of-life judgment. McCormick argues: "I see no way 
out of some quality-of-life judgments short of imposing survival on all defective newborns 
regardless of their condition and prognosis."105 For McCormick, this is not a departure from 
the Catholic tradition. It is a reformulation of the tradition in order to deal with 
contemporary bioethical problem areas. 106 
The reason for this reformulation of the tradition is that over the centuries the 
ordinary/extraordinary means distinction has become less objective and more relative 
because medicine and technology have become more sophisticated. The medical profession 
is committed to curing disease and preserving life. Today, we have the medical technology 
to make this commitment a reality. However, McCormick argues that "this commitment 
must be implemented within a healthy and realistic acknowledgment that we are mortal."107 
Therefore, McCormick believes that we must reformulate the basic value of human life 
under new circumstances. For many contemporary ethicists the traditional terminology of 
105McCormick, "Life And Its Preservation," 105. Emphasis in the original. 
106McCormick further states that: "It must be remembered that the abiding 
substance of the Church's teaching, its rock bottom so to speak, is not found in the 
ordinary means-extraordinary means terminology. It is found in a basic value judgment 
about the meaning of life and death, one that refuses to absolutize either. It is that 
judgment that we must carry with us as we face the medical decisions that technology 
casts upon us." McCormick, "Technology And Morality," 29. Emphasis in the original. 
107McCormick, The Critical Callin~, 365. 
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ordinary/extraordinary means has outlived its usefulness. McCormick argues there are two 
reasons for this: 
First, the terminology too easily hides the nature of the judgment being made. 
The major reference point in factoring out what is "reasonable" (benefit) and 
"excessive" (burden) is the patient--his or her condition, biography, 
prognosis, and values. The terminology, however, suggests that attention 
should fall on the means in an all too mechanical way. Second, many people 
misinterpret the terms to refer to "what physicians ordinarily do, what is 
customary." This is not what the term means. In their ethical sense, they 
encompass many more dimensions of the situation. 108 
As a result of being misinterpreted these terms have led to excessive abuses. 109 
Focusing on the value of human life, McCormick sought to reformulate the 
ordinary/extraordinary means distinction without abandoning the tradition. For him, 
the theologian's perspective when dealing with the sacredness of life is to 
question traditional concepts in order to maintain continuity, to express value 
insights under new circumstances, and to reword judgmental criteria in a way 
which preserves the tradition and our adhesion to the basic value. 110 
The ordinary/extraordinary means distinction, McCormick realized, could take us only so 
far. Contemporary medical problems no longer only concern those patients for whom 
biological death is imminent. Modem medicine and technology have the ability to keep 
108McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 145. 
109McCormick writes: "Thus, these terms have been badly used in our recent 
history, especially as vehicles for involuntary homicide, and, at the other end, as 
mandates for the fruitless and aimless prolongation of dying." Ibid. 
110To accomplish this McCormick suggests four elements are essential: "first, 
openness to face new facts; second, the freedom to make an honest and sincere mistake; 
third, the honesty to admit an error; and, finally, the humility and courage to try again 
because try we must." McCormick, "A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' Criteria For 
Sustaining Life," 79. 
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almost anyone biologically alive. This has tended gradually to shift the problem from the 
means to reverse the dying process to the quality of life sustained and preserved as the result 
of the application of medical technology. 111 Today, because of the advancements in 
medicine and technology, it is the kind and quality of life thus saved that establishes a means 
as extraordinary. 
To address this shift in the problem from means to quality of life preserved, 
McCormick has reformulated the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction to mean the 
benefit/burden calculus. 112 In this way, McCormick is still trying to maintain the Catholic 
tradition by walking a middle course between medical vitalism and medical pessimism. For 
McCormick, "it is clear that the judgments of burden and benefit are value judgments, moral 
choices. They are judgments in which, all things considered, the continuance of life is either 
called for or not worthwhile to the patient. "113 In making these moral judgments one can see 
111McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 344. 
112Besides McCormick's benefit/burden calculus, other ethicists have suggested 
various terms to reformulate the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction. Paul Ramsey 
suggests that the morally significant meaning of ordinary and extraordinary medical 
means can be reduced almost without remainder to two components--a comparison of 
treatments to determine if they are "medically indicated" and a patient's right to refuse 
treatment. See Paul Ramsey, Ethics On The Edges Of Life, 153-160. Robert Veatch 
maintains that the terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" are "extremely vague and are 
used inconsistently in the literature." Beneath this confusion he finds three overlapping 
but fundamentally different uses of the terms: usual versus unusual, useful versus useless, 
imperative versus elective. See Robert Veatch, Death. Dying And The Biological 
Revolution, 110-112. For further examples, see McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The 
Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New World?, 393-405. 
113McConnick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
360. 
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how the principle of proportionate reason is used as a tool for determining whether a 
particular life-sustaining treatment is a benefit or a burden, that is, in the "best interests" of 
the never-competent patient and those involved in the decision-making process. 114 
The benefit/burden calculus was also proposed by the Sacred Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith in its Declaration On Euthanasia and by the President's Commission 
For The Study Of Ethical Problems In Medicine And Biomedical And Behavioral Research 
in its Deciding To Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment. 115 The issuance of the Declaration On 
Euthanasia in 1980 by the Magisterium gave McCormick further justification for 
incorporating the benefit/burden calculus into his quality-of-life criterion. The Congregation 
concludes that: 
It will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means by studying the 
type of treatment being used, its degree of complexity or risk, its cost and 
114In making these moral judgments, McCormick will use the principle of justice 
rooted in charity. As social beings who are interrelated and interdependent, we must 
realize that decisions we make or that are made for us have a profound impact on family 
and society. McCormick writes: "Our shared humanity makes us members of a family 
with ties to each other. Up to a point, we are our sisters' and brothers' keepers. We owe 
each other. The Christian should sense this even more sharply." Therefore, when making 
treatment decisions for never-competent patients, justice, rooted in charity, demands that 
the patient's "best interests" incorporate not only medical or personal factors but also 
familial and societal factors. This is based not only on the social nature of persons but 
also on the goods of creation. Because medical resources are finite, they must be 
allocated fairly for the good of the whole. It is the principle of justice, rooted in charity, 
that will help frame parameters within which the right questions about medical treatments 
can be asked and the right decisions made for the best interests of the patient and all 
concerned. See McCormick, "Henry The Unknown," Ethics And Behavior 1 (1991): 68. 
115See President's Commission For The Study Of Ethical Problems In Medicine 
And Biomedical And Behavioral Research, "Deciding To Forego Life-Sustaining 
Treatment: Ethical, Medical And Legal Issues In Treatment Decisions," (Washington, 
D.C., U.S. Printing Office, March 1983): 218-219. 
possibilities of using it, and comparing these elements with the result that can 
be expected, talcing into account the state of the sick person and his or her 
physical and moral resources. 116 
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This statement gave McCormick further proof to anchor his guideline and thus his criterion 
for treatment decisions in the benefit/burden calculus. Medical treatments are not morally 
mandatory if they are either gravely burdensome or useless for the patient. 117 The 
benefit/burden calculus now becomes the basis for McCormick's quality-of-life criterion 
when a never-competent patient has the potential for human relationships. This entails 
making a value judgment, and the evaluation of whether a treatment is a benefit or a burden 
can be open to personal interpretation. 118 That means these evaluations can be "borderline 
116Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Declaration On Euthanasia," 
Origins 10 (August 1980): 263. 
117Warren Reich, John Connery, S.J., Leonard Weber, and Donald McCarthy 
disagree with McCormick's interpretation of the tradition on the benefit/burden 
distinction. For them, "the burden-to-benefit proportionalism of the ordinary/ 
extraordinary means tradition admits that quality of life elements impact on the prima 
facie presumption for treatment. It would be historically inaccurate to suggest that the 
extraordinary means concept referred to means qua means, whereas contemporary quality 
of life ethics speak more to the extraordinary condition or quality of the patient's life." 
For Reich, Connery, Weber and McCarthy, "the burden must be the burden of a medical 
treatment, not the burden of handicapped existence." Richard Sparks, To Treat Or Not To 
Treat? 110; see also Donald G. McCarthy, "Treating Defective Newborns: Who Judges 
Extraordinary Means?" Hospital Progress 62 (December 1981): 45-50; John Connery, 
S.J., "Prolonging Life," 151-165; Leonard Weber, Who Shall Live?, 88-98; and Warren 
Reich, "Quality Of Life And Defective Newborn Children: An Ethical Analysis," in 
Decision-Making And The Defective Newborn, ed. Chester A. Swinyard (Springfield, 
IL.: Thomas, 1978), 488-511. 
118To help clarify whether a treatment is a benefit or a burden, McCormick will 
use the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. For McCormick, quality-of-life 
judgments must avoid doing harm to the patient. Neither physicians nor parents are 
obliged to initiate or continue medical treatments which do harm to the well-being of the 
never-competent patient. That well-being consists generally in a life prolonged beyond 
275 
and controversial. " 119 
Both guidelines of McCormick's quality-of-life criterion, even though he argued they 
were both reformulations of the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction, came under 
criticism for being too relative, subjective, and consequential in nature. To address this 
criticism McCormick, along with John Paris, S.J., proposed the following norms that would 
further specify the capacity for human relationships as a summary of the benefit/burden 
evaluation: 
(I) Life-saving intervention ought not to be omitted for institutional or 
managerial reasons. Included in this specification is the ability of this 
particular family to cope with a badly disabled baby. 
(2) Life-sustaining interventions may not be omitted simply because the baby 
is retarded. There may be further complications associated with retardation 
that justify withholding life-sustaining treatment. 
(3) Life-sustaining intervention may be omitted or withdrawn when there is 
excessive hardship on the patient, especially when this combines with poor 
prognosis (e.g., repeated cardiac surgery, low prognosis transplants, 
increasingly iatrogenic oxygenization for low birthweight babies). 
(4) Life-sustaining interventions may be omitted or withdrawn at a point 
when it becomes clear that expected life can be had only for a relatively brief 
time and only with continued use of artificial feeding (e.g., some cases of 
necrotizing enterocolitis). 120 
infancy, without excruciating pain, and with the potential for participating, to at least a 
minimal degree, in human experience. Promoting the good of another person, seeking the 
well-being or benefit of a patient, preventing harm and removing harm from patients, all 
are rooted in charity and play an integral role in treatment decisions for never competent 
patients. See McCormick, "A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' Criteria For Sustaining 
Life," 79. 
119McCormick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
358. 
120Ibid., 358-359. It should be noted that McCormick uses the moral principles of 
charity, autonomy, justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence to help "enflesh" these four 
norms. 
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These norms or rules do not mandate certain decisions. McCormick argues that concrete 
rules such as these "do not replace prudence and eliminate conflicts and decisions. They are 
simply attempts to provide outlines of the areas in which prudence should operate."121 
McCormick further specified his quality-of-life criterion to help enlighten medical 
situations for the appropriate decision-makers. These rules are "an attempt to make concrete 
the relations of coalescent values and burdens, even if expressed in nonabsolute form." 122 
However, guidelines, even specified by concrete norms and moral principles, cannot cover 
all circumstances and every possible situation. McCormick's quality-of-life criterion assists 
the appropriate decision-makers by giving them a range of choices. As rational persons, it 
is up to the appropriate decision-makers to examine each situation using proportionate 
reason, and the guidelines advanced by McCormick in his quality-of-life criterion, to 
determine what is in the "best interests" of the never-competent patient and those involved 
in the decision-making process. 123 McCormick makes clear that no criterion can cover every 
1211bid., 359. 
122Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," 93. 
123To further specify how decisions are made for the never-competent patient by 
the appropriate decision-makers, McCormick uses the principle of autonomy rooted in 
charity. McCormick believes that autonomy rooted in charity is the middle path between 
paternalism and the absolutiz.ation of autonomy. McCormick defines paternalism as a 
system in which treatment decisions are made against the patient's preferences or without 
the patient's knowledge and consent. He calls this "failures of dimension." When 
autonomy becomes absolutized then medicine has been secularized to the point that 
physicians are simply technological instruments to carry out the wishes of the patient. 
Both of these extremes spell isolation of the person and that can lead to the abandonment 
of the patient. When autonomy is rooted in charity the value of the person "integrally and 
adequately considered" becomes the focus. For McCormick, "unless we confront the 
features that make choices good or bad, autonomy usurps that role. It trumps every other 
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instance where human discretion must intervene to decide. There is always the possibility 
of human error because we are finite and sinful people. 124 The margin of error, however, 
should reflect not only the utter finality of the decision (which tends to narrow it), but also 
the unavoidable uncertainty and doubt (which tends to broaden it). 125 With the assistance of 
these guidelines, McCormick believes that the appropriate decision-makers will be given the 
necessary guidance to act responsibly. 
In conclusion, McCormick's quality-of-life criterion, as applied to never-competent 
patients, is based on a normative understanding of the "best interests" of the patient. This 
criterion has been concretized by his fundamental guidelines of relational potential associated 
with the infant's condition and the benefit/burden calculus. However, these are only 
guidelines; they do not determine decisions. The quality-of-life criterion sets parameters and 
from within these parameters the appropriate decision-makers must use their reason to decide 
what is in the "best interests" of the patient. 
McCormick understands that these guidelines are open to the possibility of being 
consideration." When autonomy is rooted in the Christian story the "best interests" of the 
patient are served. For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's position on autonomy, 
see Richard A. McCormick, S.J., "Behind The Scenes: Some Underlying Issues In 
Bioethics," Catholic Library World 63 (January-June 1992): 158; Idem, "Value Variables 
In The Health-Care Reform Debate," America 168 (May 29, 1993): 10; Idem, The 
Critical Calling, 365; and Idem, Corrective Vision, 170. 
124Human error based on our finite and sinful nature is rooted in McCormick's 
theological anthropology. For a more detailed analysis, refer to Chapter Two, 
McCormick's Theological Anthropology section, Doctrine Of Creation and Doctrine Of 
The Fall subsections above. 
125McCormick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
360. 
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misinterpreted. However, because there is the potential for abuse does not mean they should 
be discarded. McCormick argues: 
Such a threat is inseparable from human living. We must reduce such threats 
by every human and Christian resource available to us; but the existence of 
threats and risks should not lead to the rejection of all exception-making, to 
a type of moral absolutism rejected by Christian tradition. 126 
McCormick is attempting to examine new medical situations from within the value-
perceptions and commitments of the Catholic tradition. The guidelines he proposes for his 
quality-of-life criterion are an attempt to help in the decision-making process in regard to 
never-competent patients. McCormick argues that these guidelines are substantially 
accurate; but he is aware that it is only through human experience that they will become 
more concrete and meaningful. 127 With this in mind, he places his guidelines, norms, and 
moral principles before a broad community that encompasses not only ethicists but also 
health care professionals so that they can be critically scrutinized. McCormick understands 
that unless his quality-of-life criterion is given the opportunity to be analyzed and criticized 
by various disciplines, its usefulness and appropriateness as a criterion for never-competent 
patients will always be questioned. Since McCormick encourages this type of broad, 
interdisciplinary analysis of his position, the next section will examine criticisms in the hope 
126McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die: The State Of The Question," 172. 
127McCormick equates this with the case of the ordinary/extraordinary means 
distinction where terminal patients are concerned. He explains that: "The first uses of 
such a distinction were hesitant and terribly anguishing. But as time went along, the 
distinction meant more to the medical profession and settled into a more helpful policy, 
precisely through increasing usage. The neonatal problems I was discussing are 
relatively new. If the guidelines I proposed are substantially accurate, it will be through 
experience alone that it will become more helpful." Ibid., 173. 
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that it will lead to a further specification and concretization of his moral criterion. 
Criticism 
Several ethicists have criticized McCormick's patient-centered, quality-of-life 
criterion over the years. Some of these criticisms have been addressed by McCormick in 
subsequent articles, such as: whether or not he has misinterpreted the ordinary/extraordinary 
means distinction, 128 whether he has departed from the Catholic tradition on the 
ordinary/extraordinary means distinction in substance or in formulation, 129 or whether a 
128 Ethicist John Connery, S.J. argues that McCormick has misinterpreted the 
Catholic tradition regarding the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction. Connery 
argues that burden and benefit are different issues and that according to the tradition it 
was always the burden that was decisive in constituting a means to be extraordinary. 
McCormick believes that one cannot separate burden and benefit that sharply. 
McCormick argues: "It is impossible in some cases to determine what will benefit a 
patient without presupposing a standard of life. If the standard is bad enough (as in 
Connery's example of quadruple amputation), the benefit and burden coalesce. Or again, 
what is a burden to the patient presupposes judgments about the patient's condition, and 
among the objective conditions to be considered one of the most decisive is the kind of 
life that will be preserved as a result of the interventions. In cases like this, therefore, 
burden and benefit do not, as Connery thinks, 'deal with different issues ... and usually 
apply to different types of cases."' For a more detailed analysis, see John Connery, S.J., 
"Prolonging Life: The Duty And Its Limits," 151-165; see also McCormick, "Life And 
Its Preservation," 104-105. Emphasis in the original. 
129John Connery, S.J. argues: "McCormick has shifted the emphasis from the 
nature of means to the quality of life itself. To this extent he departs from the tradition. 
Failure to employ ordinary means that were useful to prolong life would have been 
classified in the tradition as suicide." Connery, "Prolonging Life," note 15, 165. 
McCormick responds to Connery with two points. First, "the quality-of-life ingredient 
was always present in the very definition of burdensome means. Second, it is one thing 
to depart from a tradition, and in substance, not merely in formulation; it is another to 
extend this tradition into new problem areas. If such an extension is true to the 
substantial value judgments of the tradition, it is a departure only in formulation. This 
distinction between substance and formulation is clearly proposed by John XXIII and 
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quality-of-life ethic is completely separate from a sanctity-of-life ethic. 130 Since these 
criticisms have been addressed by McCormick, there is no need to analyze them in this 
section. The criticisms that will be addressed focus on ambiguity in regard to language, 
McCormick's narrow interpretation of social factors, and the relative and subjective nature 
of his quality-of-life criterion. This section will articulate, evaluate, and analyze these 
criticisms as they impact McCormick's moral criteriology. 
First, several ethicists have criticized McCormick for his lack of precision when it 
comes to his use of language. This lack of precision has led to a sense of ambiguity in regard 
to how McCormick understands various terms and to an inconsistency in how he applies 
various terms. James Walter believes "there is much ambiguity about what 'quality of life' 
means, and consequently there is little agreement about the definition of this criterion."131 
In particular, Walter believes the word "quality" can refer to several different realities. It can 
refer to the idea of excellence or it can be understood as an attribute or property of either 
biological or personal life. He argues that McCormick, in his first guideline, has isolated one 
quality or attribute to be considered as the minimum of personal life: the potential for human 
Vatican II." McCormick, "Life And Its Preservation," note 75, 105. For a more detailed 
analysis of Vatican II and John XXIII on the distinction between formulation and 
substance, see McCormick, The Critical Callin~, 16-19; see also "The Pastoral 
Constitution On The Church In The Modem World," Documents Of Vatican II, no. 62, 
268-269. 
13
°For a more detailed analysis, see Weber, Who Shall Live?; McCormick, "The 
Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New World?, 393-411; and Idem, 
"A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' Criteria For Sustaining Life," 76-79. 
131James J. Walter, "Quality Of Life In Clinical Decisions," in Encyclopedia Of 
Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 3, 1353. 
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relationships. 132 Walter suggests that the word "quality" should not primarily refer to a 
property or attribute. "Rather, the quality that is at issue is the quality of relationship that 
exists between the medical condition of the patient, on the one hand, and the patient's ability 
to pursue human purposes, on the other."133 The ethical concern surrounding those who 
define quality of life as a property or an attribute is that they do not attribute intrinsic value 
to physical life. 134 
McCormick's first guideline of the potential for human relationships associated with 
the patient's condition does appear to be an attribute or property of human life. Relational 
132lbid., 1354. For Walter, McCormick is at one end of the quality oflife 
spectrum because he understands "quality" as a property or an attribute. At the other end 
is Joseph Fletcher who originally defined the indicators of "personhood" by reference to 
fifteen positive qualities. In the middle of this spectrum is Earl E. Shelp who proposes 
minimal independence as the central attribute of his quality-of-life criterion. Ibid. See 
also Joseph Fletcher, "Indicators Of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile Of Man," Hastings 
Center Report 2 (1972): 1-4; and Earl E. Shelp, Born To Die?: Deciding The Fate Of 
Critically Ill Newborns. For a more detailed analysis of this "quality oflife" spectrum, 
refer to Chapter One, General Ethical Approaches To Treatment Decisions For Defective 
Neonates section above. 
133For Walter, "these purposes are understood as the material, social, moral, and 
spiritual values that transcend physical, biological life. The quality referred to is the 
quality of a relation and not a property or attribute of life." Walter, "Quality Of Life In 
Clinical Decisions," 1354; Idem, "The Meaning And Validity Of Quality Of Life 
Judgments In Contemporary Roman Catholic Medical Ethics," Louvain Studies 13 (Fall 
1988): 195-208. 
134Walter uses McCormick as an example. Walter argues: "In some of his 
writings McCormick has suggested that physical life does not possess inherent value but 
is a good to be preserved precisely as a condition of other values. Based on his 
theological convictions that physical life is a created, limited good and that the ability to 
relate to others is the mediation of one's love of the divine, McCormick resists attributing 
to physical life the status of an absolute value." Walter, "Quality Of Life In Clinical 
Decisions," 1354. 
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potential will determine for McCormick, in certain situations, whether a never-competent 
patient ought to be medically treated. However, in 1986 in an article entitled "The Best 
Interests Of The Baby," McCormick implicitly now presents his understanding of "quality" 
as the quality of relationship that exists between a person's condition and the ability to 
pursue life's goals. In 1992 McCormick published an article in America entitled "'Moral 
Considerations' Ill Considered," in which he has explicitly changed his position. 
McCormick writes: 
Brodeur correctly rejects a notion of quality of life that states that a certain 
arbitrarily defined level of functioning is required before a person's life is to 
be valued. But if it refers to the relationship between a person 's biological 
condition and the ability to pursue life's goals, it is critical to good decision-
making. 135 
Is the potential for human relationships a property of life in his quality-of-life criterion or 
does he now view it as the quality of the relationship that exists between "a person's 
biological condition and the ability to pursue life's goals?"136 It appears that either 
McCormick has changed his mind or he is in the process of clarifying his first position. In 
either case, McCormick needs to give an explanation and justification for his present 
position. Until that time, one is left wondering how exactly he interprets the word 
135McCormick, "'Moral Considerations' Ill Considered," Corrective Vision, 228. 
Emphasis mine. 
136By "quality of the relationship" I am referring to the quality of the relationship 
that exists between the medical condition of the neonate, on the one hand, and the 
neonate's ability to pursue human purposes, on the other. For a more detailed analysis, 
see Walter, "Quality Of Life In Clinical Decisions," 1354. 
" ual"ty "137 q 1 . 
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It is possible to point out additional examples of ambiguities in regard to language 
and terms. One major example centers on his moral criterion for decision-making. After 
analyzing his moral criteriology, it is clear that McCormick has abandoned his notion of the 
"reasonable person standard." However, he never explicitly states this nor does he give a 
justification for doing so. In addition, it is not at all clear where McCormick stands in regard 
to his moral criterion of proportionate reason and his moral criterion of the person "integrally 
and adequately considered." In the early 1970's McCormick accepted proportionate reason 
as a formal moral criterion and began applying it to ethical issues. Gradually, however, 
proportionate reason developed into a "tool" for determining what actions would promote 
the good of the whole human person in particular situations. The result was a new moral 
criterion, that is, the person "integrally and adequately considered." Finally, it appears that 
McCormick synthesized both criteria into his quality-of-life criterion. How this synthesis 
occurred and why has never been explained by McCormick. It is apparent from his writings 
that he continues to utilize both proportionate reason and the criterion of the person 
"integrally and adequately considered," but again he has never explained this evolution, nor 
1371t should be noted that Walter in a footnote states: "It is probably the case that 
McCormick intended "potential for human relationships" to mean a property or attribute 
of life in his quality of life criterion. Whereas this may be true, I think that the basic 
thrust of McCormick's position is to assess the quality of the relation between the 
patient's medical condition and the pursuit oflife's purposes. For McCormick, the fact 
that a patient does not possess any capacity for relationality means that the patient will 
not have any qualitative relation between his/her medical condition and the pursuit of 
life's values. Indications of my interpretation can be found throughout his more recent 
writings." Walter, "The Meaning And Validity Of Quality Of Life Judgments In 
Contemporary Roman Catholic Ethics," note 23, 207. Emphasis in the original. 
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has he given justification for it. This lack of clarity regarding the roles proportionate reason 
and the person "integrally and adequately considered" play in his quality-of-life criterion 
leaves this moral criterion open to serious criticism. McCormick argues that the most 
important facet of dealing with treatment decisions for never-competent patients is the proper 
approach, not the conclusions. He argues that "with a precisely analyzed and carefully 
articulated approach, we have our best chance of keeping the best interests of the baby in 
clear focus and of avoiding the traps of sentimentality, ideology, and subjectivism."138 If 
this is true, then he needs to clarify his moral criterion so that he can eliminate any ambiguity 
and confusion surrounding it. This is critical because McCormick's moral criteriology is an 
integral element in his ethical methodological approach. 
The last example concerns the role of prudence in McCormick's moral criteriology. 
McCormick attempts to specify further the two guidelines in his quality-of-life criterion by 
formulating four norms or rules that provide some guidance for decision-making. However, 
he argues that prudence plays a major role in the application of his quality-of-life criterion. 
McCormick writes: 
Concrete rules do not make decisions. They do not replace prudence and 
eliminate conflicts and doubt. They are simply attempts to provide outlines 
of the areas in which prudence should operate. 139 
He refers to the integral role prudence plays in his moral criteriology, but he never defines 
prudence nor does he explain how he uses it. This is the same criticism that was directed at 
138McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 25. 
139McCormick & Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
316. 
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McCormick in regard to how prudence operates in his moral epistemology. 140 Because 
McCormick is a "revised~' natural law ethicist in the Catholic tradition, one can speculate that 
he agrees with Thomas' interpretation of prudence. However, this is speculation at best. 141 
These examples show ambiguities in how McCormick uses language and 
terminology in his moral criteriology. As a result, this moral criterion has been criticized for 
being subjective, relative, and consequential by ethicists such as Ramsey, Connery, Reich, 
and Weber, to name a few. Much of this criticism has been addressed by McCormick 
directly. However, the point is that if he were to carefully articulate his positions in a 
systematic manner and precisely analyze them in regard to language and terminology, then 
much of the confusion surrounding his quality-of-life criterion could be eliminated. A 
comprehensive explanation on how his quality-of-life criterion has evolved over the years, 
and an admission that the author, at certain times, has in fact changed his mind, would 
benefit not only McCormick's moral criteriology, but his whole ethical methodology. 
Second, as Richard Sparks and James McCartney, both Roman Catholic ethicists, 
have noted McCormick may be criticized for having a narrow interpretation of how social 
factors impact his quality-of-life criterion. This criticism was discussed in chapter two in 
reference to how this criticism relates to the "essentially social" nature of the human person 
that McCormick grounds in his doctrine of creation. 142 McCormick argues that when making 
14
°For a more detailed analysis, refer to Chapter Three, Criticism section above. 
141For a detailed explanation on the virtue of prudence in Aquinas, see Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica Ia-Ilae, 61. 
142For a more detailed analysis, refer to Chapter Two, Criticism section above. 
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treatment decisions for defective neonates, one ought to take into consideration the effects 
these decisions have on both the family and society at large. McCormick grounds his 
position in the Catholic tradition quoting both Pius XII143 and moralist Gerald Kelly, S.J., 144 
to show how the Catholic tradition has always included social factors in determining medical 
decisions. The problem, according to Sparks and McCartney, is that McCormick has not 
been consistent in how he views and applies these social factors in the area of treatment 
decisions for defective neonates. 
Sparks argues that "the ultimate decision as to whether treatment is in a given 
patient's total best interests ought to incorporate not only medical or individual (i.e., 
experiential) burden factors, but also broader social factors, viewed from the patient's 
existentially-contexted vantage point. " 145 Therefore, one must allow the never-competent 
patient's social nature not only to make an impact on the calculation of benefits (e.g., the 
benefit to the never-competent patient derived from his or her ability to relate to others) but 
also to allow that same social nature to frame the calculation of burdens (e.g., psychic strain 
to the family or cost to society). 146 McCartney agrees with Sparks's position and lists the 
143For a more detailed analysis, see Pius XII, "The Prolongation Of Life," The 
Pope Speaks, 394. 
144For a more detailed analysis, see Gerald Kelly, S.J., Medico-Moral Problems, 
132. 
145Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?, 198. 
146James Walter, "Termination Of Medical Treatment: The Setting Of Moral 
Limits From Infancy To Old Age," 305. 
287 
various social factors that should be considered. 147 The major point of the Sparks and 
McCartney criticism is that McCormick's narrow interpretation of social factors is 
inconsistent with what he means by "best interests" normatively understood. In a number 
of articles pertaining to non-competent patients in non-therapeutic medical experimentation 
situations, McCormick argues that social and familial factors ought to be considered in the 
benefit/burden calculus. 148 He argues that under certain circumstances, infants and children 
ought to participate in experimentation situations because as members of the Christian 
community there is a sense of solidarity and Christian concern for others. Infants and 
children are in some sense volunteer-able to help the common good of society, provided that 
the individual's well-being is not placed under appreciable burdens. 149 However, when 
dealing with treatment decisions for never-competent patients, it appears McCormick has a 
147See Chapter Two, Criticism section above. It should be noted that there are 
others, especially in the medical profession, who believe that a "broader interpretation" of 
social factors should be included in the decision-making process for never-competent 
patients. See Raymond S. Duff and A. G. M. Campbell, "Moral Ethical Dilemmas In The 
Special Care Nursery," 890-893; Idem, "On Deciding The Care For Severely 
Handicapped Or Dying Persons: With Particular Reference To Infants," Pediatrics 57 
(April 1976): 487-493; Duff, "On Deciding The Use Of Family Commons," in 
Developmental Disabilities: Psychological And Social Implications, eds. Daniel Bergsma 
and Ann E. Pulver (New York: Alan R. Liss, 1976), 73-84; Anthony Shaw, "The Ethics 
Of Proxy Consent," in Decision-Making And The Defective Newborn, 593-600; John 
Lorber, "Spina Bifida: To Treat Or Not To Treat?," Nursing Mirror 47 (September 14, 
1978): 13-19; and Idem~ "Selective Treatment OfMyelomeningocele: To Treat Or Not 
To Teat?," Pediatrics 53 (1974): 307-310. 
148See McCormick, "Proxy Consent In The Experimentation Situation," How 
Brave A New World?, 51-71; and Idem, "Sharing In Sociality: Children And 
Experimentation," How Brave A New World?, 87-98. 
149Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?, 199. 
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rather narrow interpretation of familial and social factors. In fact, Sparks argues that 
McCormick "seems to exclude similar social solidarity and familial concerns from the 
calculus of the patient's best interests in treatment decisions related to non-competents."150 
Having a narrow interpretation of social and familial factors in the benefit/burden 
calculus does not mean that McCormick totally excludes these social factors. It appears that 
he is trying to avoid a "socially-weighted" benefit/burden calculus. Sparks explains a 
"socially-weighted" benefit/burden calculus as: 
The qualitative benefit and burden of treatment for a given patient is placed 
on the ethical scale over against the benefit (utility) and burden of said 
treatment and patient for the community of affected persons. If the latter 
social concerns coalesce with the former patient-centered claims, then the 
patient wins, either receiving the beneficial treatment or else being spared the 
agony of excessively burdensome, even futile efforts. However, if life-
prolonging, even qualitatively beneficial therapy, will inordinately tax that 
patient's family or society, it is in their best interests, and thus morally 
justified, to withhold or withdraw treatment. 151 
Sparks also rejects a "socially-weighted" calculus in determining the best interests of the 
patient. However, Sparks believes one can reject a "socially-weighted" calculus without 
maintaining a restrictive interpretation of social factors. 152 Once again, McCormick is trying 
150Ibid. 
1511bid., 268-269. Emphasis in the original. 
152Sparks writes: "While preserving unmitigated respect for the inherent dignity 
and right to life of every human patient, and related prima facie prescriptions, it still 
allows one to incorporate functional potential and social burden into decisions regarding 
the morality of forgoing treatment. Viewing each handicapped newborn as a multi-
faceted rights-bearing person, parents and physicians can factor familial burden and 
societal limitation into a benefit/burden calculus from the patient's perspective. Such a 
patient bias or a weighing of the calculus on the side of the individual serves as a 
prudential wall against the potential abuse and selfishness on the part of burdened others 
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to walk a middle course between two extremes. On one side are those who categorically 
exclude social and familial factors in regard to treatment decisions for never-competent 
patients. 153 On the other side, there are the broad interpreters of social factors in decision-
making who have a utilitarian perspective that can lead to the "slippery slope."154 
McCormick, conscious of the criticism that has been directed at his quality-of-life criterion, 
tends toward a more narrow interpretation of social factors. He is well-aware that a broad 
interpretation of social factors could lead to active infanticide, because it would be more 
humane, efficient, and the least costly next step. The problem is that McCormick is not in 
fact walking a middle course. His interpretation of social and familial factors, regarding 
treatment decisions for defective neonates, is not only more restrictive than the Catholic 
tradition, it also seems to deviate from his normative understanding of "best interests."155 
For McCormick, in determining what is in the patient's "best interests" he must 
consider not only familial and social factors, but also the associated medical condition, the 
capacity for relational potential, and the proportion of the burden of treatment to the benefits 
that might take hold if a socially-weighted benefit/burden calculus, particularly with a 
functional anthropology, were allowed free reign." Ibid., 278. 
153See Robert Veatch, Death. Dying And The Biological Revolution: Our Last 
Quest For Responsibility, 130-135; see also John Arras, "Toward An Ethic Of 
Ambiguity," Hastings Center Report 14 (April 1984): 26-28. 
154See H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., "Ethical Issues In Aiding The Death Of Young 
Children," in Beneficent Euthanasia, 180-192; see also Joseph Fletcher, "The 'Right' To 
Live And The 'Right' To Die," The Humanist 34 (July/August 1974): 4-7. 
155 For a more detailed analysis of the Catholic tradition's understanding of social 
and familial factors, see Pius XII, "The Prolongation Of Life," Acta Avostolicae Sedis. 
1,032. 
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derived for the patient. Social and familial factors play a role in determining the 
benefit/burden calculus, but they must always play a proportionate role. Sparks and 
McCartney would certainly agree. The problem appears to be that McCormick views the 
burden to the never-competent patient and the burden to the affected others as being in 
competition with one another when making treatment decisions. Sparks contends that 
viewing social burden factors from the patient's perspective can avoid the competition that 
is constitutive of the socially-weighted position. According to James Walter: 
Sparks seems to be claiming that the child would not, and perhaps should not, 
want to be treated in circumstances of excessive social burden because it 
would not be in the child's best interests to place these burdens on those who 
must care for its existence. 156 
If McCormick has a normative understanding of"best interests," then he should examine the 
social burden factors from the never-competent patient's perspective. What the defective 
neonate "ought" to want should encompass the needs of those who will care for this child. 
If the circumstances of treatment will be a grave burden for the family of the never-
competent neonate and society as a whole, then this is not in the "best interests" of the never-
competent patient. 
This criticism of Sparks and McCartney is one of the most substantive critiques of 
McCormick's quality-of-life criterion. It is substantive because it clearly shows how 
McCormick's position deviates not only from the Catholic tradition, but also deviates from 
his own normative understanding of "best interests." This author agrees with the criticism 
156James J. Walter, "Termination Of Medical Treatment: The Setting Of Moral 
Limits From Infancy To Old Age," 305; see also Richard Sparks, To Treat Or Not To 
Treat?, 293-326. 
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of Sparks and McCartney. However, one can also understand why McCormick has taken 
this position. First, he fears that a broad interpretation of social factors can easily lead to the 
slippery slope of social utilitarianism. This he understands can lead to infanticide. Second, 
McCormick is well aware of the finite and sinful nature of humanity. How does one 
determine if a family is taking the never-competent patient's perspective or their own self-
interested perspective?157 Both of these concerns are legitimate and need to be addressed. 
This can be accomplished by establishing a middle course between the extremes that follows 
the Catholic tradition on social burden factors that was clarified by Pius XII. The possibility 
of abuse is always present, but there are safeguards built into McCormick's quality-of-life 
criterion--guidelines, norms, and moral principles. Being faithful to the Catholic tradition 
and to his own normative criterion can help alleviate potential abuse. 
Third, Richard Sparks criticizes McCormick's relational potential guideline as being 
limited in its usefulness in many neonatal cases. Sparks writes that McCormick's guideline 
IS 
only minimally helpful in deciding what cases might constitute excruciating 
pain or excessive burdens. He leaves the physician the task of providing 
"more concrete categories or presumptive biological symptoms" to enflesh 
what constitutes a totally non-relational and/or an intractably pained mental 
state. 158 
Sparks commends McCormick for plotting the two extreme cases on the spectrum, but 
157James Walter, "Termination Of Medical Treatment: The Setting Of Moral 
Limits From Infancy To Old Age," 305. 
158Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?, 172. 
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criticizes him for giving physicians the responsibility for filling in the conflictual middle. 159 
This criticism seems quite unjustified. It does not appear from McCormick's writings that 
the sole authority for filling in "the conflictual middle" is left to physicians alone. Clearly, 
McCormick is convinced that his quality-of-life criterion is "correct as far as it goes."160 
However, he believes that diagnostic categories could assist decision-makers in regard to 
treatment decisions. He understands that physicians will be at the forefront of determining 
these diagnostic categories, but he does not believe they are the only ones who can perform 
this task. He states that, "the most successful recent attempt to concretize in clinical 
categories the potential for human relationships is that of Robert Weir."161 Weir is not a 
physician but an ethicist. 
McCormick is well aware that establishing a full set of diagnostic categories is not 
the cure-all for determining treatment decisions for never-competent patients. He knows 
that not all medical conditions can be placed in specific categories; there is a marked 
159Sparks shows how McCormick at one extreme uses the anencephalic infant, 
"'whose lack of neocortical function obviously indicates a life wholly without relational 
potential. Life-saving treatments are therefore optional, even contra-indicated. At the 
opposite extreme of the handicap spectrum is a 'mongoloid' infant or Down's Syndrome 
child. While retarded mental capacities inhibit these Trisomy 21 victims from higher 
education and advanced academic achievements, these infants are still 'aware,' 
'conscious,' and capable of interrelating with their environment and with others. If 
anything, their capacity for uninhibited 'love' is enhanced by the limitation of mental 
complexity and nuance." Ibid. 172-1 73. 
160McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 23-24. 
161For a detailed analysis of Weir's clinical categories, see Weir, Selective 
Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 234-243; see also McCormick, "The Best 
Interests Of The Baby," 24. 
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difference in the severity of conditions within each category. He is also aware that not all 
physicians or even bioethicists could or would agree to the specific diagnostic categories 
proposed. However, for McCormick: 
The important point, however, is that we ought to attempt, as far as possible, 
to approach neonatal disabilities through diagnostic categories, always 
realizing that such categories cannot deflate important individual differences 
and that there will always remain gray areas. 162 
How these categories are developed must depend on medical expertise, which is why 
McCormick relies on physicians and other health care professionals. However, in the final 
analysis, it is not diagnostic categories that will determine treatment decisions for never-
competent patients. Ultimately, these decisions are made by the appropriate decision-makers 
who will apply the quality-of-life criterion to a particular situation and determine what is in 
the "best interests" of the never-competent patient. 
Finally, Leonard Weber questions whether McCormick's quality-of-life criterion 
does not in the long run negate his position that every human life is of equal value regardless 
of condition. For Weber, the questions that have to be asked are: 
Once McCormick has made the claim that we must decide to treat or not on 
the basis of the child's condition, will people really be able to pay much 
attention to his insistence that every life is valuable regardless of condition? 
How valuable is a life anyway if it is only a condition for something else and 
need not be preserved if that something else cannot be achieved? And though 
he wants to base his decision on symptoms which physicians can relate to 
potential for human relationships, is it nevertheless likely that this use of 
quality of life language will lead others to move away from objective 
indications to value judgments on the worth of mentally retarded life?163 
162McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 24. 
163Weber, Who Shall Live?, 82. 
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These are justifiable concerns that must be addressed on a continual basis. However, after 
reviewing McCormick's writings, one can see that he has built-in safeguards that help him 
ensure that every human life is of equal value regardless of condition. The impetus for 
Weber's comments comes from the fact that he sees a direct contrast between a sanctity-of-
life ethic and a quality-of-life ethic. This is why Weber argues that the extraordinary means 
approach better provides "for some protection against an arbitrary decision being made on 
the basis of a judgment about the worth of a particular type of life. " 164 Comparing sanctity 
of life and quality of life allows the focus of attention to be on our obligation to preserve life 
and avoids degrees of discrimination in the quality-of-life criterion. 165 McCormick 
understands these two approaches to be correlated, not categorically opposed to one 
another. 166 There is really only one ethic that holds life to be an intrinsic value with limits 
on the patient's moral obligation to pursue this value. McCormick writes: 
Quality-of-life assessments ought to be made within an over-all reverence for 
life, as an extension of one's respect for the sanctity oflife. However, there 
are times when preserving the life of one with no capacity for those aspects 
of life that we regard as human is a violation of the sanctity of life itself. 
Thus to separate the two approaches and call one sanctity of life, the other 
quality of life, is a false conceptual split that can easily suggest that the term 
164Ibid., 85. 
165McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New 
World?, 406-407. Those who hold to this position would be Weber, Reich, and Connery. 
See Weber, Who Shall Live?, 78-87; see also Eugene F. Diamond, '"Quality' vs. 
'Sanctity' Of Life In The Nursery," America 135 (1976): 396-398. 
166Robert Weir maintains that McCormick is moving against the stream of ethical 
consensus when he makes this claim. Weir writes: "Most ethicists accept the distinction 
between a sanctity-of-life principle and a quality-of-life principle." Weir, Selective 
Nontreatment OfHandica1med Newborns," 165. 
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"sanctity of life" is being used in an exhortatory way. 167 
In addition to understanding quality of life to be an extension of sanctity of life, 
McCormick also uses the moral principle of justice to ensure the equal value of every human 
life regardless of condition. For McCormick, the principle of justice is rooted in charity 
which emphasizes the dignity of every human person. McCormick's notion of justice is 
grounded in his theological anthropology. Created in the image and likeness of God, the 
human person "is a member of God's family and the temple of the spirit."168 Therefore, God 
confers on humanity a sense of dignity, which makes everyone equally valuable. Both the 
principle of justice and the interrelatedness of the quality-of-life and sanctity-of-life criteria 
allows McCormick to differentiate between every person being of equal value and every life 
being of equal value. For McCormick, what the "equal value" language is attempting to say 
is legitimate: 
We must avoid unjust discrimination in the provision of health care and life 
supports. But not all discrimination (inequality of treatment) is unjust. 
Unjust discrimination is avoided if decision-making centers on the benefit to 
the patient, even if the benefit is described largely in terms of quality-of-life 
criteria. 169 
This does not eliminate the possibility that McCormick's quality-of-life criterion could be 
subject to abuse. Abuse is always possible. However, McCormick believes that the moral 
167McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New 
World?, 407. Emphasis in the original. 
168McCormick, "Who Or What Is The Preembryo?," 12. 
169McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New 
World?, 407. Emphasis in the original. 
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principle of justice and the correlation of sanctity of life and quality of life will serve as 
safeguards against these possibilities of abuse. 
In conclusion, in making treatment decisions for never-competent patients, 
McCormick emphasizes the need for a proper moral criterion that is precisely analyzed and 
carefully articulated in order to keep the focus on the "best interests" of the never-competent 
patient. The criticism directed at McCormick's quality-of-life criterion highlights the need 
for McCormick to be not only more precise with language and terminology but shows the 
need for a more systematic analysis of his moral criterion. Until this occurs, the result could 
be not only ambiguity and misinterpretation, but the real possibility of misapplication and 
abuse. For McCormick's quality-of-life criterion to be considered beneficial and appropriate 
for decision-makers it must stand up to both medical and ethical scrutiny. Unless it does, it 
will be added to the long list of criteria for moral decision-making found wanting. 
Conclusion 
McCormick's quality-of-life criterion is not a wooden formula that one can apply to 
any situation and come to a concrete decision. He views his quality-of-life criterion as a 
"light in a room, a light that allows the individual objects to be seen in the fullness of their 
context."170 The two guidelines McCormick proposes as the heart of his quality-of-life 
criterion serve as a guide to assist the appropriate decision-makers in making treatment 
decisions for never-competent patients. McCormick believes his quality-of-life criterion is 
17
°Castelli, "Richard A. McCormick And Life/Death Decisions," 34. McCormick, 
as interviewed by Castelli. 
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beneficial and appropriate for Christian decision-makers because it is grounded in the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition and it is reasonable. The quality-of-life criterion proposed for 
never-competent patients attempts to walk a middle course between extreme positions. To 
those who believe his criterion is too liberal, McCormick gives two reasons for why he 
believes it is a "moderate" position. He writes: 
First, there are a good number of people who would like simply to put these 
children to sleep. This is not my proposal at all. I'm proposing that we 
shouldn't intervene with artificial medical support or surgery ifthe child will 
benefit nothing from them. Second, my position comes out of and is 
continuous with a conservative tradition--the Judaeo-Christian tradition that 
life is a basic value, but not an absolute one, and therefore suggests limits 
with regard to its support. 171 
McCormick constructs his quality-of-life criterion on the foundation of his theological 
anthropology and his moral epistemology. From this foundation emerges the final element 
of his ethical methodology. 
McCormick has an underlying ethical system; the problem is that he has never 
articulated it in a systematic manner. Being an acknowledged non-system builder does not 
mean that the structure of a system is not in place. 172 The structure is secure; the problem is 
that he has never articulated it clearly and the particulars are open to ambiguity and 
misinterpretation. However, demonstrating that McCormick has an ethical methodology and 
building a case for it, is only half the battle. To verify that McCormick's ethical 
methodology is operable and of value, it will have to be applied to specific ethical situations. 
171Ibid. 
172See Odozor, Richard A. McCormick And The Renewal Of Moral Theology, 23. 
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The next chapter will take McCormick's ethical methodology and apply it to four specific 
diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates. These diagnostic treatment categories 
will attempt to encompass, as far as possible, the entire spectrum of defective neonates. 
McCormick's quality-of-life criterion will be applied to each category to determine if it is 
a practical and beneficial criterion that can be utilized by the appropriate decision-makers in 
regard to treatment decisions for defective neonates. Before this can be accomplished, one 
must determine who exactly are the appropriate decision-makers in regards to never-
competent patients. Therefore, this next chapter will also examine the procedural issues that 
focus on the four potential candidates of decision-makers for never-competent patients. 
CHAPTER V 
MCCORMICK'S ETHICAL METHODOLOGY AS APPLIED TO TREATMENT 
DECISIONS FOR DEFECTIVE NEONATES 
Introduction 
Dramatic advances in neonatal medical information and technology increase daily 
and these advances are being implemented almost immediately. One thing that is clear to 
serious observers in the field is that the implementation of medical advances and technology 
for some neonates is a mixed blessing at best. As a result, the appropriate decision-makers 
are having to decide whether defective neonates, such as those with serious congenital 
anomalies, low-birth-weights, and genetic defects, should be treated aggressively or not at 
all. McCormick writes: "Here we are dealing with tiny patients who have no history, have 
had no chance at life, and have no say in the momentous decision about their treatment."1 
Despite proposed federal regulations (1984 Child Abuse Law) and medical guidelines 
(American Academy of Pediatrics) that have helped to clarify treatment issues, there is still 
no consensus among responsible decision-makers on substantive and procedural issues 
surrounding defective neonates.2 There is general agreement within the medical, legal, and 
1McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New 
World?, 393-394. 
2For a more detailed analysis of the 1984 Child Abuse Law and the guidelines of 
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ethical professions that there are some defective neonates, in particular situations, whose 
lives need not be saved. Consensus ends, however, when an attempt is made to determine 
which specific neonates should receive or not receive medical treatment. There is also some 
general agreement, in certain situations, on the appropriate decision-makers for never-
competent patients. Consensus ends, however, when a conflict arises between parents or 
between parents and health care professionals. This diversity of opinions has brought to the 
forefront the urgent need for an acceptable set of guidelines on both substantive and 
procedural issues. McCormick has proposed an ethical methodology, in which a patient-
centered, quality-of-life criterion is an integral part, as a public policy option that can be used 
by the appropriate decision-makers in determining treatment decisions for defective 
neonates.3 To detennine if McCormick's ethical methodology is recommendable to the 
appropriate decision-makers as a public policy option for the treatment of defective neonates, 
it will be applied to four diagnostic treatment categories of neonatal anomalies. 
This chapter will first articulate, analyze, and examine the procedural issues. This 
entails focusing on a number of questions. Who decides whether a defective neonate should 
the American Academy of Pediatrics, refer to Chapter One, Neonatology: A United States 
Perspective section above. 
31t should be noted that McCormick believes morality and public policy are both 
related and distinct. He writes: "They are related because law or public policy has an 
inherently moral character due to its rootage in existential human ends (goods). The 
common good of all persons cannot be unrelated to what is judged to be promotive or 
destructive to the individual--in other words, judged to be moral or immoral. Morality 
and public policy are distinct because it is only when individual acts have ascertainable 
public consequences on the maintenance and stability of society that they are the proper 
concerns of society, fit subjects for public policy." McCormick, "Public Policy And Fetal 
Research," How Brave A New World?, 72. 
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be treated or denied treatment? What criterion is used for determining the appropriate 
decision-makers? How does the criterion apply to these individuals? Finally, on what basis 
are these treatment decisions made? Second, this chapter will present four diagnostic 
treatment categories established by this author. These four diagnostic treatment categories 
span the spectrum of neonatal defects so that most congenital anomalies can be placed in one 
of the four categories. The four diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates 
include: (1) The defective neonate whose potential for human relationships is completely 
nonexistent. (2) The defective neonate who has a potential for human relationships but 
whose potential is utterly submerged in the mere struggle for survival. (3) The defective 
neonate who has a potential for human relationships but the underlying medical condition 
will result in imminent death. Another variation of this category would be when the 
defective neonate has the potential for human relationships but after medical treatment has 
been initiated, it becomes apparent that the treatment is medically futile. ( 4) The defective 
neonate who has a potential for human relationships and has a correctable or treatable 
medical condition. A congenital anomaly has been selected to represent each particular 
diagnostic category.4 McCormick's ethical methodology will be applied to each diagnostic 
41t should be noted that this author verified the four diagnostic treatment 
categories and the representative anomalies with Dr. Jonathan Muraskas--Associate 
Professor of Pediatrics and Assistant Clinical Director ofNeonatology--at the Loyola 
Medical Center Chicago, Illinois on December 8, 1995. The four diagnostic categories 
and their representative anomalies were also confirmed by Dr. Apollo Maglalang--
Professor of Pediatrics and Director of Neonatology--at the Atlantic City Medical Center 
Atlantic City, New Jersey on December 28, 1995. These two neonatologists were 
selected because this author has done a bioethics clinical rotation under each physician's 
supervision in the past five years. 
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treatment category to determine how his approach would guide the appropriate decision-
makers in treating the defective neonate representative of the particular diagnostic category. 
Procedural Issues 
Treatment decisions for never-competent patients focus on two distinct but 
interrelated procedural issues--who are the appropriate decision-makers and how are these 
treatment decisions made? This section will first examine who are the appropriate decisions-
makers and why McCormick believes these individuals are the appropriate decision-makers. 
Secondly, this section will examine how McCormick makes these treatment decisions and 
by which criteria. 
Treatment decisions concerning defective neonates are difficult under the best of 
circumstances. It becomes even more difficult and complex when there is a conflict situation 
regarding what is in the "best interests" of the defective neonate. The complicating factors 
that add to the complexity of treatment decisions include: 
The high stakes involved in the decisions, the uncertainty of making proxy 
decisions for incompetent patients who have never been competent, serious 
time constraints, maximum emotional stress on parents, occasional 
disagreements between parents about the morally correct course of action, 
conflicts of interest (between parents and child, physicians and child, parents 
and physicians), the difficulty of accurately predicting neurological 
impairment and other future handicaps, inadequate communication of 
information between responsible parties in cases, and the logistical problems 
in using hospital committees or courts of law.5 
The complexity of these issues and the fact that the defective neonate must always be 
5Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 254. 
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represented by a proxy underscore the importance of determining the appropriate decision-
maker who will be entrusted to promote the "best interests" of the never-competent patient. 
To make this determination, ethicist Robert Weir proposes four criteria for determining an 
appropriate decision-maker. The four criteria are: 
( 1) The proxy should have relevant knowledge and information. This means 
the proxy should be knowledgeable regarding medical facts in particular 
cases. The proxy should be knowledgeable regarding the family setting into 
which particular anomalous neonates have been born. The proxy should have 
knowledge regarding possible alternatives to home care by biological parents. 
(2) The proxy should be impartial. The requirement of impartiality means 
that such persons should determine, as objectively as possible, whether life-
prolonging treatment would be in the best interests of the individual neonate 
in question. 
(3) The proxy should be emotionally well-equipped to make such treatment 
decisions. Too often, treatment decisions are made by persons under severe 
emotional distress. 
(4) There should be consistency in moral decision-making from case to case. 
The proxy, all things being equal, should be consistent in handling cases with 
the same diagnostic condition. In addition, it is necessary that proxies be 
consistent in applying the obligatory/nonobligatory distinction to cases.6 
6Ibid., 255-257. It should be noted that the reason Robert Weir is being quoted is 
that McCormick has been greatly influenced by Weir's writings, especially in the area of 
treatment decisions for defective neonates. See McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The 
Baby," 18-25. It should also be noted that Weir advocates the child's best interests as his 
fundamental decision-making standard. Weir writes: "As potential persons, neonates 
have prima facie claims to life and the medical treatment necessary to prolong life. 
Although there are some instances in which these prima facie claims are justifiably 
overridden by other considerations, such considerations should have only one focal point: 
the best interests of the anomalous child." Ibid., 194-195. Weir understands the "best 
interests" criterion to be distinct from the "quality-of-life" criterion, however, both 
McCormick and Richard Sparks disagree that these two criteria are really distinct or 
separable. McCormick writes: "It is precisely because one is focused on best interests 
that qualitative considerations cannot be ignored but indeed are central. Weir is clearly 
afraid that quality-of-life considerations will be unfair. But they need not be. It all 
depends on where the line is drawn." McCormick, review of Selective Nontreatment Of 
Handicapped Newborns, by Robert Weir, in Perspectives In Biolo~y And Medicine 29 
(Winter 1986): 328; see also Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?, 189-192. For a more 
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Weir is well-aware that not every proxy can meet all of these conditions. However, he 
believes that the appropriate decision-maker should meet as many as possible. A review of 
McCormick's writings regarding procedural issues clearly shows that he would agree with 
Weir's analysis.7 
There are four potential candidates for appropriate decision-makers regarding never-
competent patients. The potential candidates include: parents, health care professionals, 
ethics or infant care review committees, and the courts. Parents of the defective neonate 
have their own intrinsic authority because of the nature of their relationship to the neonate. 
However, there are circumstances in which this intrinsic authority can be and must be 
limited. Each potential candidate has both positive and negative factors affecting their role 
as an appropriate decision-maker that are based on Weir's criteria for proxy decision-makers. 
The potential candidates, along with the positive and negative factors affecting their role as 
a proxy, will be discussed briefly to give a comprehensive overview of the role of the 
appropriate decision-maker. 
The majority of bioethicists and health care professionals believe that treatment 
decisions regarding defective neonates ought to fall under the jurisdiction of parental 
authority. 8 The Judicial Council of the American Medical Association adds its support to 
detailed analysis of McCormick's notion of "best interests," refer to Chapter Four, 
McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above. 
7See McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 18-25; Idem, "The 
Preservation Of Life And Self-Determination," How Brave A New World?, 381-389; and 
McCormick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 352-361. 
8Examples of bioethicists who believe parents are the appropriate decision-makers 
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parents as the appropriate decision-makers by stating: "In desperate situations involving 
newborns, the advice and judgment of the physicians should be readily available, but the 
decisions whether to exert maximal efforts to sustain life should be the choice of parents. "9 
The President's Commission For The Study Of Ethical Problems In Medicine also 
recommends that parents should be the primary decision-makers, especially in borderline 
cases. 10 Parents are given this authority as part of the discretionary decision-making power 
that society grants them in other matters concerning their children. Weir writes that 
would include: John Fletcher, "Choices Of Life Or Death In The Care Of Defective 
Newborns," in Social Responsibility: Journalism. Law. And Medicine, ed. Louis W. 
Hodges (Lexington, VA.: Washington and Lee University Press, 1973), 60-79; Michael J. 
Garland, "Care Of The Newborn: The Decision Not To Treat," Perinatology/ 
Neonatolo~y 1(September-October1977): 10-17; and Terence Ackerman, 
"Meningomyelocele And Parental Commitment: A Policy Proposal Regarding Selection 
For Treatment," Man And Medicine 5 (Fall 1980): 295-300. Examples of health care 
professionals who believe parents are the appropriate decision-makers include: Raymond 
S. Duff, M.D., and A.G. M. Campbell, M.D., "Moral And Ethical Dilemmas: Seven 
Years Into The Debate And Human Ambiguity," Annals Of The American Academy Of 
Political And Social Science 447 (January 1977): 19-28; Anthony Shaw, M.D., "Who 
Should Die And Who Should Decide?," in Infanticide And The Value Of Life, ed. 
Marvin Kohl (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1978), 104-109; and R. B. Zachary, 
M.D., "Ethical And Social Aspects Of Treatment Of Spina Bifida," The Lancet 2 (1969): 
270-276. 
9The Judicial Council of the American Medical Association, "Current Opinions 
Of The Judicial Council Of The American Medical Association," (Chicago, IL.: 
American Medical Association, 1982): 9. 
10According to the President's Commission: "Parents are usually present, 
concerned, willing to become informed, and cognizant of the values of the culture in 
which the child will be raised. They can be expected to try to make decisions that 
advance the newborn's best interests." For a more detailed analysis, see The President's 
Commission For The Study Of Ethical Problems In Medicine And Biomedical Research, 
Deciding To Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1983), 6-7; 197-229. 
society gives parents considerable latitude in providing moral education for 
their children, in deciding whether their children will attend public or private 
schools, and in most of the decisions that have to be made about their 
children's medical care. 11 
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Second, parents have anticipated the birth of a child and have made certain commitments to 
the child prior to birth, therefore, they are the most likely to be most committed to the 
continuing welfare of the child. 
While parents are the most knowledgeable about the family situation into which the 
neonate is born--emotional, financial, social factors, etc.--they are hampered as decision-
makers by several other factors. Given the medical complexity of the situation, the 
emotional stress parents are under at the time when treatment decisions are being made, and 
their lack of knowledge concerning alternatives to keeping custody and providing long-term 
care for the child, some bioethicists and health care professionals believe that parents are not 
the appropriate decision-makers for never-competent patients. These factors may hinder the 
parent's decision-making capabilities and have the potential of causing harm to the neonate. 12 
Health care professionals are the second potential candidates for appropriate decision-
makers regarding defective neonates. Several bioethicists and health care professionals 
believe that neonatologists are the best decision-makers because they serve as the neonate's 
llWeir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicap_ped Newborns, 258. 
12Weir argues that according to his criteria for proxy decision-makers, there are 
three circumstances in which parents should not have the final word in treatment 
decisions: '"when they simply cannot understand the relevant medical facts of a case, 
when they are emotionally unstable, and when they appear to put their own interests 
before those of defective newborns." Ibid., 269. 
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advocate and thus are more likely to promote the neonate's best interests.13 In addition, 
physicians possess the specialized medical knowledge regarding genetic disorders and 
congenital anomalies and they understand their long-term effects. They are more impartial 
and clear-sighted than parents because they are not under emotional stress. Finally, given 
their professional involvement with daily treatment of defective neonates, they have the 
opportunity to compare neonates with similar anomalous conditions, can assess the 
effectiveness of various treatment possibilities, and can make comparative judgments about 
the long-term handicaps associated with various medical conditions. 14 
Despite their medical knowledge, this does not always enable neonatologists to make 
accurate diagnoses and prognoses. Second, neonatologists are not always impartial and 
objective. Many have a bias in favor of normal and healthy neonates. Some have a bias 
toward research and experimentation. Rather than trying to assess treatment options in terms 
of the best interests of the neonate, neonatologists may tend to view neonates, especially 
those with serious, possibly exotic conditions, as relatively rare opportunities to advance the 
13Examples ofbioethicists and health care professionals who believe 
neonatologists are the best decision-makers for defective neonates include: Carson 
Strong, "Decision Making In The NICU: The Neonatologist As Patient Advocate," 
Hastings Center Report 25 (1984): 17-23; C. Everett Koop, M.D., "The Seriously Ill Or 
Dying Child: Supporting The Patient And The Family," in Death. Dying. And 
Euthanasia, eds. Dennis J. Horan and David Mall (Washington, D.C.: University 
Publications of America, 1977), 537-539; John Lorber, M.D., "Spina Bifida Cystica: 
Results Of Treatment Of270 Consecutive Cases With Criteria For Selection For The 
Future," Archives Of Diseases In Childhood 47 (1972): 850-871; and John M. Freeman, 
M.D., Kenneth Schoolman, M.D., and William Reinke, M.D., "Decision Making And 
The Infant With Spina Bifida," in Decision Making And The Defective Newborn, ed. 
Chester A. Swinyard (Springfield, IL.: Charles C. Thomas, 1978), 103-115. 
14Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 260-261. 
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cause of neonatal medicine as a science. Finally, there are external pressures that influence 
neonatologist' s opinions. The two dominant external pressures are the law and assertive 
parents. 15 
The third potential candidate is the Neonatal Infant Review Committee. 16 A number 
of bioethicists, health care professionals, and attorneys believe that neonates are better served 
by these review committees because individual decision-makers need advice from an 
informed group representing different professional disciplines. 17 The reasons advanced for 
advocating Neonatal Infant Review Committees as the best decision-makers would be 
because they ensure emotional stability, impartiality, and consistency. In addition, because 
of the multi-disciplined representation on the committee, the members possess relevant 
knowledge of medical facts, family setting, and alternatives to home-care that is necessary 
in making borderline decisions regarding treatment. The Neonatal Infant Review Committee 
15Ibid., 261-263. 
16 A Neonatal Infant Review Committee is an advisory committee used to 
safeguard the best interests of the defective neonate. Physicians and parents can refer 
cases to the committee for treatment recommendations. The committee typically consists 
of one or more neonatologists, appropriate medical consultants, the senior Neonatal 
Intensive Care Unit (NICU) nurse, other NICU nurses, a social service representative, a 
hospital administrator, one or more pediatricians, the hospital attorney, one or more 
bioethicists, and one or more members of the clergy. For a more detailed analysis of 
Neonatal Infant Review Committees, see Ibid., 263-266. 
17Examples ofbioethicists and health care professionals who believe Neonatal 
Infant Review Committees are the most appropriate decision-makers include: Paul 
Ramsey, Ethics At The Edges Of Life, 145-227; John A. Robertson and Norman Fost, 
M.D., "Passive Euthanasia Of Defective Newborn Infants: Legal Considerations," 
Journal Of Pediatrics 88 (1976): 887-889; and Paul Bridge and Maryls Bridge, "The Brief 
Life And Death Of Christopher Bridge," Hastings Center Report 11 (December 1981 ): 
18-20. 
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is also able to adjudicate conflicts regarding treatment decisions that often arise between 
neonatologists and parents. The committee also serves to safeguard the "best interests" of 
the neonate when both the parents and the neonatologists agree on a course of medical action 
that is contrary to the "best interests" of the neonate. 18 
The negative aspects surrounding Neonatal Infant Review Committees focus on the 
fact that neonatal decisions are often made rapidly, in response to a crisis situation. Because 
of the nature of the committee, logistics and timing are problematic. In addition, committees 
are often cumbersome ways to make decisions because they can be frustratingly indecisive 
and occasionally inept. Assertive and outspoken individuals can sometimes dominate 
committee meetings. Finally, no matter how the committee is composed and how efficient 
it is, any committee placed in an advisory or decision-making role necessarily means a 
reduction in parental autonomy and physician discretion in neonatal cases. 19 Realistically, 
few parents are ever made aware of the fact that such committees exist, and many 
neonatologists resent having their decisions placed before such committees for review. 
Even though Weir believes these committees come close to meeting his criteria for proxies 
in neonatal cases, under these circumstances the practical utilization of such committees as 
appropriate decision-makers for defective neonates is questionable. 
The final potential candidate for appropriate decision-maker in regard to treatment 
18Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handica1112ed Newborns, 263-265. 
19lbid., 264-266. 
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decisions for defective neonates is the court system.2° Few parents or health care 
professionals favor turning treatment decisions over to the courts. Weir writes: 
For parents, the use of the courts as a proxy means the likelihood of court-
mandated treatment contrary to parental desires. For physicians, the prospect 
of judicial involvement in neonatal cases means unnecessary legal intrusion 
into medical matters.21 
Despite these objections, the strength of the court system would be that it provides an 
opportunity for disinterested, dispassionate, and consistent reasoning from case to case. The 
court system also has the means to ensure that relevant knowledge, information, and 
opposing points of view are presented for consideration in a public forum. Judges also have 
the ability to appoint a guardian ad /item to be an advocate for the never-competent patient.22 
On the other hand, the weakness of the court system would be that judges are more 
remote than other proxies because they are not on the scene in the NICU and often have no 
personal contact with the case under consideration. This can be viewed as leading to more 
objectivity, but at the same time it can lead to less sensitivity for the persons involved.23 In 
20Examples of those who advocate the courts as the appropriate decision-makers 
include: Paul A. Freund, "Mongoloids And 'Mercy Killing,'" in Ethics In Medicine, eds. 
Stanley J. Reiser, Arthur J. Dyck, and William J. Curran (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT 
Press, 1982), 530-542. Physicians Fost and Koop advocate a possible appropriate role for 
the courts. See Norman Fost, M.D., "Ethical Problems In Pediatrics," Current Problems 
In Pediatrics 6 (October 1976): 13-17; and C. Everett Koop, M.D., "The Handicapped 
Child And His Family," Linacre Quarterly 48 (February 1981): 19-24. 
21Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handica1wed Newborns, 266. 
22 A guardian ad /item is an adult appointed by the court to represent the interests 
of a minor or an incompetent person. 
23Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 266-268. 
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addition, the functioning of judges as proxies depends on the personal views of the judges. 24 
After examining the four potential candidates for decision-makers for defective 
neonates, Weir concludes that, because each is limited in important ways, it is preferable not 
to regard any of them as the best proxy. Instead, he advocates a serial or sequential ordering 
of decision-makers for never-competent patients. Weir writes: 
By incorporating each of the possible proxies into a sequential decision-
making process, and by restricting the circumstances in which these possible 
proxies can actually function as decision makers for incompetent patients, the 
best interests of the defective neonate are more adequately served and 
protected than if any of the alternative decision makers is permitted to make 
unilateral decisions about life prolonging treatment in all neonatal cases. 25 
Based on Weir's criteria for proxy decision-makers, McCormick argues that parents in 
consultation with health care professionals are the appropriate decision-makers for never-
competent patients.26 Like Weir, McCormick believes that when loving and responsible 
parents are adequately informed about the diagnosis and prognosis of their child, under most 
24Weir writes: "For instance, in cases involving neonates with Down's syndrome 
complicated with esophageal or duodenal atresia, some judges in some jurisdictions are 
reluctant to override parental autonomy--and other judges in other jurisdictions override 
parental autonomy in such cases simply on the basis of a telephoned request from the 
attending pediatrician." Ibid., 268. 
251bid. It should be noted that Weir begins with parents then moves to physicians, 
Neonatal Infant Review Committees and then to the courts. For a more detailed analysis 
of his serial ordering of decision makers for never-competent patients, see Ibid., 268-270. 
It should also be noted that Weir agrees with James Childress on this issue of serial 
ordering. For a more detailed analysis of Childress' position, see James F. Childress, 
Who Should Decide? (New York: Oxford Press, 1982): 172-174. 
261 am assuming at this stage of the dissertation that when McCormick refers to 
parents he is referring to parents who abide by the Christian story or are of the Christian 
faith. In chapter six I will evaluate whether McCormick's ethical methodology is 
applicable to non-Christian parents. 
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circumstances they will make well-informed decisions that all parties concerned can accept 
as both medically and morally right. To ensure that parents are well-informed and that the 
neonate's "best interests" are protected, McCormick advocates that parents should seek 
consultation from health care professionals. McCormick will ground this position both 
legally and morally. 
McCormick maintains that there is a long legal, social, and moral tradition that 
parents have the right to make their own decisions regarding medical treatments. The legal 
tradition is based on the principle of self-determination. 27 This tradition also maintains that 
when the patient is incompetent or never-competent, these decisions are to be made by those 
who have the "best interests" of the incompetent and never-competent at heart. Since the 
principle of self-determination is not directly applicable to defective neonates, McCormick 
proposes the principle of familial self-determination to ensure the "best interests" of the 
neonate are being considered. 28 Someone has to make these treatment decisions for the 
27The principle of self-determination entails that it is the person himself or herself 
who is best situated to implement treatment decisions. The underlying supposition for 
self-determination in the acceptance or refusal of treatment is that the over-all good of the 
patient will best be served iftreatment is controlled by the person. For a more detailed 
analysis, see McCormick, "The Moral Right To Privacy," How Brave A New World?, 
369. It should be noted that, even though individual self-determination is not applicable 
with never-competent patients, McCormick believes that "a fuller understanding of the 
principle of autonomy and benefit to the patient may still provide a basis for making 
responsible decisions about the care of such patients." Idem, "The Preservation Of Life 
And Self-Determination," How Brave A New World?, 386. 
28McCormick argues that the principle of patient benefit forms the foundation for 
the principle of familial self-determination. The principle of patient benefit states: 
"Incompetent patients and formerly competent patients who have not expressed 
themselves adequately while competent must be accorded full dignity as human beings. 
We must affirm the moral obligation placed upon others that this implies. Someone must 
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never-competent patient and McCormick argues that "someone" ought to be the parents. 29 
There are two reasons why McCormick proposes that parents have the right to make 
decisions for defective neonates: 
First, the family is normally in the best position to judge the real interests of 
the incompetent patient. They know his or her life-style, preferences, and 
values. Second, however--and we think this is the more important reason--
our society places great value on the family. The family is a basic moral 
community affirmed to have not only rights, but also responsibilities in 
determining how best to serve the interests of its incompetent members .... 
Family members are given enormous responsibility for moral nurture, 
theological and secular education, and decisions about the best interests of 
their incompetent members throughout the lifetime of the family unit. It 
should be no different in the case when the incompetent family member is 
seriously or terminally ill. Occasionally this may lead a family to decide that 
the incompetent one's interests can best be served by declining medical 
intervention. 30 
McCormick argues that familial self-determination has firm support both socially and 
legally, but he also argues that there are sound theological warrants for supporting familial 
have the responsibility of determining what is the patient's best interest." Ibid. 
29ln the event that no family member or family surrogate is willing to be 
appointed guardian for an incompetent or never-competent patient, then the principle of 
familial self-determination no longer has any significance for that specific case. 
McCormick writes: "The principle of patient benefit remains and becomes the exclusive 
principle for determining the case. Even then, however, when the only principle is that of 
choosing the course that will best serve the patient's best interests, someone will have to 
make the determination. In these most tragic cases often a public official such as a judge 
may have to be called upon. By this method due process will be provided to protect the 
interests of a most vulnerable group in our society." Ibid., 388. 
30Ibid., 387. It should be noted that these two reasons are similar to the criteria for 
proxy decision-makers that Weir advocates. The parents have the knowledge regarding 
the family setting into which this particular anomalous neonate has been born. The 
parents know the emotional, financial, and social factors that will play a major role in 
determining if this neonate should be treated. 
self-determination. He writes: 
In Christian tradition the family is seen as a tightly bound unit with a 
sacramental ministry to the world. It is to mirror forth, by its own 
cohesiveness and solidarity, the love of Christ for his people. It is the school 
oflove and caring, of nourishing and growth. It shares and deepens its values 
and spiritual life together as a unit. It determines what is to be its Christian 
life-style. It is the Church in miniature, and therefore like the Church has its 
own inner dynamics, priorities, and ideals. Since it lives and grows as a unit, 
its decisions in many important matters are, or ought to be, corporate matters, 
directions taken as a result of its own familial self-determination. 31 
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Firmly grounded by secular and theological warrants, McCormick believes that the 
parents of never-competent patients have the legal and moral right to act as proxies for their 
children. However, this does not mean that parents cannot make mistakes or that their 
authority should go unchecked. McCormick argues: 
The hidden assumption is that responsible and loving families (that is, 
parents) will make morally right decisions. This is a fair rule of thumb, but 
only that. Even loving, responsible people can make mistakes, and the 
assumptions ordinarily warranted in their regard become somewhat more 
questionable in the bewildering, anguishing, life-death setting of the 
emergent situation. 32 
Because parents are under emotional stress when treatment decisions have to be made, and 
because they do not have all the medical knowledge required to make well-informed 
decisions, McCormick proposes that parents should always consult with the health care 
professionals involved in the situation. Parents need as much medical information, support, 
31lbid., 387-388. McCormick's notion of familial self-determination has its roots 
in the notion oflove of God and love of neighbor. For a more detailed analysis of 
McCormick's position on the love of God and love of neighbor, refer to Chapter Two, 
McCormick's Theological Anthropology section, Doctrine Of Creation subsection above. 
32McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 19. 
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of never-competent patients. Societal intervention should take place "only when the familial 
judgment so exceeds the limits of reason that the compromise with what is objectively in the 
incompetent one's best interests cannot be tolerated. "36 If it is suspected that the parents in 
consultation with health care professionals are acting irresponsibly and not in the "best 
interests" of the neonate, then society has a duty to intervene. 37 McCormick writes: 
That intervention can take many forms, like legislation, criminal prosecution 
or a child-neglect hearing. The purpose of such proceedings is to guarantee 
that the primary decision-maker acts in a responsible way, one that should be 
able to sustain public scrutiny. We believe that public accountability and 
review, a review that guarantees that the values of the society are respected 
and adhered to, can be invoked short of judicial intervention. 38 
In this way, McCormick has an additional safeguard in place in the event that parents in 
consultation with health care professionals fail to keep the "best interests" of the neonate as 
their primary focus. 39 
McCormick believes his position that parents in consultation with health care 
professionals have the moral responsibility to make treatment decisions for defective 
36Ibid., 388. 
37When McCormick states that under certain circumstances "society" has a duty to 
intervene, he is referring to agencies such as the Department of Children and Family 
Services, etc. 
38McCormick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
360. 
39lt should be noted that McCormick's notion of safeguards corresponds to Weir's 
use of sequential arrangement of decision-makers. Weir writes: "A sequential 
arrangement of decision makers also incorporates the possibilities of (a) appeals to a 
'higher' proxy and (b) overriding the decision of a 'lower' proxy when circumstances 
merit." Weir, Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, 268. McCormick does 
not have this sequential arrangement, but he does believe that Neonatal Infant Review 
Committees and the courts can play a role when necessary. 
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neonates is firmly rooted in the Catholic tradition, in the social and legal structure of society, 
and in his own theological anthropology. Decisions by parents in consultation with health 
care professionals ought to be made in the "best interests" of the defective neonate based on 
the family's beliefs and values. In this way, the "best interests" of the defective neonate, 
normatively understood, are protected. 
McCormick will determine how treatment decisions are made for defective neonates 
by proposing his category of "best interests" understood normatively.40 This is a patient-
centered, teleological assessment of what is considered to be in the "best interests" of the 
neonate. Parents should decide what the defective neonate ought to want, that is, what is in 
the "best interests" of the neonate, and all others concerned in the decision-making process. 
McCormick has a normative understanding of"best interests" because, "as social beings, our 
good, our flourishing (therefore, our best interests) is inextricably bound up with the well-
being of others."41 McCormick's "best interests" category is a composite category that 
involves quality-of-life considerations, benefit-burden considerations, and the use of 
proportionate reason as a tool for establishing what is promotive or destructive for the good 
40It should be noted that there are other ethical approaches and criteria used by 
bioethicists in making treatment decisions for defective neonates. For a more detailed 
analysis of these other criteria, refer to Chapter One, General Ethical Approaches To 
Treatment For Defective Neonates section above. 
41McCormick, "The Rights Of The Voiceless," How Brave A New World?, 101. 
The basis for this is in McCormick's theological anthropology. For a more detailed 
analysis, refer to Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section, 
Doctrine Of Creation subsection above. 
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of the person "integrally and adequately considered."42 McCormick's understanding of "best 
interests" is grounded in his "revised" natural law position. McCormick writes: 
I believe we do have reasons for assuming we know in many cases what an 
incompetent would want. We may assume that most people are reasonable, 
and that being such they would choose what is in their best interest. At least 
this is a safe and protective guideline to follow in structuring our conduct 
toward them when they cannot speak. The assumption may be factually and 
per accidens incorrect. But I am convinced that it will not often be .... I 
believe most of us want to act reasonably within parameters that are objective 
in character, even though we do not always do so. Or at least I think it good 
protective policy to assume this. 43 
The function of parents as the proxy for their children is viewed as protective. 
Parents protect their children in that they know what their child ought to want, that is, what 
is in their "best interests" normatively understood. McCormick stresses the fact that all 
reasonable people, not just Christians, can determine what is in the "best interests" of the 
neonate. He writes: 
The value of human life leading to the traditional evaluation was seen in 
God's special and costing love for each individual--for fetal life, infant life, 
senescent life, disabled life, captive life, yes, and most of all unwanted life. 
These evaluations can be and have been shared by others than Christians, of 
course. But Christians have particular warrants for resisting any cultural 
42For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's category of"best interests," refer 
to Chapter Four, McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above. It should be noted that 
when McCormick refers to benefits in his "best interests" category it is not restricted to 
medical benefits. Benefits also apply to social and familial benefits. This notion of 
"benefit" originates in Pellegrino' s four components of "best interests" that McCormick 
has incorporated into his "best interests" category. For a more detailed analysis of 
Pellegrino's position, refer to Chapter Four, McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above; 
see also Edmund Pellegrino, M.D., "Moral Choice, The Good Of The Patient And The 
Patient's Good," in Ethics And Critical Care Medicine, 117-138. 




As social beings who are interrelated, parents in consultation with health care professionals 
can best determine whether certain treatments will cause excessive social and familial 
burdens on those who will care for the neonate's existence.45 Therefore, if McCormick has 
a normative understanding of "best interests," then it is parents in consultation with health 
care professionals who can best determine what the defective neonate ought to want, which 
should include the needs of those who will care for the neonate. To help parents determine 
what is in the "best interests" of the neonate normatively understood, McCormick proposes 
the establishment of diagnostic treatment categories. The next section will propose such 
diagnostic categories in an attempt to assist parents in the decision-making process. 
44McCormick, "Public Policy On Abortion," How Brave A New World?, 197-198. 
45This is grounded in McCormick's theological anthropology which states that 
persons are created in the image and likeness of God; therefore, all persons are social and 
relational creatures. This sense of sociality and relationality suggests that the well-being 
of persons is interrelated. Further, the well-being of one person cannot be conceived of or 
realistically pursued independently of the good of others since a social creature is part of 
human being and becoming. This sense of sociality and relationality pertains to neonates 
as much as it does to adults. McCormick \vrites: "The good of infants is inseparably 
interlocked and interrelated to the good of others, for infants are human beings. Clearly, 
they cannot experience this or respond to its implications as claims. But we may for 
them--to the extent that it is reasonable to do so, a reasonableness founded on their 
common share in our human nature. On this basis we conclude to the reasonableness of 
certain interventions and try to convey and limit this reasonableness (rooted in the 
continuity of our share in the sociality of human nature) by the language of ought." 
McCormick, "Sharing In Sociality: Children And Experimentation," How Brave A New 
World?, 90-91. Emphasis in the original. For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's 
understanding of the social and relational nature of the human person, refer to Chapter 
Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section, Doctrine Of Creation subsection 
above. 
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Application Of McCormick's Ethical Methodology To Four Diagnostic Treatment 
Categories Of Defective Neonates 
This section will address the application ofMcCormick's ethical methodology to four 
specific diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates. These categories attempt to 
encompass, as far as possible, the entire spectrwn of defective neonates. They are based on 
McCormick's moral criterion of the potential for human relationships.46 One example of a 
congenital anomaly has been selected that is representative of each particular diagnostic 
category. 
McCormick has plotted the two extreme positions on this spectrum of defective 
neonates, but has left the "conflictual middle," to be filled in by health care professionals and 
bioethicsts. McCormick writes: 
It is the task of physicians to provide some more concrete categories or 
presumptive biological symptoms for this human judgment. For instance, 
nearly all would likely agree that the anencephalic infant is without relational 
potential. On the other hand, the same cannot be said for the mongoloid 
infant. The task ahead is to attach relational potential to presumptive 
biological symptoms for the gray areas between such extremes.47 
This section will attempt to complete the ''conflictual middle." The "conflictual middle" 
pertains to those neonatal anomalies that fall into the "gray area" of treatment decisions.48 
46By relational potential McCormick means "the hope that the infant will, in 
relative comfort, be able to experience our caring and love." McCormick, "To Save Or 
Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 351. For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's 
relational potential, refer to Chapter Four, McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above. 
47McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 349-350. 
48This would include anomalies in which the neonate has the potential for human 
relationships, but the potential is utterly submerged in the mere struggle for survival, or 
the medical condition will result in imminent death, or it has been determined that further 
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I have arranged these diagnostic treatment categories in a way that demonstrates the 
application of McCormick's "best interests" criterion. McCormick has established the two 
extremes on the spectrum based on his "best interests" criterion. The middle categories have 
been arranged in accordance with the two extreme categories by applying McCormick's 
"best interests" criterion. There is a logical progression on the spectrum from the neonate 
who does not warrant medical treatment to the neonate who does warrant medical treatment. 
I believe that McCormick would agree with the arrangement of these diagnostic treatment 
categories.49 McCormick is well aware that establishing a full set of diagnostic treatment 
categories is not a panacea for determining treatment decisions for defective neonates. Not 
all medical conditions can be placed in specific categories; there is a marked difference in 
the severity of conditions within each category. Not all health care professionals or even 
bioethicists could or would agree to these specific categories. Nevertheless, McCormick 
argues: 
The important point, however, is that we ought to attempt, as far as possible, 
to approach neonatal disabilities through diagnostic categories, always 
realizing that such categories cannot deflate important individual differences 
and that there will always remain gray areas. 50 
The establishment of these four diagnostic treatment categories is an attempt to meet the 
treatment is medically futile. Certain anomalies that would fall within this category 
would be spina bifida, hypoplastic left heart syndrome, trisomy 13, trisomy 18, Lesch-
Nyhan syndrome, etc. 
491 base this opinion on McCormick's evaluation of Weir's attempt to concretize 
in clinical categories two categories of nontreatment for defective neonates. For a more 
detailed analysis, see McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 24. 
50Ibid. 
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challenge McCormick set before health care professionals and bioethicists to assist parents 
and health care professionals in making treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
Before applying McCormick's ethical methodology, and in particular his moral 
criterion of quality-of-life, it is important to note that for McCormick the neonate's life lacks 
any personal perspectives and thus life-sustaining decisions cannot be individualized.51 This 
implies two general stipulations that will impact on McCormick's ethical methodology: 
First, the criteria used in determining to save or let die where an infant is 
concerned are generalizable to all infants. Secondly, and as a consequence, 
the criteria used must be the strictest possible. That is, the very minimum 
potential for human experiencing or relationships must be seen as sufficient 
warrant for attempting to save. Any other view would be racism of the adult 
world, and would unjustly deprive not simply one but (by logical 
generalizability) many infants of their chance at life.52 
This author will add a third stipulation, which is McCormick's position on infanticide. In 
making treatment decisions for defective neonates McCormick argues that "there is no 
proportionate reason for directly dispatching a terminal or dying patient."53 McCormick 
makes a clear distinction between allowing to die and direct termination. 54 Drawing on the 
51 This is in contrast to individuals who are competent or who were once 
competent. For these individuals life-sustaining decisions can be individualized to the 
person. McCormick writes: "That is, the notion of 'benefit to the patient' can be 
individualized. The adult has a past, perspectives on life and its meaning, aspirations and 
achievements. All these things can be weighed by the patient making life-sustaining 
decisions or by those who know the patient best and presumably have his best interests at 
heart." McCormick, "The Preservation Of Life," Linacre Ouarterly 4 3 (May 197 6): 100. 
52Ibid. 
53McCormick, "The New Medicine And Morality," 316. 
54For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's position on the distinction between 
allowing to die and direct termination, as well as his position on infanticide, refer to 
Chapter Three, Practical Implications Of McCormick's Moral Epistemology As Applied 
doctrine of creation and the lordship of God over all creation, McCormick writes: 
If all persons are equally the creatures of the one God, then none of these 
creatures is authorized to play God toward any other. And if all persons are 
cherished by God, regardless of merit, we ought to cherish each other in the 
same spirit. 55 
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This means that even the most defective neonates, those who experience extreme pain and 
suffering, can never be denied dignity and respect by being terminated. 56 These three general 
stipulations will undergird McCormick's ethical methodology as it is applied to treatment 
decisions for defective neonates. 
This section will be structured so that the diagnostic treatment category is presented. 
The representative anomaly will be examined from a medical point of view by giving a brief 
description of the anomaly and then the diagnosis and prognosis. McCormick's ethical 
methodology will be applied to each anomaly to determine whether parents should decide 
to treat the defective neonate representative of the particular diagnostic category. Finally, 
when applicable, criticisms from the previous three chapters will be addressed. 
To Treatment Decisions For Defective Neonates section above. 
55McCormick, "Public Policy On Abortion," How Brave A New World?, 197. 
56This is an important safeguard because there are a number of bioethicists and 
health care professionals who argue that there is no moral difference between direct 
termination and allowing to die. See Joseph Fletcher, "Ethics And Euthanasia," 
American Journal OfNursin~ 73 (1973): 670-765. This article also appears as a chapter 
in To Live And To Die, ed. Robert H. Williams (New York: Spinger-Verlag, 1973), 113-
124. Paul Ramsey also offers a critique of this view in Ethics At The Ed~es Of Life, 212-
227. 
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Category 1: The Defective Neonate Whose Potential For Human Relationships Is 
Completely Nonexistent 
An anomaly that would be representative of this category would be anencephaly. 
Anencephaly is a developmental abnormality of the central nervous system that results in the 
congenital absence of a major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp. Because anencephalic 
neonates lack functioning cerebral hemispheres, they never experience any degree of 
consciousness. They never have thoughts, feelings, sensations, desires, or emotions. There 
is no purposeful action, social interaction, memory, pain, or suffering. However, 
anencephalic neonates do have fully or partially functioning brain stem tissue. 
Consequently, they are able to maintain at least some of the body's autonomic functions (i.e., 
unconscious activity), including the functions of the heart, lungs, kidneys, and intestinal 
tract, as well as certain reflex actions. They may be able to breathe, suck, engage in 
spontaneous movements of the eyes, arms, legs, respond to noxious stimuli with crying or 
avoidance maneuvers, and exhibit facial expressions typical of healthy infants. While all of 
this activity gives the appearance that the anencephalic neonate has some degree of 
consciousness, there is none. Anencephalic neonates are totally unaware of their existence 
and the environment in which they live. 57 
The cause of anencephaly is usually not known. The data suggests a polygenic or 
multifactorial etiology. Recognized associations include chromosomal abnormalities and 
57 American Medical Associations' s Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs, "The 
Use Of Anencephalic Neonates As Organ Donors," Journal Of The American Medical 
Association 273 (May 24-31, 1995): 1615. 
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mechanical factors. 58 The appearance of a neonate with anencephaly is unique, and the 
diagnosis can be made with virtual certainty when the following criteria are met: 
(1) A large portion of the skull is absent. (2) The scalp, which extends to the 
margin of the bone, is absent over the skull defect. (3) Hemorrhagic, fibrotic 
tissue is exposed because of defects in the skull and scalp. ( 4) Recognizable 
cerebral hemispheres are absent.59 
Some rare neonates fall into a "gray zone" in which it is unclear whether the diagnosis of 
anencephaly is proper. 
The prognosis for an anencephalic neonate is that the life span is very short. Many 
die within a few hours, less than half survive more than a day, and fewer than 10% survive 
more than a week.60 However, because anencephalic neonates do not receive aggressive 
treatment their potential life span is probably longer than their actual life span.61 
58According to the members of the Task Force on Anencephaly: "Mechanical 
factors that cause disruption of the normal processes of development include amniotic 
bands and fetal adhesions to the placenta. For anencephaly to develop, these conditions 
must occur at or before the induction of cerebral development; if they occur later, they 
may be associated with preservation of the cerebrum. Poorly understood geographic 
factors (reflected, for example, in a high incidence along the Eastern seaboard of the 
United States and the western coastal regions of Europe), and the maternal reproductive 
history influence the incidence and perhaps the causes of anencephaly. The incidence of 
anencephaly is increased in twins. Several maternal factors have been associated with 
anencephaly, including hyperthermia and deficiencies of folate, zinc, and copper." David 
A. Stumpf, M.D. et al., "The Infant With Anencephaly," The New England Journal Of 
Medicine 322 (March 8, 1990): 670. 
59lbid. 
60It should be noted that there is one case where Stephanie Keene, known as 
"Baby K," lived for two and one half years before dying. Many question if anencephaly 
was the proper diagnosis in this case. For a more detailed analysis ofthis case, see Mark 
A. Bonano, "The Case Of Baby K: Exploring The Concept Of Medical Futility," Annals 
Of Health Law 4 (1995): 151. 
61For a more detailed analysis of anencephaly, see D. A. Shewmon, 
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The first guideline that specifies McCormick's quality-of-life criterion is the potential 
for human relationships associated with the infant's condition. 62 According to medical 
authorities, the anencephalic neonate has no potential for human relationships because this 
neonate lacks functioning cerebral hemispheres, and therefore it will never experience any 
degree of consciousness. McCormick writes: "I am speaking of an infant with no realistic 
potential for human relationships, the type of infant whose life will for all practical purposes 
be vegetative only."63 Because the anencephalic neonate has no potential for human 
relationships, parents in consultation with health care professionals ought to decide morally 
to forgo medical treatment for a neonate in this diagnostic category. This is a moral 
judgment in which, all things considered, the parents decide that further treatment is of no 
benefit to the neonate. 
The decision by parents to forgo medical treatment in this situation is rooted in 
McCormick's theological anthropology and his moral epistemology. For McCormick human 
life is a basic and precious good, but a good to be preserved precisely as a condition for other 
higher values. According to McCormick, there is a hierarchy of values that is teleological 
"Anencephaly: Selected Medical Aspects," Hastings Center Report 18 (1988): 11-19; P. 
A. Baird and A. D. Sadovnick, "Survival In Infants With Anencephaly," Clinical 
Pediatrics 23 (1984): 268-271; Malcolm Levene and David Tudehope, Essentials Of 
Neonatal Medicine (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1993), 278-281; and 
Gordon Avery, Mary Ann Fletcher and Mhairi MacDonald, Neonatology: 
Pathophysiology And Management Of The Newborn, 4th ed., 1155-1156. 
62For a more detailed analysis of this guideline, refer to Chapter Four, 
McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above. 
63McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die: State Of The Question," 172. 
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in nature. Each value exists in an interrelationship that consists in a single scale. The 
ultimate value, the highest value, the End of ends is God. Therefore, human life is not an 
absolute good, because there are higher goods for which life can be sacrificed.64 These other 
values found the duty to preserve physical life, while they also dictate the limits of this duty. 
McCormick understands this to mean that physical life is a relative good. The duty to 
preserve physical life is a limited one. These limits have always been stated in terms of the 
means required to sustain life. Therefore, it is not always morally obligatory to use all means 
to preserve physical life. 65 For McCormick, when a person no longer has the potential for 
human relationships--which are the very possibility for growth in love of God and neighbor--
then parents are no longer morally required to preserve that life by all human means.66 To 
preserve human life in this situation would be to replace the "higher, more important good. "67 
"Physical life" would become the ultimate value. When this happens, the value of human 
life has been distorted. When human life is devoid of the possibility of experiencing human 
64For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's position on life as a good but not 
an absolute good, refer to Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section 
above. 
65McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 345. 
66McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 14. For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's position on how 
human relationships are the very possibility of growth in love of God and neighbor, refer 
to Chapter Two, Practical Implications Of McCormick's Theological Anthropology As 
Applied To Treatment Decisions For Defective Neonates section, Life Is A Value To Be 
Preserved Only Insofar As It Contains Some Potentiality For Human Relationships 
subsection above. 
67Lisa Sowle Cahill states: "McCormick identifies the good 'higher' than human 
life as the capacity for relationships oflove." Cahill, "On Richard McCormick," 92. 
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love, that is, no experience or interrelation is possible, then that life has achieved its 
potential.68 This is not to say that the anencephalic's life is of no worth. McCormick writes: 
Every human being, regardless of age or condition, is of incalculable worth. 
The point is not, therefore, whether this or that individual has value. Of 
course he has, or rather is a value. The only point is whether this undoubted 
value has any potential at all, in continuing physical survival, for attaining a 
share, even if reduced, in the "higher, more important good." This is not a 
question about the inherent value of the individual. It is a question about 
whether this worldly existence will offer such a valued individual any hope 
of sharing those values for which physical life is the fundamental condition. 69 
After the affections informed by the Christian story discover the basic human values, 
it is the discursive reason informed by the Christian story that determines if the presence of 
proportionate reason exists to determine if one value can be sacrificed for another in a 
conflict situation, for the good of the whole person. In the case of an anencephalic neonate, 
all things considered, the parents ought to argue that there is a proportionate reason to decide 
that it is in the "best interests" of the defective neonate to allow death to occur naturally. The 
anencephalic neonate will never experience consciousness and therefore has no potential for 
human relationships. McCormick argues that there is a point where we judge it to be in the 
"best interests" of the patient and all concerned to allow death to occur. He writes: 
68McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New 
World?, 405. 
69McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 350. Emphasis 
in the original. As I have stated prior, McCormick makes a distinction here between 
every person being of equal value and every life being of equal value. He writes: "What 
the 'equal value' language is attempting to say is legitimate: We must avoid unjust 
discrimination in the provision of health care and life supports. But not all discrimination 
(inequality of treatment) is unjust. Unjust discrimination is avoided if decision-making 
centers on the benefit to the patient, even if that benefit is described largely in terms of 
quality-of-life criteria." Ibid., 407. Emphasis in the original. 
What we judge to be the good both of the patient and all concerned is rooted 
in Christian attitudes on the meaning of life and death, attitudes that value life 
without absolutizing it, and that fear and avoid death without absolutizing it. 70 
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The anencephalic neonate has achieved its potential. It lacks the potential to be oriented 
toward other more important and even preferred values. Therefore, medical treatment would 
not be in the "best interests" of the anencephalic neonate because it would offer no benefit 
to the neonate. 
One criticism directed at McCormick's quality-of-life criterion by Leonard Weber 
concerns the treatment and value of the defective neonate once a decision has been made to 
withdraw or forgo medical treatment. Weber writes: 
Once McCormick has made the claim that we must decide to treat or not on 
the basis of the child's condition, will people really be able to pay much 
attention to his insistence that every iife is valuable regardless of condition?71 
McCormick argues that even though the anencephalic neonate has reached his or her 
potential and no treatment is recommended because it is of no benefit to the neonate, as 
members of society we have a moral obligation to care for the anencephalic neonate while 
it is in the dying process. McCormick bases this position on the fact that every life is sacred, 
is of incalculable worth, and deserves to be treated with dignity and respect, which is rooted 
in the Christian story. The sacredness of human life and the dignity that is derived from it 
leads to a particular care for the weakest, most voiceless, voteless, and defenseless members 
70McCormick, "The New Medicine And Morality," 317. 
71Leonard Weber, Who Shall Live?, 82. 
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of society. 72 McCormick argues that "sacredness of life demands reverential attitudes and 
practices."73 For him, the decision not to treat an anencephalic neonate is a "quality-of-life 
assessment that is made within an over-all reverence for life, as an extension of one's respect 
for the sanctity of life."74 As a result, every life has a value and should be treated with 
dignity and respect up until the moment of death. McCormick's understanding of the 
sacredness of human life, his understanding of quality of life as an extension of sanctity of 
life, and his application of the principles of justice and charity serve to safeguard that 
anencephalic infants will not be abandoned, but will be treated with dignity and respect while 
in the dying process. 75 This would include appropriate medical measures, comfort care, and 
personal psychological and spiritual support to the anencephalic's parents.76 
In conclusion, when the defective neonate's potential for human relationships is 
completely nonexistent, and further treatment will be of no benefit to the neonate, parents 
ought to decide, in the neonate's "best interests," not to seek medical treatment. However, 
72McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 10-11. For a more detailed analysis of the practical implications 
of McCormick's notion that human life is sacred, refer to Chapter Two, Practical 
Implications Of McCormick's Theological Anthropology As Applied To Treatment 
Decisions For Defective Neonates section, Human Life As Sacred subsection above. 
73McCormick, The Critical Calling, 268. 
74McCormick, "The Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New 
World?, 407. 
75For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's understanding of quality of life as 
an extension of sanctity of life and his understanding of the moral principles of justice 
and charity, refer to Chapter Four, Criticism section above. 
76lt should be noted that no pain relief is necessary because the anencephalic 
neonate lacks the ability to feel pain. 
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once this decision has been made, the anencephalic neonate should be cared for and treated 
with dignity and respect during the dying process. 
Category 2: The Defective Neonate Who Has A Potential For Human Relationships But 
Whose Potential Is Utterly Submerged In The Mere Struggle For Survival. 
An anomaly that would be representative of this diagnostic treatment category would 
be a neonate with a Grade III massive intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH) of the brain. 77 
Hemorrhage in or around the brain is a major problem in neonates, especially when 
premature. Hypoxia (lack of oxygen supply), pressures exerted on the neonate's head during 
labor, and the presence of the germinal matrix (a mass of embryonic cells lying over the 
caudate nucleus and present only in the fetus) in premature neonates are three major causes 
of intraventricular hemorrhage. The incidence of intraventricular hemorrhage in premature 
neonates is 25%-40%. Although there has been a reduction in incidence during the past 
decade, IVH remains a major concern, principally because of the improved survival rates of 
very low-birth-weight infants ( <1 OOOg), who are the highest risks for the development of 
IVH. In the premature neonate, IVH originates from the rupture of fragile vessels in the 
subependymal germinal matrix. In approximately 80% of patients with intracranial 
77There are three grades of severity of Intraventricular Hemorrhage by ultrasound 
scan. Grade I-- the germinal matrix hemorrhage with no or minimal intraventricular 
hemorrhage (<10% of ventricular area on parasagittal view). Grade 11--intraventricular 
hemorrhage (10-50% of ventricular area on parasagittal view). Grade 111--intraventricular 
hemorrhage (>50% of ventricular area on parasagittal view; usually distends lateral 
ventricle). For a more detailed analysis of the grading of intraventricular hemorrhages, 
see Joseph Volpe, M.D., "lntraventricular Hemorrhage And Brain Injury In The 
Premature Infant: Diagnosis, Prognosis, And Prevention," Clinics In Perinatofogy 16 
(June 1989): 388-389. 
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hemorrhage, there is associated IVH, and in approximately 10% to 15%, there is cerebral 
infarction involving the periventricular tissues. Serial cranial ultrasonography has 
demonstrated that in 50% of the neonates, IVH originates during the first day of life. In 90% 
of all neonates with this condition, hemorrhage originates before four days of age. In 20% 
to 40%, the hemorrhage progresses during the first week of life. 78 
There are two essential steps in establishing the diagnosis of IVH. First, there is the 
recognition of the neonate at risk. Second, there is the use of an effective imaging procedure. 
The neonate at risk would be any premature neonate in a NICU. This is based on the very 
high incidence of the disorder in this population. Diagnosis of the spectrum of IVH can be 
done by computed tomography (CT) but cranial ultrasonography is considered the technique 
of choice because of its portability, high resolution, and lack of ionizing radiation. 
Nevertheless, CT scanning remains superior for the diagnosis of other varieties of 
intracranial hemorrhage, including primary subarachnoid, convexity, and posterior fossa 
subdural and epidural hematomas and for differentiating hemorrhagic and ischemic 
parenchymal infarctions. 79 The diagnosis of IVH may be suspected on the basis of clinical 
signs alone in approximately 50% of neonates. The severity of clinical features range from 
78Avery et al., Neonatology, 1127. 
79Because of the high risk of IVH, routine cranial ultrasonography is 
recommended at four days of age for high risk neonates younger than 32 weeks gestation. 
Ultrasound scanning should be performed sooner if there are clinical concerns. Because 
there may be progression in the size of the hemorrhage in 20% to 40% of patients with 
IVH, the ultrasound scans should be repeated after the first week of life to establish the 
maximal extent of the hemorrhage. For a more detailed analysis of cranial 
ultrasonography, see Ibid., 1128. 
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an asymptomatic state through a saltatory neurologic deterioration over several days to a 
catastrophic presentation with coma, apnea, tonic extensor posturing, brain stem dysfunction, 
and flaccid quadriparesis. Associated systemic abnormalities may include hypotension, 
metabolic acidosis, bradycardia, serum glucose, and electrolyte disturbances. Bloody or 
xanthochromic cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) supports a diagnosis of intraventricular 
hemorrhage. 80 
The prognosis for neonates with a Grade III massive intraventricular hemorrhage is 
poor, especially if the hemorrhage extends into the parenchyma. 81 The short-term outcome 
of IVH is related principally to the size of the hemorrhage and may be considered in terms 
of mortality or hydrocephalus among survivors.82 Neonates with a Grade III massive 
intraventricular hemorrhage have a high mortality rate (50%-60%), and post-hemorrhagic 
hydrocephalus often develops (65%-100%). The most critical determinant of long-term 
outcomes is the extent of parenchymal involvement. 83 Major IVH occurs frequently in the 
80Ibid. 
81Parenchyma is the distinctive tissue characteristic of an organ and responsible 
for its functioning. 
82Hydrocephalus is caused by a pathological obstruction along the pathway of 
cerebrospinal fluid circulation, this condition is a progressive enlargement of the head 
from increased amounts of cerebrospinal fluid into the ventricles of the brain. Neonates 
with IVH usually experience progressive hydrocephalus and show evidence of 
irreversible damage of the brain or other major organs (i.e., multiple congenital anomalies 
and cerebral atrophy secondary to meningitis). In this group, prognosis is uniformly 
poor, and shunting operations have little to offer. For a more detailed analysis, see Avery 
et al., Neonatology, 1145. 
83In a study by F. Guzzetta, M.D. et al., it was determined that neonates with a 
massive intraventricular hemorrhage and periventricular parenchymal injury, identified 
on ultrasound scan as intraparenchymal echodensity (IPE) greater than 1 cm, was 
334 
context of hypoxic-ischemia cerebral insult, and long-term neurological outcome depends 
on concomitant or preceding hemorrhagic or nonhemorrhagic hypoxic-ischemic cerebral 
injury.84 
A neonate with a Grade III massive intraventricular hemorrhage has the potential for 
human relationships, but because the intraventricular hemorrhage is so severe and there is 
the associated complication of progressive hydrocephalus the potential for human 
relationships is utterly submerged in the mere struggle for survival. 85 Applying 
McCormick's ethical methodology and in particular his quality-of-life criterion to this 
neonate with a Grade III massive intraventricular hemorrhage, one can see that McCormick 
would base his decision to withdraw or forgo medical treatment on the Christian tradition 
unfavorable. Thus, neonates with extensive IPE (that is, IPE that included fronto-parieto-
occipital regions), 30 of 3 7 (81 % ) died, and of the seven survivors, all had subsequent 
motor deficits. For a more detailed analysis, see F. Guzzetta, M.D. et al., "Periventricular 
Intraparenchymal Echodensities In The Premature Newborn: Critical Determinant Of 
Neurological Outcome," Pediatrics 78 (1986): 995. 
84For a more detailed analysis ofIVH, see Avery et al., Neonatology, 1132. See 
also Joseph J. Volpe, M.D., A. Ernest, M.D., and Jane G. Stein, M.D., "Intraventricular 
Hemorrhage And Brain Injury In The Premature Infant," Clinics In Perinatology 16 (June 
1989): 387-411; John J. Paris and Kevin O'Connell, "Withdrawal Of Nutrition And 
Fluids From A Neurologically Devastated Infant: The Case Of Baby T," Journal Of 
Perinatology 11 (1991): 372-373; Michael Jellinek, Elizabeth Catlin, I. Davis Todres, and 
Edwin Cassem, "'Facing Tragic Decision With Parents In The Neonatal Intensive Care 
Unit: Clinical Perspectives," Pediatrics 89 (January 1992): 119-122. 
85To clarify what McCormick means by the potential for human relationships 
being utterly submerged in the mere struggle for survival, he writes: "Something other 
than the 'higher, more important good' would occupy first place. Life, the condition for 
other values and achievements, would usurp the place of these and become itself the 
ultimate value. When that happens, the value of human life has been distorted out of 
context." McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 347-348. 
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that human life is a basic good but a good to be preserved as the condition of other values. 
Since these other values cluster around and are rooted in human relationships, it follows that 
when the relational potential is utterly submerged in the mere struggle for survival, that life 
can be said to have achieved its potential. 86 For McCormick, if the meaning and 
consummation of life is to be found in love of neighbor, then clearly such meaning is 
inseparable from human relationships. 87 Therefore, when the potential to love one's 
neighbor is no longer possible, one does not have a moral responsibility to continue medical 
treatment. McCormick writes: 
One who must support his life with disproportionate effort focuses the time, 
attention, energy, and resources of himself and others not precisely on 
relationships, but on maintaining the condition of relationships. Such 
concentration easily becomes over concentration and distorts one's view of 
and weakens one's pursuit of the very relational goods that define our human 
growth and flourishing. The importance of relationships gets lost in the 
struggle for survival. The very Judaeo-Christian meaning of life is seriously 
jeopardized when undue and unending effort must go into its maintenance. 88 
McCormick grounds his position in the traditional ordinary/extraordinary means distinction. 
If the means used to preserve the neonate's life will bring about a grave hardship for the 
neonate and those responsible for his or her care, then this means to preserve life is 
considered extraordinary and nonobligatory, that is to say not beneficial to the neonate.89 
86McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 54. 
87McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 23. For a more detailed analysis 
of McCormick's position on how our love of God is in some real our love of God, refer to 
Chapter Four, McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above. 
88McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 346. 
891t should be noted that McCormick claims his quality-of-life criterion has its 
foundation in the traditional ordinary/extraordinary means distinction that was later 
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The moral epistemological basis for this decision is reason informed by the Christian 
story. The affections, informed by the Christian story, assist the parents in determining the 
value of this neonate's life. However, it is at the level of normative moral judgment that 
parents must now rely on discursive reason, informed by the Christian story, to determine 
if there is proportionate reason to initiate medical treatment for the "best interests'' of this 
particular neonate.9° For McCormick, to continue treatment for a neonate with a Grade III 
massive intraventricular hemorrhage would be "tantamount to elevating a subordinate good 
in a way that would prejudice a higher good, eventually making it unrecognizable as a 
good. "91 This would be a form of medical vitalism which McCormick refers to as "idolatry 
of life." McCormick argues that the Judaeo-Christian tradition has always sought a middle 
path between medical vitalism and medical pessimism. Excessive concern for the temporal 
is at some point neglect of the etemal.92 To continue treatment on the neonate with a Grade 
III massive intraventricular hemorrhage would not be in the "best interests" of the neonate 
clarified by Pius XII. McCormick quotes Pius XII as saying that an obligation to use any 
means possible "would be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment 
of the higher, more important good too difficult. Life, health, all temporal activities are 
in fact subordinated to spiritual ends." Pius XII, "The Prolongation Of Life," Acta 
Avostolicae Sedis, 1,031-1,032. 
9
°For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's moral epistemology after 1983, 
and specifically, how he determines if one value can be sacrificed for another in a conflict 
situation, refer to Chapter Three, McCormick's Dual Moral Epistemology section, 
Second Moral Epistemology--After 1983 subsection above. 
91McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 52 
921bid. For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's argument, refer to Chapter 
Three, Practical Implications Of McCormick's Moral Epistemology As Applied To 
Treatment Decisions For Defective Neonates section, Human Life Is A Good But Not An 
Absolute Good subsection above. 
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because it would cause a grave hardship and be of little or no benefit for the neonate and 
those responsible for his or her care. The medical facts presented confirm that there is no 
proportionate reason for prolonging the life of a neonate with a Grade III massive 
intraventricular hemorrhage and progressive hydrocephalus. This neonate has irreversible 
damage to the brain and other major organs and the neonate's prognosis is extremely poor 
with a high mortality rate. This neonate's ability to relate to others is completely or almost 
nearly lost in the mere struggle for physical survival. Human relationships would no longer 
function as the heart and meaning of this neonate's life as they should.93 According to 
McCormick's ethical methodology, to continue treatment on a neonate in this diagnostic 
category would devalue the life of the neonate. This is because it would remove the 
neonate's life from the Christian context and story that is the source of its ultimate value.94 
In support of McCormick's position regarding not treating a neonate with a Grade 
III massive intraventricular hemorrhage, one can also apply the third norm of his quality-of-
life criterion and the moral principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence rooted in charity. 
The third norm that McCormick uses to specify the capacity for human relationships states: 
"Life-sustaining interventions may be omitted or withdrawn when there is excessive 
hardship, especially when this combines with poor prognosis."95 The prognosis for a neonate 
93McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 347. 
94For a more detailed analysis of the key elements of the Christian story, refer to 
Chapter Three, McCormick's Dual Moral Epistemology section above. 
95McCormick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
358. For a more complete analysis of this third norm and McCormick's positiOn on the 
moral principles, refer to Chapter Four, McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above. 
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with a Grade III massive intraventricular hemorrhage is very poor. The mortality rate is 
between 80% to 90%. According to neonatologists, to initiate or continue medical treatment 
would do harm to the well-being of this neonate. For McCormick, quality-of-life judgments 
must avoid doing harm to all patients.96 To treat a neonate in this situation would violate a 
basic principle of bioethics: "non nocere" (do no harm). However, McCormick argues that 
even though a decision has been made to forgo or withdraw medical treatment, neonates in 
this category should continue to receive humane and necessary palliative care that will 
relieve pain and suffering, because every human life is sacred, is of incalculable worth, and 
deserves to be treated with dignity and respect. 97 
In conclusion, when the defective neonate has the potential for human relationships 
but this potential is utterly submerged in the mere struggle for survival, parents can decide 
in the neonate's "best interests" not to seek medical treatment. The Christian story provides 
the framework by which the parents can reasonably determine that treatment is not in the 
"best interests" of this neonate, because it offers no benefit to this neonate "integrally and 
adequately considered." McCormick believes this moral judgment is not only reasonable but 
96For McCormick, the well-being of a patient consists generally in a life 
prolonged beyond infancy, without excruciating pain, and with the potential for 
participating, to at least a minimal degree, in human experience. For a more detailed 
analysis of this position, see McCormick, "A Proposal For 'Quality Of Life' Criteria For 
Sustaining Life," 79; and refer to Chapter Four, McCormick's Ethical Criteria section 
above. 
97For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's position on pain and suffering, 
refer to Chapter Two, Practical Implications Of McCormick's Theological Anthropology 
As Applied To Treatment Decisions For Defective Neonates section, Pain And Suffering 
Can Have Redemptive Meaning subsection above. 
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is firmly grounded in the Catholic theological tradition. 
Category 3: The Defective Neonate Who Has The Potential For Human Relationships But 
The Underlying Medical Condition Will Result In Imminent Death. Another Variation Of 
This Category Would Be When The Defective Neonate Has The Potential For Human 
Relationships But After Medical Treatment Has Been Initiated, It Becomes Apparent That 
The Treatment Is Medically Futile 
Two anomalies will be presented that are representative of both circumstances. An 
anomaly that is representative of the neonate who has a potential for human relationships but 
the underlying medical condition will result in imminent death is a neonate with hypoplastic 
left heart syndrome. Hypoplastic left heart syndrome encompasses a variety of specific 
cardiovascular malformations producing similar hemodynamic and clinical manifestations, 
including aortic atresia, mitral atresia, permanent closure of the foramen ovale, and aortic 
stenosis. The left heart chamber is usually very small, and endocardial fibroelastosis is 
common.98 Hypoplastic left heart syndrome occurs in 10.2% of infants with severe heart 
disease and is one of the most common lesions presenting in the first week of life. It is less 
common in very premature neonates ( <1.85kg). It is usually an isolated lesion, although it 
has been described in association with autosomal trisomy syndromes and in infants of 
diabetic mothers (10.9%). Familial cases occur.99 The etiology is unknown. However, it 
98Endocardial fibroelastosis is the thickening of endocardium into a fibroelastic 
layer of tissue which may occur in the left ventricle of the hypoplastic heart. For a more 
detailed analysis, see Avery et al., Neonatolo~y, 551-552. 
99lbid., 551. It should be noted that a study performed by Marvin Natowicz, M.D. 
et al., found that as in other complex congenital heart lesions, the prevalence of 
underlying genetic causes of and major extra cardiac anomalies associated with 
hypoplastic left heart syndrome is substantial--28% in this study. Natowicz writes: "For 
many of the genetic disorders we identified, the association with hypoplastic left he'd.rt 
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is postulated that the cause is premature closure of foramen ovale, abnormally large ductus 
arteriosus, and autosomal recessive. 100 
The diagnosis can be made with echocardiography by demonstrating a very small or 
unrecognizable left ventricle. 101 The ascending aorta is small with retrograde flow in cases 
syndrome that we observed is not unexpected. Thus, the association of the syndrome 
with the chromosomal disorders that we found in our series is not surprising because all 
of these chromosomal syndromes are associated with high incidence of congenital heart 
disease. An association between hypoplastic left heart syndrome and trisomy 13, trisomy 
18, trisomy 21, and Turner syndrome has, in fact, been noted previously, as has an 
association with duplication 12p, duplication 16q, monosomy 4p, and monosomy 11 q 
syndromes. Similarly, an association between Smith-Lemli-Opitz, Apert, and Holt-Oram 
syndromes and hypoplastic left heart syndrome is probably not fortuitous in that each is 
frequently associated with congenital heart disease." Marvin Natowicz, M.D. et al., 
"Genetic Disorders And Major Extra Cardiac Anomalies Associated With Hypoplastic 
Left Heart Syndrome," Pediatrics 82 (November 1988): 702-704. This is an important 
point because in addition to the anomaly of hypoplastic left heart syndrome there is 
usually associated with this anomaly other serious genetic disorders. These associated 
genetic disorders will play a major role in the decision-making process of whether such 
neonates should receive medical treatment. 
100This information was obtained from Dr. Apollo Maglalang--Professor of 
Pediatrics at the Atlantic City Medical Center Atlantic City, New Jersey in an interview 
on December 28, 1995. The foramen ovale is a normal feature of the heart allowing 
blood to flow between atria. A ductus arteriosus is a normally occurring shunt between 
the aorta and the pulmonary artery. In utero, the ductus arteriosus allows blood flow to 
be diverted from the high-resistance pulmonary circulation to the descending aorta and 
the low-resistance placental bed. Functional closure of the ductus arteriosus occurs soon 
after birth but can be delayed in premature infants and in certain situations. Finally, 
autosomal has to do with any of the 22 chromosome pairs not associated with sex 
determination. For a more detailed analysis, see Avery et al., Neonatology, 551-553; see 
also Denise Kirsten, "Patent Ductus Arteriosus In The Preterm Infant," Neonatal Network 
15 (March 1996): 19-26. 
101Echocardiography is examination of the structures and movements of the heart 
with reflected pulsed ultrasound. As a non-invasive investigation employing non-
ionizing energy, it has become established as a useful additional method of evaluating 
heart disease. For a more detailed analysis, see Avery et al., Neonatology, 552-553. 
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of aortic atresia, and there is frequently a discrete juxtaductal coarctation. Neonates become 
symptomatic within the first week of life. It is estimated that 40% are diagnosed in the 
second day of life, 75% in the sixth day of life and 86% in the thirteenth day of life. The 
clinical picture of hypoplastic left heart syndrome may be simulated by respiratory distress 
syndrome, interrupted aortic arch, severe complex coarctation, early neonatal myocarditis, 
isolated critical valvar aortic stenosis, sepsis or some inherited metabolic disorders. Within 
the first few days of life the neonate will develop congestive heart failure and a shocklike 
picture may develop precipitously. The neonate becomes ashen gray with poor peripheral 
perfusion, and all pulses are weak. Ductal constriction may be intermittent, with femoral 
pulses intermittently palpable. Symptoms and signs of congestive heart failure are associated 
with hypotension and, terminally, with bradycardia. 102 The chest radiograph shows cardiac 
enlargement and pulmonary plethora, and the electrocardiogram (ECG) usually demonstrates 
right axis deviation, right atrial hypertrophy, right ventricular hypertrophy, and markedly 
diminished or absent left ventricular forces. 103 
The prognosis for a neonate with hypoplastic left heart syndrome is very poor. 
Without surgery, the mortality rate is 98% by one year of age. The mean age of survival is 
four to twenty-three days. There are few survivors with mitral atresia or hypoplastic left 
ventricle with severe aortic and mitral stenosis. Surgical therapy consists of an attempt to 
convert the circulation to Fontan-type physiology or to transplant a new heart. The perinatal 
102Bradycardia is an abnormally slow rate of heart beat (usually taken as 60 per 
minute or less). For a more detailed analysis, see Ibid., 1361-1362. 
1031bid., 552. 
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and first stage surgical mortality is between 25% and 40%, and overall during the first five 
years, it is as high as 50% to 75%. Long-term survival is undetermined. 104 Most 
neonatologists believe that neither reconstructive surgery leading to a Fontan procedure or 
cardiac transplantation can be viewed as curative. 105 Both methods of treatment have high 
fiscal and emotional costs. 106 
An anomaly that is representative of a neonate who has the potential for human 
relationships but after initiating treatment, it becomes apparent that the treatment is 
medically futile, 107 is a neonate with full-thickness Necrotizing Enterocolitis (NEC) with 
104It should be noted that cardiac transplantation has been used recently as an 
alternative approach with good results, but there is limited timely availability of neonatal 
donors and limited documentation of long-range survival. For a more detailed analysis, 
see L. L. Bailey, M.D., "Role Of Cardiac Transplantation In The Neonate," Journal Of 
Heart Transplant 4 (1985): 506. 
105The Fontan ·procedure is a surgical technique to separate the pulmonary blood 
flow from the systemic flow, in single ventricle heart defects. It relies on natural venous 
pressure to perfuse the lungs, and the single ventricle to provide systemic blood flow. 
For a more detailed analysis, see Avery et al., Neonatology, 551-553. 
106For a more detailed analysis ofhypoplastic left heart syndrome, see W. A. 
Long, Fetal And Neonatal Cardiology (Philadelphia, PA.: W. B. Sanders, 1990); J. H. 
Moller and W. A. Neal, Fetal. Neonatal. And Infant Cardiac Disease (Norfolk, CT.: 
Appleton and Lange, 1989); S. C. Mitchell, S. B. Korones, and H. W. Berendes, 
'"Congenital Heart Disease In 56,109 Births," Circulation 43 (1971): 323-335; and 
Leonard L. Bailey et al., "'Cardiac Allotransplanation In Newborns As Therapy For 
Hypoplastic Left Heart Syndrome," The New England Journal Of Medicine 315 (October 
9, 1986): 949-951. 
107It should be noted that the term "futile" is an elusive and ambiguous term. 
There are four major types of futility. First, physiological futility--an intervention cannot 
lead to the intended physiological effect. Second, imminent demise futility--an 
intervention may be futile if despite that intervention the patient will die in the very near 
future (this is sometimes expressed as the patient will not survive to discharge, although 
that is not really equivalent to dying in the very near future). Third, lethal condition 
futility--an intervention may be futile ifthe patient has an underlying lethal condition 
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perforation. It is a major cause of mortality and morbidity in neonates with birth weights less 
than 1,500 gms. 108 NEC is a condition predominantly seen in premature neonates, which is 
characterized by partial- or full-thickness intestinal ischemia, usually involving the terminal 
ileum. 109 NEC is probably the most serious gastrointestinal disorder occurring in neonates. 
which the intervention does not affect and which will result in death in the not too far 
future (weeks, perhaps months, but not in years) even if the intervention is employed. 
Fourth, qualitative futility--an intervention may be futile if it fails to lead to an acceptable 
quality of life. For a more detailed analysis of futility, see Baruch A. Brody and Amir 
Halevy, "Is Futility A Futile Concept?" Journal Of Medicine And Philosophy 20 (April 
1995): 126-129. McCormick has a normative understanding of futility which does not 
solely rely on physiological futility. McCormick's normative understanding of futility 
considers whether the agreed on potential effect is of any value and benefit to the patient, 
that is, in the patient's "best interests" normatively understood. For McCormick, a 
medical treatment might be successful in achieving an effect (physiologically effective), 
but the effect might not be beneficial to the patient (qualitatively effective). Since the 
goal of medical treatment is to benefit the patient, it follows that nonbeneficial treatment 
is medically futile. This is determined by the parents being in consultation with the health 
care professionals, because a determination must be made of the patient's medical status 
and an evaluation must be made of the medical intervention. The determination of 
medical futility entails balancing the values of patients, the values of medicine, and the 
fact that there is much uncertainty in making "predictive medical judgments." 
McCormick's notion of medical futility is rooted in the principles of beneficence and 
nonmaleficence--do no harm to the patient. For a more detailed analysis of medical 
futility, see Robert Veatch and Carol Mason Spicer, "Futile Care: Physicians Should Not 
Be Allowed To Refuse To Treat," Health Proi:ress 74 (December 1993): 22-27; James F. 
Drane and John L. Coulehan, "The Concept Of Futility: Parents Do Not Have A Right To 
Demand Medically Useless Treatment," Health Proi:ress 74 (December 1993): 32; and 
Glenn G. Griener, "The Physician's Authority To Withhold Futile Treatment," Journal Of 
Philosophy And Medicine 20 (April 1995): 209. 
108NEC is the most common surgical emergency in neonates; the mortality 
exceeds that of all gastrointestinal tract congenital malformations combined. It is the 
third leading cause of neonatal death, with a 30 to 50 percent mortality rate. For a more 
detailed analysis, see Leslie A. Parker, "Necrotizing Enterocolitis," Neonatal Network 14 
(September 1995): 17. 
109The ileum is the part of the small intestine between the jejunum (the ·second part 
of the small intestine extending from the duodenum to the ileum) and the caecum (the 
• 
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Because NEC appears predominantly in sick, low-birth-weight neonates, the incidence has 
increased in recent years as the mortality rate for very low-birth-weight neonates has 
decreased. It has been estimated that 90% of cases occur in premature neonates and that 
NEC may develop in 1 % to 10% of neonates hospitalized in neonatal intensive care units. 
The age of onset of NEC is related to birth weight and gestational age. 110 Thus, the more 
premature the neonate, the longer the duration of risk. The etiology is not fully known. 
Multiple factors appear to be involved, including hypoxia, acidosis, and hypotension, which 
may lead to ischemic damage of the mucosal barrier of the small intestine. Secondary 
bacterial invasion of the mucosa may be involved in the pathogenesis of pneumatosis 
intestinalis. Other factors considered to increase the risk of NEC are umbilical artery 
catheterization, infection with certain types of bacteria, and hypoalbuminemia. 111 Although 
first part of the large intestine, situated in the right lower quadrant of the abdomen, which 
forms a pouch-like cavity connecting the terminal ileum to the ascending colon and the 
vermiform appendix). For a more detailed description, see The Oxford Medical 
Companion, eds. John Walton, Jeremiah Barondess, and Stephen Lock (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 397. 
110lt has been noted that smaller, more immature neonates (<26 weeks of 
gestation) tend to have NEC at an older age than larger, more mature (>31 weeks of age) 
neonates. For a more detailed analysis, see R. D. Uauy et al., "Necrotizing Enterocolitis 
In Very Low Birth Weight Infants: Biodemographic And Clinical Correlates," Journal Of 
Pediat.rics 119 (1991): 630. 
111It can be noted that NEC has been observed to occur in epidemics in neonatal 
intensive care units, further supporting the role of microbial agents in pathogenesis. For a 
more detailed analysis, see Avery et al., Neonatology, 614. It should also be noted that 
another risk factor for NEC that is gaining acceptance is maternal cocaine use. Leslie 
Parker writes: "Cocaine may cause mesenteric ischemia via two mechanisms: (1) Cocaine 
causes maternal vasoconstriction, which decreases uterine blood flow and leads to fetal 
hypoxia. (2) Cocaine crosses the placenta and causes fetal vasoconstriction and 
subsequent hypoxia. Cocaine exposed neonates with NEC tend to be more critically ill 
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the cause is uncertain, the histopathology is well established. Initially, the disease begins as 
mucosal ischemia, with resultant sloughing of this layer. As the disease progresses, gas 
develops within the muscular layers and may be seen on x-ray films as pneumatosis 
cystoides intestinalis. 112 If full-thickness necrosis occurs, perforation and peritonitis 
develop. 113 The rapidity of disease progression differs in each neonate, but those who 
perforate usually do so within the first days of the disease. 114 
The diagnosis of NEC is based on both clinical assessment and x-ray studies. The 
than other infants with NEC. Because the bowel is more necrotic, these infants have an 
increased need for surgical intervention, and their overall mortality is increased." For a 
more detailed analysis, see Parker, "Necrotizing Enterocolitis," 20. 
112Pneumatosis intestinalis appears as submucosal or subserosal cysts filled with a 
gaseous mixture consisting of hydrogen, methane, and carbon dioxide. On x-ray it 
appears as linear or bubbly air in the intramural area. For a more detailed analysis, see 
Ibid., 17. 
113Peritonitis is an inflammation of the peritoneum, usually resulting from a 
rupture of a hollow viscus such as the appendix. For a more detailed description, see The 
Oxford Medical Companion, 738. 
114Avery et al., Neonatolo~y, 614-615; 937-938. It should be noted that there are 
new studies that breast milk has a protective mechanism against NEC. The studies show 
that very few infants who were fed exclusively breast milk developed NEC, and most of 
these were fed breast milk that had been either heated or frozen. At birth, neonates have 
no secretory lgA (lmmunoglobulin A) in their intestinal tract. Breast milk provides this 
lgA and other immunocompetent cells that are partially protective against gastrointestinal 
infections. As preventive strategies, oral lgA and corticosteroids have been shown to 
decrease the incidence of NEC. Oral lgA appears to decrease the incidence of NEC by 
exerting an immunoprotective effect on the gastrointestinal tract. It provides antibodies 
against numerous pathogens that may cause gastrointestinal infection. In the near future, 
all low-birth-weight neonates may receive lgA supplementation to prevent NEC. For a 
more detailed analysis, see E. Halac et al., "Prenatal And Postnatal Corticosteroid 
Therapy To Prevent Neonatal Necrotizing Enterocolitis: A Controlled Trial," Journal Of 
Pediatrics 117 (1990): 132-138; B. J. Stoll et al., "Epidemiology OfNecrotizing 
Enterocolitis: A Case Control Group," Journal Of Pediatrics 96 (1980): 44 7-451; see also 
Parker, "Necrotizing Enterocolitis," 20. 
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onset ofNEC occurs most commonly between day three and day ten of life but may occur 
as early as the first twenty-four hours of life or as late as three months. 115 Clinical 
presentations vary widely. Abdominal distension is one of the earliest and most consistent 
clinical signs, along with an intolerance of feeding with vomiting. The vomitus of about 
one-half of the neonates is bile stained. Other symptoms include bloody stools, apnea, 
bradycardia, lethargy, shock, and retention of gastric contents due to poor gastric emptying. 
Hematest-positive stools help confirm the diagnosis, but blood may be absent or a late 
finding. Abdominal wall erythema and a palpable abdominal mass are commonly late 
findings and signify more extensive disease. Radiographic findings in early NEC may show 
only separated loops of distended intestine, suggesting bowel wall thickening. A persistent 
large loop of intestine seen on a series of x-ray films has been used by some as an indication 
of surgery, but these neonates may also be treated medically .116 
The prognosis for NEC depends on the severity of the disease. Initial management 
of the neonate with NEC without pneumoperitoneum is standardized. 117 The neonate 
receives nothing orally, the stomach is decompressed with a gastric sump tube, and 
intravenous antibiotics are begun. Indications for surgery include pneumoperitoneum, 
115For a more detailed analysis, see Parker, "Necrotizing Enterocolitis," 17. 
116Elizabeth H. Thilo, M.D., Raul Lazarte, M.D., and Jacinto Hernandez, M.D., 
"Necrotizing Enterocolitis In The First Twenty-Four Hours Of Life," Pediatrics 73 (April 
1984): 476-480; and Avery et al., Neonatology, 937-938. 
117Pneumoperitoneum is air in the peritoneal cavity. Artificial pneumoperitoneum 
is sometimes induced in order to assist radiological diagnosis; it was formally a common 
procedure in the treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis, to help in immobilization of the 
lung. For a more detailed analysis, see The Oxford Medical Companion, 775. 
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persistent acidosis (i.e., pH less than 7 .2), rapidly worsening pulmonary status, and 
unremitting neutropenia or thrombocytopenia. 118 Mortality is higher in neonates who have 
perforated before surgery, and it is therefore better to operate before perforation has occurred. 
Surgery in neonates with perforation should be expeditious and conservative. The frankly 
necrotic or perforated intestine should be removed and ileostomies formed. 119 When massive 
resection is necessary, the chance for the neonate's survival is limited, but the premature 
neonate's intestine still has the potential for growth and adaption, and rarely is the entire 
intestine involved in the disease. 120 The long-term success rate for treatment for NEC has 
been good, despite long hospitalization for gastrointestinal adaption when massive resection 
is necessary. The quoted survival rate for neonates with medically treated NEC is now more 
than 80%, and the survival rate for those requiring surgery is approximately 50%. 121 
118Thrombocytopenia results from either decreased platelet production or 
increased peripheral platelet destruction or sequestration. A bone marrow examination is 
usually required to make this distinction. Normally, bone spicules contain 3-10 
megakaryocytes per low-power field. Normal or increased numbers of megakaryocytes 
imply increased platelet consumption. Decreased numbers suggests decreased platelet 
production. For a more detailed analysis, see William Claiborne Dunagan, M.D. and 
Michael L. Ridner, M.D., eds., Manual Of Medical Therapeutics 26th ed. (Boston, MA.: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1986), 330. 
119 An ileostomy is a surgically created opening of the ileum on to the abdominal 
surface. For a more detailed description, see The Oxford Medical Companion, 3 97. 
120If an extensive amount of necrotic bowel is resected, there may be an 
insufficient amount of bowel remaining for digestion. This could result in short gut 
syndrome and possibly be incompatible with life. See Parker, "Necrotizing 
Enterocolitis," 21. 
121For a more detailed analysis of NEC, see Avery et al., Neonatology, 614-616; 
937-939. For a more detailed analysis ofNecrotizing Enterocolitis, see W. A. Ballance et 
al., "Pathology Of Neonatal NEC: A Ten Year Experience," Journal Of Pediatric 
Medicine. Supplement 1. Pt. 2 117 (1990); D. Anderson, and R. M. Kliegman, "The 
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In this third diagnostic treatment category, since the potential for human relationships 
is present, McCormick will use the second guideline of his quality-of-life criterion--the 
benefit-burden calculus--to determine whether neonates ought to be treated. What is to be 
determined is whether the burden of the treatment will outweigh the benefit to the neonate. 
For McCormick: "If the treatment is useless or futile, or it imposes burdens that outweigh 
the benefits, it may be omitted."122 McCormick argues that his notion of benefit/burden 
calculus is a logical development of the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction, or what 
he refers to as an extension of the tradition into new problem areas. 123 As is the case in the 
previous two diagnostic treatment categories, McCormick's second guideline of his quality-
of-life criterion--the benefit/burden calculus--is firmly grounded in the Catholic tradition and 
his theological anthropology. Human life is a relative good. The duty to preserve physical 
life is a limited one. These limits have been stated in terms of the means required to sustain 
life. Therefore, it is not always morally obligatory to use all means to preserve human life. 124 
For McCormick, "it is clear that the judgments of burden and benefit are value 
Relationship OfNeonatal Alimentation Practices To The Occurance Of Endemic 
Necrotizing Enterocolitis," American Journal Of Perinatology 8 (1991); and R. Covert et 
al., "Factors Associated With Age Of Onset Of Necrotizing Enterocolitis," American 
Journal Of Perinatology 6 (1989). 
122McCormick, "Technology And Morality: The Example Of Medicine," 26. 
123For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's reformulation of the ordinary/ 
extraordinary means distinction into his benefit/burden calculus, refer to Chapter Four, 
McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above. 
124McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 345. For a 
more detailed analysis of McCormick's beliefthat human life is a relative good, refer to 
Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section above. 
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judgments, moral choices. They are judgments in which, all things considered, the 
continuance of life is either called for or not worthwhile to the patient."125 These value 
judgments on the meaning of life have an epistemological foundation that is based on reason 
informed by faith. 126 The Christian story influences not only the parent's dispositions, but 
moral judgments in a rather general way. This moral epistemology establishes a context in 
which the parent's reason and calculation ought to operate. It is a context that prevents the 
absolutization of life, and allows the parents to make treatment decisions based on the 
neonate's "best interests" that will include some consideration of future quality of life. Both 
the proportionate reason criterion and the criterion of the person "integrally and adequately 
considered" will play a crucial role in determining these quality-of-life judgments. Parents 
must determine if a particular treatment will benefit the neonate as a whole. McCormick 
believes that there is a prima facie duty to preserve life. He writes: 
In other words, physicians approach desperately ill patients with a general 
bias in favor of life. But there are times when this general bias is 
overwhelmed by the facts, when the attempts to preserve life are not an 
actual duty. That point is reached when attempts at life-preservation are no 
longer in the child's best interests. 127 
If the health care professionals determine that further medical treatment would not improve 
125McCormick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
360. 
126For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's second moral epistemology after 
1983, and how prediscursive and discursive reason informed by the Christian story play 
an essential role in the parent's discernment, refer to Chapter Three, McCormick's Dual 
Moral Epistemology section, Second Moral Epistemology--After 1983 subsection above. 
127McCormick, "The Best Interests Of The Baby," 21. Emphasis in the original. 
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the neonate's prognosis, or benefit the overall well-being of the neonate, then, all things 
considered, parents should decide that further treatment would not be in the "best interests" 
of the neonate. 
In examining the neonates in this category with their respective anomalies, what must 
remain at the forefront are the "best interests," normatively defined, of the neonate and those 
involved in the decision-making process. McCormick writes: 
The task of medicine is to cure when possible, and when that is not possible, 
to comfort and care. There comes a point when intervening medically or 
surgically simply to sustain life is no longer a human or Christian form of 
caring.12s 
In the case of the neonate with hypoplastic left heart syndrome and the neonate with 
necrotizing enterocolitis with perforation, it appears that further medical treatment would not 
be in the "best interests" of these neonates. Any benefit obtained would be outweighed by 
the burderis. A neonate diagnosed with hypoplastic left heart syndrome has the additional 
complication of a high incidence of chromosomal disorders. This is a major factor that must 
be taken into consideration. Without surgery the mortality rate for this neonate is 98%. 
Heart transplantation is a possible medical option, but it must be remembered that there are 
very few hearts available for transplantation and heart transplantation is an experimental 
procedure. Even with surgery, which has a high fiscal and emotional cost, the mortality rate 
remains high. 129 Any possible medical benefits obtained by this type of surgery would be 
128McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die: State Of The Question," 172. 
1291t should be remembered that A very et al. believe that neither reconstructive 
surgery leading to a Fontan procedure or cardiac transplantation can be viewed as 
curative. See Avery et al., Neonatolog;y, 552. For a more detailed analysis of heart 
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outweighed by the social and familial burdens. 130 A neonate diagnosed as having full-
thickness NEC with perforation also has a high mortality rate and according to medical 
authorities, further medical treatment is qualitatively futile, that is, any possible medical 
effect is of no benefit to the neonate. 131 Therefore, it appears that further treatment for 
neonates in this diagnostic category is not morally obligatory. It should be noted that in both 
of these anomalies, the medical facts regarding diagnosis and prognosis are extremely 
pertinent. There are less severe cases of NEC that can be treated successfully. Each medical 
anomaly contains individual differences and "gray areas" are always a reality. This is an 
example of why McCormick argues that consultation with health care professionals is 
essential for parents in making these treatment decisions. Neonatologists have the medical 
transplantation in neonates, see Leonard L. Bailey et al., "Cardiac Allotransplantation In 
Newborns As Therapy For Hypoplastic Left Heart Syndrome," New England Journal Of 
Medicine, 949-951. 
130In McCormick's notion of "best interests" the benefits are not restricted to 
medical benefits. Benefits also apply to social and familial factors. This can be seen in 
how McCormick has incorporated Pellegrino' s four components of "best interests" into 
his interpretation. For a more detailed analysis of Pellegrino' s four components, refer to 
Chapter Four, McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above; also see Edmund Pellegrino, 
M.D., "Moral Choice, The Good Of The Patient And The Patient's Good," in Ethics And 
Critical Care Medicine, 117-13 8. 
131Qualitative futility claims that although the treatment may be successful in 
achieving an effect (physiologically effective), the effect is not worth achieving. 
Effective treatment may not be beneficial for the patient. Since the goal of medical 
treatment is to benefit the patient, then nonbeneficial treatment is medically futile. For 
McCormick this is a value judgment that is made by the parents in consultation with 
health care professionals. Once complete information about medical outcomes and about 
the patient's goals and values are exchanged, then this decision can be made. For a more 
detailed analysis of qualitative futility, see Glenn G. Griener, "The Physician's Authority 
To Withhold Futile Treatment," Journal Of Philosophy And Medicine, 212-215. 
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knowledge and the expertise of comparative judgments of neonates with similar anomalous 
conditions that can assist parents in the decision-making process. 
In making treatment decisions, parents should consider not only the medical facts 
but also the relevant social and familial factors. Financial and emotional costs ought to be 
considered. A normative understanding of "best interests" means that if the social factors 
are excessive then the neonate should not and would not want to be treated, because it would 
place excessive burdens on those who must care for the neonate's existence. What the 
neonate "ought" to want should encompass the needs of those who will care for this child. 
Both of these anomalies entail extensive surgeries, long-term hospitalization, long-term 
home care, and there are serious genetic disorders associated with both anomalies that will 
entail additional treatment and serious financial and emotional burdens for the family. Both 
social and familial factors ought to play a proportionate role in determining the 
benefit/burden calculus. 
McCormick's position on social and familial factors has been criticized for being too 
restrictive and deviating from both the Catholic tradition and from his own normative 
understanding of"best interests." McCormick claims that his restrictive notion of social and 
familial factors, as they pertain to treatment decisions for defective neonates, is due to the 
fact that a boarder interpretation could lead to social utilitarianism. This caution is certainly 
relevant because the possibility of potential abuse is always present. However, the 
safeguards McCormick has built into his quality-of-life criterion--guidelines, norms, and 
moral principles--should help to alleviate the possibility of such abuse. In addition, health 
care professionals serve as a safeguard in that they can act as the neonate's advocate should 
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they suspect abuse. If McCormick has a normative understanding of "best interests," then 
he should examine both social and familial factors from the defective neonate's perspective. 
If the circumstances of treatment will be a grave burden for the family of the neonate and 
society as a whole, then this is not in the "best interests" of the neonate. 132 
Some critics of McCormick's quality-of-life criterion argue that there is a tendency 
by some decision-makers to overlook the theological importance of suffering for the neonate 
and others. These critics believe that a great value in defective neonates is the compassion 
evoked in those who must serve these unfortunates. Some believe that the deprivations and 
sufferings of others "do often bring out the best in us--affection, tenderness, compassion, 
selflessness. " 133 McCormick responds to these critics by stating: 
Keeping a child alive simply to elicit these responses when he can derive no 
benefit from continuance in physical life, is getting close to a use of children 
for adult purposes .... I would argue that just as we are "able to give," where 
the elderly terminal patient is involved, still we judge what form this giving 
should take exclusively in terms of the benefit to the patient, not in terms of 
our own opportunity to experience compassionate responses. Any other point 
of view would get the purpose of treatment mixed up. Is not the same true 
of the infant?134 
McCormick follows the Catholic theological tradition and argues that pain and suffering 
have a special place in God's saving plan. Grave illness is to be seen as an intensifying 
conformity with Christ. As the human body weakens and is devastated by disease and 
132For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's position on social and familial 
factors and the criticism of his position by Richard Sparks and James McCartney, refer to 
Chapter Four, Criticism section above; see also Chapter Two, Criticism section above. 
133McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die: State Of The Question," 172. 
1341bid. 
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illness, the strength of Jesus Christ is shared by those who have been baptized into his death 
and resurrection. 135 However, submitting a neonate to survival for the sake of others is both 
inhumane and violative of the Christian tradition and the prime rule in medical practice--
"non nocere" (do no harm). If medical treatment will bring no benefit to the neonate, then 
there is no moral obligation to treat. Neonates should not be victimized for the good of 
others. 
In conclusion, when a defective neonate has the potential for human relationships but 
the underlying medical condition will result in imminent death; or, after initiating treatment, 
it becomes apparent that the treatment is medically futile, parents in consultation with health 
care professionals are not morally obliged to continue medical treatment. This is a value 
judgment that is based on McCormick's guidelines of relational potential and benefit/burden 
calculus. McCormick's quality-of-life criterion sets basic parameters and enlightens the 
particular medical situation. Ultimately, the parents will use prudence to examine the 
medical facts and to weigh, all things considered, whether the burdens of treatment outweigh 
the benefits to the neonate. In both case scenarios presented in this diagnostic treatment 
category, the burdens frequently outweigh the benefits to the neonate. Therefore, in the "best 
interests" of the neonate, and all concerned, parents in consultation with health care 
professionals have the moral obligation to forgo or withdraw treatment for a neonate in these 
circumstances. 
135For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's position on redemptive suffering, 
refer to Chapter Two, Practical Implications Of McCormick's Theological Anthropology 
As Applied To Treatment Decisions For Defective Neonates section, Pain And Suffering 
Can Have Redemptive Meaning subsection above. 
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Category 4: The Defective Neonate Who Has The Potential For Human Relationships And 
Has A Correctable Or Treatable Condition. 
An anomaly that is representative of this diagnostic treatment category is a neonate 
with trisomy 21 (Down syndrome) and the complication of esophageal atresia with 
tracheoesophageal fistula. Trisomy 21 or Down syndrome is caused by a faulty chromosome 
distribution. In about 95% of cases of Down syndrome, there is an extra chromosome 21. 
The overall incidence is about 1/700 live births, but there is a marked variability depending 
on maternal age. 136 The extra chromosome 21 comes from the father in one-fourth to one-
third of the cases. 
Esophageal atresia occurs approximately in 1 of 3000 to 4500 births. In the most 
common form of esophageal anomaly (86% of neonates), the blind-ending upper esophageal 
segment usually extends into the upper portion of the thorax, and the lower portion of the 
esophagus is connected to the trachea at or just above the tracheal carina. This connection 
is usually 3 to 5mm in diameter and easily admits air or, in a retrograde fashion, acidic 
gastric secretions. 137 
The clinical diagnosis of a neonate with Down syndrome would be a neonate who 
tends to be placid, rarely cries, and demonstrates muscular hypotonicity. Nuchal 
136In the early childbearing years, the incidence of Down syndrome is about 
112000 live births; for mothers over 40 years of age, it rises to about 1/40 live births. Just 
over 20% of neonates with Down syndrome are born to mothers > 3 5 years of age, yet 
these older mothers have only 7% to 8% of the children. However, the number of women 
having babies after age 3 5 has been rising rapidly in the last few years. For a more 
detailed analysis, see Robert Berkow, M.D., The Merck Manual, 2299. 
137 A very et al., Neonatolo~y, 923. 
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lymphedema, similar to that seen in Turner's syndrome, also occurs in Down syndrome and 
is being detected with increasing frequency prenatally by fetal ultrasonography. 138 Physical 
and mental development are retarded; the mean IQ is about 50. Microcephaly, 
brachycephaly, and a flattened occiput are characteristic. The eyes are slanted, and 
epicanthal folds are present. Brushfield' s spots (gray to white spots resembling grains of salt 
around the periphery of the iris) usually are visible in the neonatal period and disappear 
during the first twelve months of life. The bridge of the nose is flattened, the mouth is often 
held open because of a large, protruding tongue that is furrowed and lacks the central fissure, 
and the ears are small with down-folded helixes. The hands are short and broad, with single 
palmar crease (simian crease); the fingers are short, with clinodactyly (incurvature) of the 
fifth finger, which often has two phalanges. The feet have a wide gap between the first and 
the second toes, and a plantar furrow extends backward. Hands and feet show characteristic 
dermal prints (dermatoglyphics). Congenital heart disease is found in about 35% of patients; 
atrioventricular canal defects and ventricular septal defects are most common. 139 
The diagnosis of esophageal atresia may not be obvious on the initial examination 
of a neonate unless an attempt is made to pass a tube into the stomach. The earliest clinical 
138Lymphedema is the accumulation of excessive lymph fluid and swelling of 
subcutaneous tissues due to obstruction, destruction, or hypoplasia of lymph vessels. For 
a more detailed analysis, see Robert Berkow, M.D., The Merck Manual, 593. Turner's 
syndrome, also known as Gonadal Dygenesis or Bonnevie-Ullrich syndrome, is a 
complete or partial absence of one of the two X chromosomes in the female. Its 





attached to continuous suction to prevent aspiration of swallowed saliva. When the neonate 
is stable, immediate primary repair is undertaken. If unstable, surgery is delayed until the 
clinical status is stabilized, the impact of associated anomalies is determined, and the neonate 
can be anesthetized and operated on safely. When the neonate is stable, a thoracotomy can 
be done to repair the esophageal atresia and close the tracheoesophageal fistula. 142 
Occasionally, the gap between the esophageal segments is too great for a primary repair. 
Gentle stretching of the esophageal segments before later anastomosis may be beneficial, or 
repair by interposing a segment of colon or forming a gastric tube between the esophageal 
segments may be required. The most common acute complications are leakage at the site of 
anastomosis and stricture formation. If there is no leakage feedings are begun and quickly 
advanced. 143 The survival rate for neonates who were classified as stable and had primary 
142The fistula is identified and carefully divided from the trachea. The tracheal 
opening is closed with several sutures, with care to avoid narrowing the tracheal lumen. 
The circumference of the lower esophageal fistula is usually small and is enlarged by 
trimming and spatulating its open end. The tip of the upper pouch is mobilized 
extensively and cut across to expose the lumen. For a more detailed analysis, see Avery 
et al., Neonatolo~y, 924-925. 
143lt should be noted that in the early 1900's, virtually all neonates born with 
esophageal atresia and tracheoesophageal fistula died. In 1941 Haight and Towsley were 
the first to bring a neonate with esophageal atresia and tracheoesophageal fistula through 
the rigors of primary transthoracic reconstruction. This landmark accomplishment 
occurred before antibiotics, respiratory support, or sophisticated intravenous nutrition 
were available. This surgical approach formed the basis of modem operative and 
postoperative care of neonates with this anomaly. Fifty years after the first survivor was 
announced, every neonate born with atresia of the esophagus who is spared coexisting 
fatal anomalies and is offered appropriate care has an excellent chance of leading a 
normal life. In a study done at Children's National Medical Center in Washington, D.C. 
118 patients with blind upper esophageal pouch and a fistula arising from the bifurcation 
of the trachea were treated between 1966 and 1989. Eighty-eight percent of the patients 
survived. For a more detailed analysis, see Ibid., 923-926. 
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repair is 100%. Survival in the unstable group who had staged repair is 57%. The deaths 
were due to associated anomalies, including congenital diaphragmatic hernia and hypoplastic 
left heart syndrome. 144 
To determine whether a Down syndrome neonate who has esophageal atresia with 
tracheoesophageal fistula ought to be treated, McCormick will apply both guidelines of his 
quality-of-life criterion. In this situation the defective neonate has the potential for human 
relationships. This neonate will in relative comfort be able to experience our caring and love. 
Thus, both the parents and the neonate will be able to share in the higher, more important 
good. Continued physical existence will offer this neonate hope of sharing those values for 
which physical life is a fundamental condition. 145 This position is firmly grounded in 
McCormick's theological anthropology. Secondly, the benefits of proper medical treatment 
clearly outweigh the burdens. According to the medical authorities, a neonate with Down 
syndrome associated with esophageal atresia and tracheoesophageal fistula has an excellent 
chance of living a productive life with corrective surgery. Therefore, all things considered, 
there is a proportionate reason to seek corrective surgery in this situation, because it is in the 
144Ibid., 923-927 and Berkow, The Merck Manual, 2065-2067. For a more 
detailed analysis of esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula, see L. Spitz, E. 
Keily, R. J. Brereton, "Esophageal Atresia: A Five Year Experience With 148 Cases," 
Journal Of Pediatric Surgery 22 (1987): 103-106; J. G. Randolph, K. Newman, K. D. 
Anderson, "Current Results And Repair Of Esophageal Atresia With Tracheoesophageal 
Fistula Using Physiologic Status As A Guide To Therapy," Annals Of Surgery 209 
(1989): 520-526; and E. C. Pohlson, R. Schaller, and D. Trapper, "Improved Survival 
With Primary Anastomosis In The Low-Birth-Weight Neonate With Esophageal Atresia 
And Tracheoesophageal Fistula," Journal Of Pediatric Surgery 24 (1988): 415-420. 
145McCormick, "To Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 351. 
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"best interests" of the neonate and those involved in the decision-making process. 
The decision to treat is also supported by the second norm established by McCormick 
and John Paris, S.J. as a further specification of the capacity for human relationships as a 
summary of the benefit/burden calculus. The norm states: "Life-sustaining interventions 
may not be omitted simply because the baby is retarded. There may be further complications 
associated with retardation that justify withholding life-sustaining treatment. " 146 In this 
situation, all things considered, there is a proportionate reason to treat this Down syndrome 
neonate because the complication associated with the retardation can be corrected with a very 
high probability of success. As long as the medical condition is treatable or correctable and 
the corrected condition will result in improvement of the neonate's prognosis, comfort, and 
well-being or general state of heaith, then this is looked upon as a beneficial treatment and 
under the benefit/burden calculus it ought to be made available to this neonate. 147 Failure to 
treat a Down syndrome neonate with a correctable condition would be allowing a cultural 
bias to distort the basic value of human life. For McCormick, it is reason informed by the 
Christian story that allows parents to determine what is truly in the "best interests" of the 
defective neonate against such cultural biases. 
In conclusion, when a defective neonate has the potential for human relationships and 
146McCormick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
358. 
147It should be noted that McCormick uses the moral principles of charity, 
autonomy, justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence to help "enflesh" his four norms. 
For a more detailed analysis of these moral principles, refer to Chapter Four, 
McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above. 
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an associated medical condition that is treatable or correctable, and thus there is a great 
benefit to the patient, parents have a moral obligation to treat this neonate. The decision to 
treat has its basis in McCormick's moral epistemology, which is based on reason informed 
by the Christian story. The decision to treat is rooted in the sensitivities and emotions of the 
parents as well as in rational analysis, both of which are enlightened by the Christian story. 
The guidelines, norms, and moral principles advanced by McCormick's quality-of-life 
criterion assist parents in consultation with health care professionals to examine the range 
of moral choices and to determine what is in the "best interests" of this neonate normatively 
understood. 
McCormick's patient-centered, quality-of-life criterion, which is rooted in his 
theological anthropology and his moral epistemology, provides guidelines, norms, and moral 
principles that parents can utilize in making treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
However, this criterion is not a mathematical formula that parents can apply to a particular 
situation and come up with a certain answer. The quality-of-life criterion sets certain 
parameters for parents in the decision-making process. However, parameters do not replace 
prudence nor do they eliminate doubts and conflicts. McCormick writes: 
Doubts and agonizing problems will remain. Hence a certain range of 
choices must be allowed to parents, a certain margin of error, a certain space. 
Guidelines can be developed which aid us to judge when parents have 
exceeded the limits of human discretion. They cannot cover every instance 
where human discretion must intervene to decide. The margin of error 
tolerable should reflect not only the utter finality of the decision (which tends 
to narrow it), but also the unavoidable uncertainty and doubt (which tends to 
broaden it). 148 
148McCormick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
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It is prudence that will direct parents in making the right moral decision among the range of 
choices available. 
One of the major criticisms that has been directed against McCormick's ethical 
methodology is that he never defines prudence nor does he explain how he uses it. He refers 
to the integral role that prudence plays in both his moral epistemology and his moral 
criteriology. He explains that concrete rules and guidelines cannot replace prudence. Yet, 
McCormick never gives any guidance on how parents should exercise prudence in moral 
decision-making. As a "revised" natural law ethicist in the Catholic tradition, McCormick 
understands that prudence listens to human experience, one's own and others, it seeks 
counsel, and it looks into the future to anticipate and size-up the consequences. But 
McCormick is also aware that because of our finite nature and the effects of the Fall, 
ambiguity has become part of the human condition. Both reason and free will have become 
more vulnerable and are open to potential abuse. 149 If McCormick would articulate how 
prudence should operate in situations of conflict and doubt, parents would be given more 
guidance in moral decision-making that would help safeguard the "best interests" of the 
neonate. 150 This is a substantive criticism that needs to be addressed and clarified if 
360. 
149For a more detailed analysis of the effects of the Fall on humanity, refer to 
Chapter Two, McCormick's Theological Anthropology section, Doctrine Of The Fall 
subsection above. 
1500ne could assume that because McCormick is a natural law ethicist, albeit 
revised, in the Catholic Thomistic tradition, that he agrees with Thomas' understanding 
of prudence. However, this would be speculation at best. For a detailed analysis of 
Thomas' view on prudence, see Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-Ilae, 61. 
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McCormick's ethical methodology is to become a public policy option concerning treatment 
decisions for defective neonates. 
In conclusion, McCormick has always underscored the primacy of method. His 
ethical methodology has been constructed from his writings and has been applied to 
treatment decisions for defective neonates. Criticisms of his ethical methodology remain due 
to inconsistencies in terminology and ambiguities in the application of various concepts. 
These inconsistencies and ambiguities that exist in regard to his ethical methodology could 
be overcome, I believe with a systematic and coherent articulation of his theoretical 
foundations. This articulation is crucial if McCormick is proposing his ethical methodology 
as a public policy option on the treatment of defective neonates. When making treatment 
decisions for defective neonates, parents and health care professionals need clarity not 
ambiguity, because these decisions may affect the life and death of defective neonates. 
Conclusion 
McCormick's ethical methodology has been articulated, examined, critically 
analyzed, and systematically applied to four diagnostic treatment categories that represent 
the spectrum of neonatal anomalies. In the final chapter McCormick's ethical methodology 
will be evaluated as a public policy option for the treatment of defective neonates. Two 
questions will be examined and analyzed. The first: Is McCormick's ethical methodology 
practical, beneficial, and appropriate for Christian parents and health care professionals in 
making treatment decisions for defective neonates? A brief evaluation will be given of its 
positive and negative points from the Christian decision-makers perspective. The second: 
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Can it be recommended to all decision-makers, both Christian and non-Christian, as a public 
policy option for the treatment of defective neonates? This second area concerns the 
question of the uniqueness of Christian ethics. McCormick claims that the sources of faith 
do not originate concrete moral obligations that are impervious to human insight and 
reasoning. However, they do confirm them. Christian values and norms are open to all 
reasonable people, but does this mean that McCormick's ethical methodology is sustainable 
without the religious content? If one strips away the religious content does his ethical 
methodology hold together as a public policy option that can be employed by all reasonable 
people? These issues will be examined in depth in the final chapter and a recommendation 
will be proposed regarding McCormick's ethical methodology as a public policy option for 




Dissertations, like other forms of communication, are never completely finished 
products. Rather, they are one conversation in an ongoing dialogue that hopes to advance 
the overall discussion by producing new insights and developing new directions. Bernard 
Lonergan, S.J. explains my point this way: 
For concrete situations give rise to insights which issue into policies and 
courses of action. Action transforms the existing situation to give rise to 
further insights, better policies, more effective courses of action. It follows 
that if insight occurs, it keeps recurring; and at each recurrence knowledge 
develops, action increases its scope, and situations improve. 1 
This dissertation has systematically analyzed and critiqued McCormick's ethical 
methodology as applied to treatment decisions for defective neonates. In the process, 
insights have occurred, which may give rise to a public policy option that will result in a 
more effective course of action in the treatment of defective neonates. At the same time, the 
insights gained have given rise to further questions that will need to be examined in the 
future. The aim of this dissertation has not been to conclude the debate surrounding 
treatment decisions for defective neonates, but to deepen our understanding of the issues 
1Lonergan, Insight: A Study Of Human Understanding, xiv. 
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involved principally through an analysis of McCormick's ethical methodology. Neonatal 
medical knowledge and technology will continue to advance and new ethical dilemmas will 
continue to confront us. As a result, new courses of action and further public policies will 
be needed to meet the new challenges. 
The scope of this dissertation has been twofold: First, to articulate, examine, and 
critically analyze McCormick's ethical methodology. Second, to apply it systematically to 
four diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates, to determine if this ethical 
methodology is a viable option for parents and health care professionals in determining 
treatment decisions for defective neonates. This critical analysis is necessitated by the fact 
that parents and health care professionals are often forced to draw lines between neonates 
who will be treated and those who will not be. These lines are already being drawn and 
there is a need for an ethical methodology that can be used by decision-makers to assist them 
in making these decisions because the life and death of defective neonates may hang in the 
balance. McCormick offers an ethical methodology that he believes can be beneficial and 
recommendable to decision-makers. Such an assumption has been clinically tested and now 
waits to be assessed critically to determine if McCormick's ethical methodology can be a 
public policy option for the treatment of defective neonates. 
This chapter will consist of four substantive areas of discussion. The first will focus 
on a critical assessment of McCormick's ethical methodology as applied to the spectrum of 
defective neonates. Two major questions form the basis for this critical assessment. Is 
McCormick's ethical methodology practical, beneficial, and appropriate for Christian parents 
and health care professionals in making treatment decisions for defective neonates? Can it 
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be recommended to all decision-makers, both Christian and non-Christian, as a public policy 
option for the treatment of defective neonates? Both of these questions will be critically 
assessed from McCormick's perspective and from my own perspective. Second, I will give 
a critical assessment of the contributions and shortcomings of McCormick's ethical 
methodology. Third, I will articulate three significant issues relevant to McCormick's ethical 
methodology that will need to be examined in the future. Finally, I will conclude with a 
personal assessment of what has been learned from McCormick's ethical methodology and 
from this dissertation. 
Critical Assessment Of McCormick's Ethical Methodolo~y 
Complex bioethical dilemmas challenge society to search for answers and to 
formulate policies regarding issues ranging from the first moments of life to the last 
moments before death. Contemporary theologians have been challenged to address these 
issues from a theological perspective; but there has been little clarity about how this should 
be done and what impact this will have on reasonable people. Alasdair Macintyre has 
attempted to make this challenge more clear. Macintyre writes: 
What ought we to expect from contemporary theologians in the area of 
medical ethics? First--and without this everything else is uninteresting--we 
ought to expect a clear statement of what difference it makes to be a Jew or 
a Christian or a Moslem rather than a secular thinker. 2 
McCormick has attempted to answer Maclntyre's challenge from a Christian perspective. 
2 Alasdair Macintyre, "Theological Ethics And The Ethics Of Medicine And 
Health Care," Journal Of Medicine And Philosophy 4 (1979): 435. 
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He has specified in his ethical methodology what it means to be a Christian and how the 
Christian story impacts on the decision-making process in bioethics. After applying his 
ethical methodology to the four diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates, I must 
now assess whether his ethical methodology is practical, beneficial, and appropriate for 
Christian decision-makers. 
McCormick believes and I concur that his ethical methodology is practical, 
beneficial, and appropriate for Christian decision-makers in making treatment decisions for 
defective neonates, because it is reasonable and is grounded in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. 
Before making an assessment on this statement it is first necessary to examine what these 
terms mean. The term "practical" means useful. In this context it refers to whether 
McCormick's ethical methodology is capable of being used or put into effect by Christian 
decision-makers. Specifically, when it is applied to neonatal anomalies, does it assist 
Christian decision-makers in coming to a well-reasoned conclusion? Does his ethical 
methodology give Christian decision-makers various choices within given parameters? 
"Beneficial" refers to promoting the well-being of the defective neonate. When applied to 
neonatal anomalies, does McCormick's ethical methodology promote the "best interests," 
normatively understood, of the defective neonate and all concerned in the decision-making 
process? "Appropriate" refers to suitability. Is McCormick's ethical methodology fitting 
for the needs of particular defective neonates? . That is, does it adequately consider the 
relevant medical data, the pertinent circumstances of the situation, the religious and cultural 
values of the family, and other applicable factors that should be considered in the process of 
decision-making? These questions will have to be addressed in order to give McCormick's 
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ethical methodology a proper assessment. 
As a "revised" natural law ethicist, McCormick believes that reason is shaped by 
faith, and this shaping takes the form of perspectives, themes, and insights associated with 
the Christian story.3 For McCormick, reasoning about the Christian story reveals "the deeper 
dimensions of the universally human."4 As a result of this "compenetration" of faith and 
reason, McCormick relies on a more experiential, commonsense basis for his natural law 
thinking. Reason can discover and know the basic human goods, and the Christian story 
nourishes the overall perspectives of the person and serves as a "corrective vision" to the 
secularism of the culture. McCormick argues that, because his ethical methodology is 
reasonable and objective, it can be applied to any situation by all reasonable people. 
R-0oted in "revised" natural law, McCormick believes his ethical methodology is 
practical for decision-makers because it sets certain parameters for parents in the decision-
making process. His ethical methodology is not a wooden formula that parents can apply 
to any situation and come to a concrete decision. Instead, his ethical methodology 
illuminates a certain situation so that the facts of the situation are made clearer and the 
decision-makers can see, as much as possible, the full content and context of the situation. 
3For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's "revised" natural law approach, 
refer to Chapter One, Bioethical Methodologies section above. 
4McCormick, The Critical Callin~, 204. McCormick elaborates on this statement 
by stating: "a person within the Christian community has access to a privileged 
articulation, in objective form, of this experience of subjectivity. Precisely because the 
resources of Scripture, dogma and Christian life (the 'storied community') are the fullest 
available objectifications of the common human experience, 'the articulation of man's 
image of his moral good that is possible within historical Christian communities remains 
privileged in its access to enlarged perspectives on man."' Ibid. 
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The guidelines, norms, and moral principles that make-up McCormick's moral criteria serve 
to guide and assist parents and health care professionals, not to make decisions for them. 
They cannot assure moral certitude. Doubts and conflicts will always be part of the decision-
making process. What McCormick's ethical methodology does is to allow parents a certain 
range of choices, a certain margin of error, a certain space, so that within those parameters 
they can use prudence to come to a well-reasoned moral decision.5 As long as the decisions 
reached are reasonable and do not deviate too far from the neonate's "best interests," 
normatively understood, these decisions should be respected. McCormick believes, and most 
parents and health care professionals I think would agree, that his ethical methodology, being 
reasonable and grounded in a time honored tradition, can assist Christian decision-makers 
on a practical level in making treatment decisions for defective neonates. 
I would agree with McCormick's assessment that his ethical methodology is practical 
for Christian decision-makers. Rooted in right reason informed by faith, McCormick's 
ethical methodology keeps Christian decision-makers focused on the "best interests" of the 
defective neonate. The Christian story provides a framework that illuminates the situation 
for Christian decision-makers. It clarifies what it means to be truly human, thus assisting 
Christian decision-makers to remain focused on the "best interests" of the neonate. 
McCormick's quality-of-life criterion sets limits and helps to guide Christian decision-
makers in their use of right reason in deciding whether certain medical treatments will 
promote the "best interests" of the defective neonate. McCormick's ethical methodology is 
5McCormick and Paris, "Saving Defective Infants," How Brave A New World?, 
360. 
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practical because it sets up a structure with certain parameters in which Christian decision-
makers have the flexibility to use their prudence in making well-reasoned decisions. 
To determine if certain medical treatments are beneficial for a defective neonate, that 
is, will they promote the well-being of the neonate, McCormick proposes his category of 
"best interests" normatively understood. This is a patient-centered, teleological assessment 
of what is considered to be in the "best interests" of the defective neonate and those involved 
in the decision-making process. McCormick's "best interests" category is a composite 
category that involves quality-of-life considerations, benefit-burden considerations, and the 
use of proportionate reason as a tool for establishing what is promotive or destructive for the 
good of the person "integrally and adequately considered." His understanding of "best 
interests" is grounded in his "revised" natural law position and in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition. 6 McCormick assumes that most people are reasonable, and because they are 
reasonable that they will choose what is in the "best interests" of the defective neonate. He 
believes this is a safe and protective guideline. McCormick argues that most people want 
to act reasonably within parameters that are objective in character, even though they do not 
always do so. 7 In the event that decision-makers fail to act reasonably, McCormick proposes 
several internal and external safeguards that can be used to protect the neonate's "best 
6This refers to McCormick's claim that his quality-of-life criterion has its 
foundation in the traditional ordinary/extraordinary means distinction that was later 
clarified by Pius XII. For a more detailed analysis, see Pius XII, "The Prolongation Of 
Life," Acta Avostolicae Sedis, 1,031-1,032; refer also to Chapter Four, McCormick's 
Ethical Criteria section above. 




The internal safeguards would be the guidelines, norms, and moral principles 
McCormick proposes in his quality-of-life criterion. These are objective criteria that can be 
used by parents and health care professionals in discerning treatment decisions. 8 The 
external safeguards, proposed by McCormick, are in the form of checks and balances that 
serve and protect the "best interests" of the neonate against the possibility of irresponsible 
decision-makers. These checks and balances are both individual and societal. Parents are 
the primary decision-makers; but for McCormick, health care professionals should always 
be consulted because they have the medical expertise, can best explain the diagnosis and 
prognosis based on similar cases, and they have the ability to compare neonates with the 
same anomalies and know the effectiveness of various treatments. In this capacity, health 
care professionals serve as a resource for parents and an advocate for the defective neonate. 
McCormick also advocates societal intervention should it be suspected that parents in 
consultation with health care professionals are not acting in a morally responsible manner. 
These safeguards include both Neonatal Infant Review Committees and the court system. 9 
In my judgment McCormick's ethical methodology is beneficial in determining 
treatment decisions for the defective neonate, because it is reasonable and it is grounded in 
a tradition that keeps the focus of the decision on what will promote the "best interests," 
8F or a more detailed analysis of McCormick's quality-of-life criterion, refer to 
Chapter Four, McCormick's Ethical Criteria section above. 
9For a more detailed analysis of these societal safeguards, refer to Chapter Five, 
Procedural Issues section above. 
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normatively understood, of the neonate. Being reasonable people, I would agree with 
McCormick's assumption that most people do want to act reasonably within parameters that 
are objective in character. His ethical methodology sets those objective parameters and after 
applying it to the four diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates, McCormick has 
shown them to be reasonable. His category of "best interests" normatively understood 
allows parents and health care professionals a certain discretion in their decision-making, but 
at the same time, there are built-in safeguards to protect the neonate against irresponsible 
decision-making. 
McCormick argues that his ethical methodology is appropriate for decision-makers 
because it considers not only the relevant medical facts and the pertinent circumstances of 
the situation, but also familial and social factors, such as, religious, cultural, emotional, and 
financial factors. Parents in consultation with health care professionals can best determine 
what the defective neonate ought to want and protect his or her "best interests" by using 
McCormick's quality-of-life moral criterion. As reasonable people, parents are most 
knowledgeable about the family situation into which the neonate is born. This includes 
knowing the financial, emotional, and social factors. Parents can also weigh and balance the 
religious and cultural values that inform their decision-making. Health care professionals 
have the specialized medical knowledge and clinical expertise that can assist parents in the 
decision-making process. They also have a level of objectivity that parents may lack because 
of the overwhelming emotional stress of the situation. Together, parents and health care 
professionals are able to determine what are the appropriate needs of this neonate, to assess 
these needs, and to determine whether medical treatment is in the "best interests" of the 
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neonate "integrally and adequately considered." 
In my judgment McCormick's ethical methodology is appropriate for Christian 
decision-makers because it emphasizes "the reasonable" from within a Christian context. 
It stresses the need for decision-makers to examine the medical facts, the circumstances of 
the situation, foreseeable consequences, social and familial factors, and other pertinent data 
before deciding on an appropriate course of action. McCormick's ethical methodology also 
stresses that these facts are to be considered always within the context of the Christian story, 
so that the "best interests" of the defective neonate are always promoted and protected. 
Treatment decisions for defective neonates are value judgments that must be based on the 
appropriate needs of the neonate. These value judgments can possibly become distorted by 
self-interested perspectives and technological considerations. Christian decision-makers who 
use McCormick's ethical methodology are not immune from making mistakes. We are a 
finite and sinful people. What I am saying is that because the content of this ethical 
methodology is reasonable, and because these decisions are made within the context of the 
Christian story, less chance exists that such treatment decisions will be pushed to the 
extremes. 10 McCormick's ethical methodology is appropriate for Christian decision-makers 
because it protects the "best interests" of the defective neonate by promoting value 
judgments that are grounded in reason and informed by the Christian story. 
10The two extremes would range from medical vitalism--preserve life at all costs--
to medical pessimism--abbreviate the dying process by active euthanasia. The Judaeo-
Christian tradition has always walked a middle path, that is, human life is a basic and 
precious good, but a good to be preserved precisely as the condition of other values. For 
a more detailed analysis of the Judaeo-Christian tradition's view, see McCormick, "To 
Save Or Let Die," How Brave A New World?, 345-346. 
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In conclusion, having applied McCormick's ethical methodology to the four 
diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates, and after a careful personal 
assessment, I believe McCormick has demonstrated the practicality, beneficial nature and 
appropriateness of this ethical methodology for Christian decision-makers. His ethical 
methodology is not only reasonable and coherent but it is grounded in a tradition that 
promotes the "best interests," normatively understood, of defective neonates. 
The second area of concern pertains to whether McCormick's ethical methodology 
can be recommended to all decision-makers, both Christian and non-Christian, as a public 
policy option for the treatment of defective neonates. If Christian values and norms are open 
to all reasonable people, then does this mean that McCormick's ethical methodology is 
sustainable without the religious content? That is, once the religious content is stripped away 
does McCormick's ethical methodology hold together as a public policy option that can be 
employed by all reasonable people? To determine if McCormick's ethical methodology can 
be recommended to all decision-makers, an assessment will have to be made of the three 
components of a methodology. These components are the formal elements of the 
methodology itself, the material content of the methodology, and the moral content of its 
conclusions and judgments. Before this can be accomplished, the phrase "public policy 
option" must be explained. A public policy option in the bioethical field includes public 
laws, policies, regulations, and guidelines that bear on ethical aspects of medical practice and 
health care. 11 A public policy becomes a standard way of operating in a clinical situation by 
llfor a more detailed analysis of public policy and the bioethical field, see Dan W. 
Block, "Public Policy And Bioethics," Encyclopedia Of Bioethics, rev. ed., vol. 4, 2181-
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all parties involved. Once a public policy has been approved it begins to take on a life of its 
own which requires all people, Christian and non-Christian alike, to abide by its laws, 
guidelines, norms, and principles. 
The formal elements of McCormick's ethical methodology concern his anthropology, 
epistemology, and criteriology. At the formal level, McCormick's ethical methodology is 
not unique because any valid ethical methodology must contain these formal components. 
His ethical methodology is rooted in an anthropology that critically reflects on the origin, 
purpose, and destiny of the human person. It considers human persons precisely in terms of 
their relationships with God, others, self, and the world. His moral epistemology is a 
systematic and critical study of morality as a body of knowledge. Specifically, McCormick's 
moral epistemology is concerned with the human ways of knowing values and disvalues and 
moral obligations. Finally, once the human ways of knowing have been established, 
McCormick formulates a set of moral criteria that guide moral reasoning in measuring 
human actions. At the formal level of methodology, then, McCormick's ethical 
methodology can be shared by those who are not Christian or even not religious. In my 
judgment McCormick's ethical methodology can be recommended to both Christians and 
non-Christians at the formal level. 
The material component of McCormick's ethical methodology is based on reason 
informed by the Christian story. 12 For McCormick, the Christian story as religious content 
2188. 
12For a more detailed analysis of the Christian story, refer to Chapter Two, 
McCormick's Theological Anthropology section above. 
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shapes moral perspectives, motivation, and processes of reasoning, but only in a general way. 
McCormick writes: 
The Christian story nourishes our overall perspectives, telling us through 
Christ the kinds of people we ought to be and become, and the type of world 
we ought to create. It does not give us concrete answers to tragic conflict 
cases or relieve us of the messy and arduous work of search, deliberation, and 
discussion. 13 
The Christian story as religious content informs reason so that our concrete moral 
deliberations can remain truly human and promote our well-being. 14 The religious content 
of McCormick's ethical methodology may be unique in that it is based on the Christian story 
and is rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. However, the uniqueness of religious content 
does not translate into the moral content being unique. 
The moral content of McCormick's ethical methodology concerns the question of the 
uniqueness of Christian ethics. When McCormick refers to ethics he is referring to essential 
ethics. 15 He believes that at the level of essential ethics, in principle, all reasonable people 
13McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 48. 
14lbid., 51. 
15There are four levels in which the term "ethics" can be understood where 
rightness and wrongness of conduct is concerned. First, essential ethics--this refers to 
those norms that are regarded as applicable to all persons, where one's behavior is but an 
instance of a general, essential moral norm. Second, there is existential ethics--this refers 
to the choice of a good that the individual as individual should realize, the experience of 
an absolute ethical demand addressed to the individual. Third, there is essential Christian 
ethics--this refers to those ethical decisions a Christian must make precisely because 
he/she belongs to a community to which the non-Christian does not belong. Finally, 
there is existential Christian ethics--this refers to those ethical decisions that the Christian 
as individual must make, e.g., the choice to concentrate on certain political issues not 
only because these seem best suited to one's talent, but above all because they seem more 
in accord with the gospel perspectives. For a more detailed analysis of these four levels, 
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can reach the same ethical conclusions because the moral content of ethics is the same for 
all. What the Christian tradition does is to illuminate human values, support them, and 
provide a context for their reading at any given point in history. 16 McCormick writes: 
Since there is only one destiny possible to all men, there is existentially only 
one essential morality common to all men, Christians and non-Christians 
alike. Whatever is distinctive about Christian morality is found essentially 
in the style of life, the manner of accomplishing the moral tasks common to 
all persons, not in the tasks themselves. Christian morality is, in its 
concreteness and materiality, human morality. The theological study of 
morality accepts the human in all its fullness as its starting point. It is the 
human which is then illumined by the person, teaching and achievement of 
Jesus Christ. The experience of Jesus is regarded as normative because he is 
believed to have experienced what it is to be human in the fullest way and at 
the deepest level. 17 
The Christian faith profoundly affects one's perspectives, analyses, and judgments in very 
important ways, but not to the point that there are concrete moral demands that are in 
principle unavailable to human insight and reasoning. McCormick's morality is based on 
a "revised" notion of natural law; therefore, in principle, all reasonable people can reach the 
moral truth through human insight and reasoning. McCormick writes: 
Since Christian ethics is the objectification in Jesus Christ of every person's 
experience of subjectivity, "it does not and cannot add to human ethical self-
understanding as such any material content that is, in principle 'strange' or 
'foreign' to man as he exists and experiences himself in this world."18 
see McCormick, "Does Religious Faith Add To Ethical Perception?" in Readings In 
Moral Theology No. 2, 157-158. 
16Ibid., 169. 
17lbid., 168. Emphasis in the original. 
18McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 60; see also James 
F. Bresnahan, "Rahner's Christian Ethics," 352. 
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What reasoning about the Christian story does is to reveal the deeper dimensions of what it 
means to be truly human. As a result, McCormick argues that his ethical methodology can 
be a public policy option for Christians and non-Christians because it is based on human 
reason and experience. 
In my judgment McCormick's ethical methodology can be recommended to 
Christians and non-Christians at the material moral content level. The foundation of 
McCormick's ethical methodology is the centrality of the human person, not the Christian 
story itself. McCormick bases his ethical methodology on the fact that essentially human 
nature is the same for all. Therefore, by reason reflecting on human experience, every 
person, in principle, can know the good that ought to be done and the evil that ought to be 
avoided. The moral law is not logically dependent on faith or the Christian tradition. The 
Christian story and symbols nourish the faith of the Christian and affect one's perspectives. 
They sharpen one's focus on those basic human goods that are definitive of our human 
flourishing. But they do not originate concrete moral obligations such that they would be 
considered impervious to human reasoning. The Christian story provides a context or a 
framework in which human reason can operate. The material moral content of McCormick's 
ethical methodology is Christian but it is not impervious to human reasoning. I agree with 
McCormick that what the Christian story does is to aid us in "staying human by underlining 
the truly human against all cultural attempts to distort the human."19 The Christian story 
illuminates who we are as human persons, where we come from, where we are destined, and 
19McCormick, "Does Faith Add To Ethical Perception?" in Readings In Moral 
Theology No. 2, 169. 
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who we ought to be. It is within this framework, that is knowable to all, that reason 
determines what will promote the "best interests" of each individual. 20 
The final element of McCormick's ethical methodology that must be examined to 
determine if it can be recommended to all decision-makers as a public policy option is the 
content of the moral conclusions or judgments that are drawn from his ethical methodology. 
McCormick argues that the Christian story or the religious content of his ethical 
methodology influences not only personal dispositions, but also moral judgments in a rather 
general way.21 At the level of prediscursive reason, the Christian story sinks deep into the 
person and sensitizes the person to the meaning of life and to the values that are definitive 
of human flourishing. At the level of discursive reason, the Christian story helps to shape the 
person's moral vision. The very meaning, purpose, and value of a person is grounded and 
ultimately explained by this story.22 However, McCormick emphasizes that the moral 
conclusions or judgments a Christian reaches will not be substantially different from those 
yielded by objective and reasonable but nonreligious analysis. For McCormick, "Christian 
emphases do not yield moral norms and rules for decision-making, nor do they conduce to 
20It should be noted that McCormick is developing an "in principle" argument and 
he realizes de facto that not everyone will adhere to its normative conclusions. Not all 
people will accept an afterlife, the sacredness of human life, etc. For McCormick, an in 
principle argument is not a de facto argument. 
21McCormick, "Best Interests Of The Baby," 20. 
22For a more detailed analysis of McCormick's moral epistemology, refer to 
Chapter Three, McCormick's Dual Moral Epistemology section, Second Moral 
Epistemology--After 1983 subsection above. 
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concrete answers unique to that tradition. "23 In other words, the sources of faith do not 
originate concrete moral obligations that are impervious to human insight and reasoning; 
however, they do confirm them. McCormick writes: 
It is persons so informed, persons with such "reasons" sunk deep in their 
being, who face new situations, new dilemmas, and reason together as to 
what is the best policy, the best protocol for the service of all the values. 
They do not find concrete answers in their tradition, but they bring a 
worldview that informs their reasoning--especially by allowing basic human 
goods to retain their attractiveness and not be tainted by cultural distortions. 24 
For McCormick, if the insights yielded from the Christian story were impervious to human 
reason, then any hope of a public policy option would be paralyzed in the "irreconcilable 
stand-off of conflicting stories and worldviews. "25 Human reason, unaided by explicit faith, 
can come to the same insights because they are inherently intelligible and recommendable. 
Christian insights do not automatically yield moral obligations but they will deeply condition 
them. 26 
In my opm1on the moral conclusions or judgments that are derived from 
McCormick's ethical methodology are not unique to Christians. By the light of right reason, 
in principle, all human persons can know which actions are objectively morally right and 
23McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 329. 
24McCormick, "The Judaeo-Christian Tradition And Bioethical Codes," How 
Brave A New World?, 16. 
25Ibid. 
26McCormick writes: "The Christian story is not the only cognitive source for the 
radical sociality of persons, for the immorality of infanticide and abortion, etc. even 
though historically these insights may be strongly attached to the story. In this 
epistemological sense, these insights are not specific to Christians. They can be and are 
shared by others." Ibid., 329-330. 
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which actions are objectively morally wrong. 'This entails a complete analysis of the human 
person and his or her actions before one can give an adequate account of objectivity. The 
dignity of the person, the social and relational character of personhood, life as a basic but not 
an absolute good, and love as the crowning human relationship are foundational Christian 
insights. The Christian story is not the only cognitive source for these insights. The insights 
and perspectives that are produced by McCormick's ethical methodology and form the basis 
for moral conclusions are in principle inherently intelligible. They are reasonable and, 
therefore, can and are shared by non-Christians. 
In applying McCormick's ethical methodology to the four diagnostic treatment 
categories it is apparent that the reference point for his ethical methodology is the human 
person "'integrally and adequately considered." In reaching a moral conclusion or judgment 
for each category of defective neonate a comprehensive analysis was made of both the 
medical and the non-medical facts. 'This data was interpreted from a rational point of view. 
And the "best interests," normatively understood, of the neonate were the primary focus. 
The moral conclusions produced by applying McCormick's ethical methodology to each 
diagnostic category were not unique to Christians. Each moral conclusion or judgment was 
inherently intelligible and recommendable to both Christians and non-Christians. The 
strength of McCormick's ethical methodology is that reasoning about the Christian story 
reveals the deeper dimensions of what it means to be truly human. 27 
In conclusion, it is my judgment that McCormick's ethical methodology can be 
27McCormick, "Theology And Biomedical Ethics," 331. 
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recommended to both Christians and non-Christians as a public policy option for the 
treatment of defective neonates. The formal component of his ethical methodology is firmly 
rooted in an anthropology, epistemology, and criteriology. The moral content of 
McCormick's ethical methodology is based on reason informed by the Christian story. The 
human person is the central focus and the Christian story illuminates what it mean to be truly 
human. Finally, the moral conclusions or judgments that a Christian reaches by applying 
McCormick's ethical methodology are not substantially different from those yielded by an 
objective and reasonable but nonreligious analysis. If the moral content of McCormick's 
ethical methodology is reasonable and available, in principle, to all persons, then the moral 
conclusions derived from it must also be reasonable and available, in principle, to all 
persons. This is not to say that the individual values that generate a norm cannot experience 
a special grounding and ratification in revelation. The point is that they are also grounded 
in human reason and experience.28 
McCormick's Contributions And Shortcomings 
In the process of critically analyzing and assessing McCormick's ethical 
methodology as applied to treatment decisions for defective neonates, this dissertation has 
examined a wide range of Richard McCormick's writings and positions. At times I have 
been quite critical, pointing out ambiguities and inconsistencies in his thought and a number 
of deficiencies in his ethical methodology. The criticisms are warranted because as a public 
28McCormick, "Does Faith Add To Ethical Perspectives," in Readings In Moral 
Theology No. 2, 163. 
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policy option, for both Christians and non-Christians, McCormick's ethical methodology 
will have to withstand the public scrutiny of both ethical and medical professionals. 
However, this is not to gainsay or take away from the contributions McCormick has made 
to the field of moral theology and, in particular, to the field of bioethics. 
McCormick is a prolific essayist, writing as a topical author in many diverse areas 
of moral theology, but recently especially in bioethics. As an observer, critic, and active 
participant in the debates surrounding bioethical issues, he has helped to mold the course of 
bioethics over the past two decades. He has been on the cutting edge of contemporary 
bioethical dilemmas, bringing a high degree of technical proficiency and understanding to 
bear on many of these issues. He has acknowledged that he is not a system-builder; rather, 
he sees his role as more reactive--he puts out fires. His role is to examine bioethical issues 
critically and then initiate a conversation so that an ongoing dialogue can begin. His insights 
are provocative, his arguments are reasonable and based on the accumulated wisdom of past 
years, and his ethical positions are moderate, always seeking the "extreme middle" ethical 
position. In the process of examining these bioethical dilemmas McCormick has heeded his 
own advice to theologians by having the courage both to speak his mind and to make and 
admit mistakes. McCormick writes: 
They (theologians) should speak their mind knowing that there are other and 
certainly more significant minds. In other words, they must not lose the 
nerve to make and admit an honest mistake. They should trust their intuitions 
and their hearts, but always within a sharp remembrance that the 
announcement of the faith and its implications in our times must come from 
the melding of many hearts and minds. 29 
29McCormick, "On The Tenth Anniversary Of Humanae Vitae," How Brave A 
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As a result of this courage, McCormick has not only advanced the dialogue in bioethics, but 
has helped to establish reasonable ethical positions that have proven to be beneficial to both 
Christians and non-Christians. 
Professionally, McCormick views himself as a moral theologian firmly grounded in 
the Catholic tradition. James F. Childress writes: "McCormick does not try to be all things 
to all people. He views himself as a Catholic moral theologian."30 However, this does not 
mean that he has closed off dialogue with the other traditions or that he does not consider 
their diverse ethical viewpoints. One of his strengths is his ongoing dialogue with both 
Christian and non-Christian theologians and philosophers in his unending search for the 
truth. This dialogue with other traditions and disciplines has allowed him to grasp the 
wisdom of the many in order to reach well-reasoned ethical positions. This is evident in the 
debates he sparked with ethicists like Paul Ramsey, Robert Veatch, Joseph Fletcher, Michael 
Garland, Leonard Weber, etc., on how they ought to formulate the basic principles and 
criteria of life-preservation in our time, especially for incompetent and never-competent 
patients.31 This ongoing dialogue helped McCormick to specify further his patient-centered, 
quality-of-life criterion, which is an integral part of his ethical methodology. 
Another of McCormick's strengths is that he understands the complexity of the 
New World?, 259. 
30James F. Childress, review of How Brave A New World? and Notes On Moral 
Theology: 1965 Through 1980, by Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Hastings Center Report 
10 (June 1982): 40. 
31For a more detailed analysis of this debate, see McCormick, "The Quality Of 
Life, The Sanctity Of Life," How Brave A New World?, 393-411. 
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bioethical issues that confront the contemporary culture. He has sought counsel on these 
issues not only from other bioethicists, but also from health care professionals, legal scholars, 
economists, politicians, etc. The experience of such diverse counsel has also assisted him 
in reaching well-thought-out ethical positions that have a broad appeal. This inter-
disciplinary dialogue was fostered by his writing the "Moral Notes" in Theological Studies. 
McCormick argues that the "Moral Notes" 
forced me to read a great deal of material that was very enlightening and 
challenging. In the process of reporting and critiquing this literature, I have 
been led by my colleagues into several changes of mind on important 
sometimes highly controversial subjects. In other words, I have been 
liberated from the isolation of my own perspectives, for better or for worse--
and I am sure that there are more than a few who believe it has been for the 
worse.32 
The negative aspect of his "changes of mind" is that he has not always articulated, explained, 
and justified why he made these changes. 
One of McCormick's shortcomings has been the inconsistencies and ambiguities in 
the mechanics of his ethical methodology. Throughout this dissertation I have pointed to 
various inconsistencies in terminology and ambiguities in application. For example, 
McCormick writes: "Thus I see 'association of basic values,' 'proportionate reason,' and 
'adoption of a hierarchy of values' as attempting to say the same thing, or at least very 
closely related."33 Mixing these terms adds nothing but ambiguity and confusion. Each of 
these terms plays a vital role in his moral epistemology prior to 1983 and needed to be 
32McCormick, Notes On Moral Theology: 1965 Through 1980, v. 
33McCormick, Doing Evil To Achieve Good, 253. 
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clearly defined. Another example would be that McCormick has never clearly articulated 
what he means by "prediscursive reason." Is prediscursive reason the same as connatural 
knowledge or the "moral instinct of faith"? Is prediscursive reason the same as the 
affections? This is an essential element in his moral epistemology after 1983, yet he has 
failed to explain adequately the meaning of this term. 34 These criticisms have been identified 
and analyzed in this dissertation. It would behoove McCormick to address and clarify these 
ambiguities and inconsistencies in his ethical methodology because they could have dire 
consequences in many diverse areas of bioethics, but in particular, in regard to treatment 
decisions for defective neonates. 
Another of McCormick's shortcomings are the two substantive critiques I offered 
concerning his narrow interpretation of social and familial factors and his failure to define 
prudence and to explain how he uses it. The first criticism, offered by Sparks and 
McCartney concerning McCormick's narrow interpretation of social and familial factors in 
the benefit-burden calculus, is substantive because it shows how McCormick's position not 
only moves away from a central insight in the Catholic tradition, but also moves away from 
his own normative understanding of "best interests." McCormick believes that a broad 
interpretation of social and familial factors can lead to social utilitarianism and possibly 
infanticide. The possibility of abuse is always present, but there are safeguards built into 
McCormick's quality-of-life criterion--guidelines, norms, and moral principles. Being 
faithful to the central Catholic tradition and to his own normative criterion will do much 
34For a more detailed analysis of these criticisms, refer to Chapter Three, Criticism 
section above. 
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more to help alleviate potential abuse and to promote the "best interests" of defective 
neonates now and in the future. 35 
The second criticism concerns the role prudence plays in both his moral epistemology 
and his moral criteriology. McCormick explains that concrete rules and guidelines cannot 
replace prudence. Yet, he never gives any guidance on how parents should exercise 
prudence in moral decision-making. If McCormick would articulate more clearly how 
prudence works in situations of conflict and doubt, I believe parents would be given more 
guidance in moral decision-making that would go a long way toward safeguarding the "best 
interests" of defective neonates.36 
Overall, McCormick has made significant contributions to the fields of moral 
theology and bioethics. His contributions to fundamental moral theology range from his 
writings on proportionalism and the foundation and formulation of norms to his discussions 
on the uniqueness of Christian ethics. In the field of bioethics he has initiated and actively 
participated in critical discussions ranging from issues concerning reproductive technologies 
and treatment decisions for defective neonates to quality of life issues for incompetent and 
never-competent patients. In each instance he has helped advance the discussion to a new 
level by his insights and questions. Because he has written so prolifically and because he is 
involved in such a wide variety of bioethical issues, he has been criticized for being 
35For a more detailed analysis of the criticism offered by Sparks and McCartney 
of McCormick's narrow interpretation of social and familial factors, refer to Chapter 
Four, Criticism section above. 
36For a more detailed analysis ofthis criticism, refer to Chapters Two, Four, and 
Five, Criticism section above. 
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Second, another major element of the quality-of-life approach that must be further 
examined and analyzed is the ambiguity that surrounds "medical futility." Together, 
bioethicists and health care professionals must further clarify the distinction between 
physiological futility and qualitative futility and how both operate within a quality-of-life 
criterion. As a public policy option, the quality-of-life criterion advocates a normative 
understanding of medical futility. For McCormick, a medical treatment might be successful 
in achieving an effect (physiologically effective), but the effect might not be beneficial to the 
patient (qualitatively effective). Since the goal of medical treatment is to benefit the patient, 
it follows that nonbeneficial treatment is medically futile. This is a significant distinction 
that must be clarified within both the bioethical realm as well as within the medical realm. 
Health care professionals and bioethicists need to examine this issue critically and enter into 
a constructive dialogue that will add clarity to this ambiguous and elusive term. Once the 
terms have been clarified, there is a need for the establishment of guidelines that would 
concretize qualitative futility. Some will say that such guidelines are impossible to establish, 
and others will say they are not necessary. This issue. will become, and many say has 
become, a crucial element in the quality-of-life debate. Unless the term "medical futility" 
is clarified and unless guidelines are established for qualitative futility, my fear is that some 
neonates will continue to be treated who should not be and others who should be treated will 
be denied treatment. This could be a form of abuse and even torture, because the qualitative 
aspect of their treatment has not been adequately considered. 
Third, if McCormick's ethical methodology is approved as a public policy option for 
the treatment of defective neonates, then a more constructive and open dialogue needs to be 
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initiated between neonatal health care professionals, bioethicists, and legal professionals. 
A comprehensive public policy concerning treatment decisions for defective neonates 
requires the expertise and mutual understanding of professionals in these three specialities 
in order to evaluate all pertinent information. Neonatologists and lawyers need to understand 
the ethical dimensions surrounding treatment decisions; bioethicists and lawyers need to be 
more knowledgeable about medical procedures and their consequences; and finally, 
neonatologists and bioethicists need to be more informed about the possible legal 
ramifications of certain treatment decisions. This dialogue could be advanced by the 
establishment of more Neonatal Infant Review Committees. These committees would not 
only foster constructive dialogue on the ethical, legal, and medical levels, but they could 
assist parents in their decision-making process by adding a sense of consistency, emotional 
stability, and impartiality to very difficult medical, ethical, and legal issues. 
A major stumbling block to fostering this constructive dialogue through the formation 
of Neonatal Infant Review Committees seems to be that neonatologists feel threatened to 
bring cases before such inter-disciplinary committees for review. A sense of mistrust seems 
to pervade the relationships between bioethicists, neonatologists, and lawyers. This may be 
based more on misperceptions than on facts. There is a need for dialogue between these 
professionals because even with the assistance of diagnostic treatment categories, there will 
always be "gray areas" into which some neonatal anomalies will fall. Treatment decisions 
in the future regarding these particular defective neonates will continue to be highly 
technical, ethically ambiguous, and legally unprecedented. As neonatal technology and 
medicine continue to advance and become more complex, it is likely so too will the ethical 
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dilemmas. To meet the challenge concerning the discernment of these treatment decisions, 
parents will need to rely on the expertise of neonatologists, bioethicists, and lawyers. They 
cannot be in an adversarial position. Individually, each has valuable knowledge and 
expertise that is crucial in making these treatment decisions. Together, they act as a 
safeguard to promote the "best interests" of the defective neonate in the event that decision-
makers fail to act responsibly. Unless this sense of mistrust is rectified, a constructive 
dialogue cannot begin, and both parents and neonates could suffer. The implementation of 
Neonatal Infant Review Committees with a well-balanced, inter-disciplinary membership can 
bring these essential advocates to the table where a well-informed discussion can lead to 
recommendations that will be in the "best interests" of these voiceless neonates. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this dissertation has made explicit McCormick's ethical methodology 
and has applied it to four diagnostic treatment categories of defective neonates. In a critical 
assessment of McCormick's ethical methodology and its clinical application, I have shown 
that it is practical, beneficial, and appropriate for Christian parents and health care 
professionals in making treatment decisions for defective neonates, because it is reasonable 
and is rooted in a time honored tradition. I have also demonstrated that it can be a public 
policy option for both Christian and non-Christian decision-makers, because the formal and 
material components of his ethical methodology and the moral content of the conclusions or 
judgments that are derived from it are reasonable and objective. McCormick's ethical 
methodology is rooted in the Christian tradition. However, I am convinced that the Christian 
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tradition does not originate moral rules or norms for decision-making. Rather, it informs the 
Christian person's reason and leads the Christian person to moral conclusions that can, in 
principle, be known by all reasonable people. In conclusion, I recommend McCormick's 
ethical methodology to all as a public policy option for the treatment of defective neonates. 
Following this recommendation, this dissertation concludes having attempted to 
advance the ethical dialogue and open up the possibility of further ethical discussions. I have 
invigorated the ethical dialogue by systematically articulating, examining, and assessing 
McCormick's ethical methodology. Until now McCormick's ethical methodology was only 
implied in his writings. Being committed to, as he says, "putting out fires," McCormick has 
never systematically articulated his ethical methodology. As a result ambiguities and 
inconsistencies have plagued McCormick and his bioethical positions in the past. The 
systematic articulation, examination, and assessment of McCormick's ethical methodology 
in this dissertation will not only help to clarify these ambiguities and inconsistencies, but 
will also provide people with an ethical strategy to assist them in living a good life in the 
midst of conflicting values. This is particularly true for parents and health care professionals 
as they discern treatment decisions for defective neonates. McCormick's ethical 
methodology can assist them in understanding various neonatal anomalies by illuminating 
the situation and it can guide them in making treatment decisions that are promotive of the 
"best interests" of the defective neonate. As neonatal technology and medicine continue to 
advance parents and health care professionals will continue to be called upon to draw lines 
regarding treatments for defective neonates. In my judgment the future of neonates born 
with congenital anomalies will be more humane, because McCormick's ethical methodology 
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can now be advanced as a public policy option that will result in more effective courses of 
action in the medical treatment of defective neonates. 
This dissertation has shown Richard McCormick to be a man of vision and courage. 
His contributions to moral theology and bioethics have been widely recognized and will have 
a lasting impact into the future. Though not all will agree with McCormick's moral 
positions, his rigor and intellectual passion to make a concrete difference in the world have 
provided both leadership and guidance to a whole generation of Catholic and Protestant, and 
even non-Christian readers of his work. He has accomplished this by combining humility 
with courage, dialogue with decisiveness, and support with criticism.38 Perhaps 
McCormick's greatest legacy will be his courage in confronting complex ethical dilemmas, 
his commitment to formulating well-reasoned moral arguments, and his openness to and 
respect for the wisdom of his Christian and non-Christian colleagues. This will be his 
greatest legacy because Richard McCormick and his writings have already begun to have a 
profound impact on the next generation of bioethicists. 
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